

SOURCE BOOK
IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

BY
WILLIAM HEARD KILPATRICK
PROFESSOR OF EDUCATION, TEACHERS COLLEGE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

REVISED EDITION

New York
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

**REVISED EDITION COPYRIGHTED, 1934,
BY WILLIAM H. KILPATRICK**

**ALL RIGHTS RESERVED—NO PART OF THIS BOOK MAY
BE REPRODUCED IN ANY FORM WITHOUT PERMISSION
IN WRITING FROM THE PUBLISHER, EXCEPT BY A
REVIEWER WHO WISHES TO QUOTE BRIEF PASSAGES
IN CONNECTION WITH A REVIEW WRITTEN FOR INCLU-
SION IN MAGAZINE OR NEWSPAPER.**

Printed in the United States of America.
Set up and electrotyped. Published January, 1934.

Fourteenth Printing, 1959

First edition copyrighted, 1923.
By William H. Kilpatrick.
First edition published September, 1923.

“The unexamined life is not worth living.”
Plato, *Apology*, 38.

“A clash of doctrines is not a disaster—it is an opportunity.”

A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 259.

“So long as conformity to the mores is the prime demand, very little teaching, and that quite uninspired, is needed. Fourth rate men are good enough to pass on superstition, tradition, and colorless orthodoxy. But let education become dynamic, let it thrill with a vision of becoming the chariot horses and the chariot in which society shall urge itself forward to a better day, and men and women of the first rank will arise and consecrate themselves to making the vision full reality. Without that vision educational measurements, movements to increase school efficiency, reforms of curricula, child study, and all the rest of them are but the clattering of machinery grinding chaff; with it they become the tools for generating the self-criticism and creative energies essential to the process of producing an environment in which social man can flourish and rise higher and higher above man the clod.”

A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 534.

PREFACE

This book is revised and enlarged from the edition of 1923. From a variety of considerations the need for revision had become urgent: progress in my own thinking; changes in the social situation about us, with insistent new emphases; an immense accumulation of new materials in the field of educational thought. All these and more united to demand a new selection of excerpts to fit the new interests, the new problems, and the new knowledges.

Of these demands for revision, one, that of the rapid accumulation of new materials, especially to meet new emphases, has proved an embarrassment. In spite of enlargement in size of the book, barely one third of the desirable quotations accumulated could find place. This unfortunately means a loss in variety and richness of quotation and often also a drastic shortening before inclusion could be granted.

The original preface still states, with but slight changes, the purpose of the collection:

"This book has grown up in connection with the compiler's classes, especially with his principal course in the philosophy of education. With this origin its chief function has been to supplement otherwise available reading resources, especially by rendering many short and inaccessible references easy of access. While many topics have thus been treated with perhaps satisfactory fullness, others will call for additional reading in the easily accessible books treating of educational and social theory. . . .

"As is to be expected from a book so made, the quotations here presented furnish definite material in the philosophy of education for studying the topics discussed in the author's classes especially from the point of view held by the author. But the selection of quotations is by no means limited to this point of view. On the contrary care has been taken to present all sorts of opposed views and positions, the chief criteria for inclusion being pertinence and clearness with brevity of statement. The beginner in the subject is accordingly warned to be on his guard

and think before he accepts. Indeed a primary intent has been that the student be forced to think in order to accept."

For courteous permission to use copyrighted material the compiler's thanks are hereby extended to the following:

Abingdon Press; R. G. Adams & Company; George Allen & Unwin; American Educational Research Association; American Historical Review; American Academy of Political and Social Science; Antioch Press; D. Appleton-Century Company; Edward Arnold; Association Press; Barnes Foundation; Bobbs-Merrill Company; State of California, Department of Education; Jonathan Cape, Limited; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Catholic Education Press; Collier's; Columbia University Press; Covici, Friede; Coward-McCann; F. S. Crofts & Company; Thomas Y. Crowell Company; John Day Company; Doubleday, Doran & Company; E. P. Dutton & Company; The Forum; Ginn & Company; Harcourt, Brace & Company; Harper & Brothers; Harvard University Press; D. C. Heath & Company; Historical Outlook; Henry Holt & Company; Houghton Mifflin Company; Infantry Journal; Journal of Philosophy; Junior-Senior High School Clearing House; Alfred A. Knopf; Laidlaw Brothers; J. B. Lippincott Company; Little, Brown & Company; Liveright Publishing Corp.; Ray Long & R. R. Smith; Longmans, Green & Company; McGraw-Hill Book Company; Minton, Balch & Company; Thomas B. Mosher; National Education Association, Department of Supervisors and Directors of Instruction; National Society for the Study of Education; The New Republic; New York University Press; W. W. Norton & Company; Open Court Publishing Company; Paulist Press; Philosophical Review; Princeton University Press; Progressive Education Association; Psychological Review Company; G. P. Putnam's Sons; Religious Education Association; W. B. Saunders Company; Science Press; Charles Scribner's Sons; Frederick A. Stokes Company; Teachers College, Columbia University; United States History Publishing Company; United States Office of Education; University of Chicago Press; University of Chicago, Department of Education; University of North Carolina Press; University of Southern California; Viking Press; Warwick & York; World Book Company; The World Tomorrow; Yale University Press;

Floyd Dell; Julian Huxley; Harold J. Laski; Walter Lippmann; Mrs. George Maynard Minor; Rabindranath Tagore; Frederick W. Truscott and F. L. Emory.

Pains have been taken to refer the quotations to their original sources with suitable precise designation as to location. In a number of instances, however, we have been unable to find a satisfactory source or location. For any help that the reader may give either in locating sources or in pointing out errors of any sort, I shall be grateful.

For valued assistance in making this book, my thanks are especially due to my two colleagues, Professor John L. Childs and Miss Marion Y. Ostrander. To the former I am indebted for the materials and arrangement of the first four chapters, although it is but fair to Dr. Childs to state that pressure of space compelled a severe curtailment of the inclusive and balanced collection which he had arranged. To Miss Ostrander I am indebted for assistance at every stage of the enterprise, but most in the arduous tasks of preparing the materials for publication and seeing the book through the press.

W. H. K.

NEW YORK CITY
November, 1933.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Italic figures refer to excerpt numbers

CHAPTER		PAGES
I.	PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION, 1-41 . . .	1-30
	Philosophy as critical examination of ordinary experience, 1-3	
	Philosophy and common-sense, 4-5	
	The rôle of doubt, 6-8	
	The meaning of philosophy, 9-16	
	Philosophy and civilization, 17-18	
	Philosophy as theory of education, 19-24	
	Effect of point of view on educational policy, 25-38	
	Napoleon and Jefferson, 25-29	
	Old Russia, Prussia, 30-31	
	Communist Russia, 32-33	
	Fascist Italy, 34-36	
	Other modern views, 37-38	
	Theory and practice in education, 39-41	
II.	SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN EDUCA- TION, 42-76	31-50
	General conception of science, 42-48	
	Inter-relations of science and philosophy, 49-55	
	The faith in exact measurement in education, 56-62	
	Criticism of the philosophy of measurement, 63-71	
	Science and philosophy in education, 72-76	
III.	THE CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE, 77-117 .	51-71
	Meaning and significance of concept of experi- ence, 77-82	
	Analysis of the concept of experience, 83-90	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGES
	Criticism of the concept of experience, <i>91-98</i>	
	Rivals and substitutes for the empirical method, <i>99-114</i>	
	Experience as method in fields outside of philosophy, <i>115-117</i>	
IV. GENERIC TRAITS OF EXISTENCE, <i>118-168</i>		72-95
	Some metaphysical considerations, <i>118-121</i>	
	The new physics and the traditional world view, <i>122-133</i>	
	Growth, process, development, <i>134-143</i>	
	Determinism and indeterminism, <i>144-148</i>	
	Moral implications of precariousness, <i>149-151</i>	
	Precariousness and control, <i>152-158</i>	
	The ideal and the real, <i>159-161</i>	
	Contrasting reactions to a precarious world, <i>162-168</i>	
V. NATURE OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL— BIOLOGICAL, <i>169-195</i>		96-111
	Nature of life, <i>169-171</i>	
	Equilibration or regulatory behavior, <i>172</i>	
	Unity of organism and environment, <i>173-174</i>	
	Behavior, <i>175-177</i>	
	Learning, <i>178-179</i>	
	Development and learning: structure building, <i>180-181</i>	
	The organism responding as a whole, <i>182-187</i>	
	Creation and imitation, <i>188-191</i>	
	Heredity and environment, <i>192-195</i>	
VI. NATURE OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL— PSYCHOLOGICAL, <i>196-262</i>		112-142
	Contrasting psychologies, <i>196-204</i>	
	Levels of behavior—body—mind, <i>205-212</i>	
	Conscious action, meanings, consciousness, <i>213-220</i>	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xiii

CHAPTER		PAGES
	Habit in relation to instinct and intelligence, 221-227	xiii
	Intelligence and mind, 228-236	
	Impulse and emotion in relation to thought and action, 237-241	
	Deliberation, choosing, willing, 242-248	
	Focal and marginal attention, 249	
	"Transfer of training," 250-252	
	Self, person, individuality, 253-260	
	Valuation, 261-262	
VII.	SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL LIFE, 263-304 . . .	143-161
	General nature of society, 263-267	
	Social inheritance, 268-272	
	Diversity of custom, 273-274	
	Individual and society, 275-287	
	Institutions, 288-297	
	Socialization, 298-304	
VIII.	THE LIFE GOOD TO LIVE, 305-382 . . .	162-188
	Introductory, 305-307	
	Older views, 308-319	
	Hedonism, 308-309	
	Stoicism, 310-312	
	Other ancient views, 313	
	Negation of life, 314-315	
	Other-world attitudes, 316-319	
	Current views, 320-361	
	General, 320-323	
	Contrasting views, 324-340	
	Making life better, 341-350	
	"Leading on" as enhancement of life, 351-361	
	Art, 362-367	
	Religion, 368-382	
IX.	RIGHT AND WRONG, 383-413 . . .	189-204
	Contrasting views, 383-389	
	Current views, 390-400	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGES
	Freedom and responsibility, 401-407	
	The end or object of desire, 408-409	
	Conscience, 410-412	
	Ought, 413	
X. REGARD FOR OTHERS, 414-458		205-221
Man as an end, 414-415		
Respect for best possible self, 416-418		
Selfishness, 419-421		
Regard for others, 422-458		
Institutional theory, 422-426		
Government, 427-435		
Education of children, 436-441		
Personality in industry, 442-444		
Racial and caste discriminations, 445-448		
Eugenics and sterilization, 449		
Penal theory, 450		
War and militarism, 451-458		
XI. DEMOCRACY, 459-499		222-241
Democracy as a theory of government, 459-462		
Criticisms of democratic government, 463-466		
Native ability and democracy, 467-471		
Democracy and the expert, 472-475		
Minorities, 476-481		
Democracy as general social outlook, 482-499		
Contrasting views, 482-488		
Discussion as a democratic process, 489-494		
Democracy in industry, 495-497		
Inherited wealth, 498-499		
XII. DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, 500-519 . .		242-257
Democracy and education inherently related, 500-504		
Equality of educational opportunity, 505-508		
Indoctrination, 509-515		
Democracy in school administration, 516		
Private schools and democracy, 517-519		

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xv

CHAPTER		PAGES
XIII. THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS, 520-593 . . .		258-294
Definitions, 520		
Cultural lags, 521-522		
Varying attitudes toward progress, 523-538		
Progress inevitable, 523-524		
Social improvement illusory or impossible, 525-527		
Historic evidences of change, 528-534		
Improvement possible but contingent, 535-538		
Biological bases of social improvement, 539-550		
Human nature and present cultural differences, 539-542		
Human nature and the possibility of improvement, 543-547		
Eugenics, 548-550		
Social improvement through changing public opinion, 551-576		
Public opinion, 551-554		
Propaganda, 555-559		
Censorship, 560-563		
The press, 564-566		
Leadership, 567-569		
Research in social affairs, 570		
Freedom of speech, 571-576		
Social improvement through education, 577-588		
General outlook, 577-579		
A new adult education, 580		
New type of schools, 581-582		
Academic freedom, 583-584		
Controversial issues, 585-588		
Social improvement through revolution, 589-593		
XIV. THE STATE AND EDUCATION, 594-629 . . .		295-318
Varying attitudes toward public education, 594-616		
Extreme laissez faire, 594		
Historic American outlook, 595		

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGES
	Pressure group efforts, 596-606	
	Fascist outlook, 607-610	
	Soviet Russian outlook, 611-616	
	Support and control, 617-620	
	State control over teaching, 621-623	
	Criticism of the state by schools, 624-626	
	Private and parochial schools, 627-629	
XV. SOCIAL PLANNING AND EDUCATION, 630- 684		319-350
	The historic American outlook, 630-636	
	Changes wrought by technology, 637-640	
	The evils of our economic system, 641-643	
	Other evils of our civilization, 644-654	
	Social planning, 655-673	
	Its desirability, 655-658	
	Its feasibility, 659-661	
	Its introduction gradual or catastrophic, 662- 669	
	Possible next steps, 670-673	
	Education and social planning, 674-679	
	New educational obligations, 674-677	
	Taking a position: indoctrination or what? 678- 679	
	What next in education? 680-684	
	A new professional outlook, 680	
	A new adult education, 681	
	A new school, 682-684	
XVI. DYNAMIC LOGIC, 685-726		351-371
	General outlook, 685-688	
	Ends and means, 689	
	No absolutes, 690-707	
	Knowledge not finally certain, 690-697	
	No fixed entities. Facts relative, 698-702	
	Distinctions relative, 703-704	
	Higher not necessarily in terms of lower, 705- 707	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xvii

CHAPTER		PAGES
	Integration vs. compromise, 708-709	
	Examining pre-suppositions, 710-716	
	Acting on rules and principles, 717-721	
	Working with wholes, not with separated items, 722-724	
	Operational character of concepts, 725-726	
XVII. MENTAL HYGIENE, 727-755		372-386
	General outlook, 727-730	
	Physiological bases of behavior difficulties, 731- 732	
	Life's insistent needs, 733	
	The integration of personality, 734-736	
	Maladjustment in its various types, 737-747	
	Penal theory and practice, 748-749	
	Lessons for life and education, 750-755	
XVIII. EDUCATION AND LIFE, 756-803		387-415
	Education and the social situation, 756-757	
	Various definitions of education, 758-760	
	Education according to different life outlooks, 761-771	
	The current tradition, 761-764	
	Education to maintain the <i>status quo</i> , 765-768	
	Education to foster prior chosen ends, 769-770	
	Education for a modern caste system, 771	
	Educational aims variously conceived, 772-781	
	Education as inherent in the life process, 782-784	
	Thinking in relation to life, 785-789	
	The school in interactive social relations, 790-795	
	School and industry, 796-799	
	Adult education, 800-803	
XIX. THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS, 804-861		414-445
	Introductory, 804	
	Various views, 805-809	
	Social outlook and the educative process, 810-815	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGES
	Psychology of the educative process, 816-835	
	What learning is and how it takes place, 816-822	
	Many simultaneous learnings, 823	
	"Motivation," interest, effort, 824-832	
	Study, learn, teach, subject-matter and differing school outlooks, 833-835	
	How to conceive aims and objectives, 836-839	
	Curriculum making, 840-847	
	Method, 848-855	
	Military training, 856-861	
XX.	ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS, 862-903	446-469
	Introductory, 862-865	
	Place of the teacher, 866-870	
	Grading and promotion, 871-873	
	Group adaptations to individual differences, 874-878	
	Examinations, tests, and measures, 879-886	
	Supervision, 887-891	
	Place of the board of trustees, 892-894	
	Administration in relation to the educative process, 895-901	
	The public and the educative process, 902-903	
XXI.	MORAL EDUCATION, 904-937	470-486
	General considerations, 904-907	
	Conceptions of character, 908-915	
	Socially considered, 908-909	
	Psychologically considered, 910-915	
	How character comes, 916-924	
	Discipline as variously conceived, 925-929	
	Punishment and character building, 930-932	
	Religion and character building, 933-937	
	INDEX OF SOURCES	487-505
	INDEX OF SUBJECTS	507-535

SOURCE BOOK IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

SOURCE BOOK IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

CHAPTER I PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION

1. PHILOSOPHY NOT ALIEN TO ORDINARY EXPERIENCE

"There are those who look upon philosophy as a revelation of something foreign to everyday experience, or as a key that opens a door to realms otherwise inaccessible which have a supreme and final value. There are those who have once believed they found this ultimate revelation and this powerful key in religion, and who, having been disillusioned there, search in philosophy for what they have missed. When they do not find what they are after, they turn away disappointed or invent a system of fantasy according to their wishes and label it philosophy.

"But philosophy is not a special road to something alien to ordinary beliefs, knowledge, action, enjoyment, and suffering. It is rather a criticism, a critical viewing, of just these familiar things. It differs from other criticism only in trying to carry it further and to pursue it methodically. If it has disclosures to offer it is not by way of revelation of some ultimate reality, but as disclosures follow in the way of pushing any investigation of familiar objects beyond the point of previous acquaintance. Men thought before there was logic, and they judged right and wrong, good and evil, before there was ethics. Before there was ever anything termed metaphysics men were familiar with distinctions of the real and the unreal in experience, with the fact that processes whether of physical or human nature have results, and that expected and desired results often do not happen because some process has its path crossed by some other course of events. But there is confusion and conflict, ambiguity and inconsistency, in our experience of familiar

2 SOURCE BOOK IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

objects and in our beliefs and aspirations relating to them. As soon as anyone strives to introduce definiteness, clarity, and order on any broad scale, he enters the road that leads to philosophy. He begins to criticize and to develop criteria of criticism, that is, logic, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics."

John Dewey, *Construction and Criticism* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1930), pp. 22-23.

2. THE NEED FOR REFLECTION

"Irrationally held truths may be more harmful than reasoned errors."

T. H. Huxley, in *Science and Culture, and Other Essays* (New York, Appleton, 1888), p. 319.

3. FALSE BELIEFS PERILOUS LUXURIES

"But let us be clear what philosophy proposes to do. It does not necessarily insist that every belief must be established by reason. It does not assert that we have no right to believe what we cannot prove. What it does is to inquire *what grounds are good grounds*. It may find a normal place for prejudice, distinguishing justifiable from unjustifiable prejudice. It may, in some cases, sanction authority as a ground for belief, aiding us to discriminate between a good authority and a bad one. It may advise us, in other cases, to rely on intuition, offering some way of telling a true intuition from a false one. A large part of its business is to inquire what reason can do, and what it cannot do, in the way of supporting belief. But in any case it holds that we cannot, as human beings, remain satisfied with dumb tenacity in holding our beliefs. So long as false beliefs are possible, and such false beliefs in vital matters are perilous luxuries, there can be no virtue in declining to think about the foundations of belief."

W. E. Hocking, *Types of Philosophy* (New York, Scribner, 1929), pp. 9-10.

4. THE AXIOMATIC, THE UNQUESTIONED

"Canvass the opinion of people as to what they consider inherently reasonable, axiomatic, or self-evident, and you will find that in an overwhelming proportion of cases, this quality is attributed to the familiar or to what happens in fact to have

been unquestioned. The questioning of that which we have been accustomed to accept and on which we have habitually relied is profoundly disturbing. Hence we naturally resist the questioner's challenge and we hold to our primary beliefs with increased vehemence. This is plainly seen when naïve people are confronted with the demand to show the evidence for the views that they regard as certain. They answer, generally, with some emphatic: It is so; I know it is so; I am sure it is so; or: How could it be otherwise? In a homogeneous community, the challenge of the doubter or skeptic may thus be crushed by the common feeling of certainty on the part of all the respectable. But in a period of rapidly developing science in which all sorts of preconceived opinions turn out to be false, doubt cannot be so readily eliminated. Moreover, in a heterogeneous community or in a time of struggle for power between different groups, questioning the first principles of our opponents is greatly admired and encouraged. In any case modern mathematics and physics have found the systematic questioning of self-evident axioms a fruitful source of new insight."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 47.

5. PHILOSOPHY AND COMMON SENSE

"If we cannot justify philosophy by common sense, we can at least contrast it with common sense, and so approach it from that more familiar ground. Since we must admit that philosophy is at odds with common sense, let us make the most of it. What, then, is common sense? First of all it is evident that this is not a common-sense question. One of the things peculiar to common sense is that it must not be questioned, but taken for granted. It is made up of a mass of convictions that by common consent are allowed to stand; one does not ask questions about them, but appeals to them to determine what questions shall be asked. They are the conservative opinion, the solidified and uniform belief, on which men act, and which is the unconscious premise of most human reasoning. As a man of common sense, I use common sense to live by or to think by; it is a practical and theoretical bias which I share with my fellows, but which I do not think about at all.

4 SOURCE BOOK IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

"Now suppose that in some whimsical and senseless mood I *do* think about common sense. Something very startling happens. This once unchallenged authority is proved to be highly fallible. Its spell is gone. It at once appears, for example, that common sense has had a history, and that it has varied with times and places. The absurdities of yesterday are the common sense of today; the common sense of yesterday is now obsolete and quaint. The crank of the sixteenth century was the man who said that the earth moved; the crank of the twentieth century is the man who says that it does not. Moreover, once common sense is thus reflected upon, it is seen to be in part, at least, the result of wholly irrational forces, such as habit and imitation. What has been long believed, or repeatedly asserted, acquires a hardness and fixity from that fact; in the future it is always easier to believe, more difficult to disbelieve, than anything recent or novel. What others about us believe, we tend unconsciously to reflect in our own belief, just as our speech catches the accent and idioms of the social circle. Furthermore, a belief once widely diffused takes on the authority of established usage. It is supported by public opinion, as anything normal or regular is supported; unbelievers are viewed with hostile suspicion as unreliable and incalculable. 'You can never tell what they will do next.' Or they are forcibly persecuted as a menace to the public peace. I have called habit and imitation 'irrational' forces. By that I mean they have no special regard for truth. They operate in the same way to confirm and propagate a bad way of thinking as a good way of thinking. It does not follow that common sense is necessarily mistaken; indeed reasons can be adduced to show that common sense is a very good guide indeed. But if so, then common sense is justified on other grounds; it is not itself the last court of appeal. Common sense, despite its stability and vogue, perhaps on account of its stability and vogue, is open to criticism. We cannot be sure that it is true, and it may positively stand in the way of truth through giving an unwarranted authority to the old and familiar, and through shutting our minds so that no new light can get in."

Ralph Barton Perry, in Wm. A. Neilson (ed.), *Lectures on the Harvard Classics* (New York, P. F. Collier, 1914), pp. 130-31.

6. DOUBT, A MORAL NECESSITY

"Strive as we may to eradicate it, there is always in our thinking an amount of error, of wish-fancy accepted as objective fact, of exaggeration, special pleading, self-justification. Many of our beliefs are not founded in reason at all, but are demanded by some unconscious and repressed impulse in our nature. Men make a virtue of their faith when in fact they are *victims* of it; they can no more help believing certain things than a neurotic can stop a compulsive habit.

"It is said that it is easy to doubt and that to believe is no accomplishment. It is not so. It is easier to believe than to doubt. The things we must train ourselves to doubt are as a rule just the things we wish to believe. It is children and savages and the illiterate who have the most implicit faith. It is said that unbelief is sin. This is not so; it is nobler to doubt than to believe, for to doubt is often to take sides with fact against oneself. Nietzsche said that this trait is characteristic of 'higher men.' It was Huxley, as I remember it, who considered that man could in nothing fall so low as when he deliberately took refuge in the absurd. Even with a rationalist like Huxley doubt is not merely a function of the intellect. Under certain circumstances it is a moral necessity."

Everett Dean Martin, *The Meaning of a Liberal Education* (New York, Norton, 1926), p. 88.

7. PLACE OF SKEPTICISM AND DOUBT

"The skeptic is not always an interesting person; but then, you must remember, as skeptic he doesn't want to be interesting. He only wishes to be honest. He is meanwhile not only to be tolerated; he is also indispensable. Philosophical thought that has never been skeptical is sure not to be deep. The soul that never has doubted does not know whether it believes; and at all events the thinker who has not dwelt long in doubt has no rights to high rank as a reflective person. In fact, a study of history shows that if there is anything that human thought and cultivation have to be deeply thankful for, it is an occasional but truly great and fearless age of doubt. You may rightly say that doubt has no value in itself. Its value is in what it leads to

But then consider what ages of doubt have led to. Such an age in Greece produced that father of every humane sort of philosophizing, Socrates. The same age nourished with doubts the divine thought of Plato. Another and yet sterner age of doubt brought about the beginnings of Christian thought, prepared the Roman empire for the new faith, and saved the world from being ruined by the multitudinous fanatical rivals of Christianity. Yet a third great age of doubt began, at the Renaissance, the history of modern literature, and made the way plain for whatever was soundest about the Reformation. And a fourth age of doubt, the one under our consideration in this present lecture, proved more fruitful for good to humanity than a half dozen centuries of faith had done at another time. For, as we shall see, this eighteenth-century doubting drove thinkers from the study of nature to the study first of human reason, then of human conscience, then of all the human heart and soul, and meanwhile cleared the way for those triumphs of the spirit over great evils which have taken place from the moment of the French Revolution until now. Despise not doubting; it is often the best service thinking men can render their age. Condemn it not; it is often the truest piety."

Josiah Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1892), pp. 71-72.

8. THE UNENDING CRITICISM OF VALUES

"Some will ask with feelings of dismay whether, if nothing be finally fixed and everything is to be questioned, chaos does not ensue? How can we question everything simultaneously? The answer is that no one attempts such a thing. No one questions everything at once, any more than one questions every word when he uses a dictionary. The parallel is so true as to merit our further notice. When we study the meaning of a word the 'final' appeal, so far as there is one, is to contexts. Dictionaries are, of course, made on this basis. Some one might then ask: If we get the meaning of each word from its context, how can we get any meanings when we question all the words, for then the contexts themselves become meaningless? The only answer is that sensible people do not question all the words at once. Any word may be questioned at any time, but if so

there will be many others not then questioned. And a general process of such conscious questioning inevitably results in an on-the-whole increase in precision of meanings. There is no finality in the process. But equally there is no chaos about it. One has only to look about him and he will see, to try it and he will find out.

"It is precisely the same way, in fact, with everything else with which we have to deal in this world. We have always on hand a stock of more or less reliable meanings and knowledge and standards and ways of behaving. We no more question all these at once than we question all the words we use. But we may question any one at any time, and be perhaps the better off for the scrutiny we thus give to that one. And continuing the process of conscious study we gradually make all-round improvement in our knowledge and behavior of all sorts."

William H. Kilpatrick, *Our Educational Task* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1930), pp. 86-87.

9. PHILOSOPHY, A GENERALIZED THEORY OF CRITICISM

"Philosophy is inherently criticism, having its distinctive position among various modes of criticism in its generality; & criticism of criticisms, as it were. Criticism is discriminating judgment, careful appraisal, and judgment is appropriately termed criticism wherever the subject matter of discrimination concerns goods or values. . . .

"Philosophy . . . is a generalized theory of criticism. Its ultimate value for life-experience is that it continuously provides instruments for the criticism of those values--whether of beliefs, institutions, actions, or products--that are found in all aspects of experience. The chief obstacle to a more effective criticism of current values lies in the traditional separation of nature and experience, which it is the purpose of this volume to replace by the idea of continuity."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), pp. 398, ix.

10. PHILOSOPHY, OUR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE

"The totality of one's loyalties is one's philosophy of life. This, I think, is the simplest and most useful way in which to

8 SOURCE BOOK IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

define that frequently misunderstood term. A philosophy of life is one's world outlook. It is the way in which one regards things, events, relationships, the values one sets upon them. This individual, for example, sets a very high value upon the acquisition of money and a very low one upon an equitable sharing with others. Such valuation is part of his philosophy of life. To another this philosophy may be something to be despised. The high value to him may be a life of shared possessions, the low value a life of mere private acquisition.

"It is clear from the above that the most powerful factor or force in one's life is one's philosophy. One does a multitude of different things. The knowledge of how to do each thing is indeed important—how to add a column of figures, how to run a motor car, how to invest in the right kind of securities. But by far the most important of all is the *system of values* which determines what things one will do and not do. One's philosophy of life, in short, is one's fundamental principle of choice. It is that which most deeply and enduringly determines what one is to select out of the heterogeneity of existence. Without a principle of choice there is chaos."

H. A. Overstreet, "Finding our Philosophy," in *The Thinker*, 4:12 (Sept. 1931).

11. JAMES ON THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY

"In the preface to that admirable collection of essays of his called 'Heretics,' Mr. Chesterton writes these words: 'There are some people—and I am one of them—who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether in the long run anything else affects them.'

"I think with Mr. Chesterton in this matter. I know that you, ladies and gentlemen, have a philosophy, each and all of

you, and that the most interesting and important thing about you is the way in which it determines the perspective in your several worlds. You know the same of me. . . . The philosophy which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter; it is our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means. It is only partly got from books; it is our individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos."

William James, *Pragmatism* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1907), pp. 3f.

12. THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

"If my view of the function of philosophy is correct, it is the most effective of all the intellectual pursuits. It builds cathedrals before the workmen have moved a stone, and it destroys them before the elements have worn down their arches. It is the architect of the buildings of the spirit, and it is also their solvent:—and the spiritual precedes the material. Philosophy works slowly. Thoughts lie dormant for ages; and then, almost suddenly as it were, mankind finds that they have embodied themselves in institutions."

Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), p. x.

13. THE INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY

"A man's philosophy, by imperceptible degrees, colors the whole of his life and affects his attitude towards all things in heaven and on earth. In like manner, the prevalent philosophy of a people gradually transforms all their social institutions."

Thomas E. Shields, *Philosophy of Education* (Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1917), pp. 22-23.

14. PHILOSOPHY AND THE COMMON TASK

"Nothing but the best, the richest, and fullest experience possible, is good enough for man. The attainment of such an experience is not to be conceived as the specific problem of 'reformers' but as the common purpose of men. The contribution which philosophy can make to this common aim is criticism. Criticism certainly includes a heightened consciousness

10 SOURCE BOOK IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

of deficiencies and corruptions in the scheme and distribution of values that obtains at any period."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), p. 412.

15. PHILOSOPHY AND ITS BEGINNING

"Philosophy is and can be nothing but this critical operation and function become aware of itself and its implications, pursued deliberately and systematically. It starts from actual situations of belief, conduct, and appreciative perception which are characterized by immediate qualities of good and bad, and from the modes of critical judgment current at any given time in all the regions of value; these are its data, its subject matter. These values, criticisms, and critical methods, it subjects to further criticism as comprehensive and consistent as possible. The function is to regulate the further appreciation of goods and bads; to give greater freedom and security in those acts of direct selection, appropriation, identification and of rejection, elimination, destruction which enstate and which exclude objects of belief, conduct, and contemplation."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), pp. 403-4.

16. HAS EVERY MAN A PHILOSOPHY?

"Chesterton may declare that every man has his philosophy, and that this is the most practical and important thing about him; James, Dewey, *et al.*, may generously indorse the saying, so that one would rather believe it than not; it is for all that an illusion. In point of fact what does this universally possessed philosophy come to? It comes to something having less kinship with anything to be called a philosophy than with the job lot of odds and ends in Tom Sawyer's pocket. In so far as the vast majority of us are equipped with anything resembling an outlook upon life and the world it consists of a substratum of superstition about the supernatural, a smattering of social theory, a nest of group prejudices, a few wise saws, a rumor or two from science, a number of slipshod observations of life. To call this hodge-podge a philosophy is to take unwarranted liberty with language."

M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals* (New York, Holt, 1924), pp. 3f.

17. PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION

"It follows that there is no specifiable difference between philosophy and its rôle in the history of civilization. Discover and define the right characteristic and unique function in civilization, and you have defined philosophy itself. To try to define philosophy in any other way is to search for a will-of-the-wisp; the conceptions which result are of purely private interpretation, for they only exemplify the particular philosophies of their authorship and interpretation. Take the history of philosophy from whatever angle and in whatever cross section you please, Indian, Chinese, Athenian, the European of the twelfth or the twentieth century, and you find a load of traditions proceeding from an immemorial past. You find certain preoccupying interests that appear hypnotic in their rigid hold upon imagination and you also find certain resistances, certain dawning rebellions, struggles to escape and to express some fresh value of life. The preoccupations may be political and artistic as in Athens; they may be economic and scientific as today. But in any case, there is a certain intellectual work to be done; the dominant interest working throughout the minds of masses of men has to be clarified, a result which can be accomplished only by selection, elimination, reduction, and formulation; the interest has to be intellectually forced, exaggerated in order to be focused. Otherwise it is not intellectually in consciousness, since all clear consciousness by its very nature marks a wrenching of something from its subordinate place to confer upon it a centrality which is existentially absurd. Where there is sufficient depth and range of meanings for consciousness to arise at all, there is a function of adjustment, of reconciliation of the ruling interest of the period with preoccupations which had a different origin and an irrelevant meaning."

John Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization* (New York, Minton Balch, 1931), pp. 6-7.

18. SELF-CRITICISM ESSENTIAL TO CREATIVE ACTIVITY

"We live, some one has said, in a haphazard mixture of a museum and a laboratory. Now it is certain that we cannot get rid of the laboratory and its consequences, and we cannot by a gesture of dismissal relegate the museum and its specimens

to the void. There is the problem of selection, of choice, of discrimination. What are the things in the past that are relevant to our lives and how shall they be reshaped to be of use? Does anyone suppose that our education, our legal system, and our politics would not take on new life if we could answer this question and apply our answer in practice? Formal philosophy should at least provide a method which may be used in this questioning of what has come to us from the past. But I am more concerned to suggest that there is here indicated a service for criticism that is universal. There is no one among us who is not called upon to face honestly and courageously the equipment of beliefs, religious, political, artistic, economic, that has come to him in all sorts of indirect and uncriticized ways, and to inquire how much of it is validated and verified in present need, opportunity, and application. Each one finds when he makes this search that much is idle lumber and much is an oppressive burden. Yet we give storeroom to the lumber and we assume the restriction of carrying the burden.

"If I do not try to point out just the ways in which creative energy would be freed to operate if we got rid of the lumber and the burden, it is because there is a weightier reason than even the fact that my time is drawing to a close. It is because every individual is in some way original and creative in his very make-up; that is the meaning of individuality. What is most needed is to get rid of what stifles and chokes its manifestation. When the oppressive and artificial load is removed, each will find his own opportunity for positive constructive work in some field. And it is not the extent, the area, of this work that is important as much as its quality and intensity, and the cumulative effect of a multitude of individual creations, no matter how quantitatively limited each is by itself. Creative activity is our great need; but criticism, self-criticism, is the road to its release."

John Dewey, *Construction and Criticism* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1930), pp. 24-25.

19. THE CLARIFICATION OF HUMAN VALUES A MAJOR TASK OF SOCIAL THINKING

"Finally, the Committee is not unmindful of the fact that there are important elements in human life not easily stated

in terms of efficiency, mechanization, institutions, rates of change, or adaptations to change. The immense structure of human culture exists to serve human needs and values not always readily measurable, to promote and expand human happiness, to enable men to live more richly and abundantly. It is a means, not an end in itself. Men cling to ideas, ideals, institutions, blindly perhaps even when outworn, waiting until they are modified and given a new meaning and a new mode of expression more adequate to the realization of the cherished human values. The new tools and the new technique are not readily accepted; they are indeed suspected and resisted until they are reset in a framework of ideas, of emotional and personality values as attractive as those which they replace. So the family, religion, the economic order, the political system, resist the process of change, holding to the older and more familiar symbols, vibrant with the intimacy of life's experience and tenaciously interwoven with the innermost impulses of human action.

"The clarification of human values and their reformulation in order to give expression to them in terms of today's life and opportunities is a major task of social thinking. The progressive confusion created in men's minds by the bewildering sweep of events revealed in our recent social trends must find its counterpart in the progressive clarification of men's thinking and feeling, in their reorientation to the meaning of the new trends.

"In the formulation of these new and emergent values, in the construction of the new symbols to thrill men's souls, in the contrivance of the new institutions and adaptations useful in the fulfillment of the new aspirations, we trust that this review of recent social trends may prove of value to the American public."

Recent Social Trends in the United States. Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933), v. lxxv.

20. PHILOSOPHY, A GENERAL THEORY OF EDUCATION

"Education offers a vantage ground from which to penetrate to the human, as distinct from the technical, significance of philosophic discussions. The student of philosophy 'in itself' is always in danger of taking it as so much nimble or severe in-

tellectual exercise—as something said by philosophers and concerning them alone. But when philosophic issues are approached from the side of the kind of mental disposition to which they correspond, or the differences in educational practice they make when acted upon, the life-situations which they formulate can never be far from view. If a theory makes no difference in educational endeavor, it must be artificial. The educational point of view enables one to envisage the philosophic problems where they arise and thrive, where they are at home, and where acceptance or rejection makes a difference in practice.

"If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the *general theory of education*. Unless a philosophy is to remain symbolic—or verbal—or a sentimental indulgence for a few, or else mere arbitrary dogma, its auditing of past experience and its program of values must take effect in conduct."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), p. 383.

21. CONFLICTS OF SOCIAL PURPOSES

"The most fundamental social issues hinge far more upon conflicts of ends than upon divergencies of opinion as to method. The fundamental conflict between conservative and radical sentiments results from incompatibility of ends. The capitalistic conservative, for example, regards his own class as an end and the workers as means, while the labor radical looks upon the workers as ends and the capitalist as a parasite. This in a nutshell is the explanation of the bitter opposition between the aristocratic, or plutocratic, tradition and the sentiment of democracy."

A. B. Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method* (New York, Macmillan, 1923), p. 252.

22. EDUCATION AND THE FACTORS OF TIME AND PLACE

"Any social conception remains formal and abstract which is not applied to some particular society existing at a definite time and place. Factors of time and place do not receive recognition as long as nominal social conceptions of education are

not connected with the concrete facts of family, industry, business, politics, church, science, in this country. If we are not to be content with formal generalities (which are of value only as an introduction of a new point of view), they must be translated into descriptions and interpretations of the life which actually goes on in the United States today for the purpose of dealing with the forces which influence and shape it. Failure to accomplish this task results in an unconscious but deplorable lack of sincerity in prevalent educational philosophies."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), p. 34.

23. EVERY SCHEME OF EDUCATION INVOLVES A CHOICE OF VALUES

"It is the business of a philosophy of education to make clear what is involved in the action which is carried on within the educational field, to transform a preference which is blind, based on custom rather than on thought, into an intelligent choice—one made, that is, with consciousness of what is aimed at, the reasons why it is preferred, and the fitness of the means used. Nevertheless intelligent choice is still choice. It still involves preference for one kind of end rather than another one which might have been worked for. It involves a conviction that such and such an end is valuable, worthwhile, rather than another. Sincerity demands a maximum of impartiality in seeking and stating the reasons for the aims and the values which are chosen and rejected. But the scheme of education itself cannot be impartial in the sense of not involving a preference for some values over others. The obligation to be impartial is the obligation to state as clearly as possible what is chosen and why it is chosen."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), p. 288.

24. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION?

"Negatively, so far as concerns this writer, we do not mean an appeal to 'metaphysics' or any other pretended peculiar access to some underlying 'reality' or 'fundamental truths' of any sort. The philosophy of education as here conceived has

no region of facts peculiar to itself. In solving any particular problem it will need facts. It must have access to all pertinent facts known to any science or art. Depending on the problem at hand any set of facts may prove crucially pertinent. But the establishment of facts it leaves to those especially competent in the respective fields. Its concern is *what to do about the facts*, everything pertinent considered. All of which means that we are not here dealing with a separate science, not even with a science of sciences.

"Positively, the philosophy of education as a matter of serious study is the determined effort to find out what education should *consistently* do in the face of *contradictory demands* coming to it from the diverse, deeply rooted interests of life. The emphases here are found in the italicized words. As to *consistency*, every man in the street has some sort of philosophy of education in accordance with which he decides, likely enough offhand, any educational question that presents itself. But a study of his decisions will probably show inconsistency, either among his decisions, or between his decisions in this field and his professed principles of life, or at any rate between the decisions he makes and the demands of the situation as seen by more sensitive observers. A determined effort is necessary to bring about even tolerable consistency. The philosophy of education as here upheld will strive zealously for consistency both among its decisions and between these and the most sensitively perceived demands of the situation.

"As to the *contradictory demands* coming to education. This is the crux of the matter. Life is diversified. Art and science, for example, as understood by those who respectively pursue them, face different problems and have developed different techniques for taking care of these problems. So also in varying degree have ethics and politics and religion and economics, to mention some of the outstanding interests. It is not here contended that these have nothing in common, still less that no one man may not feel more than one such interest. The contrary is exactly true. In fact the existence of interests pulling one man in different directions is perhaps the basis of the definition proposed. Our concern here is the contradictory demands that these interests make upon education. . . .

"Opposed demands for action will be made upon education. The most important perhaps of all educational questions so arise. On such the administrator or other practitioner cannot avoid a stand; avoidance is itself a stand. The answer then and so made will come from the administrator's philosophy, such as it is. There is no question as to whether the administrator or the practitioner will have a philosophy; the only question is as to what kind of philosophy he will have. Much depends on it. Sensitivity to the pertinent issues involved in any problem is the necessary basis for an adequate consideration of those issues. A body of intelligently held, criticized ideas is, correlative with the sensitivity to issues, the surest promise of wise decision. A proper study under adequate guidance of actual current problems traced to their deeper issues is the surest hope of the requisite sensitivity and of the needed intelligent holding of criticized ideas. This means the university study of the philosophy of education."

William H. Kilpatrick, in *School and Society*, 18: 451-55 (Oct. 20, 1923).

25. NAPOLEON ON EDUCATION

(a) *The purpose of his educational system.*—"My principal aim in the establishment of a teaching body is to have a means for directing political and moral opinions."

Paroles de Napoléon I au Conseil d'État.

(b) *The control of education.*—"It is impossible, indeed, to remain long in the present state of things, since everyone may now set up a shop for education as he would for broadcloth . . . I feel called upon to organize a system of education for the new generation, such that both political and moral opinions may be duly regulated thereby."

E. A. Ross, *Social Control* (New York, Macmillan, 1915), p. 174.

(c) *A national system of education.*—"Of all political questions, that [of the control of ideas by education] is perhaps the most important. There cannot be a firmly established political state unless there is a teaching body with definitely fixed principles. Except as the child is taught from infancy

whether he ought to be a republican or a monarchist, a Catholic or a free-thinker, the state will not constitute a nation; it will rest on uncertain and ill-defined foundations; and it will be constantly exposed to disorder and change."

Correspondance de Napoléon I, No. 8.328.

(d) *On the press*.—“The printing office is an arsenal which must not be within the reach of everybody. . . . It is very important for me that only those be allowed to print who have the confidence of the government. A man who addresses the public in print is like a man who speaks in an assembly, and certainly no one can dispute the sovereign's right to prevent the first comer from haranguing the public.”

Napoleon, cited in H. A. Taine, *The Modern Régime* (Trans. by Durand. New York, Holt, 1894), Vol. II, p. 200.

(e) *Military character of Napoleon's schools*.—“It was impossible for the essentially military character of Napoleon not to be marked in his work. The University, in fact, was organized like a regiment. The discipline was severe; the teachers as well as the pupils were subjected to it. Punishments were not for pupils only; they struck the teachers as well. When a teacher had committed some infraction against a rule and had merited some censure, he was put under arrest. There was a uniform for all the members of the university; it was a black coat with blue palms. The college was in a small way the image of the army. Each establishment was divided into companies, with its sergeants and its corporals. Everything was done to the beating of the drum. They wished to turn out soldiers, not men.”

Gabriel Compayré, *Histoire critique des doctrines de l'éducation en France* (Paris, Hachette, 1882), Vol. 2, p. 335.

(f) *Education of girls*.—“Religion is an important matter in a public institution for girls. It is, whatever one may say about it, the surest guarantee for the mothers and for the husbands. Bring up women who believe and not women who reason. The weakness of women's minds, the fickleness of their ideas, their destination in the social order, the necessity for a constant and

perpetual resignation and for a sort of indulgent and ready charitableness, all this can be obtained only through religion, through a charitable and gentle religion."

Correspondance de Napoléon I, No. 12.585.

26. NAPOLEON'S CATECHISM

"*Question.*—Why are we subject to all these duties toward our emperor?"

"*Answer.*—First, because God, who has created empires and distributed them according to His will, has, by loading our emperor with gifts both in peace and in war, established him as our sovereign and made him the agent of His power and His image upon earth. To honor and serve our emperor is, therefore, to honor and serve God himself."

Carlton J. H. Hayes, *History of Modern Europe* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), Vol. I, p. 535.

27. JEFFERSON ON ELEMENTARY EDUCATION

"Were it necessary to give up either the Primaries or the University, I would rather abandon the last, because it is safer to have a whole people respectably enlightened, than a few in a high state of science, and the many in ignorance. This last is the most dangerous state in which a nation can be. The nations and governments of Europe are so many proofs of it."

Letter to J. C. Cabell, Jan. 13, 1823 (Jefferson and Cabell, *Early History of the University of Virginia*, Richmond, Randolph, 1856, pp. 267f.).

28. JEFFERSON'S PLAN FOR EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA

(Presented to the Legislature in 1779 but never adopted.)

"This bill proposes to lay off every county into small districts of five or six miles square, called hundreds, and in each of them to establish a school for teaching reading, writing, and arithmetic. The tutor to be supported by the hundred, and every person in it entitled to send their children three years gratis, and as much longer as they please, paying for it. These schools to be under a visitor, who is annually to chuse the boy, of best genius in the school, of those whose parents are too poor to give them further education, and to send him forward to one of the grammar schools, of which twenty are proposed to be

erected in different parts of the country, for teaching Greek, Latin, geography, and the higher branches of numerical arithmetic. Of the boys thus sent in any one year, trial is to be made at the grammar schools one or two years, and the best genius of the whole selected, and continued six years, and the residue dismissed. By this means twenty of the best geniuses will be raked from the rubbish annually, and be instructed, at the public expense, so far as the grammar schools go. At the end of six years' instruction, one half are to be discontinued (from among whom the grammar schools will probably be supplied with future masters); and the other half, who are to be chosen for the superiority of their parts and disposition, are to be sent and continued three years in the study of such sciences as they shall chuse, at William and Mary college, the plan of which is proposed to be enlarged, . . . and extended to all the useful sciences. . . . Of all the views of this law none is more important, none more legitimate, than that of rendering the people safe, as they are the ultimate guardians of their own liberty. For this purpose the reading in the first stage, where they will receive their whole education, is proposed, as has been said, to be chiefly historical. History by apprising them of the past will enable them to judge of the future."

The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Ford, ed. New York, Putnam, 1894), Vol. III, pp. 251-54.

29. JEFFERSON ON LOCAL CONTROL OF EDUCATION

"If it is believed that these elementary schools will be better managed by the Governor and Council, the Commissioners of the Literary Fund, or any other general authority of the Government, than by the parents within each ward, it is a belief against all experience. Try the principle one step further, and amend the bill so as to commit to the Governor and Council the management of all our farms, our mills, and merchants' stores. No, my friend, the way to have good and safe government, is not to trust it all to one; but to divide it among the many, distributing to every one exactly the functions he is competent to. Let the National Government be intrusted with the defense of the nation, and its foreign and federal relations; the State Governments with the civil rights, laws, police and

administration of what concerns the State generally; the counties with the local concerns of the counties, and each ward direct the interests within itself."

Letter to J. C. Cabell, Feb. 2, 1816 (Jefferson and Cabell, *Early History of the University of Virginia*, Richmond, Randolph, 1856, p. 54).

30. EDUCATION IN AN AUTOCRACY

The Russian Minister of Education in 1824 said: "Learning . . . is useful only when like salt, it is used and taught in due measure, having regard to the position in life of its recipient and the necessities of his particular vocation. A superfluity of learning is as much opposed to real enlightenment as a deficiency of it. To teach the whole people or a disproportionate number of them to read and write would do more harm than good. To instruct a farmer's son in rhetoric would be to make of him a bad and worthless, if not a positively dangerous, citizen."

Thomas Darlington, *Education in Russia* (Special Report on Educational Subjects, Vol. 24, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1909), p. 63.

31. KAISER WILLIAM II'S ORDER TO THE SCHOOLS (1889)

"In a time when Social-Democratic errors and misrepresentations are being spread abroad with increased zeal, the school should make more vigorous efforts to further a knowledge of what is true and real and practically possible. It must make a special effort to furnish even the youth with the conviction that not only are the teachings of Social-Democracy contrary to the commandments of God and to Christian morals, but also impracticable of realization and dangerous to the individual and to society at large. More than has formerly been the case, the school must include in the course of study modern, even contemporary history and give proof that state authority alone can protect for the individual his family, his freedom, and his rights. It must make the youth conscious of how the kings of Prussia have labored to improve the living conditions of the workingman in a progressive evolution, beginning with the legislative reforms of Frederick the Great and the abolition of serfdom down to the present day. Further, through the use of

22 SOURCE BOOK IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

statistics it must show how essentially and how constantly during the present century the wages and living conditions of the working class have improved under the guiding care of the Prussian kings. . . .

"The history of our country will have . . . to show how the Prussian kings have always regarded it as their special mission to confer upon that portion of the population which is destined to labor with its hands a protection that was consistent with the title 'father of the country,' and to increase its physical and spiritual well-being, and how in the future as well the workingman can look forward to just and secure pursuit of his calling only under the protection and the solicitous care of the king at the head of a well-ordered state."

Edward H. Reisner, *Nationalism and Education since 1789* (New York, Macmillan, 1922), pp. 194-95.

32. THE SOVIET SCHOOL TO PREPARE WARRIORS FOR THE REVOLUTION

"An additional trait which sharply distinguishes the new school, the school of the children of the struggling proletariat, is its aim to prepare a shift of warriors for the revolution, to train the builders of a new society, to produce capable organizers and firm revolutionaries. This calls for a relationship between the school and questions of politics and economics which is altogether unlike that which prevailed under the czar. The old school, while supporting autocracy, orthodoxy, and national chauvinism, feared at the same time to introduce into the school the study of social science and the foundations of economic life. The need then was not for independent builders, but for servants, clerks, and slaves. In the case of the Soviet Republic, on the contrary, the question of enlisting the widest masses of the people in the work of cultural and economic construction is a question of life and death. Consequently before leaving school the child must receive a clear understanding, in theory and practice, of how to build a state for those who labor. 'The unified school therefore places the labor of the people at the center of its attention. This basic theme penetrates the program of the school in all of its stages, and the approach to labor is not from the point of view of a specialist but rather

from the point of view of a builder of a new life who regardless of his profession must have a clear comprehension of the relations and inter-dependences of the various forms of labor. Such a comprehension we call general education.' In its work the school must be connected most intimately with reality; a prominent place must be given to productive labor; the entire structure of the school must promote the development of the social instincts and provide a socialistic training of the revolutionary communists of the future.

"To state that there is no place in our school for any kind of religion is hardly necessary. Clearly the church, which has always been a powerful agency for clouding the social consciousness of the workers, should not be admitted into the school."

Albert P. Pinkevitch, *The New Education in the Soviet Republic* (New York, John Day, 1929), pp. 152-53.

33. "TO TRAIN UP A GENERATION OF MATERIALISTS"

"All Communists are Marxists and must pass examinations in the Marxian doctrine. Non-Communists holding certain positions must also show a knowledge of the writings and teachings of Karl Marx. In time the teachers of mathematics in the higher educational institutions are to be Marxists, and already Marxian economists and historians hold the key positions in teaching and writing. The youth and children are being educated on the principles of Karl Marx; the new text books are based on the materialistic interpretation of history. One of the terms of the formula which has been widely adopted as the basis of the programs of study in educational institutions is 'dialectic materialism,' and the aim is to train up a generation of materialists."

S. N. Harper, *Civic Training in Soviet Russia* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 2.

34. FROM THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MUSSOLINI

"It was . . . not sufficient to create—as some have said superficially—an anti-altar to the altar of Socialism—it was necessary to imagine a wholly new political conception, adequate to the living reality of the twentieth century—over-

coming at the same time the ideological worship of liberalism, the limited horizons of various spent and exhausted democracies, and finally the violently Utopian spirit of Bolshevism. . . .

"Fascism is a unit; it cannot have varying tendencies and trends; as it cannot have two leaders on any one level of organization. There is a hierarchy; the foundation is the Black Shirts and on the summit the Chief, who is only one. . . .

"I abolished the subversive Press, whose only function was to inflame men's minds. . . .

"It was time that the central authority should no longer be debated by those who occupied inferior positions. Italian political life needs command and organization and discipline. . . .

"We had to crowd out from the Intermediate School the negative and supercilious elements. We were determined to infuse in the Public School those broad humanistic currents in which our history and our traditions are rich indeed. Finally, it was indispensable to impose a new discipline in education to which everyone had to submit and the teachers themselves first of all. . . .

"I have willed that, in collaboration with the Universities, departments of Fascist economics, of corporative law, and a whole series of fruitful institutes of Fascist culture, should be created. Thus a purely scholastic and academic world is being penetrated by Fascism, which is creating a new culture through the fervid and complex activity of real, of theoretical, and of spiritual experiences."

Benito Mussolini, *My Autobiography* (Trans. by Child. London, Hutchinson, no date), pp. 74, 199, 223, 229, 260, 264.

35. EDUCATION IN FASCIST ITALY

"As we have already seen, instruction in civics and elementary economics begins in the fifth year and is continued in the *corsi integrativi* and complementary schools, one hour a week being devoted to these subjects. Previous to the fifth year teachers may use the hours for reading or intellectual recreation for teaching the elements of civics. In this way the children are taught the Fascist conception of the state and Fascist philosophy. An idea of the nature of this instruction may be had from the text-books used. . . .

"Valerio Campogrande, *L'Ordinamento dello Stato Italiano Fascista*. Turin: Lattes, 1928.

"This book is for the complementary schools. It is in the fourth edition. It is an excellent brief treatise of Fascist reforms. It lauds the régime and its chief. On page 6 is this passage:

"As there is only one official religion of the State, the Catholic, so today there must be only one political faith, Fascism, which is synonymous with the Italian Nation. As the Catholic must have a blind belief in the Catholic faith and obey the Catholic Church blindly, so the perfect Fascist must believe absolutely in the principles of Fascism and obey the hierarchical heads to whom he owes allegiance without reserve.

"Religious dogmas are not discussed because they are truths revealed by God. Fascist principles are not discussed because they come from the mind of a Genius: Benito Mussolini. . . ."

"In addition to the influence of the patriotic material in textbooks, Italian school children are surrounded with nationalistic symbols. The lictor's rods, emblem of imperial Rome and Fascism, must be worked into every new educational building. In the classrooms of both elementary and secondary schools there must be a crucifix, a picture of the king, and a picture of Mussolini. Many of the classrooms have the announcement of victory drawn up by General Diaz. The Fascists desire that every day's work begin with a prayer and a national hymn, that the schools have pictures of the heroes of the *risorgimento*, of the Great War, and of the masters of Italian culture, that every school have its flag, and that on the eve of every vacation a patriotic speech be made and that the children respond with the Roman salute.

"*Selection of teachers.*—Despite this patriotic environment and patriotic textbooks, the education of the children would not necessarily be nationalistic if the teachers were not nationalists. The Fascists have realized this, and have taken especial pains to see that the instructors have the desired political views. A law has been made whereby teachers may be discharged if they have political views contrary to those of the government. Although only four elementary school-teachers have been discharged on political grounds there is always the danger that they may be, which tends to make them toe the

mark. In order to be appointed to a teaching position one must pass competitive examinations, preference being given first to those who were decorated in the war, secondly to those who have passed other competitive examinations, thirdly to those who have published their works, and fourthly 'to those who have other qualifications.' "

Herbert W. Schneider and Shepard B. Clough, *Making Fascists* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 100-2.

36. FASCIST DOCTRINES

"The child, as soon as he is old enough to learn, belongs to the State alone. No sharing is possible. Maybe this will be judged Spartan doctrine carried to an extreme. One cannot deny, however, that it is clear. We are in process of reconstructing Italy—a great Italy. It is a colossal task such as I do not believe has often been tried. . . . In the [Fascist] régime's private meetings we discuss ardently, but at a certain moment I say, 'The case has been heard!' And the discussion ceases. I then decide and everybody obeys. An oath of obedience is sworn on entering the Fascist party."

Interview with Mussolini, in *Le Journal de Paris* (1931).

37. FINNEY ON EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

"The behavior of *homo sapiens* is almost as predetermined by his culture mass as a jack rabbit's is by his instincts. The masses do not think for themselves, except to a negligible degree. Only the brightest do that; and they, cogently and fruitfully, only in those fields where their acquired knowledge is most exhaustive of the culture mass. The masses only echo. To expect anything else of them is like expecting the lower animals to discard their instincts and think also for themselves. . . .

"And nothing on God's green earth can make it otherwise—or change the leopard's spots. It is utopian to expect people to think for themselves. Neither the project method, the problem-solving method nor the contradiction-resolving method will have any more effect on I.Q.'s and the use that is commonly made of them than flying lessons would have on fish. . . .

"For the past two centuries the western world has been in-

sanc with the cult of individualism; and the egocentric cravings just mentioned have been its major obsession. They have paraded under the label of 'democracy.' . . . Of historic democracy the think-for-yourself illusion has been the cognitive fallacy, the 'liberty' illusion its affective infatuation. Accordingly the method of democracy is based upon a psychological illusion; and even the objective of democracy has been vaguely conceived. The valid objective of democracy is the self-realization of all individuals; and this objective is worthy of all the idealism which democracy has generated. . . .

"Intellectual leadership is impotent without followership. The problem of public education is, therefore, to load the dice so that upon a throw public opinion will fall with the same faces up as informed and expert opinion. This involves a radically different pedagogy than the problem-solving method, especially for the duller half. The duller masses must be indoctrinated through a memoriter drill in epigrams, slogans, couplets, etc., which capsule the best wisdom of the age. With the brightest, that indoctrinization must be accompanied with explanations, and with the development of a critical, constructive, and creative attitude of mind. With the average minds, a compromise or combination of these two methods is required."

Ross L. Finney, in *Theses on Freedom* (Washington, Nat'l Council of Educ. of the N.E.A., 1932), pp. 8-12.

38. PATRIOTIC TEACHING

"We want no teachers who say there are two sides to every question, including even our system of government; who care more for their 'academic freedom of speech' and opinion (so-called) than for their country. Academic freedom of speech has no place in school, where the youth of our country are taught and their unformed minds are developed. There are no two sides to loyalty to this country and its flag. There is nothing debatable about allegiance to that flag and the Republic for which it stands. Freedom of speech does not give the right to teach disloyalty to our children and college youth."

Address by President General in *Daughters of the American Revolution Magazine*, 57: 270 (May 1923).

39. THEORY INHERENT IN ALL EDUCATION

"Whoever makes a reflective choice between educational ends, and then determines by systematic analysis what are in general the means whereby the chosen ends can be most certainly and most economically reached, has a theory of education in the sense in which the term 'theory' is used in this work.

"A committee was discussing plans for a training institute for workers in religious education. 'What we want,' said one member of the committee, 'is something practical. We don't want theories.' To this another committeeman replied: 'What have you against theories? We have practice already, and practice is what makes all our trouble. Theory is the thing we need. We're perishing for want of it!' Doubtless the first of these men meant to stand for applied knowledge as against ineffective thinking, while the second meant to stand for applied knowledge as against ineffective practice. Both really wanted theory in the present sense of the term."

George A. Coe, *A Social Theory of Religious Education* (New York, Scribner, 1922), p. 3.

40. THEORY THE MOST PRACTICAL OF ALL THINGS

"There is no science without abstraction and abstraction means fundamentally that certain occurrences are removed from the dimension of familiar practical experience into that of reflective or theoretical inquiry.

"To be able to get away for the time being from entanglement in the urgencies and needs of immediate practical concerns is a condition of the origin of scientific treatment in any field. Preoccupation with attaining some direct end or practical utility, always limits scientific inquiry. For it restricts the field of attention and thought, since we note only those things that are immediately connected with what we want to do or get at the moment. Science signifies that we carry our observations and thinking further afield and become interested in what happens on its own account. Theory is in the end, as has been well said, the most practical of all things, because this widening

of the range of attention beyond nearby purpose and desire eventually results in the creation of wider and farther-reaching purposes and enables us to use a much wider and deeper range of conditions and means than were expressed in the observation of primitive practical purposes. For the time being, however, the formation of theories demands a resolute turning aside from the needs of practical operations previously performed.

"This detachment is peculiarly hard to secure in the case of those persons who are concerned with building up the scientific content of educational practices and arts. There is a pressure for immediate results, for demonstration of a quick, short span of usefulness in school. There is a tendency to convert the results of statistical inquiries and laboratory experiments into directions and rules for the conduct of school administration and instruction. Results tend to be directly grabbed, as it were, and put into operation by teachers. Then there is not the leisure for that slow and gradual independent growth of theories that is the necessary condition of the formation of a true science."

John Dewey, *The Sources of a Science of Education* (New York, Liveright, 1929), pp. 16-18.

41. THE RECIPROCAL RELATION BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

"The notion that action and sentiment are inherently unified in the constitution of human nature has nothing to justify it. Integration is something to be achieved. Division of attitudes and responses, compartmentalizing of interests, is easily acquired. It goes deep just because the acquisition is unconscious, a matter of habitual adaptation to conditions. Theory separated from concrete doing and making is empty and futile; practice then becomes an immediate seizure of opportunities and enjoyments which conditions afford without the direction which theory—knowledge and ideas—has power to supply. The problem of the relation of theory and practice is not a problem of theory alone; it is that, but it is also the most practical problem of life. For it is the question of how intelligence

30 SOURCE BOOK IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

may inform action, and how action may bear the fruit of increased insight into meaning: a clear view of the values that are worth while and of the means by which they are to be made secure in experienced objects."

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, Minton Balch, 1929), p. 281.

CHAPTER II

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN EDUCATION

42. SCIENCE AS METHOD

“Science is but a method. Whatever its material, an observation accurately made and free of compromise to bias or desire, and undeterred by consequence, is science.”

Hans Zinsser, in *Atlantic Monthly*, 144:91 (July 1929).

43. SCIENCE AS CONTRASTED WITH COMMON EXPERIENCE

“Science, then, is the attentive consideration of common experience; it is common knowledge extended and refined. Its validity is of the same order as that of ordinary perception, memory, and understanding. Its test is found, like theirs, in actual intuition, which sometimes consists in perception and sometimes in intent. The flight of science is merely longer from perception to perception, and its deduction more accurate of meaning from meaning and purpose from purpose. It generates in the mind, for each vulgar observation, a whole brood of suggestions, hypotheses, and inferences. The sciences bestow, as is right and fitting, infinite pains upon that experience which in their absence would drift by unchallenged or misunderstood. They take note, infer, and prophesy. They compare prophecy with event; and altogether they supply—so intent are they on reality—every imaginable background and extension for the present dream.”

George Santayana, *Reason in Science* (New York, Scribner, 1905), pp. 37-38.

44. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF HYPOTHESES IN SCIENCE

“To the superficial observer scientific truth is unassailable, the logic of science is infallible; and if scientific men sometime,

make mistakes, it is because they have not understood the rules of the game. Mathematical truths are derived from a few self-evident propositions, by a chain of flawless reasonings; they are imposed not only on us, but on Nature itself. By them the Creator is fettered, as it were, and His choice is limited to a relatively small number of solutions. A few experiments, therefore, will be sufficient to enable us to determine what choice He has made. From each experiment a number of consequences will follow by a series of mathematical deductions, and in this way each of them will reveal to us a corner of the universe. This, to the minds of most people, and to students who are getting their first ideas of physics, is the origin of certainty in science. This is what they take to be the rôle of experiment and mathematics. And thus, too, it was understood a hundred years ago by many men of science who dreamed of constructing the world with the aid of the smallest amount of material borrowed from experiment."

H. Poincaré, *Science and Hypothesis* (London, Walter Scott, 1914), pp. xxiii-xxiv.

45. PHILOSOPHY AS THE CRITICISM OF ABSTRACTIONS

"The disadvantage of exclusive attention to a group of abstractions, however well-founded, is that, by the nature of the case, you have abstracted from the remainder of things. In so far as the excluded things are important in your experience, your modes of thought are not fitted to deal with them. You cannot think without abstractions; accordingly, it is of the utmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising your *modes* of abstraction. It is here that philosophy finds its niche as essential to the healthy progress of society. It is the critic of abstractions. A civilization which cannot burst through its current abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very limited period of progress. An active school of philosophy is quite as important for the locomotion of ideas, as is an active school of railway engineers for the locomotion of fuel."

Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), pp. 82-83.

46. THE PRESENT EFFORT OF SCIENCE DESCRIPTION, NOT EXPLANATION

"It is now a full quarter of a century since physical science, largely under the leadership of Poincaré, left off trying to explain phenomena and resigned itself merely to describing them in the simplest way possible. . . . The formulæ of modern science are judged mainly, if not entirely, by their capacity for describing the phenomena of nature with simplicity, accuracy, and completeness."

Sir James Jeans, *The Universe around Us* (New York, Macmillan, 1931), pp. 325-26.

47. MEANING WIDER IN SCOPE THAN TRUTH

"Meaning is wider in scope as well as more precious in value than is truth, and philosophy is occupied with meaning rather than with truth. Making such a statement is dangerous; it is easily misconceived to signify that truth is of no great importance under any circumstances; while the fact is that truth is so infinitely important when it is important at all, namely, in records of events and descriptions of existences, that we extend its claims to regions where it has no jurisdiction. But even as respects truths, meaning is the wider category; truths are but one class of meanings, namely, those in which a claim to verifiability by their consequences is an intrinsic part of their meaning. Beyond this island of meanings which in their own nature are true or false lies the ocean of meanings to which truth and falsity are irrelevant. We do not inquire whether Greek civilization was true or false, but we are immensely concerned to penetrate its meaning. We may indeed ask for the truth of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* or Shelley's *Skylark*, but by truth we now signify something quite different from that of scientific statement and historical record.

"In philosophy we are dealing with something comparable to the meaning of Athenian civilization or of a drama or a lyric. Significant history is lived in the imagination of man, and philosophy is a further excursion of the imagination into its own prior achievements. All that is distinctive of man, marking him off from the clay he walks upon or the potatoes he eats.

occurs in his thought and emotions, in what we have agreed to call consciousness. Knowledge of the structure of sticks and stones, an enterprise in which, of course, truth is essential, apart from whatever added control it may yield, marks in the end but an enrichment of consciousness, of the area of meanings. Thus scientific thought itself is finally but a function of the imagination in enriching life with the significance of things; it is of its peculiar essence that it must also submit to certain tests of application and control. Were significance identical with existence, were values the same as events, idealism would be the only possible philosophy."

John Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization* (New York, Minton Balch, 1931), pp. 4-5.

48. A POSSIBLE TYRANNY IN SCIENCE

"The impulse towards scientific construction is admirable when it does not thwart any of the major impulses that give value to human life, but when it is allowed to forbid all outlet to everything but itself it becomes a form of cruel tyranny. There is, I think, a real danger lest the world should become subject to a tyranny of this sort, and it is on this account that I have not shrunk from depicting the darker features of the world that scientific manipulation unchecked might wish to create."

Bertrand Russell, *The Scientific Outlook* (New York, Norton, 1931), p. 260.

49. THE POINT OF VIEW

"The view depends upon the point of view."

Hindu maxim. Quoted in T. V. Smith, *The American Philosophy of Equality* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 35.

50. BIAS INHERENT IN ALL OBSERVATION

"All observation begins with some form of bias. The mere fact that one is sufficiently interested in a particular object or process to spend time and energy on its study is evidence of one kind of bias. No inquiry is ever begun with a blank mind."

Eduard C. Lindeman, *Social Discovery* (New York, New Republic, 1925), p. 271.

51. THE "ZEITGEIST" AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

"Indeed, can we reasonably assume that the wind blows in only one direction—from psychology to popular opinion, but not from the popular mood into the psychological laboratory? Surely psychologists are human, which is to say we need a psychology of their psychologizing. Here is an item of it: (1) The area that one chooses for investigation; (2) The questions that one asks; (3) The facts that one notices or fails to notice; (4) The values that are noticed in the work of another; (5) The apparent size of the sphere in which one acts—all these are influenced by some interest then and there present. Now interest can be awakened in all sorts of ways. The spirit of the times can shunt research onto this track or that, and it can make this datum or that prominent in the mind of the researcher.

"It is easy, in fact, to trace to their origin several of the dominant interests of psychology. Thus it struggled for scientific standing at a period when 'science' connoted, most clearly of all, physical science; at a time when the biological concept of evolution filled the sky; at a time when it was necessary, in order to be let alone, to seem not to meddle with theological interests; and, above all, at a time when industrialism was rushing swiftly towards its present climax. We shall do no despite to science nor to any of its devotees if we say that there is a subtle connection between the dominance of machinery in our civilization, the prominence of a machine-like view of motivation in the many works on psychology, and the predilection of the popular mood for just this idea of human nature."

George A. Coe, *The Motives of Men* (New York, Scribner, 1928), p. 46.

52. "DON'T THINK, FIND OUT"

"According to the currently fashionable view, it is of the very essence of scientific method to distrust all reason and to rely on the facts only. The motto, 'Don't think, find out,' often embodies this attitude. Scientific method is supposed to begin by banishing all preconceptions or anticipations of nature. In the first positive stage it simply collects facts; in the second, it classifies them; then it lets the facts themselves suggest a working hypothesis to explain them. It is only in the

last stage in the testing or verifying of hypotheses (so as to transform them into established laws) that the rational deduction of consequences plays any part. Such deduction, it is maintained, brings us no new information. It only makes explicit what experience has already put into our premises.

"All this, like other conventional accounts of development through 'stages,' rests on *a priori* plausibilities rather than on actual history. Begin with collecting the facts? Aye, but what facts? Obviously only with those that have some bearing on our inquiry. Attention to irrelevant circumstances will obviously not help us at all, but will rather distract us from our problem. Now the relevant facts of nature do not of their own accord separate themselves from all the others, nor do they come with all their significant characteristics duly labeled for us. Which of the infinite variety of nature's circumstances we should turn to as relevant to or bearing upon any specific problem depends upon our general ideas as to how that which is sought for can possibly be related to what we already know. Without such guiding ideas or hypotheses as to possible connection we have nothing to look for."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), pp. 76-77.

53. DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

"The moment we pass from description of social phenomena to an attempt at an evaluation of them, so as on the basis of reasoned conclusions to venture to state ends and ideals, that moment we pass from the strict area of science into problems of philosophy—such as the relation of facts and ideals, the nature of value, of criteria for judging it, and so on."

John Dewey, in Wilson Gee (ed.), *Research in the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1929), pp. 241-42.

54. SCIENCE AND THE ENDS OF LIFE

"Man hitherto has been prevented from realizing his hopes by ignorance as to means. As this ignorance disappears he becomes increasingly able to mold his physical environment, his social milieu and himself into the forms which he deems

best. In so far as he is wise this new power is beneficent; in so far as he is foolish it is quite the reverse. If, therefore, a scientific civilization is to be a good civilization it is necessary that increase in knowledge should be accompanied by increase in wisdom. I mean by wisdom a right conception of the ends of life. This is something which science in itself does not provide. Increase of science by itself, therefore, is not enough to guarantee any genuine progress, though it provides one of the ingredients which progress requires."

Bertrand Russell, *The Scientific Outlook* (New York, Norton, 1931), pp. ix-x.

55. FAITH IN IDEAS

"As long as we worship science and are afraid of philosophy we shall have no great science; we shall have a lagging and halting continuation of what is thought and said elsewhere. As far as any plea is implicit in what has been said, it is, then, a plea for the casting off of that intellectual timidity which hampers the wings of imagination, a plea for speculative audacity, for more faith in ideas, sloughing off a cowardly reliance upon those partial ideas to which we are wont to give the name of facts. I have given to philosophy a more humble function than that which is often assigned it. But modesty as to its final place is not incompatible with boldness in the maintenance of that function, humble as it may be. A combination of such modesty and courage affords the only way I know of in which the philosopher can look his fellowman in the face with frankness and with humanity."

John Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization* (New York, Minton Balch, 1931), p. 12.

56. JUDD ON GUIDING EDUCATION BY SCIENTIFIC PROCESSES

"How shall we guide education? We must guide education by applying to this field of human endeavor the same forms of scientific analysis that have been successful in the mastery of the physical world. I think that we in the United States are not interested in anyone's opinion about education. We have tried all the different opinions. . . . We must face this problem

exactly as the chemist goes about his problem. We must take each of these experiments, or any experiment that is proposed, and measure the results that we secure. . . . We would almost be prepared, I think, to say that in various parts of the United States you can find every possible experiment being carried on, but we are attempting to check those experiments in such a way that there shall survive ultimately only those experiments or phases of culture that can be demonstrated by careful scrutiny and analysis of results to be justifiable. If you want to put it in that way, I would say that we are trying by scientific methods to make our life in America adaptable to our human relations, adapted to our physical relations, adapted to our political and social relations."

Charles H. Judd, in *Conference on Examinations*, Eastbourne, England (New York, Teachers College, 1931), p. 57.

57. A COMPLETE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY

"A complete science of psychology would tell every fact about every one's intellect and character and behavior, would tell the cause of every change in human nature, would tell the result which every educational force—every act of every person that changed any other or the agent himself—would have. It would aid us to use human beings for the world's welfare with the same surety of the result that we now have when we use falling bodies or chemical elements. In proportion as we get such a science we shall become masters of our own souls as we now are masters of heat and light. Progress toward such a science is being made."

Edward L. Thorndike, "The Contribution of Psychology to Education," in *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1: 6 (Jan. 1910).

58. THORNDIKE ON MEASURING

"These tests will not replace skill, they will not replace tact, they will not replace kindness, they will not replace enthusiasm or nobility. On the other hand, they will not in any sense harm us, and they will be useful as helps, no matter how ideal our aims. Our ideals may be as lofty and subtle as you please, but if they are real ideals, they are ideals for achieving something; and if anything real is ever achieved, it can be measured. Not

perhaps now, and not perhaps in fifty years; but if a thing exists, it exists in some amount; and if it exists in some amount, it can be measured. I am suspicious of educational achievements which are so subtle and refined and spiritual that they cannot be measured. I fear that they do not exist."

Edward L. Thorndike, in *Proceedings of Indiana University Conference on Educational Measurements* (1914), p. 141.

59. IMPERSONAL METHOD AND SOCIAL AIMS

"We need to replace these empirical conclusions regarding the values of the several subjects with scientific investigations that will be impersonal, systematic, observational.

"1. Fundamentally we need to know, on a scientific basis, what are the abilities that are needed in society—the fitnesses that individuals must have if they are to be socially efficient in maximum degree.

"2. Next we need to determine scientifically what is the subject matter that can make largest contributions toward these desired ends.

"3. Then we need to know, on an experimental basis, what are the methods of handling the subject matter that will be most economical of time and energy.

"4. Finally, we need to have some adequate measuring instruments that will enable us to tell whether or not, and how largely, we are succeeding in actually attaining these ends."

Charles C. Peters, *Foundations of Educational Sociology* (New York, Macmillan, rev. ed., 1930), p. 81.

60. COUNTING TECHNIQUES

"It was the day of the principle of social utility in curriculum making in the skills. . . . Even in history and geography, in economics and sociology, the students of scientific method in education demanded that the determination of what to teach should objectify so far as possible the methods of selecting material, of assigning it to grades, and of organizing it.

"Rarely the educational technicians questioned the existing order. They were concerned, as were their administrative colleagues, with makeshifts; with reorganization, not with reconstruction. They started with the *status quo*. They accepted

school subjects. They were willing to permit the traditional algebra, arithmetic, spelling, geography, and science their definitely allotted places in the school program. They did not see American life and its problems on the one hand and the growing child and his needs on the other as important units to be integrated. Even to these new educational scientists reorganization was to be piecemeal."

Harold Rugg and Ann Shumaker, *The Child-Centered School* (Yonkers, World Book, 1928), p. 30.

61. THE MEASUREMENT OF APPRECIATION

"It is possible to measure, at least crudely, an individual's love of a sunset or appreciation of opera. Theoretically the thesis is sound but whether practically we shall ever possess sufficient ingenuity to discover all the things that exist in amount and then measure them with any great accuracy, is a question. All that is necessary to accept for the present is that all the abilities and virtues for which education is consciously striving can be measured and be measured better than they ever have been. The measurement of initiative, judgment of relative values, leadership, appreciation of good literature, and the like is entirely possible. We already have a scientific scale for the measurement of poetic appreciation. The measurements may not be as exact as we might wish, but they would have value."

W. A. McCall, *How to Measure in Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1923), pp. 4-5.

62. PHILOSOPHY SOON TO DISAPPEAR

"With the Behavioristic point of view now becoming dominant it is hard to find a place for what has been called philosophy. Philosophy is passing—has already all but passed."

John B. Watson, "What Is Behaviorism," in *Harpers Magazine*, 152:726 (May 1926).

63. QUALITY CANNOT BE MEASURED

"All things that can be measured, and all things, just so far as they can be measured, come within the purview of Science. The realm of Science is Quantity. Quality can be appraised, but it cannot be measured. This holds, even though for practical

purposes we may try to correlate our estimate of quality with some scale of quantity. One picture is not two and three-quarter times as beautiful as another, nor is one crime three and a half times as heinous as another, even if the price paid for two pictures, or the terms of imprisonment awarded for two crimes may be in these proportions. Again, you can *measure* the chemical constituents of two wines, but not the corresponding flavors; you cannot measure the differences of *quality* in the notes of a harmonic scale, although a mathematical formula will exactly describe the relative lengths of the vibrating strings."

B. H. Streeter, *Reality* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), p. 26.

64. QUANTITATIVE RELATIONSHIPS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR SOCIAL STUDY

"If we concern ourselves solely with the external aspects of this world of experience, with its material signs and symbols, with its quantitative relations of unit to unit, with the mere mechanisms which it employs, with the environmental factors in and through which it strives for being and fulfillment, we are rejecting the main content of our study and denuding these external aspects themselves of their significance. To understand society we must appreciate the processes of group life, the conscious attitudes of relationship which in their constancy and their changefulness, their variety and their subtlety, sustain and modify every social system. Apart from these attitudes and conscious strivings the system would instantly dissolve into nothingness, and apart from the comprehension of them it becomes an empty shell, no matter how marvelous its convolutions or how intricate its design. . . .

"The physical sciences deal with quantities, numbers, ratios, or at least with phenomena which it expresses in these terms. Sociology, in the minds of many of its students, achieves its end in so far as it does likewise. They want to act like scientists, forgetting that their business is not to put the veil of imitation between them and their object of study, but to understand that object in any way in which it admits of understanding. They think, for example, of social statistics as belonging to the same order of reality as the quantitative expressions of physico-mechanical law, whereas they have a wholly different import.

The essential difference between the social and the physical sciences—at once the stumbling-block and the glory of the former—is that social phenomena are facts of conscious experience, consciously created or sustained. Not a single *social* phenomenon would exist were it not for the creative experience of social beings such as we are ourselves. Here we have a principle at once of causation and of explanation which is unknown to the ‘natural sciences.’ ”

R. M. MacIver, *Society: Its Structure and Changes* (New York, Ray Long & R. R. Smith, 1931), pp. vii–x.

65. BORROWED TECHNIQUES INSUFFICIENT

“Educational science cannot be constructed simply by borrowing the techniques of experiment and measurement found in physical science. This could happen only if some way had been found by which mental or psychological phenomena are capable of statement in units of space, time, motion, and mass.”

John Dewey, *The Sources of a Science of Education* (New York, Liveright, 1929), p. 26.

66. SCIENCE ADMITS ONLY THE MEASURABLE

“What exact science looks out for is not entities of some particular category, but entities with a metrical aspect. We shall see in a later chapter that when science admits them it really admits only their metrical aspect and occupies itself solely with that. It would be no use for beauty, say, to fake up a few numerical attributes (expressing for instance the ideal proportions of symmetry) in the hope of thereby gaining admission into the portals of science and carrying on an aesthetic crusade within. It would find that the numerical aspects were duly admitted, but the aesthetic significance of them left outside.”

A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), p. 105.

67. ABOUT “FACTS”

“I think we should be slow to assume that the analyzing and adding method of natural science is equally appropriate to human affairs and will prove equally fruitful in results. By way

of illustration, I propose to examine briefly that method as admirably expounded by Mr. Herbert Hoover in an address to members of his engineering fraternity. 'The engineers,' he said, 'have contributed a great purpose in the United States—a purpose that is applicable to all branches of public life; not only their service but the engineers' mode of thinking by which there must be a determination by exact facts, which is followed by a proper presentation of these facts in their proportional weight before any determination is made of either public or private issue. That should be the basis of governmental action.' That is a very attractive ideal and will doubtless be greeted as a contribution to political science, at least in some quarters of our country.

"Yet after spending several hours in the Connecticut Hills analyzing this series of words, I must confess some difficulties with their logical exactness and practical upshot. Mr. Hoover says there must be a determination of exact facts; he does not say the facts or all the facts or even the pertinent facts; he says 'exact facts.' Yet when I look to any governmental action pertaining to, let us say, the tariff, railway rates, income taxes, banking, foreign relations, it seems impossible to determine the facts in the case; what we always have is a selection of more or less pertinent facts, and if we have a selection then some fallible human being must select them, and in spite of the best endeavors, he is likely to get his desires mixed up with his realities. Any governmental action cuts into a living organism, not into a warehouse of facts."

Charles A. Beard, in Wilson Gee (ed.), *Research in the Social Sciences* (New York, Macmillan, 1929), pp. 281-82.

68. "FACTS" DO NOT SUFFICE FOR LIFE

"But it cannot be too emphatically stated that 'facts' and 'laws' of themselves do not suffice for life. Experience, as we have seen, continually presents problematic situations calling for appropriate action. Until we think through these situations, weighing alternatives, considering consequences, etc., we cannot act intelligently. For this we need, to be sure, certain pertinent 'facts' and 'laws,' but these are data with which and about which we think. They are to be taken into account

along with all the other pertinent considerations. Forming an integrated decision as to conduct or policy involves and uses facts, but is itself quite a different process from establishing facts. Among other differences, one stands out. The 'principles' or criteria which one uses in judging in this field are—like the context words used for understanding a new term—themselves in part remade in the process. Such judgment forming seems in fact *sui generis* and as such has developed its own safeguarding techniques. Anyone who undertakes to think through such a problem—layman, scientist, professional philosopher—is under obligation to learn and apply the best available safeguards for attacking such problems. As the 'philosophic' procedures cannot ignore the safeguards that have been devised to make fact-finding reliable, so the scientist in his conduct or policy forming decisions cannot ignore the safeguards of 'philosophic' procedure. The obligation is reciprocal and mutual."

William H. Kilpatrick, "The Relation of Philosophy to Scientific Research," in *Journal of Educational Research*, 24:109-10 (Sept. 1931).

69. SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS NOT RULES OF ACTION

"No conclusion of scientific research can be converted into an immediate rule of educational art. For there is no educational practice whatever which is not highly complex; that is to say, which does not contain many other conditions and factors than are included in the scientific finding.

"Nevertheless, scientific findings are of practical utility, and the situation is wrongly interpreted when it is used to disparage the value of science in the art of education. What it militates against is the transformation of scientific findings into rules of action."

John Dewey, *The Sources of a Science of Education* (New York, Liveright, 1929), p. 19.

70. SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL SCIENCE

"The other point about the contribution of sociology to educational science concerns the determination of values, of objectives. The shortest cut to get something that looks scientific is to make a statistical study of existing practices and desires, with the supposition that their accurate determination

will settle the subject matter to be taught, thus taking curriculum-forming out of the air, putting it on a solid factual basis. This signifies, in effect and logic, that the kind of education which the social environment gives unconsciously and in connection with all its defects, perversions, and distortions, is the kind of education the schools should give consciously. Such an idea is almost enough to cause one to turn back to the theories of classicists who would confine the important subject matter of instruction to the best products of the past, in disregard of present and prospective social conditions. It is hard to see any cause for such a procedure except a desire to demonstrate the value of 'educational science' by showing that it has something immediate and direct to furnish in the guidance of the schools."

John Dewey, *The Sources of a Science of Education* (New York, Liveright, 1929), pp. 72-73.

71. THE FUTILITY OF TAKING APPEAL TO CONSENSUS OF OPINION

"The futility of taking appeal to consensus of opinion was discussed earlier in another context. The net result of such a procedure is either to cover up real differences in point of view or else to make the consensus a means for perpetuating the prejudices of the past. The irony in the present enthusiasm for scientific method lies in the fact that tradition is placed in the saddle and acclaimed in the name of scientific method. The determination of objectives except by the use of scientific technique is frowned upon. But this technique is adapted only to fact-finding, to a determination of what is, not of what ought to be. Consequently, it furnishes no objectives at all, and it becomes necessary to make use of consensus of opinion or sleight-of-hand. In other words, we set up objectives that have been derived from the past and have never been subjected to adequate criticism."

B. H. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), pp. 134-35.

72. SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND HUMAN PROBLEMS

"The book is alive with suggestions regarding the bearing of the scientific changes upon the deeper issues of society. I wish

in closing simply to point to one of these. He [Whitehead] remarks that 'biology has aped the manner of physics'; he might have added that with only the tools of the old science at command it was obliged to do so. At the present time psychology is also aping the manner of physics, and with the consequence, as far as the influence of an influential school is concerned, of mechanizing education and social relations—in the precise sense which Whitehead shows that mechanism has collapsed in physics itself. It is one of the tragedies of that professionalized specialism of science which Mr. Whitehead reveals and criticizes, that the humane sciences are always adopting and using in the sphere of psychology, education, and human relations, materials and methods which the more advanced physical sciences are abandoning. If the psychological school which claims to be the only genuine 'Behaviorism' could read and digest the physical ideas which this book sets forth an immense amount of misleading and confusing intellectual activity would be saved the next generation."

John Dewey, in *New Republic*, 45: 361 (Feb. 17, 1926).

73. FAITH IN A SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

"The Americans, with few exceptions, have the utmost confidence in the application of the scientific method to the field of education. Many prominent educators seem even to believe that there is no educational problem which is incapable of objective solution. They contend, moreover, that insistence on the employment of any other method is to waste time and obscure thinking. In support of this position they point to the centuries of fruitless speculation about education and to the general disrepute into which such speculation plunged the entire subject of pedagogy. They consequently demand facts, and yet more facts; and the surest and quickest way of achieving academic reputation among them is either to collect or to devise some instrument for collecting new facts. They, however, never define very clearly just what they mean by facts, and how facts are to be distinguished from ideas. Because of this deep distrust of speculation there are great university departments of education in the United States in which no general

courses in educational philosophy or the general theory of education are offered. The Americans thus hope to make education an exact science and remove its problems from the realm of dispute.

"This complete absorption in educational science, however, is beginning to relax. Many able students of the question are contending that the solution of educational problems does not follow automatically from investigation and that provision must be made for a process of synthesis and evaluation which lies somewhat beyond the confines of science. They argue that, while facts are absolutely essential to the solution of an educational problem, the same facts may with different sets of values lead to different solutions."

George S. Counts, *The American Road to Culture* (New York, John Day, 1930), pp. 169-71.

74. EDUCATION AND LIFE

"Every scheme of education being, at bottom, a practical philosophy, necessarily touches life at every point."

Sir Percy Nunn, *Education: Its Data and First Principles* (London, Edward Arnold, 1930), p. 2.

75. PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE IN EDUCATION

"Some philosophy is implied in every educational measure and recommendation made as to every method of teaching and discipline. There is no possible opposition therefore between that which is termed 'science' and that which is termed 'philosophy' in education. For as soon as a science is actually *used*, as soon as action based upon it occurs, then values, consequences, enter in. Choice operates and produces consequences. There are, then, philosophical implications, since philosophy is a theory of values to be achieved and to be rejected. But a conflict of *philosophies*, between a philosophy and what purports to be a science, is both possible and actual. For example, the presupposition of much of the work done in the name of science is that there is no need for philosophy itself. This view itself involves a decided philosophy. It does so in at least three ways and directions. In the first place, since the only thing to

which factual science *can* be applied is something already in existence, there is a virtual assumption that educational direction and progress rest upon analysis of existing practices with a view to rendering them more efficient. The underlying philosophy is that it is the function of education to transmit and reproduce existing institutions—only making them more efficient. This philosophy we deny.

"In the second place, the assumption implicit in the method of much of the work referred to is that processes and functions with which education deals are isolable, because they are independent of one another. This involves the philosophical notion that character, mental life, experience, and the methods of dealing with them, are composed of separable parts and that there is no whole, no integralness in them; that what seems to be a unity is in reality nothing but an aggregate of parts. This philosophy once dominated physical science. In physics and biology its inadequacy from a scientific point of view is now realized. Yet it has been taken over by that school of educational 'science' which denies the importance of a philosophy in conducting education. The ends and values which we regard as the proper ends of choice in action are consistent only with a philosophy which recognizes the basic importance of organization and patterns of integration.

"The work done in the name of science (in the third place) during the recent period has been largely in connection with the *impersonal* phase of education, and has reduced personality as far as possible to impersonal terms. These terms do lend themselves most readily to factual and statistical treatment—but a non-social philosophy is implied. When it is acted upon, the implication becomes practically antisocial. It takes the individual out of the medium of associations and contexts in which he lives. It ignores social connections and bearings, and, in ignoring them, it invites that kind of educational policy which is in line with an outworn philosophy of individualism. Our philosophy, while accepting the results of authenticated scientific work, builds upon the idea that organisms, selves, characters, minds, are so intimately connected with their environments, that they can be studied and understood only in relation to them. The emphasis which is found in the previous

pages upon the culture of a time and a community is, for example, one phase of this general philosophy."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 288-90.

76. THE NEED TO STUDY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

"Will those who have hitherto thought they had no place for philosophy reflect upon the following considerations found either explicitly or implicitly in the foregoing discussion?

"1. Each competent person is continually called upon to make decisions as to conduct and policy. It is inevitable. The process involved is essentially that of integrating initially discordant interests as far as possible into one working whole, an accepted purpose.

"2. This kind of decision making is *sui generis*. In particular it is not the same as fact finding or 'law' establishing, though it will make use of both. Nor is it the mere bringing of facts and laws together. Rather is it somehow getting all conflict-interests into one working whole so that we may more surely act satisfactorily.

"3. This inevitable problem unique in kind may, if properly practiced and studied, be expected to leave successive results in the mind and disposition. The contrary would be most remarkable. In fact, each one does store up such results according to the work done on them and is thus always forming an ever growing point-of-view. And this point-of-view does in fact affect all the pertinent decisions that one makes.

"4. If these things be so—and they cannot, it appears, be denied—then it would be further remarkable if the conscious study of such viewpoints should be without effect: How points of view are made; how they work; how they differ; how different viewpoints have differing effects on life and on education. Might not the intelligent study of these thus show how better to review and possibly revise one's own point-of-view?

"5. And surely, since one's inclusive viewpoint does affect all one's conduct or policy decisions, criticized points-of-view will in the long run serve better than those held in ignorance. And if criticism is desirable, surely conscious criticism with the help of an expert in the field will be better than mere hap-

hazard criticism, conducted in ignorance of what good thinkers in the field have brought together.

"Some seem to think of philosophy simply as *a priori* systems founded on dialectic juggling. Possibly some past philosophies have thus sinned. But the conscious criticism of conceptions and points-of-view in the light of pertinent outworkings is quite another matter. It is as feasible as it is desirable. There need be no more *a priori* or dialectic juggling in it than in scientific thinking. The past sins of philosophy are bad, very bad, somewhat like those made in science before Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton. If science has learned better, why refuse the possibility to philosophy?

"6. It is thus not a question of philosophy or no philosophy. Each one does have a philosophy. Denial simply means that one will not look at it. The only question is whether one shall be content with a philosophy he just happens to have or whether he will become conscious of his philosophy, take it in hand, and try to improve it. Shall education accept a philosophy built on mere tradition and prejudice and held more or less unconsciously, or should it seek consciously to make a better philosophy using the best available criticism?"

William H. Kilpatrick, "The Relation of Philosophy to Scientific Research," in *Journal of Educational Research*, 24:110-12 (Sept. 1931).

CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT OF EXPERIENCE

77. THE FINALITY OF EXPERIENCE

“Whatever forces may govern human life, if they are to be recognized by man, must betray themselves in human experience.”

George Santayana, *Reason in Common Sense* (New York, Scribner, 1905), p. 1.

78. EXPERIENCE BOTH PROCESS AND END

“The only function that one experience can perform is to lead into another experience; and the only fulfillment we can speak of is the reaching of a certain experienced end.”

William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York, Longmans Green, 1922), p. 63.

79. EXPERIENCE CREATES ITS OWN DIVISIONS

“Experience has no other divisions than those it creates in itself by distinguishing its objects and its organs.”

George Santayana, *Reason in Common Sense* (New York, Scribner, 1905), pp. 91–92.

80. EXPERIENCE FURNISHES ITS OWN GOALS, IDEALS, AND CRITERIA

“All philosophies employ empirical subject matter, even the most transcendental; there is nothing else for them to go by. But in ignoring the kind of empirical situation to which their themes pertain and in failing to supply directions for experimental pointing and searching they become non-empirical. Hence it may be asserted that the final issue of empirical method is whether the guide and standard of beliefs and conduct lies within or without the *shareable* situations of life. The ultimate accusation leveled against professedly non-empirical philoso-

phies is that in casting aspersion upon the events and objects of experience, they deny the power of common life to develop its own regulative methods and to furnish from within itself adequate goals, ideals, and critera. Thus in effect they claim a private access to truth and deprive the things of common experience of the enlightenment and guidance that philosophy might otherwise derive from them."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Chicago, Open Court, 1925), p. 38.

81. EXPERIENCE DISCLOSES BOTH CONJUNCTION AND DISJUNCTION

"I am interested in another doctrine in philosophy to which I give the name of radical empiricism, and it seems to me that the establishment of the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first-rate importance in making radical empiricism prevail. Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclusion.

"The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience. [Things of an unexperienceable nature may exist *ad libitum*, but they form no part of the material for philosophic debate.]

"The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves.

"The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure.

"The great obstacle to radical empiricism in the contemporary mind is the rooted rationalist belief that experience as immediately given is all disjunction and no conjunction, and that to make one world out of this separateness, a higher unifying agency must be there."

William James, *The Meaning of Truth* (New York, Longmans Green, 1927), pp. xii-xiii.

82. THE METHOD OF DENOTATION

"The value of experience as method in philosophy is that it compels us to note that *denotation* comes first and last, so that to settle any discussion, to still any doubt, to answer any question, we must go to some thing pointed to, denoted, and find our answer in that thing. . . . There are two kinds of demonstration: that of logical reasoning from premises assumed to possess logical completeness, and that of showing, pointing, coming upon a thing. The latter method is that which the word experience sums up, generalizes, makes universal and ulterior. To say that the right method is one of pointing and showing, not of meeting intellectual requirements or logical derivation from rational ideas, does not, although it is non-rational, imply a preference for irrationality. For one of the things that is pointed out, found and shown, is deduction, and the logic that governs it. But these things have also to be found and shown, and their authority rests upon the perceived outcome of this empirical denotation. The utmost in rationality has a sanction and a position that, according to taste, may be called sub-rational or suprarational.

"The value, I say, of the notion of experience for philosophy is that it asserts the finality and comprehensiveness of the method of pointing, finding, showing, and the necessity of seeing what is pointed to and accepting what is found in good faith and without discount. Were the denotative method universally followed by philosophers, then the word and the notion of experience might be discarded; it would be superfluous, for we should be in possession of everything it stands for. But as long as men prefer in philosophy (as they so long preferred in science) to define and envisage 'reality' according to aesthetic, moral, or logical canons, we need the notion of experience to remind us that 'reality' includes whatever is denotatively found."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Chicago, Open Court, 1925), pp. 10-11.

83. THE ACTIVE-PASSIVE CHARACTER OF EXPERIENCE

"Experience is primarily a process of undergoing: a process of standing something; of suffering and passion, of affection,

in the literal sense of these words. The organism has to endure, to undergo, the consequences of its own actions. Experience is no slipping along in a path fixed by inner consciousness. Private consciousness is an incidental outcome of experience of a vital objective sort; it is not its source. Undergoing, however, is never mere passivity. The most patient patient is more than a receptor. He is also an agent—a reactor, one trying experiments, one concerned with undergoing in a way which may influence what is still to happen. Sheer endurance, side-stepping evasions, are, after all, ways of treating the environment with a view to what such treatment will accomplish. Even if we shut ourselves up in the most clam-like fashion, we are doing something; our passivity is an active attitude, not an extinction of response."

John Dewey, in *Creative Intelligence* (New York, Holt, 1917), pp. 10-11.

84. THE COGNITIVE EXPERIENCE A DERIVED EXPERIENCE

"One can be insane without knowing he is insane and one may know insanity without being crazy; indeed absence of the direct experience is said to be an indispensable condition of study of insanity. Adequate recognition of the implications of such a fact as this might almost be said to be the chief contribution which empirical method has to make to philosophy.

"For it indicates that *being* and *having* things in ways other than knowing them, in ways never identical with knowing them, exist, and are preconditions of reflection and knowledge. *Being* angry, stupid, wise, inquiring; *having* sugar, the light of day, money, houses and lands, friends, laws, masters, subjects, pain, and joy, occur in dimensions incommensurable to knowing these things which we are and have and use, and which have and use us. Their existence is unique, and, strictly speaking, indescribable; they can *only be* and be *had*, and then be pointed to in reflection. In the proper sense of the word, their existence is absolute, being qualitative. All cognitive experience must start from and must terminate in *being* and *having* things in just such unique, irreparable, and compelling ways. And until this fact is a commonplace in philosophy, the notion of experience will not be a truism for philosophers."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Chicago, Open Court, 1925), pp. 18-19.

85. THOUGHT WITHIN EXPERIENCE

"Is not thought with all its products a part of experience?"

George Santayana, *Reason in Common Sense* (New York, Scribner, 1905), p. 79.

86. RUGG'S CRITICISM OF EXPERIMENTALISM

"For some years, however, doubts concerning the adequacy of the pragmatic concepts as a guide for living have steadily encroached upon my thinking. Year by year my catalogue of experiences which are non-technological has increased. Day by day I have been forced to confront situations which are not 'problems.' Deepening friendships with persons of great culture have marked out great areas of human experience in which conduct is not guided by 'the experimental inquiry.' And so doubts have spread concerning the pragmatic criteria for the full life and convictions have grown that our philosophy must include other modes for response, other directive attitudes toward life. . . .

"There is a wide gamut of sensory experiences in which human behavior appears to be 'consummatory,' not 'preparatory.' These experiences are not problematic situations; they are situations to be lived, seized, enjoyed, thrilled over. There is the dynamic love of nature, the primary base of which is sensuous. Every such experience is a consummatory act, a rare integration of fused sensory impressions and perceptions. Analysis, problem-solving, experimental knowing, play no part in response to such stimuli. Indeed, they would inhibit the integral response itself!"

Harold Rugg, *Culture and Education in America* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), pp. 224-25.

87. EXPERIENCE AND ART

"A theory of experience is a theory of art."

Irwin Edman, in *Essays in Honor of John Dewey* (New York, Holt, 1929), p. 122.

88. REFLECTION AND THE IMMEDIACY OF THINGS

"It may well be contended that the primary function of art is to restore to us the immediacy of things that is lost in re-

flection and in daily hustle. But it is precisely because the artist sees more than the bare immediacy of nature, because he sees the inherently rich imaginative suggestiveness of things that he is impelled to labor arduously to add ornament and beauty to the world of actuality. Moreover, how to attain and express the effects and values of immediacy is itself a rational problem of adapting means to ends in a given medium, and is not to be solved by turning one's back on logical thought and conduct."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 46.

89. KNOWLEDGE, AFFECTIONS, AND MEANINGS

"Attraction and repulsion become love of the admirable and hate of the harsh and ugly, and they seek to find and make a world in which they may be securely at home. Hopes and fears, desires and aversions, are as truly responses to things as are knowing and thinking. Our affections, when they are enlightened by understanding, are organs by which we enter into the meaning of the natural world as genuinely as by knowing, and with greater fullness and intimacy. This deeper and richer intercourse with things can be effected only by thought and its resultant knowledge; the arts in which the potential meanings of nature are realized demand an intermediate and transitional phase of detachment and abstraction. The colder and less intimate transactions of knowing involve temporary disregard of the qualities and values to which our affections and enjoyments are attached. But knowledge is an indispensable medium of our hopes and fears, of loves and hates, if desires and preferences are to be steady, ordered, charged with meaning, secure."

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, Minton Balch, 1929), p. 297.

90. CLASS VALUES SHOULD NOT DECIDE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

"A small class devoted to distinctively intellectual pursuits—in science and philosophy—have always found the cultivation of thought and extension of knowledge of priceless value. To

those who enjoy these things, no other enjoyments offer comparable values. To them, thought and learning are in a very genuine sense ends in themselves. No theory of the intimate connection of thought and action can deprive such persons of this legitimate and precious good. But a value cannot be converted on the ground of private appreciation into a theory of the structure, nature, and function of thought and knowledge."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), p. 303.

91. CONTRASTING VIEWS OF EXPERIENCE

"(i) In the orthodox view, experience is regarded primarily as a knowledge-affair. But to eyes not looking through ancient spectacles, it assuredly appears as an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social environment. (ii) According to tradition experience is (at least primarily) a psychical thing, infected throughout by 'subjectivity.' What experience suggests about itself is a genuinely objective world which enters into the actions and sufferings of men and undergoes modifications through their responses. (iii) So far as anything beyond a bare present is recognized by the established doctrine, the past exclusively counts. Registration of what has taken place, reference to precedent, is believed to be the essence of experience. Empiricism is conceived of as tied up to what has been, or is, 'given.' But experience in its vital form is experimental, an effort to change the given; it is characterized by projection, by reaching forward into the unknown; connection with a future is its salient trait. (iv) The empirical tradition is committed to particularism. Connections and continuities are supposed to be foreign to experience, to be by-products of dubious validity. An experience that is an undergoing of an environment and a striving for its control in new directions is pregnant with connections. (v) In the traditional notion experience and thought are antithetical terms. Inference, so far as it is other than a revival of what has been given in the past, goes beyond experience; hence it is either invalid, or else a measure of desperation by which, using experience as a springboard, we jump out to a world of stable things and other selves. But experience, taken free of the restrictions im-

posed by the older concept, is full of inference. There is, apparently no conscious experience without inference; reflection is native and constant."

John Dewey, in *Creative Intelligence* (New York, Holt, 1917), pp. 7-8.

92. CONJUNCTIONS AND DISJUNCTIONS ARE ON THE SAME LEVEL IN EXPERIENCE

"Conjunctions and separations are, at all events, coördinate phenomena which, if we take experiences at their face value, must be accounted equally real; and second, . . . if we insist on treating things as really separate when they are given as continuously joined, invoking, when union is required, transcendental principles to overcome the separateness we have assumed, then we ought to stand ready to perform the converse act. We ought to invoke higher principles of *disunion*, also, to make our merely experienced *disjunctions* more truly real."

William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York, Longmans Green, 1922), pp. 51-52.

93. HOW MUCH OF OUR WORLD CAN BE EXPERIENCED?

"Consider what a poor insignificant fragment of our world we can actually experience at any one time. Not only is it impossible for past and future events to be directly present to us, but only an infinitesimal part of the contemporary world spread in space can be directly reached by optical or other sensory contact. We can of course speak of past, future, and distant events as ideally present to the mind on the occasion when we think of them. But assuredly this is not what we ordinarily mean by experiencing things. Having an idea about typhoid is fortunately not the same as experiencing it."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 57.

94. ACTUAL EXPERIENCE DOES NOT STAND SELF-SUFFICIENT ON ITS OWN FEET

"Professor Dewey insists that any experience is determinate. He says the vague impression of something in the dark 'is as "good"' a reality as the self-luminous vision of an absolute.' But it isn't if it does not work as well. If I take this vague im-

pression for a soft couch and it turns out to be a coil of hot steam pipes or a bathtub, I do not consider my former judgment to be 'good.' I say it was an erroneous experience and the steam pipes are and *were* real all the time. Professor Dewey insists that to find the meaning of any philosophic concept we must go to experience. True! but how? to whose experience? and how shall experience be controlled? We must *think* in order to make experience yield its fruitage, and because it fails to yield complete fullness and harmony our thought must continue ever to transcend actual experience in its own interests. The urge and stress of thinking is born of the partial failure and partial promise of actual experience. Professor Dewey says that the method of immediate empiricism is identical in kind with that of the scientist. But the scientist is continually re-making experiences and by thought constructions transcending the actual. The all-pervading frictionless, massless fluid and the electric corpuscles of the physicist certainly transcend immediate experience. Actual experience, which always belongs to a self and hence is not a substantive reality, does not stand self-sufficient on its own feet."

J. A. Leighton, "Cognitive Thought and 'Immediate' Experience," in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 3:176-77 (Mar. 29, 1906).

95. WE KNOW THE INDIVIDUAL ONLY THROUGH EXPERIENCE

"I know of no ready-made and antecedent conception of 'the individual man.' Instead of telling about the nature of experience by means of a prior conception of individual man, I find it necessary to go to experience to find out what is meant by 'individual' and by 'man'; and also by 'the.' Consequently, even in such an expression as 'my experience,' I should wish not to contradict this idea of method by using the term 'my' to swallow up the term 'experience,' any more than if I said 'my house,' or 'my country.' On the contrary, I should expect that any intelligible and definite use of such phrases would throw much more light upon 'me' than upon 'house' or 'country'—or 'experience.' "

John Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916), p. 69.

96. THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF TRUTH

"We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself."

Charles S. Peirce, *Chance, Love and Logic* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1923), p. 3.

97. THE VALIDITY OF THE KNOWLEDGE-EXPERIENCE

"We are thus enabled to give a precise statement of the relationship of the knowledge-experience to alteration and to validity. In its second sense, knowledge arises because of the inherent discrepancy and consequent alteration of things. But it gives that alteration a particular turn which it would not take without knowledge—it directs alteration toward a result of security and stability. Hence it is because knowledge is an experience, in organic connections of genesis and destiny with other experiences, that the validity of knowledge or truth has an assignable meaning. Because it is an affair of meeting the concrete demands of things, the demand of dissentient things for consensus, harmony, through defining reference and through redefining things which sustain the reference in question, validity or invalidity is a trait or property of facts which may be empirically investigated and instituted. But validity is not definable or measurable in terms of the knowledge-content if *isolated*, but only the *function* of the knowledge-experience in subsequent experiences. So knowledge tells us the 'nature of the real when it is most fittingly and appropriately defined,' because it is only when a real is ambiguous and discrepant that it needs definition. Its peculiar fitness is functional, relative, and empirical, not absolutistic and transcendental. Yet we may admit a certain empirical transcendence. The outcome of the doubt-inquiry-answer experience literally goes beyond the state of suspense and dissidence out of which it originates. So far as the knowledge-experience fulfills its function, it permanently transcends its own originating conditions. It puts

certain things out of doubt, rendering them reliable, economical and fruitful constituents in other complex things. *This transcendence is the very essence of the pragmatic empiricist's account of truth.*"

John Dewey, "The Knowledge-Experience and Its Relationships," in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 2: 657 (Nov. 23, 1905).

98. RADICAL EMPIRICISM

"I give the name of 'radical empiricism' to my *Weltanschauung*. Empiricism is known as the opposite of rationalism. Rationalism tends to emphasize universals and to make wholes prior to parts in the order of logic as well as in that of being. Empiricism, on the contrary, lays the explanatory stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction. My description of things, accordingly, starts with the parts and makes of the whole a being of the second order. . . .

"To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, *the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system*. Elements may indeed be redistributed, the original placing of things getting corrected, but a real place must be found for every kind of thing experienced, whether term or relation, in the final philosophic arrangement."

William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York, Longmans Green, 1922), pp. 41-42.

99. FAITH THE SOURCE OF ALL KNOWLEDGE

"There is nothing further that we have to believe beyond our [Christian] belief. To be ignorant of everything outside the rule of faith is to possess all knowledge."

Tertullian. Quoted in W. R. Inge, *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems* (New York, Putnam, 1930), p. 153.

100. CREDO UT INTELLIGAM

"I cannot seek thee, except thou teach me, nor find thee, except thou reveal thyself. . . . I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand. For this also I believe,—that unless I believed, I should not understand."

St. Anselm, *Proslogium* (Trans. by Deane. Chicago, Open Court, 1903), pp. 6-7.

101. MAINTAINING BELIEFS NOT BASED ON EVIDENCE

"A similar consideration seems to have weight with many persons in religious topics, for we frequently hear it said, 'Oh, I could not believe so-and-so, because I should be wretched if I did.' When an ostrich buries its head in the sand as danger approaches, it very likely takes the happiest course. It hides the danger, and then calmly says there is no danger; and, if it feels perfectly sure there is none, why should it raise its head to see? A man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions, and if he only succeeds—basing his method, as he does, on two fundamental psychological laws—I do not see what can be said against his doing so. It would be an egotistical impertinence to object that his procedure is irrational, for that only amounts to saying that his method of settling belief is not ours. He does not propose to himself to be rational, and indeed, will often talk with scorn of man's weak and illusive reason. So let him think as he pleases.

"But this method of fixing belief, which may be called the method of tenacity, will be unable to hold its ground in practice. The social impulse is against it. The man who adopts it will find that other men think differently from him, and it will be apt to occur to him in some saner moment that their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will shake his confidence in his belief. This conception, that another man's thought or sentiment may be equivalent to one's own, is a distinctly new step, and a highly important one. It arises from an impulse too strong in man to be suppressed, without danger of destroying the human species. Unless we make ourselves hermits, we shall

necessarily influence each other's opinions; so that the problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community."

Charles S. Peirce, *Chance, Love and Logic* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1923), pp. 19-20.

102. MYSTICISM AS A METHOD OF ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE

"In favor of mysticism as a method of acquiring knowledge, it may truly be said that not only in philosophy, but in art, and even in science, some of the most significant ideas and ideals have originated from the intuitions of the mystic. Moreover, the belief which lies at the heart of all religion, that the soul of man can somehow unite itself with the substance of the universe, be that substance personal or impersonal, and thereby attain to a vision of truth far surpassing in its depth and sublimity and in the peace, joy, and power that it brings, anything that mere reason or sense can afford is, as we have seen, a product of mystical experience. The major part of every human life is concerned with adjustments to the material world, and the consciousness accompanying such adjustments is sensory and external. It is well for us that this is not the whole story, and that part of our experience is derived from within ourselves. The sentiments and aspirations that come from within the self give us our world of immediate values. These values are the expressions of temperamental likes and dislikes; they cannot be derived from perception or proved by reason. No interpretation of reality that neglects or violates the inner harmonies of feeling can gain a hold upon the heart. The mystic is one to whom these inner experiences appeal as vital and real. He pictures the world in terms of them, and the picture is precious in that it embodies and makes visible in objective form the hidden depths of the human spirit."

Wm. Pepperell Montague, *The Ways of Knowing* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1925), pp. 56-57.

103. TRADITION GIVES LIFE ITS COMPASS

"When ancient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot possibly be estimated. From that moment we

have no compass to govern us; nor can we know distinctly to what port we steer."

Edmund Burke, *Reflections on The French Revolution* (New York, Maynard Merrill, no date. 1st ed., 1790), p. 48.

104. DEMOCRACY IMPOSSIBLE APART FROM AN ABSOLUTE STANDARD

"If society (as not a few of our social philosophers believe) is the only or final interpreter of human nature, human nature is helpless as against society. Our individualism, our democracies, with their brave claims in behalf of the human unit, have no case. 'Socialization' is the last word in human development; and society is always right. . . .

"A man is not free unless he is delivered from persistent sidelong anxiety about his immediate effectiveness, from servitude to an incalculable if not whimsical human flux. He is free only if he can mentally direct all his work to a constant and absolute judgment. . . .

"We owe to it [the competitive elements in our own social order] also an over-development of the invidious comparative eye, a trend of attention fascinated by the powers, perquisites, and opinions of the immediate neighbors. The eternal standard is obscured: hence we do nothing well; we lack sincerity and simplicity; we are suspicious, disunited, flabby; we do not find ourselves; we are not free. Unless we can recover a working hold on some kind of religious innervation, our democracy will shortly contain little that is worthy to survive."

W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1918), pp. xi-xiii.

105. DEPENDENCE UPON AUTHORITY INEVITABLE

"We must perforce appeal, in the common conduct of life, to some immediate authority, and as we have already sufficiently seen, we do so. Men abide by common sense in mundane matters; and on the whole, in the ultimate questions, men accept some religious dogma or other, whether dictated by the heart's claims or by some potent personality; and in neither realm have men stopped to demonstrate. The Catholic Church is simply the strictly logical conclusion in matters of religion, of

the common human attitude; and that is to say, of the inevitable attitude. Faith we must have, and do have. If life is a war upon evil, and the church life's army, the soldiers must implicitly obey their commanders."

W. H. Sheldon, *Strife of Systems and Productive Duality* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1918), pp. 398-99.

106. AUTHORITY

"There is never a case of authority in human society which does not go back, for its origin and explanation, to the influence of the other world (ghosts, etc.) over this world."

William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, Ginn, 1906), p. 123.

107. WHY WE SUBMIT TO AUTHORITY

"Following the method of authority is the path of peace. Certain non-conformities are permitted; certain others (considered unsafe) are forbidden. These are different in different countries and in different ages; but, wherever you are let it be known that you seriously hold a tabooed belief, and you may be perfectly sure of being treated with a cruelty no less brutal but more refined than hunting you like a wolf. Thus, the greatest intellectual benefactors of mankind have never dared, and dare not now, to utter the whole of their thought; and thus a shade of *prima facie* doubt is cast upon every proposition which is considered essential to the security of society. Singularly enough, the persecution does not all come from without; but a man torments himself and is oftentimes most distressed at finding himself believing propositions which he has been brought up to regard with aversion. The peaceful and sympathetic man will, therefore, find it hard to resist the temptation to submit his opinions to authority."

Charles S. Peirce, *Chance, Love and Logic* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1923), p. 29.

108. CERTAIN CONVICTIONS NOT THE FRUIT OF EXPERIMENT

"Yet even a rightly understood experimental attitude is not enough on which to build our supreme loyalties. All human living rests ultimately on some faith,—the faith that certain things are of transcendent importance. Such final values can-

not be touched by scientific verification. They are exempt from experiment. The scientist himself has such a faith,—the faith in science. His ultimate conviction the laboratory can neither prove nor disprove, for it is the faith in laboratory proof itself. Such supreme allegiances can find no other verification than that men do and will live by them. . . .

"These convictions are not the fruits of experiment, they are its premises. They are touchstones by which we ultimately judge."

John Herman Randall, *Our Changing Civilization* (New York, Stokes, 1930), pp. 330-31.

109. THE PRIMITIVE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG

"Our more general ethical standards seem to be of this nature. With all the immense force of experience and social tradition in molding our ethical sense, it is not yet obvious to me that the experience of eventualities can ever instruct us in the primitive distinction between right and wrong. We can hardly adopt the view (to quote a colleague) that Cain did not know it was wrong to kill Abel until after he had done so. Unless the discovered consequence confirmed an uneasy foreboding of his own, already ethical, it could teach him nothing except that he had made an unfortunate decision. Nor can we adopt the view that the 'lost causes' of mankind are proved by the outcome to have been somehow illicit. I am wholly convinced that it is wasteful, and may be vicious, to contemplate impossible ideals; that an ideal ought to be a pressure toward technical embodiment; that if ends are holy, the use of means is not less so. But how are we to know which ideals are possible and which are not? If we are to avoid the vice of cherishing impossible ideals, we must be guided either by an *a priori* knowledge of what ideals are possible or impossible, or by an *a priori* knowledge of what ideals are right. If we assume (with Joan of Arc, for example) that what is right must be somehow possible, we are relieved of the effort to foresee ultimate outcomes; the whole burden of judgment rests on the prior assurance of rights. The event of failure reacts, not on the validity of the ideal, but on the wisdom of the means used or the energy

of the agent. The defeated reformer, lover, patriot may have to curse himself as a fool: but he has still to say, ‘That for which I tried had the quality of goodness in it: my knowledge of that quality was prior to eventualities, and remains unmoved by them.’”

W. E. Hocking, “Action and Certainty,” in *Journal of Philosophy*, 27: 234–35 (Apr. 24, 1930).

110. JUSTICE A PRIORI

“When justice is considered as a mere means of securing man’s welfare, and is treated accordingly—whether it be the welfare of individuals or of society as a whole makes no essential difference—it loses all its characteristic features. No longer can it compel us to see life from its own standpoint; no longer can it sway our hearts with the force of a primitive passion, and oppose to all consideration of consequences an irresistible spiritual compulsion. It degenerates rather into the complaisant servant of utility; it adapts itself to her demands, and in so doing suffers inward annihilation. It can maintain itself only when it comes as a unique revelation of the Spiritual Life within our human world, as a lofty Presence transcending all considerations of expediency.”

Rudolph Eucken, *The Meaning and Value of Life* (Trans. by Gibson. London, Black, 1910), p. 104.

111. A PRIORI ELEMENTS WHICH UNDERLIE ALL HUMAN ACTION

“The value of trying to realize value appears to me to belong to this metaphysical setting of action; and if we wished to apply to it the opprobrious terms, ‘transcendent,’ ‘eternal,’ or even ‘absolute,’ the objections would arise chiefly, I think, from the traditional connotations of these words. I will confine myself to calling it a case of the uncovered *a priori*, and to making a plea that we extend the use of the principle by which this invariant is uncovered.

“For we are going to get truth by endless experimenting, and there is presumably a charter for this experimenting which is not itself establishable by experiment. We are going to get truth by induction, and whatever the inductive postulate is

we cannot prove *it* by induction. To my mind, experiment and induction are ways of trying to unearth necessities; and there is a prior necessity laid on us for continuing this search for necessity, whose authority no success can confirm and no failure unsettle. Here we have a small group of *a priori* elements, which are in a way formal and transcendent; that is, they are not in the fight, because they constitute the arena and the urge which makes the fight go on! I am disposed to see in them available theoretical certainties which underly all human action. To them the more concrete certainties may attach themselves in proportion to that power of genius which, in the midst of incoherent and disagreeing empirical cases, can discern the universal element, not perfectly but clearly enough to do a man's work in the world."

W. E. Hocking, "Action and Certainty," in *Journal of Philosophy*, 27:236-37 (Apr. 24, 1930).

112. RATIONALISM VERSUS EXPERIENCE

"Systems of this sort have not usually rested upon observed facts, at least not in any great degree. They have been chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seemed 'agreeable to reason.' This is an apt expression; it does not mean that which agrees with experience, but that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. Plato, for example, finds it agreeable to reason that the distances of celestial spheres from one another should be proportional to the different lengths of strings which produce harmonious chords."

Charles S. Peirce, *Chance, Love and Logic* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1923), p. 23.

113. THE RULE OF REASON

"Neither authority nor experience, neither intuition nor imagination, can ever be completely ruled out in favor of pure reason (if the latter is identified with logical inference). All of these play significant rôles in our effort to apprehend the nature of things; but their fruitfulness depends, in brief, upon the extent to which they submit to the rule of reason. Neither brute authority nor the immediacy of experience, neither mystic intuition nor unreasoned imagery, forms a sufficient basis for

an adequate human philosophy. Always we need a rational apprehension of the significance of things in their relational or intelligible contexts."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 75.

114. WE IGNORE EXPERIENCE AT OUR PERIL

"This course results in intellectual irresponsibility and neglect:—irresponsibility because rationalism assumes that the concepts of reason are so self-sufficient and so far above experience that they need and can secure no confirmation in experience. Neglect, because this same assumption makes men careless about concrete observations and experiments. Contempt for experience has had a tragic revenge in experience; it has cultivated disregard for fact and this disregard has been paid for in failure, sorrow, and war."

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1920), pp. 97–98.

115. EXPERIENCE, NOT LOGIC, THE LIFE OF THE LAW

"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which the judges share with their fellowmen, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We must alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the two into new products at every stage."

Oliver Wendell Holmes, *The Common Law* (Boston, Little Brown, 1881), p. 1.

116. A REVOLUTION IN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

"The humility, the self-distrust, the dependence upon supernatural powers, the submission to external authority, the sub-

ordination of time to eternity and of fact to symbol, the conviction of the insignificance and meanness of the present life, the somber sense of the sin of man and the evil of the world, the static interpretation of reality, the passive acceptance of existing conditions and the belief that amelioration can come only in another world beyond the grave, the dualism between God and man, heaven and earth, spirit and flesh, the ascetic renunciation of the world and its pleasures—all of which characterized the Middle Ages—were widely overcome, and men faced life with a new confidence in themselves, with a new recognition of human power and achievement, with a new appreciation of present values, and with a new conviction of the onward progress of the race in past and future. . . .

"Still more important was the disappearance of all the old claims of universality, absoluteness, and infallibility. One's own experience is authoritative for oneself only, not for others. They may gain instruction and inspiration from it, but more than that cannot be demanded of them. Moreover, experience is a growing and changing thing. As the years pass one is conscious, if spiritually alive, that one is entering into new reaches and penetrating new depths of life. To postulate finality for any stage of one's experience is to be guilty not only of unpardonable presumption but of gross ignorance of the conditions of all life. An external code might be final, a living experience in the very nature of the case cannot be.

"This recognition of the incompleteness and consequent fallibility of human experience may consort with either of two attitudes toward the ultimate ground of authority. It may be maintained, as it is by many modern theologians, that while all the existing organs of religious authority—Bible, church, and reason, whether one's own or the community's—are fallible in greater or less degree, there lies back of them a fixed and unchanging standard to which they all approximate. This is in reality the old absoluteness modified under the compulsion particularly of Biblical and historical criticism, and they who share it still crave external authority for their religious faith as truly as any traditionalist. With it is to be contrasted the thoroughgoing relativity of their point of view who believe that growth and change belong to the very essence of reality. This

belief has been greatly forwarded by the spread of modern evolutionary ideas. Where they prevail the tendency is to think of everything as in the making, and to regard the notion of the absolute in the sense of the fixed and unchanging as a mere chimera. According to such relativists the idea of an infallible authority is not simply historically unsound, no such authority having actually appeared, but essentially erroneous, none being possible in the very nature of the case. For when all is in flux and when change not fixity is the necessary condition of existence, the ideals and principles of today are bound to be modified by the enlarging experience of tomorrow. No conception has had a more disintegrating effect upon traditional notions of authority than the conception of evolution even where its results have not been as radical as those just indicated and nothing has done so much to undermine the old dogmatism once shared by all the sects."

A. C. McGiffert, *The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas* (New York, Macmillan, 1921), pp. 11-12, 294-96.

117. EXPERIENCE PROVIDES ALL POSSIBLE OBJECTS OF FAITH

"Man, because of his finite and propulsive nature and because he is a pilgrim and a traveler throughout his life, is obliged to have faith: the absent, the hidden, the eventual, is the necessary object of his concern. But what else shall his faith rest in except in what the necessary forms of his perception present to him and what the indispensable categories of his understanding help him to conceive? What possible objects are there for faith except objects of a possible experience?"

George Santayana, *Reason in Common Sense* (New York, Scribner, 1905), p. 95.

CHAPTER IV

GENERIC TRAITS OF EXISTENCE

118. IMPORTANCE OF ONE'S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD

"In the last analysis it is the ultimate picture which an age forms of the nature of its world that is its most fundamental possession. It is the final controlling factor in all thinking whatever."

E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1927), p. 3.

119. NEWTON'S METAPHYSICS AND ITS EFFECTS

"It was of the greatest consequence for succeeding thought that now the great Newton's authority was squarely behind that view of the cosmos which saw in man a puny, irrelevant spectator (so far as a being wholly imprisoned in a dark room can be called such) of the vast mathematical system whose regular motions according to mechanical principles constituted the world of nature. The gloriously romantic universe of Dante and Milton, that set no bounds to the imagination of man as it played over space and time, had now been swept away. Space was identified with the realm of geometry, time with the continuity of number. The world that people had thought themselves living in—a world rich with color and sound, redolent with fragrance, filled with gladness, love, and beauty, speaking everywhere of purposive harmony and creative ideals—was crowded now into minute corners in the brains of scattered organic beings. The really important world outside was a world hard, cold, colorless, silent, and dead; a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable motions in mechanical regularity. The world of qualities as immediately perceived by man became just a curious and quite minor effect of that infinite machine beyond. In Newton the Cartesian metaphysics, ambiguously interpreted and stripped of its distinctive

claim for serious philosophical consideration, finally overthrew Aristotelianism and became the predominant world-view of modern times."

E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1927), pp. 236-37.

120. THE CONFUSION IN THE METHOD OF IDEALISM

"Idealism has been guilty, historically, of arguing from what is only a methodological difficulty. It has created the appearance of a significant affirmation by concealing a redundancy. No one would think it worth while to say, 'It is impossible for me to discover anything which is, when I discover it, undiscovered by me,' or, 'It is impossible that anything should remain totally unknown after it has become known'; but to say, 'It is impossible to discover anything that is not thought,' or, 'It is impossible to find anything that is not known,' has seemed to many idealists to be the beginning of philosophical wisdom—in spite of the fact that the self-evidence of the last two propositions consists entirely in the fact that 'discover' and 'thought,' 'find' and 'known,' are taken as meaning the same thing."

Ralph Barton Perry, in Geo. P. Adams and Wm. P. Montague (eds.), *Contemporary American Philosophy* (New York, Macmillan, 1930), Vol. II, p. 193.

121. ALL TYPES OF EXPERIENCE ARE EVIDENTIAL OF THE NATURE OF NATURE

"If experience actually presents æsthetic and moral traits, then these traits may also be supposed to reach down into nature, and to testify to something that belongs to nature as truly as does the mechanical structure attributed to it in physical science. To rule out that possibility by some general reasoning is to forget that the very meaning and purport of empirical method is that things are to be studied on their own account, so as to find out what is revealed when they are experienced. The traits possessed by the subject matters of experience are as genuine as the characteristics of sun and electron. They are *found*, experienced, and are not to be shoved out of being by some trick of logic. When found, their ideal qualities are as

relevant to the philosophic theory of nature as are the traits found by physical inquiry."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), p. 2.

122. NEWTONIAN MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS

"The seventeenth century had finally produced a scheme of scientific thought framed by mathematicians, for the use of mathematicians. . . . The enormous success of the scientific abstractions, yielding on the one hand *matter* with its *simple location* in space and time, and on the other hand *mind*, perceiving, suffering, reasoning, but not interfering, has foisted onto philosophy the task of accepting them as the most concrete rendering of fact.

"Thereby, modern philosophy has been ruined. It has oscillated in a complex manner between three extremes. There are the dualists, who accept matter and mind as on equal basis, and the two varieties of monists, those who put mind inside matter, and those who put matter inside mind."

Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), pp. 78-79.

123. NON-EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRY IN THE NEW ASTRONOMY

"Wherever gravitational effects are observable it is an indication that the extended Euclidean geometry is not quite exact, and the true geometry is a non-Euclidean one."

A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), p. 136.

124. THE OLD BELIEF IN UNITY DISAPPEARS

"What, in these circumstances, has science to contribute to metaphysics? Academic philosophers, ever since the time of Parmenides, have believed that the world is a unity. This view has been taken over from them by clergymen and journalists, and its acceptance has been considered the touchstone of wisdom. The most fundamental of my intellectual beliefs is that this is rubbish. I think the universe is all spots and jumps, without unity, without continuity, without coherence

or orderliness or any of the other properties that governesses love."

Bertrand Russell, *The Scientific Outlook* (New York, Norton, 1931), pp. 94-95.

125. FINAL TRUTH AND THE NEW PHYSICS

"Theoretical science itself has changed its character in the course of its development. Newton's 'Principia' has a statu-esque perfection; a modern man of science does not attempt to give his work this character. Final truth is no longer demanded of a scientific theory, or claimed for it by its inventor. There is no longer the same conception of 'truth' as something eternal, static, exact, and yet ascertainable. Consequently even the best modern theories are more satisfying to the practical than to the theoretical side of our nature. The more physics advances, the less it professes to tell us about the external world. To the Greek atomist, an atom was a little hard lump, just like an ordinary body except that it was small. To the modern physicist, it is a set of radiations coming out from a center, and as to what there may be in the center nothing can be known. Even when we say that there are radiations coming out from a center, we are saying something which, when correctly interpreted, is found to mean much less than it seems to mean at first sight. More and more, science becomes the art of manipulating nature, not a theoretical understanding of nature. The hope of understanding the world is itself one of those daydreams that science tends to dissipate. This was not formerly the case; it is an outcome of the physics of the last twenty-five years. Undoubtedly it tends to strengthen the instrumentalist philosophy."

Bertrand Russell, in Chas. A. Beard (ed.), *Whither Mankind* (New York, Longmans Green, 1928), pp. 76-77.

126. THE MEANING OF DISORDER

"The idea of disorder . . . [objectifies] for the convenience of language, the disappointment of a mind that finds before it an order different from what it wants."

Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (Trans. by Mitchell. New York, Holt, 1911), p. 225

127. LAW A STATEMENT OF THE ORDER OF EVENTS

"The hypotheses, the thoughts, that Newton employed were of and about fact; they were for the sake of exacting and extending what can be apprehended. Instead of being sacrosanct truths affording a redemption by grace to facts otherwise ambiguous, they were the articulating of ordinary facts. Hence the notion of law changes. It is no longer something governing things and events from on high; it is the statement of their own order."

John Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916), p. 213.

128. NO IMMUTABLE NATURAL LAWS

"In technical statement, laws on the new basis are *formulae for the prediction of the probability of an observable occurrence*. They are designations of relations sufficiently stable to allow of the occurrence of forecasts of individualized situations—for every observed phenomenon is individual—within limits of specified probability, not a probability of error, but of probability of actual occurrence. Laws are inherently conceptual in character, as is shown in the fact that either position or velocity may be fixed at will. To call them conceptual is not to say that they are merely 'mental' and arbitrary. It is to say that they are *relations* which are thought not observed. The subject matter of the conceptions which constitute laws is not arbitrary, for it is determined by the interactions of what exists. But determination of them is very different from that denoted by conformity to fixed properties of unchanging substances. Any instrument which is to operate effectively in existence must take account of what exists, from a fountain pen to a self-binding reaper, a locomotive, or an airplane. But 'taking account of,' paying heed to, is something quite different from literal conformity to what is already in being. It is an adaptation of what previously existed to accomplishment of a purpose.

"The eventual purpose in knowledge is observation of a new phenomenon, an object actually experienced by way of perception. Thus the supposed immutable law supposed to govern phenomena becomes a way of transacting business effectively,

with concrete existences, a mode of regulation of our relations with them."

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, Minton Balch, 1929), pp. 206-7.

129. LAPLACE ON UNIVERSAL INCLUSIVE DETERMINISM

"All events, even those which on account of their insignificance do not seem to follow the great laws of nature, are a result of it just as necessarily as the revolutions of the sun. In ignorance of the ties which unite such events to the entire system of the universe, they have been made to depend upon final causes or upon hazard, according as they occur and are repeated with regularity, or appear without regard to order; but these imaginary causes have gradually receded with the widening bounds of knowledge and disappear entirely before sound philosophy, which sees in them only the expression of our ignorance of the true causes.

"Present events are connected with preceding ones by a tie based upon the evident principle that a thing cannot occur without a cause which produces it. This axiom, known by the name of *the principle of sufficient reason*, extends even to actions which are considered indifferent. . . .

"We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis—it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes."

Pierre Simon, Marquis de Laplace, *A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities* (Trans. by Truscott and Emory. New York, Wiley, 1902), pp. 3-4.

130. INTELLIGENCE DEPENDENT UPON UNIFORMITIES

"In the final analysis it is the *uniformity of nature* that enables learning to play this *purposive* and *anticipatory* rôle. Because of the tendency to uniformity in the processes of the

natural world, the details of coming situations will be *like* the details of past situations. It is reaction to the *early* cues of coming situations that enables the individual, in the light of its past, to meet the future in ways that are adaptive, anticipatory, and purposive."

H. L. Hollingworth, *Educational Psychology* (New York, Appleton, 1933), p. 79.

131. THE MECHANISTIC CHARACTER OF A FIXED, CLOSED WORLD

"It is an old remark that human progress is a zigzag affair. The idea of a universal reign of law, based on properties immutably inhering in things and of such a nature as to be capable of exact mathematical statement was a sublime idea. It displaced once for all the notion of a world in which the unaccountable and the mysterious have the first and last word, a world in which they constantly insert themselves. It established the ideal of regularity and uniformity in place of the casual and sporadic. It gave men inspiration and guidance in seeking for uniformities and constancies where only irregular diversity was experienced. The ideal extended itself from the inanimate world to the animate and then to social affairs. It became, it may fairly be said, the great article of faith in the creed of scientific men. From this point of view, the principle of indeterminacy seems like an intellectual catastrophe. In compelling surrender of the doctrine of exact and immutable laws describing the fixed antecedent properties of things, it seems to involve abandonment of the idea that the world is fundamentally intelligible. A universe in which fixed laws do not make possible exact predictions seems from the older standpoint to be a world in which disorder reigns.

"The feeling is psychologically natural. But it arises from the hold which intellectual habits have over us. The traditional conception displaced in fact lingers in imagination as a picture of what the world ought to be; we are uneasy because the fact turns out not to be in accord with the picture in our minds. As a matter of fact, the change, viewed in a perspective of distance, is nothing like so upsetting. All the facts that were ever known are still known, and known with greater accuracy than before.

The older doctrine was in effect an offshoot not of science but of a metaphysical doctrine which taught that the immutable is the truly real, and of a theory of knowledge which held that rational conceptions rather than observations are the vehicle of knowledge. Newton foisted a fundamental 'rationalism' upon the scientific world all the more effectually because he did it in the name of empirical observation.

"Moreover, like all generalizations which go beyond the range of possible as well as of actual experience, a price was paid for the sublime and inspiring ideal of a reign of universal and exact law: the sacrifice of the individual to the general, of the concrete to the relational. Spinoza's magnificently sweeping dictum that 'the order and connection of ideas is the order and connection of things' was in effect, although not avowedly as it was with Spinoza, the current measure of the intelligibility of nature. And a universe whose essential characteristic is fixed order and connection has no place for unique and individual existences, no place for novelty and genuine change and growth. It is, in the words of William James, a block universe. The fact that in detailed content it is a thoroughly mechanistic world is, one may say, a mere incident attending the fact that it is a fixed and closed world."

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, Minton Balch, 1929), pp. 208-9.

132. WHY PARTICULARS HAVE BEEN SCORNED

"From Aristotle downwards philosophers have frankly admitted the indispensability, for complete knowledge of fact, of both the sensational and the intellectual contribution. For complete knowledge of fact, I say; but facts are particulars and connect themselves with practical necessities and the arts; and Greek philosophers soon formed the notion that a knowledge of so-called 'universals,' consisting of concepts of abstract forms, qualities, numbers, and relations was the only knowledge worthy of the truly philosophic mind. Particular facts decay and our perceptions of them vary. A concept never varies; and between such unvarying terms the relations must be constant and express eternal verities. Hence there arose a tendency, which has lasted all through philosophy, to contrast the knowledge of universals

and intelligibles, as godlike, dignified, and honorable to the knower, with that of particulars and sensibles as something relatively base which more allies us with the beasts."

William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy* (New York, Longmans Green, 1919), pp. 53-54.

133. PURE UNIVERSALS ARE HYPOTHESES

"The Kantian and neo-Kantian efforts to derive conclusions as to specific questions of justice from purely formal principles ignore the logical fact, made clear by modern logic, that from pure universals no particular existential propositions can properly be deduced. Pure universals are hypotheses and you cannot prove a fact by piling up nothing but suppositions. This can be seen in Kant's own efforts to derive the rules of perfect and imperfect obligations from purely formal considerations. These rules follow only if we accept certain empirical ends of life and assume certain conditions of life to remain permanent."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 416.

134. THE CATEGORY OF TIME

"Time is a sort of river of passing events, and strong is its current; no sooner is a thing brought to sight than it is swept by and another takes its place, and this too will be swept away."

Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, IV, 43.

135. THE CONTINUOUS EMERGENCE OF CONCRETE NOVELTY

"The everlasting coming of concrete novelty into being is so obvious that the rationalizing intellect, bent ever on explaining what is by what was, and having no logical principle but identity to explain by, treats the perceptual flux as a phenomenal illusion, resulting from the unceasing recombination in new forms of mixture, of unalterable elements, coeval with the world. These elements are supposed to be the only real beings; and, for the intellect once grasped by the vision of them, there can be nothing genuinely new under the sun. The world's history, according to molecular science, signifies only the 'redistribution' of the unchanged atoms of the primal firemist, parting and meeting

so as to appear to us spectators in the infinitely diversified configurations which we name as processes and things."

William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy* (New York, Longmans Green, 1919), p. 149.

136. NATURE AN EVOLVING PROCESS

"Nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the process. It is nonsense to ask if the color red is real. The color red is ingredient in the process of realization."

Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), p. 102.

137. EVOLUTION A CREATIVE PROCESS

"Evolution is the preëminent natural creative process. There is no evidence that when life began on our planet or when our cosmos began all subsequent history was actually present enwrapped in that primordial beginning. On the contrary, the evidence is that all growth and all evolution are genuinely creative events. At every step new patterns are fabricated by working over old materials; they are not merely unfolded ready-made."

C. Judson Herrick, *Fatalism or Freedom* (New York, Norton, 1926), p. 21.

138. NOVELTY CANNOT BE IGNORED

"Indeed, the historical school has been a positive hindrance to any improvement or enlargement of the law—precisely because those who think of new problems exclusively in terms of historical analogies get tangled up in their own traces and think that what has been must remain forever."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 375.

139. THE REAL DEFINED

"What is it to be 'real'? The best definition I know is that which the pragmatist rule gives: 'anything is real of which we find ourselves obliged to take account in any way.' Concepts are thus as real as percepts, for we cannot live a moment without taking account of them. But the 'eternal' kind of being which they enjoy is inferior to the temporal kind, because it is so

static and schematic and lacks so many characters which temporal reality possesses."

William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy* (New York, Longmans Green, 1919), p. 101.

140. THE FALLACY OF REDUCTION

"If we take an example from the field of physical science, the same difficulty confronts us. The chemist tells us that water consists of two gases, *viz.*, hydrogen and oxygen, the combination of the two being represented by the formula H₂O. What does it mean to say that water *is* hydrogen and oxygen? Water is curiously unlike these gases. It has a freezing point of its own, it flows downhill, it quenches thirst, it passes off into steam, etc. In all these particulars it differs from both hydrogen and oxygen. If the expression, water *is* H₂O, means that hydrogen and oxygen under certain conditions take on new properties, *i.e.*, change into water, or that these new properties can be made to disappear and to be replaced by hydrogen and oxygen, we cannot only understand the statement, but we can verify it. Moreover, if we study the chemical processes involved, we discover no warrant for saying anything more than this. To say that hydrogen and oxygen are a cause of water, or that water in turn can become a source of hydrogen and oxygen is science. To say that water *is* hydrogen and oxygen is not science; it is nonsense. Water *is* water; hydrogen *is* hydrogen; and oxygen *is* oxygen. A thing *is* what it *is*; it *is not* something else. What it can mean to say that water *is* H₂O, or that thought *is* a movement, is past finding out. Statements of this sort rank with the incantations of the aboriginal medicine man, but with the advantage on the whole in favor of the medicine man, since he does not claim that his verbiage has the sanction of science.

"To put it differently, the whole notion of 'reduction' rests on a misconception. There is no such thing as reduction anywhere, in the sense of saying that one thing *is* identical with another, different thing. There is plenty of reduction, if by reduction we mean that one thing *is* the cause of another thing or changes over into something else by taking on new properties. If we stay within the limits of verifiable fact we cannot say that a color *is* a movement, but movement *is* connected with or

is a cause of color. To say that a color is a movement is like saying that a man is his own grandfather."

B. H. Bode, *Conflicting Psychologies of Learning* (Boston, Heath, 1929), pp. 206-7.

141. SCIENTIFIC LAW A CORRELATION OF CHANGES

"Instead of a closed universe, science now presents us with one infinite in space and time, having no limits here or there, at this end, so to speak, or at that, and as infinitely complex in internal structure as it is infinite in extent. Hence it is also an open world, an infinitely variegated one, a world which in the old sense can hardly be called a universe at all; so multiplex and far-reaching that it cannot be summed up and grasped in any one formula. And change rather than fixity is now a measure of 'reality' or energy of being; change is omnipresent. The laws in which the modern man of science is interested are laws of motion, of generation and consequence. He speaks of law where the ancients spoke of kind and essence, because what he wants is a correlation of changes, an ability to detect one change occurring in correspondence with another. He does not try to define and delimit something remaining constant *in* change. He tries to describe a constant order of change. And while the word 'constant' appears in both statements, the meaning of the word is not the same. In one case, we are dealing with something constant *in existence*, physical or metaphysical; in the other case, with something constant *in function* and operation. One is a form of independent being; the other is a formula of description and calculation of interdependent changes. . . .

"Attention has already been called to the meaning that is now given the term law—a constant relationship among changes. Nevertheless, we often hear about laws which 'govern' events, and it often seems to be thought that phenomena would be utterly disorderly were there not laws to keep them in order. This way of thinking is a survival of reading social relationships into nature—not necessarily a feudal relationship, but the relation of ruler and ruled, sovereign and subject. Law is assimilated to a command or order."

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1920), pp. 60-64.

142. A METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATION OF PRAGMATISM

"Pragmatism thus has a metaphysical implication. The doctrine of the value of consequences leads us to take the future into consideration. And this taking into consideration of the future takes us to the conception of a universe whose evolution is not finished, of a universe which is still, in James' term, 'in the making,' 'in the process of becoming,' of a universe up to a certain point still plastic.

"Consequently reason, or thought, in its more general sense, has a real, though limited, function, a creative, constructive function. If we form general ideas and if we put them in action, consequences are produced which could not be produced otherwise. Under these conditions the world will be different from what it would have been if thought had not intervened. This consideration confirms the human and moral importance of thought and of its reflective operation in experience."

John Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization* (New York, Minton Balch, 1931), p. 25.

143. JAMES ON A UNIVERSE STILL IN THE MAKING

"The idea of a universe which is not all closed and settled, which is still in some respects indeterminate and in the making, which is adventurous and which implicates all who share in it, whether by acting or believing, in its own perils, . . . the fundamental idea of an open universe in which uncertainty, choice, hypotheses, novelties, and possibilities are naturalized will remain associated with the name of James; the more he is studied in his historic setting the more original and daring will the idea appear. . . . Such an idea is removed as far as pole from pole from the temper of an age whose occupation is acquisition, whose concern is with security, and whose creed is that the established economic régime is peculiarly 'natural' and hence immutable in principle."

John Dewey, *Characters and Events* (New York, Holt, 1929), Vol. II, pp. 439-40.

144. ALL PREORDAINED

"Whatever may befall thee, it was preordained thee from everlasting."

Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, X, 5.

145. UNCERTAINTY AND ORDER

"It is uncertainty and indeterminateness that create the need for and the sense of order and security."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), p. 396.

146. UNPREDICTABILITY IN NATURE

"By determinism we understand the belief that the future of the whole universe, or of an isolated part of it, is determined in terms of a complete description of its present condition. It is popularly assumed that every physicist subscribes to some such thesis as this. But now if there is infinite structure even in a small isolated part of the universe, a complete description of it is impossible, and the doctrine as stated must be abandoned. It seems to me that all present physical evidence prepares us to admit this possibility. I suppose, however, that most physicists would subscribe to some modification of the original thesis, perhaps along the following lines. Given a description of an isolated part of the physical universe in the most complete terms that have physical meaning, that is, down to the smallest elements of which our physical operations give us cognizance, then the future history of the system is determined within a certain penumbra of uncertainty, this penumbra growing broader as we penetrate to finer details of the structure of the system or as time goes on, until eventually all but certain very general properties of the original system, such as its total energy, are forever lost in the haze, and we have a system which was unpredictable."

P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), p. 210.

147. THE BEHAVIOR OF ELECTRONS

"Although we can write down the laws which govern subatomic phenomena and make deductions from them, these laws are, at present, unintelligible. An electron behaves as if it had foreknowledge of what it was about to do and could make the mathematical calculations necessary to achieve its end. We cannot admit this to be possible, and we can only

suppose that the difficulty arises from the way we think about things."

J. W. N. Sullivan, *Gallio, or The Tyranny of Science* (New York, Dutton, 1928), p. 29.

148. BOTH LAWS AND FACTS STATISTICAL IN NATURE

"The net effect of modern inquiry makes it clear that these constancies, whether the larger ones termed laws or the lesser ones termed facts, are statistical in nature. They are the products of averaging large numbers of observed frequencies by means of a series of operations. They are not descriptions of the exact structure and behavior of any *individual* thing, any more than the actuarial 'law' of the frequency of deaths of persons having a certain age is an account of the life of one of the persons included in the calculation. Nature *has* a mechanism sufficiently constant to permit of calculation, inference, and foresight. But only a philosophy which hypostatizes isolated results and results obtained for a purpose, only a substantiation of the function of being a tool, concludes that nature *is* a mechanism and only a mechanism."

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, Minton Balch, 1929), p. 248.

149. THE RELATIVE CHARACTER OF THE GOOD

"The universe can wish particular things only in so far as particular beings wish them; only in its relative capacity can it find things good, and only in its relative capacity can it be good for anything."

George Santayana, *Reason in Common Sense* (New York, Scribner, 1905), p. 37.

150. "MAN'S PLACE IN THE COSMOS"

"I still believe that the major processes of the universe proceed according to the laws of physics: that they have no reference to our wishes, and are likely to involve the extinction of life on this planet; that there is no good reason for expecting a life after death; and that good and evil are ideas which throw no light upon the non-human world."

Bertrand Russell, *A Free Man's Worship* (Portland, Me., Mosher, 1923), pp. ix-x.

151. THE NATURAL ORDER AND PURPOSE

"The belief or hypothesis that the total universe is the expression of a purpose—even of a definite purpose revealed to us—cannot be disproved. One who holds to that faith can always appeal to the remote future for verification. But neither can we disprove the assertion that the total cosmic process shows no purpose with reference to human life. Theoretically it seems reasonable to suppose that since the category of purpose arises in human affairs, it ought not without adequate justification be stretched to cover the entire universe of non-human relations. It is a common experience that categories applicable in a given realm cause confusion when stretched beyond that realm. But the emotional pull of rival hypotheses does not generally permit of even intellectual neutrality. A universe that is not alive to its core strikes us as cold and bleak and fills us with the almost instinctive fear of the unknown; while the idea that human or quasi-human forces are cosmically dominant produces a satisfaction similar to that of returning home from a lonely trip in a desert.

"For the purposes of currently prevailing religion, it is not enough that the world should be merely purposive. It must be purposive in the interests of humanity and in accordance with a definite scheme as to what our best interests are. A purposive world in which the fate of humanity is a mere incident, in which this whole earth of ours plays no greater part than a stray chip from a statue which an artist is perfecting, offers little more support to current religion than a dogmatic materialism. Yet so ingrained is the fear of empty spaces and so strong the human desire for a conscious spectator of our intense but often incomunicable inner strivings, that millions have preferred to believe in a demoniac world, designed to torture all but a few of the elect, rather than in a world that indifferently pours its beneficent and destructive rains on the just and the unjust."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), pp. 291–92.

152. PRECARIOUSNESS

“The best laid schemes o’ mice and men
Gang aft a-gley.”

Robert Burns, “To a Mouse.”

153. THE STARTING POINT

“The things of ordinary experience contain within themselves a mixture of the perilous and uncertain with the settled and uniform. The need for security compels men to fasten upon the regular in order to minimize and to control the precarious and fluctuating. In actual experience this is a *practical* enterprise, made possible by knowledge of the recurrent and stable, of facts and laws.”

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), pp. iii-iv.

154. HUMAN PREFERENCES AND THE GOOD

“If we had no desires and no purposes, then, as sheer truism, one state of things would be as good as any other.”

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, Minton Balch, 1929), p. 39.

155. EVERY IDEA AND HUMAN ACT AN EXPERIMENT

“The conjunction of problematic and determinate characters in nature renders every existence, as well as every idea and human act, an experiment in fact, even though not in design. To be intelligently experimental is but to be conscious of this intersection of natural conditions so as to profit by it instead of being at its mercy.”

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), p. 70.

156. CONTROL IS REAL AND BASIC

“Every organism to some extent controls the environment in which it lives, and the pattern of this control of environment through behavior is shaped by the internal organization of the individual. . . .

“Man is no exception to this rule. . . . We cannot deflect the earth from its orbit, but we can divert Niagara from its channel and set it to work for us in a water mill. . . .

"This control is real. It is no illusion to mock our anguished striving. Control of behavior and of environment is in fact a basic vital function. The organism differs from the dead mechanism through its control of the energies which play around it so that these do not corrode and destroy it, but on the other hand they nourish and perpetuate it."

C. Judson Herrick, *Fatalism or Freedom* (New York, Norton, 1926), pp. 25-27.

157. RISKS INEVITABLE

"There is no need to expiate upon the risk which attends overt action. The burden of proverbs and wise saws is that the best laid plans of men as of mice gang a-gley. Fortune rather than our own intent and act determines eventual success and failure. The pathos of unfulfilled expectation, the tragedy of defeated purpose and ideals, the catastrophes of accident, are the commonplaces of all comment on the human scene. We survey conditions, make the wisest choice we can; we act, and we must trust the rest to fate, fortune, or providence. Moralists tell us to look to the end when we act and then inform us that the end is always uncertain. Judging, planning, choice, no matter how thoroughly conducted, and action no matter how prudently executed, never are the sole determinants of any outcome. Alien and indifferent natural forces, unforeseeable conditions, enter in and have a decisive voice. The more important the issue, the greater is their say as to the ulterior event."

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, Minton Balch, 1929), p. 7.

158. EXPERIMENTAL ACTIVITY CHALLENGES BOTH NATURALISM AND IDEALISM

"It is worth while to call attention to the reciprocal character of the practical judgment in its bearing upon the statement of means. From the side of the end, the reciprocal nature locates and condemns utopianism and romanticism: what is sometimes called idealism. From the side of means, it locates and condemns materialism and predeterminism: what is sometimes called mechanism. By materialism I mean the conception that the given contains exhaustively the entire subject matter of practical judgment: that the facts in their givenness are all 'there is'

to it.' The given is undoubtedly just what it is; it is determinate throughout. But it is the given *of* something to be done. The survey and inventory of present conditions (of facts) are not something complete in themselves; they exist for the sake of an intelligent determination of what is to be done, of what is required to complete the given. To conceive the given in any such way, then, as to imply that it negates in its given character the possibility of any doing, of any modification, is self-contradictory. As a part of a practical judgment, the discovery that a man is suffering from an illness is not a discovery that he must suffer, or that the subsequent course of events is determined by his illness; it is the indication of a needed and a possible course by which to restore health. Even the discovery that the illness is hopeless falls within this principle. It is an indication not to waste time and money on certain fruitless endeavors, to prepare affairs with respect to death, etc. It is also an indication of search for conditions which will render in the future similar cases remediable, not hopeless. The whole case for the genuineness of practical judgments stands or falls with this principle. It is open to question. But decision as to its validity must rest upon empirical evidence. It cannot be ruled out of court by a dialectic development of the implications of propositions about what is already given or what has already happened."

John Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916), pp. 341-42.

159. "ENDS" IN NATURE

"Empirically, the existence of objects of direct grasp, possession, use, and enjoyment cannot be denied. Empirically, things are poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, settled, disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, splendid, fearful; are such immediately and in their own right and behalf. If we take advantage of the word *aesthetic* in a wider sense than that of application to the beautiful and ugly, *aesthetic* quality, immediate, final, or self-enclosed, indubitably characterizes natural situations as they empirically occur. . . . If experienced things are valid evidence, then nature in having qualities within itself has what in the literal sense must be called ends, terminals, arrests, enclosures. . . .

"The genuine implications of natural ends may be brought about by considering beginnings instead of endings. To insist that nature is an affair of beginnings is to assert that there is no one single and all-at-once beginning of everything. It is but another way of saying that nature is an affair of affairs, wherein each one, no matter how linked up it may be with others, has its own quality. It does not imply that every beginning marks an advance or improvement; as we sadly know accidents, diseases, wars, lies, and errors, begin. Clearly the fact and idea of beginning is neutral, not eulogistic; temporal, not absolute. And since wherever one thing begins something else ends, what is true of beginnings is true of endings. . . .

"If ends are only endings or closing of temporal episodes, why bother to call attention to ends at all, to say nothing of framing a theory of ends and dignifying it with the name of natural teleology? In the degree, however, in which the mind is weaned from partisan and egocentric interest, acknowledgment of nature as a scene of incessant beginnings and endings, presents itself as the source of philosophic enlightenment. It enables thought to apprehend causal mechanisms and temporal finalities as phases of the same natural processes, instead of as competitors where the gain of one is the loss of the other. Mechanism is the order involved in an historic occurrence, capable of definition in terms of the order which various histories sustain to each other. Thus it is the instrumentality of control of any particular termination since a sequential order involves the last term."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), pp. 96-98.

160. THE CONTINUITY OF THE IDEAL AND THE REAL

"Those who do insist that the ideal and the real are dynamically continuous are those by whom the world is to be saved."

Letters of William James (Henry James, ed. Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), Vol. II, p. 123.

161. IDEALS REPRESENT POSSIBILITIES OF NATURAL EVENTS

"God only knows how many of the sufferings of life are due to a belief that the natural scene and operations of our life are lacking in ideal import, and to the consequent tendency to flee

for the lacking ideal factors to some other world inhabited exclusively by ideals. That such a cut-off, ideal world is impotent for direction and control and change of the natural world follows as a matter of course. It is a luxury; it belongs to the 'genteel tradition' of life, the persistence of an 'upper' class given to a detached and parasitic life. Moreover, it places the scientific inquirer within that irresponsible class. If philosophers could aid in making it clear to a troubled humanity that ideals are continuous with natural events, that they but represent their possibilities, and that recognized possibilities form methods for a conduct which may realize them in fact, philosophers would enforce the sense of a social calling and responsibility."

John Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916), p. 72.

162. LUCRETIUS ON THE ENDLESS FLUX

"No single thing abides, but all things flow.
 Fragment to fragment clings—the things thus grow
 Until we know and name them. By degrees
 They melt, and are no more the things we know.

• • • •
 "Flakes of the water, on the waters cease!
 Soul of the body, melt and sleep like these.
 Atoms to atoms—weariness to rest—
 Ashes to ashes—hopes and fears to peace!"

W. H. Mallock, *Lucretius on Life and Death* (London, Adam and Charles Black, 1901), III, i, xxi.

163. A TALE THAT IS TOLD

"It's too late to make any improvement now. The universe is finished; the copestone is on, and the chips were carted off a million years ago."

Herman Melville, *Moby Dick* (New York, Macmillan, 1929), p. 10.

164. EFFORTS COUNT

"However good or however bad the universe may be, it is always worthwhile to make it better."

George Santayana, *Reason in Science* (New York, Scribner, 1905), p. 61.

165. THE WORLD SO FRAMED THAT IT SUPPORTS HUMAN IDEALS

"If the scales do not rest even, and if I still retain some measure of faith in the fundamental soundness of the world in terms of human notions of the good, it is due chiefly to one last consideration for which I do not pretend to offer proof. My own attitude I find varying with my mood; but it is just the recognition of this fact that for my reflective consciousness inclines the balance. It is in the rôle of passive observer that evils overweigh me most, whereas the times when I am least uncertain that man may hope for a satisfying life in a world that is not unfriendly to him are the times when my instincts are in active eruption; and if I ask myself which mood carries with it the greater impression of reality I do not have to hesitate about the answer. I may on occasion be minded to discard ideals and resign myself to salvaging such personal benefits as come my way, among which a sardonic interest in the spectacle of human folly will perhaps not prove the least enduring. But I do not find it in my heart particularly to like or to admire such a temper. It is the man who, without shutting his eyes to unpleasant facts, still trusts his instincts and goes ahead to make them count who calls forth my spontaneous applause. And to free this last attitude from the suggestion either of sentimental bravado or of unintelligence, I need to contemplate it, not as a forlorn hope inspired by the courage of despair, but as the outgrowth of a confidence that the goal it sees to be desirable the world is so framed as to put within our reach. This, as I say, is less a reasoned conclusion than an intuition. But it will have a certain rational grounding also in so far as experience makes plausible the claim that *all* our human assurances rest in the end on just such an ultimate and unreasoned prompting of human nature. And at least metaphysics has left me with the firm persuasion—perhaps its most substantial service—that whether or not my own favorite arguments are sound, there is no logical compulsion in rival speculations to force me to abandon them."

A. K. Rogers, in Geo. P. Adams and Wm. P. Montague (eds.), *Contemporary American Philosophy* (New York, Macmillan, 1930), Vol. II, pp. 234-35.

166. OUR NEW HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY

"Thus beyond doubt, and beyond recall, the possibility of religious belief is leaving Western man. But what does this mean? It means that man is at length alone with the universe. He is at last free to face those natural forces which are so unbearably careless of his fate. He can no longer pretend, as he used in his childhood, that these natural forces can be made, if suitably invoked, to coöperate with him. Nor can he now, as he did in his youth, invoke the aid of a celestial and omnipotent ally to fight on his side against the stars. At last, he is old enough to bear the thought that upon himself alone depends the issue of the struggle between life and death. For he has at length thought this fatal thought and so he must bear it.

"The ebb of religious belief brings man face to face with his environment; but it also brings him face to face with the necessity of remodeling that environment. For unmodified by man, the world is intolerable. It must be recreated, if not in fancy by the comforts of religion, then in fact by the hand of man himself. Fortunately, by the inevitable intertwinings of historical cause and effect, that very growth of knowledge which has robbed man of his protective cloak of religious illusion, gives him in compensation the power to refashion the earth. It is precisely because man is at last in sight of being able to control nature himself that he now can neither maintain, nor should he need, the illusion that nature is controlled by God."

John Strachey, *The Coming Struggle for Power* (New York, Covici Friede, 1933), pp. 164-65.

167. OMNIPOTENT MATTER

"Brief and powerless is Man's life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man, condemned today to lose his dearest, tomorrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that enoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve

a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power.”

Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic* (New York, Norton, 1929), pp. 56f.

168. CERTAIN GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM

“It may still be contended that man’s range of influence is very limited and that changes are constantly taking place on earth and beyond it which may sooner or later frustrate all his efforts. This must be conceded. When we remember the animal dynasties that have gone to their doom, or consider the destiny of suns and moons and stars, we cannot engage upon the so-called ‘mastery of nature’ with the confidence and buoyancy of those who were younger in knowledge. There is much disclosed by science which ‘shadows forth,’ as some one has said, ‘heartless voids and immensities of the universe, and thus stabs us from behind with the thought of annihilation.’ Still, whether the run of the human drama is to be long or short, it promises to be long enough before the curtain falls, if fall it must, for the decrease of suffering and the increase of happiness; long enough to win great numbers of men from acquisitive scheming to creative endeavor, and to make beauty far more pervasive of life than it is. And that is what matters.”

M. C. Otto, *Natural Laws and Human Hopes* (New York, Holt, 1926), pp. 81-82.

CHAPTER V

NATURE OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL— BIOLOGICAL

169. THE LIFE PROCESS

"Empirically speaking, the most obvious difference between living and non-living things is that the activities of the former are characterized by needs, by efforts which are active demands to satisfy needs, and by satisfactions. In making this statement, the terms need, effort, and satisfaction are primarily employed in a biological sense. By need is meant a condition of tensional distribution of energies such that the body is in a condition of uneasy or unstable equilibrium. By demand or effort is meant the fact that this state is manifested in movements which modify environing bodies in ways which react upon the body, so that its characteristic pattern of active equilibrium is restored. By satisfaction is meant this recovery of equilibrium pattern, consequent upon the changes of environment due to interactions with the active demands of the organism."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), pp. 252-53.

170. LIFE AS CONTINUAL ACCOMMODATION

"All our lives long, every day and every hour, we are engaged in the process of accommodating our changed and unchanged selves to changed and unchanged surroundings; living, in fact, is nothing else than this process of accommodation; when we fail in it a little we are stupid, when we fail flagrantly we are mad, when we suspend it temporarily we sleep, when we give up the attempt altogether we die. In quiet, uneventful lives, the changes internal and external are so small that there is little or no strain in the process of fusion and accommodation; in other lives there is great strain, but there is also great fusing

and accommodating power; in others great strain with little accommodating power. A life will be successful or not according as the power of accommodation is equal to or unequal to the strain of fusing and adjusting internal and external changes."

Samuel Butler, *The Way of All Flesh* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), pp. 329-30.

171. RIGNANO ON THE NATURE OF LIFE

"The fundamental characteristics of the movements of lower organisms show that these creatures move by their own inward forces, that they are autonomous in their movements, that they never abandon themselves passively, as brute matter does, to the mere play of external energies, but react actively to them. . . .

"In no fragment of non-living substance do we see anything remotely resembling behavior influenced by past experience."

Eugenio Rignano, *The Nature of Life* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1930), pp. 78-79.

172. REGULATION OR EQUILIBRATION AS CONTINUOUS READJUSTMENT

"Regulation is a general name applied to the organism's capacity for return to the form or behavior characteristic of the species after any disturbance of this original pattern. The factors of regulation of behavior can be analyzed more readily than those of form and the latter are seen to be intimately bound up with the former. All behavior is regulatory in the sense that there is a typical action system adapted to meet the ordinary exigencies arising in the life of the species to which the organism returns after modification produced by unusual events. Even the ordinary reactions called forth by change in existing conditions tend to bring the system back to the former state and then cease. Trial-and-error, tropism, reflex, instinct, and various forms of modifiability of behavior may all participate on occasion in these regulatory processes."

C. Judson Herrick, *Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior* (New York, Holt, 1924), p. 293.

173. THE UNITY OF ORGANISM AND ENVIRONMENT

"An organism and its environment are one, just as the parts and activities of the organism are one, in the sense that though we can distinguish them we cannot separate them unaltered, and consequently cannot understand or investigate one apart from the rest. It is literally true of life, and no mere metaphor, that the whole is in each of the parts, and each moment of the past in each moment of the present."

J. S. Haldane, *Organism and Environment* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1917), p. 99.

174. BOTH ORGANISM AND ENVIRONMENT ALWAYS INVOLVED

"Any 'organic' activity is as much an affair of the environment as it is of the organism. Any habit of a child belongs as truly to the situation as to the child, for it joins both together. And 'the situation' is the actual total situation in all its particular manifestations to which the child is in fact sensitive. In a true sense any significant instance of learning thus joins up in a way new for the child indefinitely many parts of the situation at the same time that it remakes the child in indefinitely many aspects. Learning becomes thus immensely far-reaching and we see the more clearly how inadequate—nay, how hazardous—are those procedures and those studies which attempt to base themselves on single and isolated learnings. The whole child with all his effectual past now actually located in a present concrete situation with all its effectual connectednesses—this is the only unit. Anything less is an abstraction, a part only. Conclusions based on such abstractions need not elsewhere be valid, and treatment proposed under such conditions may well be harmful. Difficult as are the demands herein made, we dare not disregard them."

William H. Kilpatrick, "A Reconstructed Theory of the Educative Process," in *Teachers College Record*, 32:535 (Mar. 1931).

175. THE DYNAMICS OF BEHAVIOR

"The organism's tensions are set up by environmental events and by objects with which it comes in contact. In the environment lie the remote ends which must be reached before tensions

will be resolved. These ends are goals, but they are not only environmental goals, they are goals *perceived*. The organism's behavior is purposeful. Thus there are two factors to keep in mind: one, the differentials of stress within the organism and, the other, something in the environment that the organism wants. It is this relationship between the organism and its environment that is represented by differentials in the nervous system. Accordingly, the same movements that bring internal equilibrium are those which carry the organism to its environmental goal; they are also the same movements that relieve consciousness of wants and desires."

Raymond H. Wheeler and Francis T. Perkins, *Principles of Mental Development* (New York, Crowell, 1932), p. 30.

176. THE NATURE OF BEHAVIOR

"As we look more closely at life itself, the newer biologic view of organism helps us to understand behavior possibly as never before. Any organism is seen as a self-regulative pattern, intricably interwoven with the environment. When by a change either within or without the organism the equilibrium of the organism is upset, there ensues a strain which we variously call need, want, wish, drive, preference, or the like. Consequent upon this strain there ensue movements directed toward the environment which tend to restore the lost equilibrium. These movements will (typically) both continue and (if need be) vary until equilibrium is restored. Thus pepper in the nose brings an upset which in turn results in sneezing. 'Nature's effort,' we say, to remove the pepper. Or hunger (as an upset) brings 'seeking' movements which typically find food to relieve the hunger. All such movements so arising we call behavior. It appears that all life activities are of this nature. The specific 'drive' to them comes thus from the upset and continues (typically) till equilibrium is restored. This peculiar and characteristic connection here existing between the upset and the consequent varying behavior is highly significant. The upset furnishes the 'efficient cause' to the behavior movements. The same upset—or if you prefer, its removal—supplies at the same time the final end of these movements: the movements typically both continue and vary until the upset is removed. Such a state of affairs presents

an essentially teleological character. Behavior is at bottom purposive."

William H. Kilpatrick, "A Reconstructed Theory of the Educative Process," in *Teachers College Record*, 32:532 (Mar. 1931).

177. THE STENTOR'S LEARNING BEHAVIOR

"The behavior just described shows clearly that the same individual does not react always in the same way to the same stimulus. The stimulus and the other external conditions remaining the same, the organism responds by a series of reactions becoming of more and more pronounced character, until by one of them it rids itself of the stimulation. Under the conditions described—when a dense cloud of carmine is added to the water—the changes in the behavior [of the Stentor] may be summed up as follows:

"(1) No reaction at first: the organism continues its normal activities for a short time.

"(2) Then a slight reaction by turning into a new position,—a seeming attempt to keep up the normal activities and yet get rid of the stimulation.

"(3) If this is unsuccessful, we have next a slight interruption of the normal activities, in a momentary reversal of the ciliary current, tending to get rid of the source of stimulation.

"(4) If the stimulus still persists, the animal breaks off its normal activity completely by contracting strongly—devoting itself entirely, as it were, to getting rid of the stimulation, though retaining the possibility of resuming its normal activity in the same place at any moment.

"(5) Finally, if all these reactions remain ineffective, the animal not only gives up completely its usual activities, but puts in operation another set, having a much more radical effect in separating the animal from the stimulating agent. It abandons its tube, swims away, and forms another one in a situation where the stimulus does not act upon it.

"The behavior of Stentor under the conditions given is evidently a special form of the method of the selection of certain conditions through varied activities,—a form which we have not met before. The organism 'tries' one method of action; if this fails, it tries another, till one succeeds. . . .

"The phenomena are thus similar to those shown in the 'learning' of higher organisms, save that the modifications depend upon less complex relations and last a shorter time."

H. S. Jennings, *Behavior of the Lower Organisms* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1923), pp. 176-79.

178. NOVEL BEHAVIOR AS LEARNING

"Even the lowly organism does not yield to this fate without a struggle. Endowed with a certain capacity for general motility not specifically excited by an external stimulus, in an emergency for which no stereotyped response is directly provided in the innate action system it rapidly tries in turn all forms of response permitted by its organization, and if the outcome is successful the organization may be so altered as to facilitate a similar adjustment on repetition of the situation. The animal, we may say, has learned (physiologically) or has acquired a physiological habit which may persist for a longer or shorter time."

C. Judson Herrick, *Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior* (New York, Holt, 1924), p. 285.

179. WHAT "LEARN" MEANS

"Where the organism faces a novel situation, old responses will not suffice. A new response is called for or failure confronts. If fortunate, the organism will contrive a response new to it and adequate to cope with the novel difficulty. Such a contriving we call 'learning.' A dog is upset at being shut in an inclosure. He finds or contrives a way out. It works. Thereafter, if shut in, he uses his new-found exit (or, more exactly, his newly contrived response). He has 'learned' how to meet the situation. Since he did not have this way of responding before, we may, if we wish, say that he has 'created' a response novel to him. In such a case the restoration (return to equilibrium) is not to the prior state. The organism is different by the new response and all that it brings. Each act of learning adds a certain change and increment to the very structure of the organism itself."

William H. Kilpatrick, "A Reconstructed Theory of the Educative Process," in *Teachers College Record*, 32:532-33 (Mar. 1931).

180. GROWTH AND LEARNING ARE ONE CONTINUOUS PROCESS

"The notion of growth as a mere unfolding of potentially contained characters is to be abandoned. And further, the process of functional construction which is so largely sustained by outside, environmental agencies *is not different in principle* from the process that we call 'learning.' Growth (in so far as it is organic development, and not mere increase of volume) and learning are one continuous process, to the earlier phases of which we give the one name, and to the later (including adult) phases we give the other."

Edwin B. Holt, *Animal Drive and the Learning Process* (New York, Holt, 1931), p. 12.

181. CHILD ON THE IDENTITY OF DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING

"We are accustomed to speak of development as ending with maturity. Actually, of course, development never ends while life continues, for structural and functional equilibrations are always going on and leaving their records in the protoplasm. So far as its developmental aspects are concerned, then, life may be regarded as a continuous series of regulations, or in the words of Spencer as 'continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations.' . . .

"In the past biologists have often drawn a sharp distinction between development as a process of construction of a machine and behavior as the functioning or working of the machine after construction is completed. But if the position taken in the preceding section is correct, development represents behavior as truly as any activities of the mature organism, and we have to distinguish not between development and behavior, but between different aspects and phases of developmental and other forms of behavior. . . .

"The whole course of development is a process of physiological learning, beginning with the simple experience of differential exposure to an external factor, and the undergoing one modification after another, as new experiences in the life of the organism or of its parts in relation to each other occur. Memory and learning in the narrower, psychological sense represent that part of the general developmental learning process which con-

cerns the minute pattern of certain regions of the nervous system in advanced stages of development, particularly in the higher animals. There is no evidence of any fundamental physiological difference between the general protoplasmic memory as expressed in physiological gradients and their effects and the higher forms of memory characteristic of the central nervous system.

"To sum up: the development of the individual may be regarded as the expression of a general protoplasmic memory, and experiment shows us that developmental behavior is modifiable by experience. Such modification or learning is going on at all times from the differential exposure which determines the primary axial gradient, to the end of life."

C. M. Child, *Physiological Foundations of Behavior* (New York, Holt, 1924), pp. 226, 249.

182. THE ORGANISM RESPONDS AS A WHOLE

"When man reacts to even the most minute sensory stimulus, the whole body coöperates in the reaction, even if he only raises a finger or says the word 'red.' . . . A stimulus applied anywhere on the body produces not only a local segmental reflex action, but it changes the system of tension and secretions probably in every part of the body."

John B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of the Behaviorist* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1919), pp. 48, 122.

183. THE ORGANISM ACTING AS A WHOLE

"What happens at one point in the organism is never independent of, or without its influence upon, what is taking place at any other point in the organism."

Kurt Koffka, *The Growth of the Mind* (Trans. by Ogden. New York, Harcourt Brace, 1925), p. 80.

184. LEARNING NOT A MATTER OF SPECIFIC NEURAL CONNECTIONS

"The learning process and the retention of habits are not dependent upon any finely localized structural changes within the cerebral cortex. The results are incompatible with theories of learning by changes in synaptic structure, or with any theo-

ries which assume that particular neural integrations are dependent upon definite anatomical paths specialized for them. Integration cannot be expressed in terms of connections between specific neurons."

K. S. Lashley, *Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 176.

185. THE "WHOLE" NOT OTHER THAN THE PROCESS OF BEHAVIOR

"Because a unified whole, such as 'organism,' 'man,' etc., receives a *name*, the human mind is prone to let all the concrete, interacting parts fade out, and then to carry on with the mere name-thing that remains, as with a chess pawn. Very little *objective content* is left in the thinking that is done with this name-thing; it is wish-thinking. . . .

"A whole is *not* more than the sum or totality of its parts in that arrangement or organization which *constitutes the whole*. To say that the 'whole' constitutes, generates, dominates, etc., its parts is the most arrant nonsense. And this is as true of component parts of the highest living organisms as it is of the straws in a thatched roof.

"To say that a 'whole' regulates or in any wise operates on its parts makes of the 'whole' something other than the totality of its interrelated parts, a metaphysical other that lends itself to vicious thinking. Thus the statement that 'life perpetuates itself' makes 'life' a metaphysical entity apart from that concrete process of living which in fact neither perpetuates nor maintains itself but depends abjectly at every instant on its environment. Such a reifying power of words is conspicuous in all vitalistic arguments. This may seem a small point of logic, but small lapses of logic often have grave consequences."

Edwin B. Holt, *Animal Drive and the Learning Process* (New York, Holt, 1931), pp. 258-59.

186. THE ORGANISM ACTING AS A WHOLE

"In describing a sample reaction we speak conveniently of the stimulus as if it were the action on a few receptors, and the response as if it involved only a relatively few efferent, cerebral, and efferent neurons and a few muscles. But we know that the

real stimulus is a pattern involving practically all the receptors in the body; and the real response involves the nervous system integratively, and practically all the muscles, and many, at least, of the glands. Even such response as the knee-jerk in the uninjured animal can readily be shown to be no mere reflex but to depend on a vastly greater assemblage of receptors than those terminating in the patellar tendon, and I am confident that within two years we shall be able to show that all muscles in the skeletal system participate in this so-called reflex, and in all other overt responses of the human body."

Knight Dunlap, in *Scientific Monthly*, 31:100 (Aug. 1930).

187. BEHAVIOR OF THE ORGANISM AS A WHOLE

"An organism functions as a whole and in no sense can it be understood by studying the isolated function of one of its parts. The parts are all modified by the whole and lose their identity in the functional whole. The organism is composed of material which, although maintaining diversity of structure, fuses and amalgamates in such a way that it functions as a single unit. Any study of less than the organism as a whole is inadequate for a complete understanding of the organism. . . .

"If an organism always behaves as a whole, the psychology which maintains that behavior is due to 'bonds' which lead from 'parts of the situation to parts of the response' can only be wrong. [Footnote in original: Thorndike, E. L., *Educational Psychology* (briefer course), p. 153.] A 'part of the response' must mean a part of the responding structure and separate bonds can only mean that they are functionally independent of each other. All this is inconsistent with the biological position which holds that the organism at all times behaves as a functional whole and at no time is any one part independent of the other parts. Functionally, there are no parts. The behaving organism is never less than the whole. Functionally the organism-as-a-whole defies further analysis.

"Likewise, the explanation of learning only in terms of 'new bonds,' 'neural pathways,' 'synaptic alterations,' etc., must be discarded. Learning cannot be restricted to changes in the nervous system only. It, too, is organismal or body-wide. . . . It cannot be localized in any part. . . . Inorganic learning (if

we may use such a contrasting illustration) involves the alteration only of those parts of the machine which are involved in the performance of the desired behavior. But in organic behavior, all parts of the machine are involved and learning must concern the alteration of the mechanical whole."

J. Stanley Gray, "A Biological View of Organic Behavior," in *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 17:466-68 (Sept. 1931).

188. A CREATION-IMITATION SCALE

"But 'learn' needs further study before we can leave it, especially in relation to imitation. . . .

"Mere imitation does not suffice. The golf professional shows me his swing, even explains it in detail. I try and fail. I have to do some contriving myself. He may show or suggest, but I have to do the contriving. In short, taking my existing stock of habits and skills I 'create' a movement new to me (and, believe me, mine is never exactly his). Without his help, however, I had done less well. What I do is thus part 'creation,' part 'imitation.' But the same thing is true of Shakespeare. Supreme creator that he was, he profited still by what others showed him. No man can create out of nothing. Always there are things that suggest. It begins to appear that there is a creation-imitation scale. At one end the greatest possible amount of creation in proportion to imitation. At the other end the reverse, the least possible amount of creation in proportion to imitation. With all gradations in between. Even Shakespeare shows greater creation at times than at others. Many of us would be glad to reach his lowest. Somewhere in this scale each act belongs."

William H. Kilpatrick, "The Place of Creating in the Educative Process," in *Childhood Education*, 7:117 (Nov. 1930).

189. HABITS AND CREATIVENESS

"Acts of this sort are guided by the perceived situation, which directs them towards an end. Habits enter into such activities and make them possible, but the habits are combined into wholes which as wholes are not mechanical at all, but flexible, so as to suit the circumstances of the moment. The final act is an integration of habits and is a new thing.

"On higher levels we call this process of organizing habits into a new pattern by such names as inventiveness or creativity. The inventor, the architect, the statesman, and the scientist, for example, use their habits in solving problems, but the solution of the problem is something new. Similarly old habits come into play when we carry on a conversation or play a game of golf. Pronunciation, sentence structure, modulation of voice, all reflect old habits, yet the combination of words may be new, just as in golf the particular stroke may be somewhat different from any that we have tried before. This flexibility, or control by a purpose or aim, is the essential and differentiating trait of conscious behavior. So far, behaviorism has failed completely to give an adequate or even reasonably plausible account of this trait. In order to understand conscious activity it is necessary to deal with habits, not in isolation, but as elements in adaptive behavior."

B. H. Bode, *Conflicting Psychologies of Learning* (Boston, Heath, 1929), pp. 270-71.

190. RUGG ON THE CREATIVE ACT

"Students of the creative act maintain that there is a difference between the process of problem-solving (in which assimilation plays the leading rôle) and that of creative self-expression and contemplative awareness. The instrumentalists deny this. They maintain that the assimilative act and the creative act are merely differing aspects of the same general procedure of learning. . . .

"Next, a word concerning the data and the method of my analysis. The data are the subjective materials of experience, and the method is that of introspection, or rather retrospection. We are studying the mental and emotional experience undergone in the *creative* act. It is, therefore, only by the introspection of the *creative* artist that the experiential data of the process can be explored. No person who has not experienced this process can generalize concerning it, and no objective measure of products can lay bare the process itself. . . .

"Consider, first, the attitudes orienting the act of problem-solving. In confronting a problem, the worker is oriented outward. The conditions of the problem are 'given.' . . .

"In each of these 'problems' the attitude is set in reference to external needs. To grasp the problem, the individual must adopt the attitude necessary to understand the conditions set by it. . . . It is only by striking the attitude rigorously determined by conditions outside his own experience, external to his background of meaning and generalization, that the problem-solver successfully recognizes the 'felt difficulty' in the 'forked-road' situation.

"In the creative attitude, however, the orientation is inward. It is subjective, not objective as in problem-solving. The creating process is propelled by an inner urge to objectify moods, to portray overtly personal integrations of meaning, generalization, and emotion. The drive may be to write a poetic phrase or line or stanza, to portray something with pencil or brush, to put together a new combination of tones or bodily movements that will objectify a fusion of ideas and feeling. But the attitude adopted in the initial stage in the creative act is determined by reference to the subjective, inner experience of the individual.

"There is also a second distinction. Whereas the 'problem' of the problem-solver is external to the individual, the 'problem' of the artist is internal. There is a difference in definiteness. Problem-solving is focused with sharpness on conditions prescribed in the external world. . . . The problem-solved must adjust with exactitude to these externally prescribed requirements.

"Not so with the orienting attitude in the creative act. It consists at first of little more than a vague restlessness, an undefined desire to express in an external product the internal experience of the individual. This gives us, indeed, an important cue to the difference between problem-solving and creating, that is, the unchanging rigor and clarity of definition of the externally set problem and the constantly changing indefinite character of the artist's subjective vision."

Harold Rugg, *Culture and Education in America* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), pp. 364-69.

191. WHO CREATE?

"The ways of men we can study. What do we find? Is their creation limited to 'art,' 'music,' and 'literature'? Or do we

find it as well in statesmanship, generalship, invention, research? Do we not in fact find it present more or less in every realm where man has concern enough to achieve? And is such creation limited to the very few? Do we find the great ones standing quite apart from the rest of us, doing things the like of which we lesser ones cannot do even in smaller scale? Are they a different kind of being from us, so that they alone create and we can only imitate? Or do we all create, only in different degrees? Does not history in fact show one unbroken stretch ('distribution of creative ability') from Shakespeare or Beethoven or Einstein down to us, with everywhere each one in the line almost as creative as the one next above, no break anywhere to mark off the 'creative' ones from the rest? . . .

"Even a very low animal form may in the face of a novel situation contrive a (to him) novel response to meet the situation, and this response will abide as a structural change. These facts we may describe in two ways: the animal has 'learned' a new response or the animal has 'created' a new response. Note here that 'create' and 'learn' (the latter in at least one of its aspects) are made to mean the same thing. 'Learn' thus becomes a more active and creative affair than most seem to think. Create is brought more lowly, if you will, but still means to make something that beforetimes did not (for the learner) exist. Old material will enter constitutively, but the result is something qualitatively new. For the learner (if not for the world) actual creation has taken place."

William H. Kilpatrick, "The Place of Creating in the Educative Process," *Childhood Education*, 7:116 (Nov. 1930).

192. HEREDITY

"Heredity today is not what it used to be, and perhaps it never was. We no longer set heredity over against environment, nature against nurture, instinct against habit; but we conceive each in terms of the other. . . .

"Heredity tendencies are not absolute, but are relative to the environment, and are capable of formulation only in terms of the environment. Environmental influences, on the other hand, operate only on hereditary tendencies. Each is a function of the other, the two being comparable to mathematical factors in a

product, which accordingly varies with both and becomes zero when either factor becomes zero."

Knight Dunlap, in *Scientific Monthly*, 31:104 (Aug. 1930).

193. HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT

"To ask whether heredity or environment is responsible for certain behavior is like asking whether it is the engine or the gas that makes the car go."

R. S. Woodworth, "The Nursery School and Child Development," in *School and Society*, 29: 502 (Apr. 20, 1929).

194. ADULT CHARACTERISTICS AND THE GERM CELLS

"The characteristics of the adult are no more present in the germ cells than are those of an automobile in the metallic ores out of which it is ultimately manufactured. To get the complete, normally-acting organism, the proper materials are essential; but equally essential is it that they should interact properly with each other and with other things. *And the way they interact and what they produce depends on the conditions.* . . .

"The process of development shows itself not to be stereotyped, as at first appears to be the case; it varies with changes in conditions. What any given cell shall produce; what any part of the body shall become; what the body as a whole shall become—depends not alone on what it contains—its 'heredity'—but also on its relation to many other conditions, on its environment."

H. S. Jennings, *Prometheus*, (New York, Dutton, 1925), pp. 28f., 32.

195. EFFECT OF DIVERSE ENVIRONMENTS ON I.Q.

"The adoption of children of inferior inheritance into these relatively superior homes constitutes a kind of crude social experiment. In this experiment is accomplished the separation of the two factors of heredity and environment in such a way as to enable us to estimate the effect of the two factors separately. . . .

"In order to confine the comparison to children whose inheritance was similar, so as to reduce to the minimum any possible influence of variations in inheritance, comparisons were

made between brothers and sisters. Among the entire group 125 pairs of brothers and sisters, or siblings, were found. These pairs were classified according to the grade of homes in which they were living, a member of each pair who was in the superior home being put in one group and the other member of the pair in the poorer home being put in the other group. The average I.Q. of those in the better homes was 95 and of their own brothers and sisters in the poorer homes 86, a difference of nine points. Again, a comparison was made of brothers and sisters placed early and those placed later. The average I.Q. of 129 who were placed at an earlier age was 94.3 and those placed at a later age 86.4. Finally, brothers and sisters who are placed in different homes were found to be less alike than are brothers and sisters who are brought up together. The degree of resemblance between brothers and sisters is usually expressed by a correlation coefficient of .50. In the case of brothers and sisters who are separated the resemblance is represented by a coefficient of only .34. Those in unlike homes, moreover, are less alike than those in like homes, the two coefficients being respectively .28 and .38."

Frank N. Freeman, "The Effect of Environment on Intelligence," in *School and Society*, 31: 628-29 (May 10, 1930).

CHAPTER VI

NATURE OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL— PSYCHOLOGICAL

196. FUNDAMENTAL POSTULATES OF BEHAVIORISM

“In adopting physical monism any conscious or psychical entity as distinct from the physical electron-proton entity is, of course, excluded. The formulation of the behavioristic position is then expressed in the statement that all human conduct and achievement reduces to *nothing but*: (a) different kinds of electron-proton groupings characterized according to symmetry or geometrical structure; (b) the motions that occur when one structural or dynamic form changes into another. In other words, I assume that the scientific study of what is generally known as personality and social organization can be conducted under the assumption that the physico-chemical continuum is the sole existential datum and that the totality of the electron-proton aggregates *is* the universe in which we live.”

A. P. Weiss, *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior* (Columbus, Ohio, R. G. Adams, 1929), p. 54.

197. BEHAVIORISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS

“We advance the view that *behaviorism* is the only consistent and logical functionalism. In it one avoids both the Scylla of parallelism and the Charybdis of interaction. Those time-honored relics of philosophical speculation need trouble the student of behavior as little as they trouble the student of physics. The consideration of the mind-body problem affects neither the type of problem selected nor the formulation of the solution of that problem.

“This leads us to the point where argument should be made constructive. It is possible to write a psychology, to define it as Pillsbury does (as the ‘science of behavior’), and never go back

upon the definition: never to use the terms consciousness, mental states, mind, content, will, imagery, and the like. . . . It can be done in terms of stimulus and response, in terms of habit formation, habit integration, and the like."

John B. Watson, *Behavior* (New York, Holt, 1914), p. 9.

198. BEHAVIORISM'S CONCEPTION OF ITSELF

"Behaviorism's primary contention is that if its facts were all at hand the behaviorist would be able to tell after watching an individual perform an act what the situation is that caused his action (prediction), whereas if organized society decreed that the individual or group should act in a definite, specific way the behaviorist could arrange the situation or stimulus which would bring about such action (control)."

John B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1919), pp. viii-ix. (From edition containing preface signed J. B. W.)

199. MIND NOT TO BE EXPLAINED AWAY

"To assert, then, that *conscious* behavior is a fiction is to draw a logical deduction from a premise, not to observe a fact. And since the fact of conscious behavior, of observing, analyzing, noting, reasoning, is involved in the whole undertaking, the absurdity of the conclusion shows the falsity of the premise."

John Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization* (New York, Minton Balch, 1931), p. 309.

200. "DOMINION OF PHYSICS . . . IS PAST"

"There was a time when the whole combination of self and environment which makes up experience seemed likely to pass under the dominion of a physics much more iron-bound than it is now. That overweening phase, when it was almost necessary to ask the permission of physics to call one's soul one's own, is past. The change gives rise to thoughts which ought to be developed. Even if we cannot attain to much clarity of constructive thought we can discern that certain assumptions, expectations or fears are no longer applicable."

A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), p. 344.

201. THORNDIKE ON THE NATURAL UNITS IN THE MIND

"The natural units in the mind are very small ones, connections between situations or elements of situations and responses or elements thereof. These units interrelate and coöperate in elaborate and subtle ways. So far as now known, honesty is not a faculty or unit-character or compound of six or eight such, but an expression of the aggregate status of literally hundreds or thousands of tendencies to act, and of their relations *inter se* and their relations to other tendencies. Whatever common factor these have is not yet identified, isolated, and made capable of direct measurement. On the other hand, abstract intellectual ability with verbal content does show substantial unity, so that we can, by a suitable battery of tests, approximate a measurement of it uncontaminated by other facts—all of it and nothing but it. Much further research in the nature and relation of abilities is necessary."

Edward L. Thorndike, in *Conference on Examinations*, Eastbourne, England (New York, Teachers College, 1931), p. 27.

202. MIND COMPOSED OF BILLIONS OF NERVE FIBERS

"Modern psychology conceives of the mind, not as a compact group of relatively large divisions or faculties, but as a collection of several billion tiny nerve fibers or cells, each of which has learned, or is capable of learning, a definite function. Of course, these neurones, as they are called, seldom act as individuals, but are organized into systems to perform various mental and physical functions. These functions however are very specific."

Edwin H. Reeder, *Simplified Teaching* (New York, Laidlaw, 1929), pp. 13-14.

203. CONDITIONED REFLEX ARCS NOT ADEQUATE

"I began the study of cerebral function with a definite bias toward such an interpretation of the learning problem. The original program of research looked toward the tracing of conditioned-reflex arcs through the cortex, as the spinal paths of simple reflexes seemed to have been traced through the cord. The experimental findings have never fitted into such a scheme.

Rather, they have emphasized the unitary character of every habit, the impossibility of stating any learning as a concatenation of reflexes, and the participation of large masses of nervous tissue in the functions rather than the development of restricted conduction-paths."

K. S. Lashley, *Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 14.

204. HOW THE IDEALIST SEES INDIVIDUAL GROWTH

"It will be found, we believe, that this apparent state of the case can only be explained by supposing that in the growth of our experience, in the process of our learning to know the world, an animal organism, which has its history in time, gradually becomes the vehicle of an eternally complete consciousness. What we call our mental history is not a history of this consciousness, which in itself can have no history, but a history of the process by which the animal organism becomes its vehicle."

Thomas Hill Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1899. 1st ed. 1883), p. 81.

205. WEISS ON THE ULTIMATE UNITS OF REALITY

"Physicists are fairly well agreed that negative and positive electrical particles, described as electrons and protons . . . are the hypothetical ultimate elements out of which everything is built up."

A. P. Weiss, *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior* (Columbus, Ohio, R. G. Adams, 1929), p. 16.

206. ALL IS PHYSICAL

"The behavior of the physicist is just as physical as the physics he teaches."

A. P. Weiss, *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior* (Columbus, Ohio, R. G. Adams, 1929), p. 51.

207. MOTION NOT THE ONLY TYPE OF CHANGE

"The only theoretic argument against the existence of consciousness advanced by recent behaviorists is that of A. P. Weiss. Starting with the assumption that ultimately everything is constituted by electrons (and protons) in motion, he argues

that consciousness must be reducible to the former. This naïve denial of facts because they do not fit in with a preconceived assumption is a clear case of the fallacy of universal reducibility. For granting that all things are combinations of electrons and protons in motion, it does not follow that combinations of these elements cannot contain forms not contained in the elements separately. We may see in the operation of this fallacy the typical nominalistic incapacity to recognize any existence except spatial and material terms, to the neglect of forms or patterns."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 315.

208. PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM (1896)

"The principle of parallelism . . . takes mind for granted, in the psychological sense, and it takes body for granted, in the physiological definition of 'body.' It merely says: Where there is a mental process, there is also a process in a living body.

"It is clear, however, that we have a right to ask for something more than this bare statement of fact; we have a right to ask how mind and body are related in the world at large, how they stand to each other in the general order of events in the universe. This inquiry, like the questions concerning the ultimate nature of mind, belongs to metaphysics. We shall do no good, but rather confuse ourselves, if we attempt to introduce it into psychology. Especially must we be careful to avoid, as psychologists, the popular view that bodily states are the *causes* of mental, and mental states the *causes* of bodily: that a ray of light is the cause of a sensation of sight, or an impulse the cause of a physical movement."

E. B. Titchener, *An Outline of Psychology* (New York, Macmillan, 1896), pp. 342-43.

209. THE BODY-MIND

"Man is not to be conceived as Descartes conceived him,—namely, as an automaton *plus* a soul, or, with Epictetus, as 'a ghost bearing up a corpse.' He is, through and through, a single organism, a 'body-mind,' the latest term of an evolutionary process in which living substance has developed ever higher and more subtle functions. This view is as remote as possible

from materialism; for though it invites the physiologist to push as far as he can his physico-chemical analysis, it refuses to regard perception and thought, feeling and will, as superfluous additions to a machine that would be complete without them. It preserves to the psychical all that ethics and religion require. It spiritualizes the body; it does not materialize the soul."

Sir Percy Nunn, *Education: Its Data and First Principles* (London, Edward Arnold, 1930), pp. 19–20.

210. MIND AND BODY

"To an unprejudiced observer mind appears to be as truly a cause of certain bodily actions as muscular contraction is a cause of bodily movement. The evidence is of the same kind and as convincing in the one case as in the other. Now in biology we do not recognize disembodied functions as causes of anything. It is the functioning organ which is the cause, and it seems to be at least a plausible inference that the observed effects of mind on body are in reality effects of one functioning organ (the brain thinking) on other organs of the body. This is no more an objectionable materialism than is the statement of any other physiological correlation between an organ and its function. The question of the essential nature of the relation between structure and function in general the biologist may set aside for future consideration or very cheerfully hand over to the philosopher to do with as he sees fit."

C. Judson Herrick, *Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior* (New York, Holt, 1924), p. 302.

211. INORGANIC AND ORGANIC LEVELS OF BEHAVIOR

"The difference between the animate plant and the inanimate iron molecule is not that the former has something in addition to physico-chemical energy; it lies in the way in which physico-chemical energies are interconnected and operate, whence different *consequences* mark inanimate and animate activity respectively. For with animate bodies, recovery or restoration of the equilibrium pattern applies to the complex integrated course or history. In inanimate bodies as such, 'saturation' occurs indifferently, not in such a way as to tend to maintain a temporal pattern of activity. The interactions of the various

constituent parts of a plant take place in such ways as to tend to continue a characteristically organized activity; they tend to utilize conserved consequences of past activities so as to adapt subsequent changes to the needs of the integral system to which they belong. Organization is a fact, though it is not an original organizing force. Iron as such exhibits characteristics of bias or selective reactions; but it shows no bias in favor of remaining simple iron; it had just as soon, so to speak, become iron-oxide. It shows no tendency in its interaction with water to modify the interaction so that consequences will perpetuate the characteristics of pure iron. If it did, it would have the marks of a living body, and would be called an organism. Iron as a genuine constituent of an *organized* body acts so as to tend to maintain the type of activity of the organism to which it belongs."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Chicago, Norton, 1929), pp. 253-54.

212. HUMAN CAPACITY FOR DIVERSIFIED LIVING

"A species which can adjust itself to few elements of the environment we call low; one that can adapt itself to a wide range of environmental conditions in a great variety of ways we call higher. The supremacy of the human race is directly due to our capacity for diversified living."

C. Judson Herrick, *An Introduction to Neurology* (Philadelphia, Saunders, 1918), p. 23.

213. "CONSCIOUS" A DESCRIPTIVE ADJECTIVE

"Consciousness is an abstract characterization, not of brain cells, or even of the brain as a whole, but of response, that is to say, reaction. Put concretely, certain responses are conscious. The brain actions, taken by themselves, are neither conscious nor unconscious.

"'Conscious' is merely a descriptive adjective applied by convention to such responses as hearing, seeing, thinking, etc. These processes are so named by common consent, and the naming is in no wise an explanation. No one, not even among the former behaviorists, denies the occurrence of seeing, and of a variety of processes which seem properly classified therewith:

and the calling of these conscious is a mere matter of useful convention."

Knight Dunlap, "Psychological Hypotheses Concerning the Functions of the Brain," in *Scientific Monthly*, 31:100 (Aug. 1930).

214. THE REFLEX ARC AND CONSCIOUS ACTION

"In a reflex act we may suppose that the stimulus which evokes the first stage in the response is like the first in a row of upstanding bricks, which in falling knocks down another. That is, the reflex arc is built up by agencies that are quite independent of the subsequent act. The arc is all set up and ready for use by the time the reflex act appears upon the scene. In the case of conscious activity, on the other hand, we find a very different state of affairs. The arc is not first constructed and then used, but is constructed as the act proceeds; and this progressive organization is, in the end, what is meant by conscious behavior. . . .

"The bearing of this standpoint on the interpretation of psychology is readily apparent. If it be granted that consciousness is just a name for behavior that is guided by the results of acts not yet performed but reflected beforehand in the objects of experience, it follows that this behavior is the peculiar subject matter of psychology."

B. H. Bode, "Consciousness and Psychology," in *Creative Intelligence* (New York, Holt, 1917), pp. 238, 255.

215. THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUS BEHAVIOR

"The behavior of a dog, in the presence of a strange object, is instructive. The dog keeps a watchful eye on the object, keeps its ear cocked for possible sounds, and, if possible, takes an inventory of the smells inhering in the object. His activities, such as barking at the object, nipping it, and perhaps turning it over, are of a sort to give him a better stimulus. For the time being he is uncertain; he is prepared both to advance and to retreat, to eat the possible food and to fight the possible enemy. The present object, accordingly, acts as a stimulus to securing a better stimulus, or, as we sometimes say, to finding out what sort of object it really is. And this is characteristic of all conscious behavior. Psychologists are agreed that all consciousness in-

volves some measure of attention. But attention is just an interrogation point; it is, as James says, a sentinel with the everlasting challenge, 'Who goes there?' We are constantly aiming at new meanings; and this, when put into biological language, is equivalent to saying that conscious behavior is always a quest for a more adequate stimulus."

B. H. Bode, *Fundamentals of Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1921), p. 215.

216. SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE

"When we investigate the presence of an ache, an affection, and a person; when we invite descriptions of a migraine figure, an emotion, and an animal, we find various degrees of consistency in the available reports. It is easy to arrange a set of topics which would disclose the continuous transition from reports with which no one else agrees to those to which practically every one assents.

"'Common sense' has fixed on the two extremes of such a series, and has used 'objective' for events consistently reported, and 'subjective' when one reporter finds the rest disagreeing with him. We have no definite terms provided for the intermediate degrees of statistical agreement, just as we have no precise words for the intermediate ranges of such continuous series as those indicated by tall-short, sick-well, sane-insane, heaven-hell."

H. L. Hollingworth, *Psychology* (New York, Appleton, 1928), pp. 12-13.

217. REACTION TO REPRESENTATIVE STIMULI: THE BEGINNING OF MEANING

"The sea urchin tends to remain in dark places, and light is apparently injurious to it. Yet it responds to a sudden shadow falling upon it by pointing its spines in the direction from which the shadow comes. This action is defensive, serving to protect it from enemies that in approaching may have cast the shadow. The reaction is produced by the shadow, but it *refers*, in its biological value, to something behind the shadow.

"In all these cases the reaction to the change cannot be considered due to any direct injurious or beneficial effect of the actual change itself. The actual change merely *represents* a

possible change behind it, which *is* injurious or beneficial. The organism reacts as if to something else than the change actually occurring; the change has the function of a *sign*. We may appropriately call stimuli of this sort *representative* stimuli.

"This reaction to representative stimuli is evidently of the greatest value, from the biological standpoint. It enables organisms to flee from injury even before the injury occurs, or to go toward a beneficial agent that is at a distance."

H. S. Jennings, *Behavior of the Lower Organisms* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1923), p. 297.

218. EXPERIENCE AND THINKING

"It is not experience when a child merely sticks his finger into a flame; it is experience when the movement is connected with the pain which he undergoes in consequence. Henceforth the sticking of the finger into flame *means* a burn. Being burned is a mere physical change, like the burning of a stick of wood, if it is not perceived as a consequence of some other action. . . .

"As soon as an infant begins to *expect* he begins to use something which is now going on as a sign of something to follow; he is, in however simple a fashion, judging. For he takes one thing as *evidence* of something else, and so recognizes a relationship. Any future development, however elaborate it may be, is only an extending and a refining of this simple act of inference. All that the wisest man can do is to observe what is going on more widely and more minutely and then select more carefully from what is noted just those factors which point to something to happen."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), pp. 163, 171.

219. CONCEPTIONS AND MEANINGS

"Suppose a little speck of light hitherto unseen is detected in the heavens. Unless there is a store of meanings to fall back upon as tools of inquiry and reasoning, that speck of light will remain just what it is to the senses—a mere speck of light. For all that it leads to, it might as well be a mere irritation of the optic nerve. Given the stock of meanings acquired in prior experience, this speck of light is mentally attacked by means of

appropriate concepts. Does it indicate asteroid, or comet, or a new-forming sun, or a nebula resulting from some cosmic collision or disintegration? Each of these conceptions has its own specific and differentiating characters, which are then sought for by minute and persistent inquiry. As a result, then, the speck is identified, we will say, as a comet. Through a standard meaning, it gets identity and stability of character. Supplementation then takes place. All the known qualities of comets are read into this particular thing, even though they have not been as yet observed. All that the astronomers of the past have learned about the paths and structure of comets becomes available capital with which to interpret the speck of light. Finally, the comet-meaning is itself not isolated; it is a related portion of the whole system of astronomic knowledge. Suns, planets, satellites, nebulæ, comets, meteors, star dust—all these conceptions have a certain mutuality of reference and interaction, and when the speck of light is identified as meaning a comet, it is at once adopted as a full member in this vast kingdom of beliefs."

John Dewey, *How We Think* (Boston, Heath, 1910), pp. 126-27.

220. CONSCIOUSNESS NOT AN ENTITY

"To deny plumply that 'consciousness' exists seems so absurd on the face of it—for undeniably 'thoughts' do exist—that I fear some readers will follow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. That function is *knowing*. 'Consciousness' is supposed necessary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get reported, are known. Whoever blots out the notion of consciousness from his list of first principles must still provide in some way for that function's being carried on."

William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York, Longmans Green, 1922), pp. 3-4.

221. THE ACQUIRED CONTENT OF “INSTINCTS”

“The most cursory analysis of the origin of the action-patterns involved in such so-called instincts as the parental instinct, reproductive instinct, fighting instinct, instinct of self-preservation, the gregarious instinct, and the like, will show that by far the greater part of the action content is acquired. Most of what a parent does for a child is the product of social or individual experience and therefore belongs to the category of acquired habit rather than to that of inheritance or instinct.”

L. L. Bernard, *Instinct* (New York, Holt, 1924), p. 515.

222. OUR CONDUCT IS CUMULATIVE

“We grow up, mature, and decline; being endowed with memory and the capacity to form habits, our conduct is cumulative. We drag our past along with us and it pushes us on. We do not make a new approach to each new experience. We approach new experiences with the expectations and habits developed by previous experience, and under the impact of novelty these expectations and habits become modified.”

Walter Lippmann, *A Preface to Morals* (New York, Macmillan, 1929), p. 171.

223. HABITS THAT HOLD US

“We speak of *fixed* habits. Well, the phrase may mean powers so well established that their possessor always has them as resources when needed. But the phrase is also used to mean ruts, routine ways, with loss of freshness, openmindedness, and originality. Fixity of habit may mean that something has a fixed hold upon us, instead of our having a free hold upon things. . . .

“Routine habits are unthinking habits; ‘bad’ habits are habits so severed from reason that they are opposed to the conclusions of conscious deliberation and decision. As we have seen, the acquiring of habits is due to an original plasticity of our natures: to our ability to vary responses till we find an appropriate and efficient way of acting. Routine habits, and habits that possess us instead of our possessing them, are

habits which put an end to plasticity. They mark the close of power to vary. There can be no doubt of the tendency of organic plasticity, of the physiological basis, to lessen with growing years. The instinctively mobile and eagerly varying action of childhood, the love of new stimuli and new developments, too easily passes into a 'settling down,' which means aversion to change and a resting on past achievements. Only an environment which secures the full use of intelligence in the process of forming habits can counteract this tendency."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), pp. 57-58.

224. HABITS, IDEAS, AND CONDUCT

"Evidence points to the fact that taking people as they are found, their ideas control only a very small fraction of their conduct. Even the most intelligent people guide their conduct by ideas only in new and unfamiliar situations which comprise only a small percentage of a day's activities. . . . For the average man perhaps it is safe to say that for every hundred responses to an idea, one is a new response to an idea."

Percival M. Symonds, *The Nature of Conduct* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), p. 297.

225. A HABIT PSYCHOLOGY IS A SCIENTIFIC PERVERSION

"The educational process which is arrested at the stage of habit formation, it matters not how extensive the repertoire and how perfect the mastery of the letter of the lesson assigned, is scarcely begun. In fact, it is a failure. True education must use the knowledge and skill thus acquired and mechanized merely as the tools for constructing out of the experience of life new and individual methods of response, powers of logical analysis, critical appreciation, and personal ideals. . . .

"And what shall we say of a psychology which subsumes under habit formation the whole of the rational process? This is not merely a perversion of the scientific analysis of mind; it is a complete negation of those constructive factors which alone make mental or any other progress in mankind possible. Habit faces backward, while thought reaches forward into the

future and gives zest and piquancy to an otherwise dull and listless repetition of the necessary routine of daily life.

"Human progress builds today upon the past of yesterdays gone, and the activity of today at its close will in turn be laid down as another static foundation stone on which tomorrow's building will be done. Creative intelligence shapes these building stones of character."

C. Judson Herrick, *Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior* (New York, Holt, 1924), pp. 300-1.

226. HABITS AS SERVANTS OF EXPRESSION

"All life operates through a mechanism, and the higher the form of life the more complex, sure and flexible the mechanism. This fact alone should save us from opposing life and mechanism, thereby reducing the latter to unintelligent automatism and the former to an aimless splurge. How delicate, prompt, sure, and varied are the movements of a violin player or an engraver! How unerringly they phrase every shade of emotion and every turn of idea! Mechanism is indispensable. If each act has to be consciously searched for at the moment and intentionally performed, execution is painful and the product is clumsy and halting. Nevertheless the difference between the artist and the mere technician is unmistakable. The artist is a masterful technician. The technique or mechanism is fused with thought and feeling. The 'mechanical' performer permits the mechanism to dictate the performance. It is absurd to say that the latter exhibits habit and the former not. We are confronted with two kinds of habit, intelligent and routine. . . .

"The current dualism of mind and body, thought and action, is so rooted that we are taught (and science is said to support the teaching) that the art, the habit, of the artist is acquired by previous mechanical exercises of repetition in which skill apart from thought is the aim, until suddenly, magically, this soulless mechanism is taken possession of by sentiment and imagination and it becomes a flexible instrument of mind. The fact, the scientific fact, is that even in his exercises, his practice for skill, an artist uses an art he already has. He acquires greater skill because practice of skill is more important to him than practice for skill. . . . Whether it concerns the cook, musician,

carpenter, citizen, or statesman, the intelligent or artistic habit is the desirable thing, and the routine the undesirable thing."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 70-72.

227. TO CHANGE A HABIT CHANGE THE CONDITIONS

"In practical life, there are many recognitions of the part played by social factors in generating personal traits. . . . When we generalize this perception and act upon it intelligently we are committed by it to recognize that we change character from worse to better only by changing conditions—among which, once more, are our own ways of dealing with the one we judge. We cannot change habit directly: that notion is magic. But we can change it indirectly by modifying conditions, by an intelligent selecting and weighting of the objects which engage attention and which influence the fulfillment of desires. . . .

"We may desire abolition of war, industrial justice, greater equality of opportunity for all. But no amount of preaching good will or the golden rule or cultivation of sentiments of love and equity will accomplish the results. There must be change in objective arrangements and institutions. We must work on the environment not merely on the hearts of men."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 19-22.

228. ORGANIC PROCESSES AND PURPOSEFUL BEHAVIOR

"The remainder of the story is that chemico-physical processes go on in ways and by interactions which have reference to the needs of the organism as a whole and thus take on psychical quality, and in human beings at least are in such connection with the social environment as confers upon them intellectual quality. Any notion that human action is identical with that of non-living things or with that of the 'lower' animals is silly. It is contradicted by the fact that behavior is so *organized* in human beings as to have for its consequence all that we call civilization, culture, law, arts—fine and industrial, language, morals, institutions, science itself. And by its fruits we know it."

Organic processes are thus seen to be the constituent means of a behavior which is endued with purpose and meaning, animate with affection, and informed by recollection and foresight."

John Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization* (New York, Minton Balch, 1931), p. 307.

229. INTELLIGENCE

"Stern's definition of intelligence belongs here. He says, 'Intelligence is a general capacity of an individual consciously to adjust his thinking to new requirements.' And again, and perhaps better, 'It is general mental adaptability to new problems and conditions of life.' By this definition Stern differentiates general intelligence from talent which is the development of a specific ability, and again from knowledge or mere information, and lastly from memory because this deals with the old, whereas general intelligence is directed toward the new. Further he says, 'Any sort of perceptive, memorial, or attentive activity is at the same time an intelligent activity just in so far as it includes a new adjustment to new demands.' These statements of Stern are often further contracted as follows: 'General intelligence is the ability of the organism to adjust itself adequately to new situations.'

"Similar to Stern's definition is the statement of Wells: 'Intelligence means precisely the property of so recombining our behavior-patterns as to act better in novel situations.' And Peterson says, 'Intelligence seems to be a biological mechanism by which the effects of a complexity of stimuli are brought together and given a somewhat unified effect in behavior.' Woodworth describes what the subject in a test must do:—'He has to see the point of the problem now set him, and to adapt what he has learned to this novel situation.' Edwards defines intelligence as 'capacity for variability or versatility of response.'

"All of these definitions conceive of general intelligence as including behavior that leads to better and better adaptation not only in man, but in the whole animal kingdom."

Rudolf Pintner, *Intelligence Testing* (New York, Holt, 1931), pp. 47-48.

230. MIND AN EMERGENT

"If from our strictly physiological start we do come upon mental phenomena, or perchance the general mechanism of the mind, it will be because we have reached a new 'emergent level,' that is, because nerves and muscles when organized in a more complex unity necessarily give rise to a new phenomenon which not at all resembles nerves and muscles; as happens so often in chemical syntheses, where two or more substances combine into a new compound which bears no resemblance to the ingredients that were combined. And in fact, the mind is precisely such an emergent; it is a new transformation level."

Edwin B. Holt, *Animal Drive and the Learning Process* (New York, Holt, 1931), pp. 256-57.

231. ACTIVITIES VIEWED AS EXPRESSIONS OF THE SELF

"The whole controls its parts; the 'mind' *develops* its experiences; experiences do not form the 'mind'; a growing, single *pattern* of behavior 'divides' into all manner of skilled activities. Activities are not learned separately and *put together*; they are self-expressions, at all times, of an individual, organic unit, whose main object is to preserve its unity."

Raymond H. Wheeler and Francis T. Perkins, *Principles of Mental Development* (New York, Crowell, 1932), p. 11.

232. MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS DISTINGUISHED

"Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings; it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contemporary, or future, *in* their meanings, the having of actual ideas. The greater part of mind is only implicit in any conscious act or state; the field of mind—of operative meanings—is enormously wider than that of consciousness. Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial; a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness is process, a series of heres and nows. Mind is a constant luminosity; consciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of varying intensities. Con-

sciousness is, as it were, the occasional interception of messages continually transmitted, as a mechanical receiving device selects a few of the vibrations with which the air is filled and renders them audible."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), pp. 303-4.

233. THINKING AS RESPONSE TO THE DOUBTFUL

"The natural tendency of man is to do something at once; there is impatience with suspense, and lust for immediate action. . . . Intelligence signifies that direct action has become indirect. It continues to be overt, but it is directed into channels of examination of conditions, and doings that are tentative and preparatory. Instead of rushing to 'do something about it,' action centers upon finding out something about obstacles and resources and upon projecting inchoate later modes of definite response. Thinking has been well called deferred action. . . .

"Many definitions of mind and thinking have been given. I know of but one that goes to the heart of the matter:—response to the doubtful as such. No inanimate thing reacts to things *as* problematic. Its behavior to other things is capable of description in terms of what is determinately there. Under given conditions, it just reacts or does not react. Its reactions merely instate a new set of conditions, in which reactions continue without regard to the nature of their outcome. It makes no difference how it reacts, even if the effect is its own pulverization. . . .

"In the degree that responses take place to the doubtful *as* the doubtful, they acquire *mental* quality. If they are such as to have a directed tendency to change the precarious and problematic into the secure and resolved, they are *intellectual* as well as mental. Acts are then relatively more instrumental and less consummatory or final; even the latter are haunted by a sense of what may issue from them."

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, Minton Balch, 1929), pp. 223-25.

234. PURPOSIVE BEHAVIOR REMAKES ITS STIMULUS

"Purposive behavior requires the sort of continuity that gives to the successive acts the status of means to an end. Consequently the final act must somehow be foreshadowed in the

beginning; the whole series must be a progressive coördination of activities and not just a sequence. This continuity is provided by the introduction of a changing stimulus, *i.e.*, a stimulus which leads to a successful conclusion by securing its own progressive transformation."

B. H. Bode, *Conflicting Psychologies of Learning* (Boston, Heath, 1929), p. 249.

235. THE WORTH OF SYMBOLS

"The invention or discovery of symbols is doubtless by far the single greatest event in the history of man. Without them, no intellectual advance is possible; with them, there is no limit set to intellectual development except inherent stupidity."

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, Minton Balch, 1929), p. 151.

236. EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AN ACQUISITION

"No matter what are the differences in native intelligence (allowing for the moment that intelligence can be native), the actuality of mind is dependent upon the education which social conditions effect. Just as the specialized mind and knowledge of the past is embodied in implements, utensils, devices, and technologies which those of a grade of intelligence which could not produce them can now intelligently use, so it will be when currents of public knowledge blow through social affairs. . . ."

John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, Holt, 1927), pp. 209-10.

237. WOODWORTH ON EMOTIONS

"All in all, it appears as if the formula developed from our rather precise knowledge of fear and anger were probably applicable also to a number of other emotions, and possibly to all; so that it is a reasonable theory that the emotion, as a conscious state, represents or is correlative with (1) the drive towards a certain consummatory reaction, and (2) the bodily state of preparedness for that reaction. It is clear also that native equipment provides for the internal preparation as well as for the overt reaction."

R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1918), pp. 58-59.

238. EMOTION AS INCREASE OF TENSION

"Emotion is not a special discrete kind of behavior. It is not something added to other activities. *It is an aspect of whatever the person is doing at the time, when, in the approach to a given goal, the tension is increased and maintained through intraorganic stimulation.*"

Raymond H. Wheeler and Francis T. Perkins, *Principles of Mental Development* (New York, Crowell, 1932), p. 207.

239. JAMES ON THE INDIRECT CONTROL OF THE EMOTIONS

"There is, accordingly, no better known or more generally useful precept in the moral training of youth, or in one's personal self-discipline, than that which bids us pay primary attention to what we do and express, and not to care too much for what we feel. If we only check a cowardly impulse in time, for example, or if we only *don't* strike the blow or rip out with the complaining or insulting word that we shall regret as long as we live, our feelings themselves will presently be the calmer and better, with no particular guidance from us on their own account. Action seems to follow feeling, but really action and feeling go together; and by regulating the action, which is under the more direct control of the will, we can indirectly regulate the feeling, which is not."

William James, *On Vital Reserves* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 44-45.

240. IMPULSE AND THOUGHT

"Impulse is primary and intelligence is secondary and in some sense derivative. There should be no blinking of this fact. But recognition of it as a fact exalts intelligence. For thought is not the slave of impulse to do its bidding. Impulse does not know what it is after; it cannot give orders, not even if it wants to. . . . It is indiscriminate. Its vagaries and excesses are the stock theme of classical moralists; . . . What intelligence has to do in the service of impulse is to act not as its obedient servant but as its clarifier and liberator. And this can be accomplished only by a study of the conditions and causes, the workings and consequences of the greatest possible variety of desires and combinations of desire. Intelligence converts desire into plans,

systematic plans based on assembling facts, reporting events as they happen, keeping tab on them and analyzing them."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 254-55.

241. THINKING AND PASSION

"The idea that people have ever been emotionally indifferent in the degree in which they are intellectually aroused is contradicted by the facts of all productive intellectual activity. The contrary idea is probably due to traditional philosophies and psychologies that have cherished a conception of intellect as something outside the situation in which action is to occur, and to the correct inference that such an intellect would necessarily be 'cold'; intellectual and nothing but intellectual. Since intelligence as the method of action is what it is as the method, the how, of a particular scene of action, it will share in all the excitement involved in the active situation. It may be passionate to any degree—provided it be intelligent passion."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), p. 315.

242. WILL DEFINED

"When we use such a term as 'the will,' we must remember what was said in the first chapter regarding the nouns used in psychology. Will is not a thing or machine, but a way of acting. It is a verb or adverb, rather than a noun. To will is to decide between conflicting motives, or it is to overcome obstruction by effort, or it is to enter on a course of action purposely and with anticipation of the goal."

R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1929), p. 274.

243. THE NATURE OF WILL

"What may be called *will* is a complex resultant of native and acquired, organic and environmental developments and influences. If the native inclinations, the instinctive propensities, the immediate stimuli of the moment, and the mechanical intensities of current stimuli have their way, will is weak. If, on the other hand, the acquired tendencies, the learned symbols, the socially approved values, the remote ends, and the subtle

inner cues dominate, will is then strong. . . . Will is then not a faculty but a fact; not a causal agent but the description of a particular picture or outcome."

H. L. Hollingworth, *Psychology* (New York, Appleton, 1928), pp. 440–41.

244. CHOICE IN THE LOWER ORGANISMS

"The distinctive thing about the choice of organisms is that it is regulatory; organisms on the whole choose those things which aid their normal life processes and reject those that do not. This is what justifies the use of the term 'choice,' as contrasted with the mere selectiveness of inorganic reactions. Choice in this regulatory sense is shown by lower organisms, as we have seen in detail in previous chapters. Choice is not perfect, from this point of view, in either lower or higher organisms. Paramecium at times accepts things that are useless or harmful to it, but perhaps on the whole less often than does man."

H. S. Jennings, *Behavior of the Lower Organisms* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1923), p. 330.

245. KNOWLEDGE OF CONSEQUENCES A TRUE CAUSATIVE FACTOR

"It is not that I have foreknowledge of what I am compelled to do. But the foreknowledge of possible consequences is a true causative factor in determining what I actually shall do."

C. Judson Herrick, *Fatalism or Freedom* (New York, Norton, 1926), pp. 61f.

246. CHOICE

"What then is choice? Simply hitting in imagination upon an object which furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of overt action. Choice is made as soon as some habit, or some combination of elements of habits and impulse, finds a way fully open. Then energy is released. The mind is made up, composed, unified. . . . It is a great error to suppose that we have no preferences until there is a choice. We are always biased beings, tending in one direction rather than another. The occasion of deliberation is an *excess* of preferences, not natural apathy or an absence of likings. We want things that are incompatible with

one another; therefore we have to make a choice of what we *really* want, of the course of action, that is, which most fully releases activities. Choice is not the emergence of preference out of indifference. It is the emergence of a unified preference out of competing preferences. Biases that had held one another in check now, temporarily at least, reinforce one another, and constitute a unified attitude. The moment arrives when imagination pictures an objective consequence of action which supplies an adequate stimulus and releases definitive action. All deliberation is a search for a way to act."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 192-93.

247. DELIBERATION AS DRAMATIC REHEARSAL

"Any actual experience of reflection upon conduct will show that every foreseen result at once stirs our present affections, our likes and dislikes, our desires and aversions. There is developed a running commentary which stamps values at once as good or evil. It is this direct sense of value, not the consciousness of general rules or ultimate goals, which finally determines the worth of the act to the agent. Here is the inexpugnable element of truth in the intuitional theory. Its error lies in conceiving this immediate response of appreciation as if it excluded reflection instead of following directly upon its heels. Deliberation is actually an imaginative rehearsal of various courses of conduct. We give way, *in our mind*, to some impulse; we try, *in our mind*, some plan. Following its career through various steps, we find ourselves in imagination in the presence of the consequences that would follow: and as we then like and approve, or dislike and disapprove, these consequences, we find the original impulse or plan good or bad. Deliberation is dramatic and active, not mathematical and impersonal; and hence it has the intuitive, the direct factor in it. The advantage of a mental trial, prior to the overt trial (for the act after all is itself also a trial, a proving of the idea that lies back of it), is that it is retrievable, whereas overt consequences remain. They cannot be recalled."

John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics* (New York, Holt, 1908), pp. 323-24.

248. JAMES ON CHOOSING

“What constitutes the difficulty for a man laboring under an unwise passion of acting as if the passion were unwise? Certainly there is no physical difficulty. It is as easy physically to avoid a fight as to begin one, to pocket one’s money as to squander it on one’s cupidities, to walk away from as towards a coquette’s door. The difficulty is mental; it is that of getting the idea of the wise action to stay before our mind at all. When any strong emotional state whatever is upon us the tendency is for no images but such as are congruous with it to come up. If others by chance offer themselves, they are instantly smothered and crowded out. If we be joyous, we cannot keep thinking of those uncertainties and risks of failure which abound upon our path; if lugubrious, we cannot think of new triumphs, travels, loves, and joys; nor if vengeful, of our oppressor’s community of nature with ourselves. The cooling advice which we get from others when the fever-fit is on us is the most jarring and exasperating thing in life. Reply we cannot, so we get angry; for by a sort of self-preserving instinct which our passion has, it feels that these chill objects, if they once but gain a lodgment, will work and work until they have frozen the very vital spark from out of all our mood and brought our airy castles in ruin to the ground. Such is the inevitable effect of reasonable ideas over others—if they can once get a quiet hearing; and passion’s cue accordingly is always and everywhere to prevent their still small voice from being heard at all.”

William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1899), Vol. II, pp. 562–63.

249. FOCUS AND MARGIN OF ATTENTION

“The first result of our analysis . . . is therefore the distinction between what is focal and what is merely marginal. It is the focal element to which we attend; indeed, we may say that attention is the clear, accurate, and decisive focusing of the central element in consciousness; or, otherwise stated, that attention differentiates the focus from the margin. In children this differentiation is probably less perfect, less rapid, and less under control than in older people. We must be ready to make

allowances for them in this respect. The power of bringing out the focus to the neglect of the margin is a valuable gift. Some people can read a book and follow a difficult train of reasoning amid a buzz of conversation, or in spite of the distraction of a street band. With others the influence of the margin is more disturbing, and the attention is easily distracted. On the other hand, the observant person is one in whom occurrences in the margin of consciousness can rapidly and readily be made focal. For example, a naturalist, when he is out for a walk with you, catches a hundred sights and sounds which for you remain unnoticed. A mouse in the grass, an insect on yonder flower, the note of a rare bird, have caught his observant eye and ear, while yours have been blind and deaf to these sights and sounds. This, too, is a valuable gift. Fortunate is he who can both focus rapidly and clearly, and yet retains a sensitive margin in the field of consciousness. We should therefore encourage the cultivation of both."

C. Lloyd Morgan, *Psychology for Teachers* (London, Edward Arnold, 1894), pp. 4f.

250. THE PROBLEM OF "TRANSFER"

"If learning is restricted to particular synapses, there can be no influence of training upon other activities than those actually practiced. . . .

"There is no evidence to support this belief in identity of nervous elements. On the contrary, it is very doubtful if the same neurons or synapses are involved even in two similar reactions to the same stimulus. Our data seem to prove that the structural elements are relatively unimportant for integration and that the common elements must be some sort of dynamic patterns, determined by the relations or ratios among the parts of the system and not by the specific neurons activated. If this be true, we cannot, on the basis of our present knowledge of the nervous system, set any limit to the kinds or amount of transfer possible or to the sort of relations which may be directly recognized."

K. S. Lashley, *Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 172-73.

251. THE ORGANISM-AS-A-WHOLE AND “TRANSFER OF TRAINING”

“From this point of view, the problem of ‘training transfer’ fades out of the picture completely. If structural changes have been brought about (and training can only mean structural changes) by the study of mathematics, they are body-wide and so affect all subsequent behavior of that organism, or at least so long as those changes are permanent. There is no need to postulate ‘identical elements’ in the stimulus situation. The organism-as-a-whole is not the same organism as it was before the mathematical training and of course does not behave in the same manner. The fact that specific structural changes may be located (in the neural system, for example) does not prove that their functional effects are so located, or that they represent all the structural changes which have taken place during the learning. Alteration of any part of the organism affects the organism-as-a-whole and ‘transfers’ to all subsequent behavior. There is no problem as to *what* training transfers. *All* training transfers, or rather, the structural changes brought about by training are body-wide in consequence and therefore affect all subsequent behavior.”

J. Stanley Gray, “A Biological View of Organic Behavior,” in *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 17: 468-69 (Sept. 1931).

252. BODE ON “TRANSFER OF TRAINING”

“If the moth, as a result of previous happenings, were capable of comprehending the meaning of the candle, the tendency to fly toward the candle would be suppressed, and adaptive behavior would be secured by means of a different reflex or habitual reaction; *viz.*, that of withdrawal. Behavior becomes flexible or adaptive when reflex and habitual tendencies become the servants of meanings. We avoid a mud puddle, not because we are born with a reflex for mud puddles, but because it means wet feet; we reach for the apple because it means something to eat; we take our umbrella because the sky looks like rain. Every normal person has on hand a certain stock of meanings by which to give direction to conduct, and the possession of a wide range of meanings implies a more or less commensurate ability to

adjust conduct to the nature of the environment. In so far as we know the meaning of things, we know what to expect of them and what can be done with them; in other words, conduct becomes intelligent in proportion to our understanding of the world in which we live. . . .

"This brings us to the subject of transfer. As was indicated just now, the reason why meanings make conduct so adaptable is that they are transferable; they can be learned in one context and used in another. This is, indeed, one of the commonest facts of life. . . . Old meanings are transferred or given a new application. Some persons are clearly more able than others, but there is *some* transfer, some extension in the use of meanings, in the case of every individual. There are limits even to stupidity. . . .

"The conclusion, then, to which we are led is that transfer of training means the extension or application of meanings to new problems or new situations."

B. H. Bode, *Fundamentals of Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1921), pp. 151-54.

253. THE NATURE OF THE SELF

"We regard our personality as a simple definite whole; as a plain, palpable, individual thing, which can be seen going about the streets or sitting indoors at home, which lasts us our lifetime, and about the confines of which no doubt can exist in the minds of reasonable people. But in truth this 'we,' which looks so simple and definite, is a nebulous and indefinable aggregation of component parts which war not a little among themselves, our perception of our existence at all being perhaps due to this very clash of warfare, as our sense of sound and light is due to the jarring of vibrations. . . . [And these component parts of the self, he goes on to suggest] blend some of them so imperceptibly into, and are so inextricably linked on to, outside things which clearly form no part of our personality, that when we try to bring ourselves to book, and determine wherein we consist, or to draw a line as to where we begin or end, we find ourselves completely baffled. There is nothing but fusion and confusion."

Samuel Butler. Quoted in M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals* (New York: Holt, 1924), pp. 133-34,

254. THE EMPIRICAL SELF AND ME

"In its widest possible sense, . . . a man's Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account. All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down,—not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in much the same way for all."

William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1899), Vol. I, pp. 291–92.

255. WHAT IS IT TO BE A PERSON?

"To be a person is to have satisfactions and dissatisfactions that are 'one's own' and that are discriminated, compared, and weighed by the one whose 'own' they are, and to act in view of this discrimination, comparison, and weighing. This involves having a past, and knowing it as one's own past; having a future in prospect, and making the transition from one to the other by the kind of acts just indicated. When we attribute personality to infants who cannot thus act, we mean that, since it is normal for them to grow into this capacity, we classify them with their elders, and value them accordingly."

George A. Coe, *What Is Christian Education?* (New York, Scribner, 1930), p. 69.

256. PERSONALITY

"Personality is primary; emotions and habits are secondary, for they will develop or not develop, become 'fixed' or not, in accordance with the laws of balance that pertain to the personality-as-a-whole. *Personality is the psychological organism, and the laws of its development are the same as those for the physiological organism.*

"At first, the physiological organism is a simple, relatively undifferentiated structure. Biologically, it is nondescript.

Personality, at first, is the simple, undifferentiated, but total behavior-pattern of the individual."

Raymond H. Wheeler and Francis T. Perkins, *Principles of Mental Development* (New York, Crowell, 1932), p. 217.

257. SELF AND INTEREST

"The self is not something ready-made, but something in continuous formation through choice of action. . . . A man's interest in keeping at his work in spite of danger to life means that his self is found *in* that work; if he finally gave up, and preferred his personal safety or comfort, it would mean that he preferred to be *that* kind of a self."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), p. 408.

258. HOW THE BABE BECOMES A PERSON

"The new-born babe is not really a human being; he is a candidate for humanity. He has a fundamental instinctive equipment not greatly different from that of the lower animals, but he has also the capacity so to react to social stimuli that he will develop human habits. But he cannot develop the human habits without the social stimuli. This is the difference between the human infant and the young of lower animals. The new-born pup is a real dog, equipped with the tendencies to act which belong to his species. These will develop apart from contact with any other canine being. He will be truly a dog when he is grown whether he has ever lived with other dogs or not. Entirely different is the human child. He will never become human except through the stimuli of human society. He will never know himself as a self except through interaction with other selves."

Theodore G. Soares, *Religious Education* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1928), pp. 17f.

259. HOW SELF AND "SOCIUS" EACH MUTUALLY BUILD THE OTHER

The conception which I have of myself and the conception which I have of you have both been socially built. In fact the

two conceptions grow up together, and each mutually helps the other into being. Much that I now see in myself I first saw in others. Much that I now attribute to you and to others I first saw in myself, and only gradually learned to attribute to you. Each conception—that of self as well as that of other—is thus a compound of elements derived from both subjective and objective sources. The essential factor in the process is that what I know subjectively of myself enables me to understand you, and what I see and understand objectively in you and others enables me to see and understand myself.

The process, once begun, never ends. Each of us can recall at some tender age dipping into this poem or that passage in the New Testament, only to find it unutterably dull and incomprehensible. But later, after expanding experience has brought insight, the poem and the passage are crowded with meaning. Some sayings in the poem bring to first consciousness stirrings within. Other personal experiences are here for the first time now related, and the poem itself has now even greater meaning than yesterday. And the passage from Paul, I wake almost with a start, "I see it means me. Paul knew what I have felt." And then I look within more closely and find there for the first time some things I had but just the moment before seen first in Paul. And so it is in life. Only those who have sorrowed deeply know what sorrow is. After that the hand grasp of sympathy conveys an understanding, back and forth, that before-times was impossible. The process never ends. Continually does experience disclose within me what hitherto I had observed unfeelingly in others. Now I know, and if I am a true man I judge less harshly. And more and more I find that feelings I had somehow supposed peculiar to me do in fact belong also to others, only there they take on a different form of outward show. In this continued process my concepts of myself and of others are continually compounded each of self and other. I can neither be nor think myself, if I do not have the help of you and of others. Nor could I know you, if I did not have myself to add its informing quota. The self and its comrade, the "socius," each works with the other to form each and the other. This is the ever continuing "dialectic of personal growth."

260. THE FALLACY OF REIFICATION

"In thus rejecting the soul as the subject matter of the science of psychology, we do not discriminate against any known phase of conscious life. But we set ourselves against the fallacy of reification, of supposing that because we can speak of the soul as a noun or subject of discourse it must necessarily be an existing thing in which properties inhere. This fallacy of reification is not avoided if for the word *soul* we substitute any other term such as *the conscious* or *unconscious mind*, *the non-empirical self*, *the psychic organism independent of the body*, or the like. Conscious life is a series of events in the history of an organism. It is not a separate non-empirical thing. Some realization of this led William James to reject consciousness as an entity though not as a function."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 302.

261. CONDUCT AND VALUATION

"The concept of the desirable, and its comparative, that of progress, is never absent from human affairs. All conduct implies a consciousness of welfare, of less and greater welfare—we could neither live nor act without it. To live is to act, and to act is to choose, and to choose is to evaluate."

R. M. MacIver, *Society: Its Structure and Changes* (New York, Ray Long & R. R. Smith, 1931), p. 417.

262. THE BASIS OF VALUE

"Things are not good and bad for no reason. Better and worse, worthy and harmful, right and wrong, have meaning only in reference to conscious beings whose lives can be made more satisfying or more bearable.

"A thing or event or act or condition is not, in the last analysis, desirable because it is valuable. It is valuable because it is desirable,—because it satisfies a want or craving or impulse of some man or other conscious being. . . .

"Value or worth or the good means *power to satisfy wants.*"

Edward L. Thorndike, *Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1912), pp. 9-10.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL LIFE

263. INDIVIDUALS EXIST IN SOCIETY

“Nothing in the universe, not even physical things, exist apart from some form of association; there is nothing from the atom to man which is not involved in conjoint action. Planets exist and act in solar systems, and these systems in galaxies. Plants and animals exist and act in conditions of much more intimate and complete interaction and interdependence. Human beings are generated only by union of individuals; the human infant is so feeble in his powers as to be dependent upon the care and protection of others; he cannot grow up without the help given by others; his mind is nourished by contact with others and by intercommunication; as soon as the individual graduates from family life he finds himself taken into other associations, neighborhood, school, village, professional, or business associates. Apart from the ties which bind him to others, he is nothing. Even the hermit and Robinson Crusoe, as far as they live on a plane higher than that of the brutes, continue even in physical isolation to be what they are, to think the thoughts which go through their minds, to entertain their characteristic aspirations, because of social connections which existed in the past and which still persist in their imagination and emotions.”

John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics* (New York, Holt, 1932), p. 358.

264. SOCIETY, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND INSTITUTIONS

“Society is the *process* of associating in such ways that experiences, ideas, emotions, values are transmitted and made common. To this active process, both the individual and the institutionally organized may truly be said to be subordinate. The individual is subordinate because except in and through communication of experience from and to others, he remains

dumb, merely sentient, a brute animal. Only in association with fellows does he become a conscious center of experience. Organization, which is what traditional theory has generally meant by the term Society or State, is also subordinate because it becomes static, rigid, institutionalized whenever it is not employed to facilitate and enrich the contacts of human beings with one another."

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1920), p. 207.

265. THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

"Society, and particularly civilized society, is a very complex structure. We have not to do with one society,—the political community standing over against a number of individuals who are its component members. Each individual is a member of many societies. He is one of a family; he belongs to a church, to a corporation, to a trade union, to a political party. He is also a citizen of his state, and his state has a place in the commonwealth of states. In so far as the world becomes one, that is to say, as social relations arise which interconnect human beings all the world over, Humanity becomes the supreme society, and all smaller social groupings may be conceived as constituent elements of this supreme whole."

L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1911), p. 88.

266. NOT SOCIETY, BUT INDIVIDUALS ACT

"We think of society not as the name of a thing but as the name of all the adjustments between individuals and their things. Then, we can say without theoretical qualms what common sense plainly tells us is so: it is the individuals who act, not society; it is the individuals who think, not the collective mind; it is the painters who paint, not the artistic spirit of the age; it is the soldiers who fight and are killed, not the nation; it is the merchant who exports, not the country. It is their relations with each other that constitute a society."

Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1925), p. 172.

267. SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS DEPENDENT ON COMMUNICATION

"All political and social institutions, all matters of human relationship, are dependent upon the means by which mind reacts upon mind and life upon life, that is to say, upon the intensity, rapidity, and reach of mental and physical communication."

H. G. Wells (and others), in *Atlantic Monthly*, 123:108 (Jan. 1919).

268. THORNDIKE: IF THERE WERE NO SOCIAL INHERITANCE?

"If all human beings save new-born infants vanished to another planet, and if by a miracle the babies were kept alive for a score of years, preserving whatever knowledge and skill came from natural inner growth, and lacking only the influence of the educational activities of other men, they would, at the age of twenty-one, be a horde of animals. They would get a precarious living from fruits, berries, and small animals, would easily become victims of malaria, yellow fever, smallpox, and plague, and would know little more of language, mechanic arts, or provision for the future than the monkeys. They would be distinguishable from other mammalian species chiefly by a much greater variety of bodily movements, especially of the hands, mouth-parts, and face, a much quicker rate of learning, and a very much keener satisfaction in mental life for its own sake. They would consequently enjoy the remnants of civilization, using the books, tools, engines, and the like as toys, somewhat more intelligently than would apes, but they would not read the books, repair the tools, or make of the engines more than spectacles for amusement, wonder, and fear."

Edward L. Thorndike, *Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1912), pp. 4f.

269. OUR DEPENDENCE ON THE SOCIAL INHERITANCE

"If . . . every human being now alive were to lose all the knowledge and habits which he had acquired from preceding generations (though retaining unchanged all his own powers of invention, and memory, and habituation) nine-tenths of the inhabitants of London or New York would be dead in a month, and 99 per cent of the remaining tenth would be dead in six months. They would have no language to express their thoughts,

and no thoughts but vague reverie. They could not read notices, or drive motors or horses. They would wander about, led by the inarticulate cries of a few naturally dominant individuals, drowning themselves, as thirst came on, in hundreds at the riverside landing places, looting those shops where the smell of decaying food attracted them, and perhaps at the end stumbling on the expedient of cannibalism. Even in the country districts, men could not invent, in time to preserve their lives, methods of growing food, or taming animals, or making fire, or so clothing themselves as to endure a northern winter."

Graham Wallas, *Our Social Heritage* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1921), p. 16.

270. SOCIAL HEREDITY

"Several things may then be said about Social Heredity.

"(1) The first thing is that it is analogous to physical heredity. The child, apart from the defective in mind or body, learns to speak, write, read, play, combine forces with others, build structures, do bookkeeping, shoot firearms, address meetings, teach classes, conduct business, practice law and medicine—or whatever his line of further development may be away from the three 'r's' of usual attainment—just as well as if he had received an instinct for that activity at birth from his father and mother. His father or mother may have the accomplishment in question; and he may learn it from him or her. But then both the father and mother may not have it, and he then learns it from some one else. It is inheritance; for it shows the attainments of the fathers handed on to the children; but it is not physical heredity, since it is not transmitted physically at birth.

"(2) It is hereditary in that the child cannot escape it. It is as inexorably his as the color of his eyes and the shape of his nose. He is born into a system of social relationships just as he is born into a certain quality of air. As he grows in body by breathing the one, so he grows in mind by absorbing the other. The influence is as real and as tangible; and the only reason that it is variable in its results upon different individuals is that each individual has his physical heredity besides, and the outcome is always the outcome of the two factors,—natural temperament and social heredity. The limits of the relative influence

of these two factors I shall speak of again; here it is enough to say that the development of the natural disposition is always directed more or less into the channels opened up by the social forces of the environment."

J. Mark Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (New York, Macmillan, 1906), pp. 69-70.

271. BOURNE'S SENSE OF HELPLESSNESS

"The most important fact we can realize about society is that to every one of us that comes into the world it is something given, irreducible. We are as little responsible for it as we are for our own birth. From our point of view it is just as much a non-premeditated, non-created, irrational portion of our environment, as is the weather. Entering it in the closing years of the nineteenth century, we find it as it exists and as it has developed through the centuries of human change. We had nothing whatever to do with its being as it is, and by the time we have reached such years of discretion as dimly to understand the complex of institutions around us, we are so implicated in it and compromised by it as to be little able to effect any change in its irresistible bulk. No man who ever lived found himself in a different relation to society from what we find ourselves. We all enter as individuals into an organized herd-whole in which we are as significant as a drop of water in the ocean, and against which we can about as much prevail. Whether we shall act in the interests of ourselves or of society is, therefore, an entirely academic question. For entering as we do a society which is all prepared for us, so toughly grounded and immalleable that even if we came equipped with weapons to assail it and make good some individual preference, we could not in our puny strength achieve anything against it. But we come entirely helpless."

Randolph Bourne, *Untimely Papers* (New York, Huebsch, 1919), pp. 20-21.

272. HOW CUSTOMS FORM HABITS

"An individual usually acquires the morality as he inherits the speech of his social group. The activities of the group are already there, and some assimilation of his own acts to their pattern is a prerequisite of a share therein, and hence of having any

part in what is going on. Each person is born an infant, and every infant is subject from the first breath he draws and the first cry he utters to the attention and demands of others. These others are not just persons in general with minds in general. They are beings with habits, and beings who upon the whole esteem the habits they have, if for no other reason than that, having them, their imagination is thereby limited. The nature of habit is to be assertive, insistent, self-perpetuating. There is no miracle in the fact that if a child learns any language he learns the language that those about him speak and teach, especially since his ability to speak that language is a precondition of his entering into effective connection with them, making wants known and getting them satisfied. Fond parents and relatives frequently pick up a few of the child's spontaneous modes of speech and for a time at least they are portions of the speech of the group. But the ratio which such words bear to the total vocabulary in use gives a fair measure of the part played by purely individual habit in forming custom in comparison with the part played by custom in forming individual habits. Few persons have either the energy or the wealth to build private roads to travel upon. They find it convenient, 'natural,' to use the roads that are already there; while unless their private roads connect at some point with the highway they cannot build them even if they would."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 58f.

273. FOLKWAYS

"If any one is liable to be shocked by *any* folkways he ought not to read about folkways at all."

William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, Ginn, 1906), p. iii.

274. THE POWER OF CUSTOM TO DEFINE MORALITY

"According to Mr. Pearce, there were in Bengal alone about 1,200 suttees annually, and when (in 1832) Lord William Bentinck passed an act forbidding them, a petition was sent to the Privy Council signed by 18,000 people, many of them representing the best families in Calcutta, asking that this practice be allowed to continue. . . . In the Solomon Islands it was the

practice to kill all (or nearly all) the children and buy others from neighboring islands, the idea being the same as in the case of the farmer among ourselves who sells his young calves to the butcher and buys yearlings. . . . In Japan, under Iyeyasu, a death penalty was attached to 'other-than-expected behavior.' Not smiling when reproved by a superior, and smiling too broadly when addressing a superior were forms of other-than-expected behavior. The smile had to be carefully regulated; to expose the molars was fatal.

"And we are not to regard these examples as merely curious or disgusting—slavery, duelling, burning of witches are examples of practices coming within the definition of moral acts in our own past—but as evidence of the power which the communal definitions have to control behavior."

W. I. Thomas, in *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1920), pp. 170-71.

275. MAN'S UNSOCIAL SOCIABLENESS

"Man cannot get on with his fellows and he cannot do without them."

Kant (not located).

276. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EACH IN RELATION TO ALL

"It is not any and every development of the individual which is socially desirable, or even socially possible. For if one man's personality gains till he bestrides the narrow world like a Colossus, then it remains for the rest to peep in and out and find themselves dishonored graves. His overgrown development means for the mass not development but extinction; and in lesser degree a similar discord results from every development of the individual which is not in accordance with the conditions of social harmony. Social development, then, involves the harmonious development of the constituent members of society."

L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1911), pp. 86-87.

277. KIDD ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

"The interests of the social organism and those of the individuals comprising it at any one time are actually antagonistic;

they can never be reconciled; they are inherently and essentially irreconcilable."

Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution* (New York, Macmillan, 1894), p. 78.

278. "MAN UNSOCIAL BY NATURE"

"Man is not naturally a social being; human society is purely a product of his reason and arose by insensible degrees, *pari passu* with the development of his brain. In other words, human association is the result of the perceived advantage which it yields, and came into existence only in proportion as that advantage was perceived by the only faculty capable of perceiving it, the intellect."

J. Q. Dealey and L. F. Ward, *Textbook of Sociology* (New York, Macmillan, 1907), p. 1.

279. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

"There is no problem in all history so artificial as that of how 'individuals' manage to form 'society.' . . .

"The problem of social psychology is not how either individual or collective mind forms social groups and customs, but how different customs, established interacting arrangements, form and nurture different minds."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 59, 63.

280. TIES THAT BIND IN SOCIETY

"A society consists of beings *related* to one another in various ways, some superficial, some deep and vital. Into social relations men are born, in them they live and develop. None lives or dies to himself, and all are bound up in one unity by reason of their social relationships. It is when men reflect on this essential fact that they fall, so often, into . . . delusion. They come to think of these social relations as literally *ties* between man and man, somehow outside the beings they bind together, as railway-couplings are outside the carriages they connect. . . . We speak of the *ties* of friendship, but the ties are the reciprocal sentiments felt by each toward the other of the beings so related. The ties exist *in* the personality of each, and there alone. . . .

Social relations, in a word, are simply those elements and functions of personality in each which are dependent on the elements and functions of personality in others. Society is therefore not relations, but beings in their relationships. It follows that there is no social function which is outside of the functions of personalities. Society is in us, in each of us, in some degree in all, in the highest degree in the greatest of us."

R. M. MacIver, *Community* (London, Macmillan, 1917), pp. 69f.

281. HOW CULTURE FREES

"There is the fallacy that man is born free. As a matter of fact, he is born helpless. He achieves freedom, as a race and as an individual, through the medium of culture. The most crucial of all circumstances conditioning human life is birth into a particular culture. By birth one becomes a Chinese, an Englishman, a Hottentot, a Sioux Indian, a Turk, or a one-hundred-percent American. Such a range of possibilities may appear too shocking to contemplate, but it is the price that one must pay in order to be born. Nevertheless, even if a given soul should happen by chance to choose a Hottentot for a mother, it should thank its lucky star that it was born into the Hottentot culture rather than entirely free. By being nurtured on a body of culture, however backward and limited it may be comparatively, the individual is at once imposed upon and liberated. The child is terribly imposed upon by being compelled through the accidents of birth to learn one language rather than another, but without some language man would never become man. Any language, even the most poverty-stricken, is infinitely better than none at all. In the life cycle of the individual many choices must of necessity be made, and the most fundamental and decisive of these choices will always be made by the group. . . .

"A particular society of the modern type commonly has a vast number of different traditions all of which may be bound together and integrated more or less by some broad and inclusive tradition. One might argue that the imposing of these traditions upon children involves a severe restriction upon their freedom. My thesis is that such imposition, provided the tradition is vital and suited to the times, releases the energies of

the young, sets up standards of excellence, and makes possible really great achievement."

George S. Counts, *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* (New York, John Day, 1932), pp. 13-15.

282. FREEDOM

"The essence of the demand for freedom is the need of conditions which will enable an individual to make his own special contribution to a group interest, and to partake of its activities in such ways that social guidance shall be a matter of his own mental attitude, and not a mere authoritative dictation of his acts."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), p. 352.

283. MAN A POINT RATHER THAN A UNIT IN THE SOCIAL PROCESS

"As the collective idea and the collective will, right and purpose, are born within the all-sufficing social process, so here too the individual finds the wellspring of his life. The visible form in which this interplay of relations appears is society and the individual. A man is a point in the social process rather than a unit in that process, a point where forming forces meet straightway to disentangle themselves and stream forth again. In the language of the day man is at the same time a social factor and a social product."

M. P. Follett, *The New State* (New York, Longmans Green, 1920), p. 60.

284. INDIVIDUALITY NOT GIVEN, BUT CREATED

"Individuality is not originally given but is created under the influences of associated life."

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1920), p. 198.

285. INDIVIDUALIZATION AND SOCIALIZATION

"The individual's normal growth lands him in essential solidarity with his fellows, while on the other hand the exercise of his social duties and privileges advances his highest and purest individuality."

J. Mark Baldwin, *Individual and Society* (Boston, Badger, 1911), p. 16.

286. SOCIALIZATION AND INDIVIDUALIZATION

"The first and greatest of all the laws of community . . . *Socialization and individualization are the two sides of a single process.*

"In this brief statement we have used two terms which require careful definition. When we say that a being has become more individualized, we mean that he has become more an autonomous being, more a distinct personality self-directed and self-determining, recognizing and recognized as having in himself a worth or value of his own. When again we speak of socialization we mean the process in which a being strikes deeper root in society, in which his social relations grow more complex and more extensive, in which he finds the fulfillment of his life in and through the increase and development of his relations with his fellows. We can thus express the law as follows: *Sociality and individuality develop pari passu*, sociality and individuality being the qualities corresponding to the processes of socialization and individualization."

R. M. MacIver, *Community* (London, Macmillan, 1917), pp. 214f.

287. HOW INDIVIDUALITY HAS BEEN DEVELOPED

"‘Faith comes by hearing’; a man will be a Buddhist in China and a Quaker in Pennsylvania, by virtue of traditional, and not of racial, heredity. He will, on principle, be a polygamist in Persia, a monogamist in modern Europe. In the Congo he will ‘think cannibal thoughts.’ As it was not the individual who made society in the first instance, but society which created the individual, so the mind of every human being is the product of the society in the midst of which he has been born and of the age in which he lives. ‘Men,’ says an Arab proverb, ‘resemble the times they live in more than they resemble their fathers.’ . . .

"One of the most fundamental and startling differences between the mentality of primitive humanity and the current conception of human nature, is the degree, almost inconceivable to us, in which the sentiment of individuality is undeveloped in the primitive mind. That is not the effect of theories which the savage holds, it is not product of the ideas of totemism, or of the

external soul, or of the blood-bond, or of any conception which he may entertain. Those very theories and ideas are, on the contrary, consequences and manifestations of his diffuse sentiment of individuality. . . . An injury to a member of the group to which he belongs, to one who is of one flesh with himself, is an injury suffered by himself. He resents it not by virtue of magnanimous sentiments, or elevated principles of honor, or sublime ethical faiths, but because of the hazy conceptions of individuality which permit of his complete identification with the group. He does not think in terms of his ego and its interests, but in terms of the group-individual. . . .

"That individualistic standpoint which is the alpha and omega of the judgments, sentiments, and motives of modern man is not a primitive character of humanity, but a product of social evolution. It has developed mainly, if not solely in relation to social circumstances, and more especially to the growth of personal property. . . . The feeling of individuality does not arise from cognitive perceptions and analyses, but from the operations of interests and desires; it can exist only when those interests and desires are personal to the individual and opposed to those of other individuals about him. It is that opposition which constitutes the line of demarcation between the individual and his social environment. . . .

"By his becoming for the first time a legal and individual proprietor the very foundations of the mentality of primitive man are changed. The peasant populations of Europe closely resemble the savage in their immemorial traditions, customs, theories, conceptions, 'superstitions'; but in one respect the European peasant differs profoundly from the savage. He is a proprietor; and instead of those sentiments of social solidarity conspicuous in primitive man, we find in the peasant opposite sentiments of narrow selfishness and meanness. For the primitive savage there are group-interests, things which both he and the group desire, and there are strong and fierce antagonisms between those interests and those of other groups. But he and his fellows are not competitors, and he has no clear consciousness of any conflict between his personal interests and opposed interests within his group. The development of those individual interests has taken place only when the individual has held

property apart from the group and has thus become separated from it both economically and psychologically. It is not the operation of innate individualistic instincts that has given rise to the acquisition of personal property; it is rather the acquisition of personal property which has brought about the development of individualistic feelings."

Robert Briffault, *The Mothers* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), Vol. I, pp. 60f., Vol. II, pp. 499-501.

288. NATURE OF INSTITUTIONS

"The sabbath was made for man and not man for the sabbath."

Jesus (Mark 2: 27).

289. THE TEST OF INSTITUTIONS

"Political and social institutions are to be judged by the good or harm that they do to individuals. Do they encourage creativity rather than possessiveness? Do they embody or promote a spirit of reverence between human beings? Do they preserve self-respect?"

Bertrand Russell, *Political Ideals* (New York, Century, 1917), p. 14.

290. SAVAGES BOUND BY CUSTOM

"It is difficult to exhaust the customs and small ceremonials of a savage people. Custom regulates the whole of a man's actions—his bathing, washing, cutting his hair, eating, drinking, and fasting. From his cradle to his grave he is the slave of ancient usage. In his life there is nothing free, nothing original, nothing spontaneous, no progress towards a higher and better life, and no attempt to improve his condition, mentally, morally, or spiritually."

Rev. J. Macdonald, in *J. of Royal Anthropol. Inst. of Gt. Britain and Ireland*, 20:140.

291. INSTITUTIONS AND MEN

"Social arrangements, laws, institutions are made for man, rather than that man is made for them; that they are means and agencies of human welfare and progress. But they are not means for obtaining something for individuals, not even

happiness. They are means of *creating* individuals. Only in the physical sense of physical bodies that to the senses are separate is individuality an original datum. Individuality in a social and moral sense is something to be wrought out. It means initiative, inventiveness, varied resourcefulness, assumption of responsibility in choice of belief and conduct. These are not gifts, but achievements."

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1920), p. 194.

292. TOM PAINE ON GOVERNMENT VERSUS SOCIETY

"Some writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or no distinction between them; whereas, they are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness *positively* by uniting our affections, the latter *negatively* by restraining our vices. . . .

"Society in every state is a blessing; but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one."

Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* (1776), p. 1.

293. THE NEED OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

"Even the most civilized nations have not yet learned to settle international disputes by a court of expert judges, or to prevent national violence and law-breaking by an international police. Theft, arson, and murder are still honored, provided they be done wholesale by a nation."

Edward L. Thorndike, *Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1912), p. 5.

294. RESPONSIBILITY OF INSTITUTIONS

"The chronic conflict of interests in America today, and elsewhere with different accidents; the conflict that produces the most tension, the conflict that involves the most radical differences, the conflict that is fundamental to most of the specific issues which produce acute social disorders, is the fundamental hostility between those types of people who think that institutions should always be responsible for their stewardship to the

living generation, and those other types of people who act on the assumption that institutions can do no wrong."

Albion W. Small, *General Sociology* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1905), pp. 381-82.

295. INSTITUTIONS IN THE SERVICE OF INDIVIDUALITY

"A tool's values and meaning are decided not by what the tool is, but by what it accomplishes for each and every man and woman taken as a unique and inviolable individuality. We may ask concerning it, and concerning any form of social machinery or method of common action:

"Does it work in such a way as to set free and to enhance the powers of individuality, enabling it to change and to grow in self-knowledge and self-mastery?

"Is it imposed by authority and rationalized by dogmas, or is it tentative and experimental, to be freely abandoned if it fails and as freely strengthened if it works?

"Does it require and facilitate that coöperative unity of purpose and that competitive diversity of effort which is characteristic of the sciences?

"Is its cohesion the consequence of the strength and freedom of its members?

"Can it live and work together with other associative units without sacrificing its functional pattern to the exigencies of this association?

"Does it operate and coöperate with a minimum of coercion and a maximum of consent?

"Certainly, in no establishment of society, in no institution, can be found affirmative answers to each and all of these questions. But I am convinced beyond every doubt that the value a man sets upon any human association whatsoever will vary directly with the range and degree of such affirmations that it can provide."

Horace M. Kallen, *Individualism: An American Way of Life* (New York, Liveright, 1933), pp. 18-19.

296. THE CRUX: WHETHER TO TURN ON ALL THE LIGHT

"However we formulate and classify the concrete interests clashing with each other in our society, we find that in every

instance the issues may be stated in terms of this rudimentary antagonism. We usually call it the opposition between conservatism and radicalism, but this phrasing covers up the real nature of the conflict. It is really a conflict between types of people, *viz.*: First, those who are afraid to turn on all the light there is, and to learn all that can be learned about the facts of life. These constitute a perpetual veto power demanding that a mass of questionable things shall be taken for granted, without further inquiry, on pain of outlawry as a common enemy—the ‘nothing-to-arbitrate’ attitude. Second, those who think that nothing is too sacred to be investigated and that all the sacredness there is to anything is the respect it compels our judgment to pay after measuring it by the standards of evolving human purposes.”

Albion W. Small, *General Sociology* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1905), pp. 382-83.

297. WISDOM AND REGARD FOR CONSEQUENCES

“In practice authoritarians are people who are so afraid of the perils of change that they blind themselves to the absurdities and iniquities of the established order, while reformers and revolutionists are so impressed with the existing evils that they give little heed to the even greater evils which their proposals may generate. The true rationality or wisdom of any course of conduct obviously depends upon a true estimate of all its consequences, and such estimate is avoided both by those who will not hear of any change and by those who think that any change is necessarily good (because they identify change with life).”

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 26.

298. SOCIALIZATION

“The fourth great practical business of life is the attempt to adapt ourselves to one another.”

Franklin H. Giddings, *Theory of Socialization* (New York, Macmillan, 1897), p. 4.

299. SOCIALIZATION MAY BE GOOD OR BAD

“‘Society,’ however, is either an abstract or a collective noun. In the concrete, there are societies, associations, groups of an

immense number of kinds, having different ties and instituting different interests. They may be gangs, criminal bands; clubs for sport, sociability, and eating; scientific and professional organizations; political parties and unions within them; families; religious denominations, business partnerships, and corporations; and so on in an endless list. The associations may be local, nation-wide, and trans-national. Since there is no one *thing* which may be called society, except their indefinite overlapping, there is no unqualified eulogistic connotation adhering to the term 'society'. Some societies are in the main to be approved; some to be condemned, on account of their consequences upon the character and conduct of those engaged in them and because of their remoter consequences upon others. All of them, like all things human, are mixed in quality; 'society' is something to be approached and judged critically and discriminately. 'Socialization' of some sort—that is, the reflex modification of wants, beliefs, and work because of share in a united action—is inevitable. But it is as marked in the formation of frivolous, dissipated, fanatical, narrow-minded, and criminal persons as in that of competent inquirers, learned scholars, creative artists, and good neighbors."

John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, Holt, 1927), pp. 69-70.

300. PERSONALITY AND SOCIALIZATION

"The socialization of the person consists in his all-round participation in the thinking, the feeling, and the activities of the group. In short, socialization is 'personality freely unfolding under conditions of healthy fellowship.' Society viewed from this aspect is an immense coöperative concern for the promotion of personal development. But social organization is not the end of socialization; the end and the function of socialization is the development of persons. The relation is even closer: personality consists, almost wholly, in socialization, in this mental interaction of the person and his group. The person is coming to realize that in achieving his interests he must at the same time achieve functional relations with all other persons. In this achieving of right relations with his fellows, in this capacity of fitting 'into an infinitely refined and complex

system of coöperation,' the development of personality consists."

Ernest W. Burgess, *The Function of Socialization in Social Evolution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1916), pp. 236-37.

301. SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

"Social structure is an important factor. Where men are divided by language, or by religion, or by caste distinctions grounded on race or on occupation, there are grounds for mutual distrust and animosity which make it hard for them to act together or for each section to recognize equal rights in the other."

James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (New York, Macmillan, 1921), Vol. II, p. 502.

302. LACK OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION

"A glance at the world situation, a perusal of the week's journalism, reveals conflict at almost every point where the races come together in organized contacts. While the aspirations of men of good-will and the thoughts of men of science tend to mingle, yet in the practical affairs of government and economics, where the multitudes are brought together, it is antagonism and not unity that grows between the races. . . . Today their partial knowledge of each other is being followed by fear, which is induced both by facts and propaganda."

Harry F. Ward, in *The World Tomorrow*, 8: 327 (Nov. 1925).

303. TRUE AMERICANIZATION

"Americanization is a process. . . . It is a process of building as perfect a society as it is possible to do on earth. It has as its starting-point the ideals and achievements of all the immigrants, and of their descendants, who have been coming for the past three centuries, and more, to the land now known as the United States. . . . True Americanization is nothing less than an educational process of unifying both the native-born and foreign-born in perfecting and putting into practice the principles of democracy. . . .

"True Americanization . . . invites the immigrant to give himself, as native Americans are expected to do, to improve the

quality of American standards, and at the same time, to retain his identity, in fact to grow into a more socialized personality."

Emory S. Bogardus, *The Essentials of Americanization* (Los Angeles, University of Southern California Press, 3rd rev. ed. 1923), pp. 13-18.

304. THE MEASURE OF SOCIALIZATION

"In any social group whatever, even in a gang of thieves, we find some interest held in common, and we find a certain amount of interaction and coöperative intercourse with other groups. From these two traits we derive our standard. How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association? If we apply these considerations to, say, a criminal band, we find that the ties which consciously hold the members together are few in number, reducible almost to a common interest in plunder; and that they are of such a nature as to isolate the group from other groups with respect to give and take of the values of life. Hence, the education such a society gives is partial and distorted. If we take, on the other hand, the kind of family life which illustrates the standard, we find that there are material, intellectual, æsthetic interests in which all participate and that the progress of one member has worth for the experience of other members—it is readily communicable—and that the family is not an isolated whole, but enters intimately into relationships with business groups, with schools, with all the agencies of culture, as well as with other groups, and that it plays a due part in the political organization and in return receives support from it. In short, there are many interests consciously communicated and shared; and there are varied and free points of contact with other modes of association."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), pp. 96-97.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LIFE GOOD TO LIVE

305. LIFE AS AIM

“Once more the trial must be made to realize the dream, to distill out of this little piece of cosmic stuff and this tiny stretch of time a strain of music, thrilling, glorious, and beautiful.”

A. E. Haydon. Quoted in M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals* (New York, Holt, 1924), p. xii.

306. SANTAYANA'S DILEMMA

“That life is worth living is the most necessary of assumptions and, were it not assumed, the most impossible of conclusions.”

George Santayana, *Reason in Common Sense* (New York, Scribner, 1905), p. 252.

307. COUNT LIFE WORTH LIVING

“Be not afraid of life. Believe that life is worth living, and your belief will help create the fact. The ‘scientific proof’ that you are right may not be clear before the day of judgment . . . is reached. But the faithful fighters of this hour, or the beings that then and there will represent them, may then turn to the faint-hearted, who here decline to go on, with words like those with which Henry IV greeted the tardy Crillon after a great victory had been gained: ‘Hang yourself, brave Crillon! We fought at Arques, and you were not there!’”

William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays* (New York, Longmans Green, 1923. 1st ed. 1897), p. 62.

308. EAT, DRINK, AND BE MERRY

“A man has no better thing under the sun than to eat, and to drink, and to be merry.”

Ecclesiastes, 8:15.

309. OMAR KHAYYÁM ON LIFE

“Waste not your Hour, nor in the vain pursuit
 Of This and That endeavor and dispute:
 Better be jocund with the fruitful Grape
 Than sadden after none, or bitter, Fruit. (LIV)

“Ah, my Beloved, fill the cup that clears
 Today of past Regret and future Fears:
Tomorrow!—Why, Tomorrow I may be
 Myself with Yesterday’s Sev’n thousand Years. (XXI)

“A Book of Verses underneath the Bough,
 A Jug of Wine, a Loaf of Bread—and Thou
 Beside me singing in the Wilderness—
 Oh, Wilderness were Paradise enow!” (XII)

Rubáiyát (Trans. by Fitzgerald. 3rd ed., London, Quaritch, 1872).

310. MARCUS AURELIUS ON THE NATURAL IMPULSES

“Efface imagination. Restrain impulse. Quench desire.
 Keep the ruling Reason in thine own power.”

Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* (Trans. by Haines), IX, 7.

311. THE STOIC OUTLOOK

(a) “Freedom is acquired not by the full possession of the things which are desired, but by the removal of the desire.”

(b) “Demand not that events should happen as you wish, but wish them to happen as they do, and all will go well.”

(c) Hymn of Cleanthes:

“Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, O Destiny
 Wherever your decrees have fixed my lot.
 I follow cheerfully; and did I not,
 Wicked and wretched, I still must follow.”

Epictetus, Disc. IV, 1; Enchir. 8, 52.

312. A JAPANESE IDEAL

“The discipline of fortitude, on the one hand, inculcating endurance without a groan, and the teaching of politeness on

the other, requiring us not to mar the pleasure or serenity of another by expressions of our own sorrow or pain, combined to engender a stoical turn of mind, and eventually to confirm it into a national trait of apparent stoicism."

Inazo Nitobe, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan* (New York, Putnam, 1905), p. 103.

313. THE BASE MECHANIC ARTS

"The base mechanic arts, so called, have got a bad name; and what is more, are held in ill repute by civilized communities, and not unreasonably; seeing they are the ruin of the bodies of all concerned in them, workers and overseers alike, who are forced to remain in sitting postures and to hug the gloom, or else to crouch whole days confronting a furnace. Hand in hand with physical enervation follows apace enfeeblement of soul: while the demand which these base mechanic arts make on the time of those employed in them leaves them no leisure to devote to the claims of friendship and the state. How can such folk be other than sorry friends and ill defenders of the fatherland? So much so that in some states, especially those reputed to be warlike, no citizen is allowed to exercise any mechanical craft at all."

Xenophon, *Œconomicus* (Trans. by Dakyns), IV, 2-3.

314. SOCRATES ON WANTING LITTLE

"You, Antipho, seem to think that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance; but I think that to want nothing is to resemble the gods, and that to want as little as possible is to make the nearest approach to the gods; that the Divine nature is perfection, and that to be nearest to the Divine nature is to be nearest to perfection."

Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, I, vi, 10.

315. THE METHOD OF PRACTICING MEDITATION (ZAZEN)

"Sit straight and motionless, never inclining to the left hand, nor to the right, never bowing forward nor turning backward. The ears should be in the same plane with the shoulders, and nose and navel in the same straight line. The tongue should

stick to the upper jaw, while lip meets with lip and teeth with teeth. Open the eyes not too widely yet not too slightly, and keep breathing through the nose. After composing mind and body in this way, you may take a long, deep breath. Thus sitting motionless you may think of not-thinking. Can you think of not-thinking? That is thinking of nothing. This is the most important art of Zazen [meditation]. . . . It is the only way to great calm joy. This is unpolluted practice and this is an enlightenment."

Quoted in Tasuku Harada, *The Faith of Japan* (New York, Macmillan, 1914), p. 89.

316. ASCETICISM

"A clean body and a clean dress mean an unclean soul." (P. 206.)

"To induce you to take baths they will speak of dirt with disgust." (P. 218.)

"It is usual in the monasteries of Egypt . . . for virgins and widows . . . to cut their hair . . . It is designed to save those who take no baths and whose heads and faces are strangers to all unguents from all accumulated dirt, and from the tiny creatures which are sometimes generated about the roots of the hair." (P. 292).

St. Jerome's Letters and Select Works (New York, Scribner, 1912).

317. PURITANISM

"The Puritan hated bear-baiting, not because it gave pain to the bear, but because it gave pleasure to the spectators."

Lord Macaulay, *History of England* (New York, Longmans Green, 1906), Vol. I, p. 80.

318. A FORMER RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE TOWARD PLAY

"The students [at Cokesbury (M. E.) College in 1788] shall be indulged with nothing which the world calls *play*. Let this rule be observed with the strictest nicety; for those who play when they are young, will play when they are old."

Discipline of the M. E. Church, 1792.

319. OTHERWORLDLINESS

“I’m but a stranger here, Heav’n is my home;
 Earth is a desert drear, Heav’n is my home.
 Danger and sorrow stand, Round me on every hand
 Heav’n is my fatherland, Heav’n is my home.”

Familiar hymn, Thomas Rawson Taylor, 1835.

320. RUSKIN ON THE GOOD

“There is no wealth but life.”

John Ruskin.

321. THE LIFE GOOD TO LIVE

“The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge.”

Bertrand Russell, *What I Believe* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Truebner, 1928), p. 28.

322. SIGNS OF UNSATISFACTORY LIFE

“A sense of desolation and uncertainty, of futility, of the groundlessness of aspirations, of the vanity of endeavor, and a thirst for a life-giving water which seems suddenly to have failed, are the signs in consciousness of this necessary reorganization of our lives.”

I. A. Richards, *Science and Poetry* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Truebner, 1926), p. 64.

323. THE GOOD LIFE AN ACHIEVEMENT

“From these considerations it follows that the good life is an achievement. It cannot be transmitted from one to another. It cannot be superimposed. It is not a gift of original nature. It is not an accident. It is an *end* to be discovered, to be desired, to be sought for in every relation and function of human living. Its techniques are to be acquired by understanding and mastery, just as any other of the major skills of effective living. It requires the utilization of every resource of intelligence, purpose, and executive action which the candidate for the good life possesses. In our total culture it overarches the building of cities, the subduing of continents, the framing of laws, and the

conquests of science. For what does it profit a civilization if it has acquired knowledge, developed technologies, built machines, and conquered the forces of nature if civilization has lost its soul and the life we have attained is not worth living?"

W. C. Bower, *Religion and the Good Life* (New York, Abingdon Press, 1933), pp. 35-36.

324. HU SHIH ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION

"The chief characteristic of Eastern civilizations is 'Contentment.' The chief characteristic of Western civilization is 'Discontent.' . . .

"On the one side there is quiet, acceptance of one's appointed lot, quiet acceptance of poverty, desire to please heaven, non-resistance, endurance of misery. On the other side there is dissatisfaction with one's appointed lot, dissatisfaction with poverty, unwillingness to endure misery, determined struggle, continuous improvement of the existing environment."

Hu Shih, *Our Attitude toward Modern Western Civilization* (Peking, Peking Leader Press, 1926), pp. 14, 13.

325. COMPTÉ ON THE GOOD

"The inventor of a new spinning-machine was a greater benefactor to humanity than Homer and all his poetry."

Quoted.

326. ON THE OMNIBUS TOP

"You will not wonder how much attraction all this is on a fine day, to a great loafer like me, who enjoys so much seeing the busy world move by him and exhibiting itself for his amusement, while he takes it easy and just looks on and observes."

Attributed to Walt Whitman.

327. LIVE IN EACH MOMENT

"As I got older, I became aware of the folly of this perpetual reaching after the future, and of drawing from tomorrow—and from tomorrow only—a reason for the joyfulness of today. I learned, when, alas! it was almost too late, to live in each moment as it passed over my head, believing that the sun as it is

now rising is as good as it ever will be, and blinding myself as much as possible to what may follow."

Mark Rutherford. Quoted in André Gide, *Dosloevsky* (New York, Knopf, 1926), p. 149.

328. "MORE PASSION OUR NEED"

"It is passion, more passion and fuller, that we need. The moralist who bans passion is not of our time; his place these many years is with the dead."

Havelock Ellis, *Little Essays of Love and Virtue* (New York, Doran, 1922), p. 61.

329. ONE OUTLOOK ON LIFE

"A myriad of men are born; they labor and sweat and struggle for bread; they squabble and scold and fight; they scramble for little mean advantages over each other. Age creeps upon them; infirmities follow; shames and humiliations bring down their prides and their vanities. Those they love are taken from them, and the joy of life is turned to aching grief. The burden of pain; care; misery; grows heavier year by year. At length ambition is dead; pride is dead; vanity is dead; longing for release is in their place. It comes at last—the only unpoisoned gift earth ever had for them—and they vanish from a world where they were of no consequence; where they achieved nothing; where they were a mistake and a failure and a foolishness; where they have left no sign that they have existed—a world which will lament them for a day, and forget them forever."

Attributed to Mark Twain.

330. GANDHI ON SACRIFICE AS THE LAW OF LIFE

"Suffering is the mark of the human tribe. It is an eternal law. The mother suffers so that her child may live. Life comes out of death. The condition of wheat growing is that the seed grain should perish. No country has ever risen without being purified through the fire of suffering. . . . It is impossible to do away with the law of suffering which is the one indispensable condition of our being. Progress is to be measured by the amount of suffering undergone. . . .

"I have ventured to place before India the ancient law of self-sacrifice, the law of suffering."

Romain Rolland, *Mahatma Gandhi* (Trans. by Groth. New York, Century, 1924), pp. 67-68.

331. ROMAIN ROLLAND: SACRIFICE IDIOTIC

"There never was anything so idiotic as this talk of sacrifice. Clergymen, in the poverty of their hearts, mix it up with a cramped and morose idea of Protestant gloom. . . . If a sacrifice means sorrow to you, and not joy, then don't do it; you are unworthy of it."

Romain Rolland, *Jean Christophe: Journey's End* (New York, Holt, 1913), p. 72.

332. LOSING ONE'S LIFE

"For whosoever would save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's shall save it."

Jesus (Mark 8:35, Am. Rev.).

333. TO BE HAPPY—THE WILL OF GOD

"Men are made for happiness, and anyone who is completely happy has a right to say to himself, 'I am doing God's will on earth.' "

Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov* (Trans. by Garnett. New York, Macmillan, 1929), p. 52.

334. AGAINST FRETFUL DESIRE

"There is in resignation a further good element: even real goods, when they are unattainable, ought not to be fretfully desired. To every man comes, sooner or later, the great renunciation. For the young, there is nothing unattainable; a good thing desired with the whole force of a passionate will, and yet impossible, is to them not credible. Yet, by death, by illness, by poverty, or by the voice of duty, we must learn, each one of us, that the world was not made for us, and that, however beautiful may be the things we crave, Fate may nevertheless forbid them. It is the part of courage, when misfortune comes, to bear without repining the ruin of our hopes, to turn away our

thoughts from vain regrets. This degree of submission to Power is not only just and right; it is the very gate of wisdom."

Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic* (New York, Norton, 1929), p. 52.

335. MATTHEW ARNOLD ON THE PHILISTINES

"Culture says: 'Consider these people [the Philistines, the merely rich], then, their ways of life, their habits, their manners, the very tones of their voice; look at them attentively; observe the literature they read, the things which give them pleasure, the words which come forth out of their mouths, the thoughts which make the furniture of their minds; would any amount of wealth be worth having with the condition that one was to become just like these people by having it?'"

Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy* (New York, Macmillan, 1912), p. 16.

336. LIVE IN THE PRESENT—DOING NOTHING

"‘Ah, my brother,’ said a chieftain to his white guest, ‘thou wilt never know the happiness of both thinking of nothing and doing nothing. This, next to sleep, is the most enchanting of all things. Thus we were before our birth, and thus we shall be after death. Thy people when they have finished reaping one field, they begin to plow another, and, if the day were not enough, I have seen them plough by moonlight. What is their life to ours,—the life that is as naught to them? Blind that they are, they lose it all! But we live in the present.’”

Anonymous.

337. FREEDOM DEPENDS ON ECONOMIC SECURITY

Socrates [speaking through Walter Lippmann]:

“When the necessities of life are secure, a man can begin to be free. We in Athens founded our freedom on chattel slavery. So I think did you. You have got to found it on something. If they can do it with machines and organization and wise laws, well and good. The point is that a man can only begin to be disinterested when he has ceased to be hungry and uncomfortable and frightened. I was free because I wanted so little. You were free because you wanted nothing more. But people are never free who want more than they can have. Their wants

create worries, their worries create prejudices, their prejudices demand guaranties, and under freedom of thought nothing is guaranteed."

Walter Lippmann, *American Inquisitors* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), pp. 48-49.

338. LLEWEYLON POWYS ON SEEKING PLEASURES

"Why should harmless gratifications be forbidden when the only purpose of life is to live and to live as richly as possible? . . . Our personal conduct should principally be regulated by the natural response of our being to each situation as it arises. Every action of ours should be directed by one aim, the happiness that will result from it. Imaginative sympathy is sufficient as our guide. These herd-inhibitions that hedge about conventional people are as often as not mean and harmful. . . .

"When Nature stirs in the throes of her own purposes, then woe to those who cast impediments in her way. It is from within, from the heart, that the binding-back must come. In every strong and healthy human being there is an inner knowledge of what it is good to do and what it is not good to do. Each circumstance of life is unique and has never been before and will never be again. It must be considered on its own merits without prejudice or preconception. . . .

"All that we see, all that we hear, all that we smell, all that we taste, and all that we feel, should be subject to an untiring appreciation. There should be no stint to our gusto and relish. . . .

"Oh, youth, youth, youth, fill your hands with the purple fruit while you are still abroad in the vineyards. Crush the sweet globes that the little foxes love. Crush them every one. Trust to your senses and never allow complicated reasonings to render you recreant to this great and ancient tradition. . . .

"We were wise to take well to heart the words on the old Roman's gravestone:

"I WAS NOTHING, I AM NOTHING, EAT BREAD, DRINK
WINE, MAKE LOVE, COME."

Llewelyn Powys, *Impassioned Clay* (New York, Longmans Green, 1931), pp. 103-4. 112-20.

339. GEORGE JEAN NATHAN ON THE GOOD LIFE

"To me, pleasure and my own personal happiness—only infrequently collaborating with that of others—are all I deem worth a hoot. . . .

"That I am selfish and, to a very considerable degree possibly offensive, is thus more or less regrettably obvious. All that I am able to offer in extenuation is that so are most other men if you dig down into them and, paying no attention to their altruistic pretensions, get at the hearts of them.

"In all my experience I have yet to find and know intimately a man worth his salt in any direction who did not think of himself first and foremost. He may drop a quarter into the hat of a beggar (when somebody is looking); he may have gracious manners; he may obey the punctilio on every occasion; he may be original and liberal and hearty; he may buy drinks when it comes his turn; he may be scrupulously polite, considerate, and superficially lovable. But under it all his first interest, his first consideration, and his first admiration are reserved for himself. The man who thinks of others before he thinks of himself may become a Grand Master of the Elks, a Socialist of parts or the star guest of honor at public banquets, but he will never become a great or successful artist, statesman, or even clergyman. . . .

"I am against all reforms and all reformers. The world, as I see it, is sufficiently gay, beautiful, and happy as it stands. It is defective only to those who are themselves defective, who lack the sagacity, imagination, humor, and wit to squeeze out its rich and jocose juices and go swimming in them. With Norman Douglas I agree: 'I am not the stuff of which reformers are made: rather than indulge in that variety of meddlesomeness I would sweep a crossing. Nine-tenths of the reformers of humanity have been mischief-makers or humbugs. I have no desire to be added to the list. A man who has reformed himself has contributed his full share towards the reformation of his neighbor.' . . .

"My code of life and conduct is simply this: work hard; play to the allowable limit; disregard equally the good or bad opinion of others; never do a friend a dirty trick; eat and drink

what you feel like when you feel like; never grow indignant over anything; trust to tobacco for calm and serenity; bathe twice a day; modify the æsthetic philosophy of Croce but slightly with that of Santayana and achieve for oneself a pragmatic sufficiency in the beauty of the æsthetic surface of life; learn to play at least one musical instrument and then play it only in private; never allow oneself even a passing thought of death; never contradict anyone or seek to prove anything to anyone unless one gets paid for it in cold, hard coin; live the moment to the utmost of its possibilities; treat one's enemies with polite inconsideration; avoid persons who are chronically in need; and be satisfied with life always, but never with oneself."

George Jean Nathan, "What I Believe," in *The Forum*, 84:354-57 (Dec. 1930).

340. HIGHEST HAPPINESS

"We can only have the highest happiness, such as goes with being a great man, by having wide thoughts, and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good."

George Eliot, *Romola* (Garden City, Doubleday Page, 1901), p. 209.

341. THE MORE CONTROL THE HIGHER THE ORGANISM AND THE MORE OF LIFE

"All living is a creative process. And its value to the organism and to the community in which one lives is measured by the efficiency of the internal controls. Those organisms, including those persons who are able to adjust themselves to their environments in more diversified ways, to assimilate into their own personal organizations more different kinds of things (material, dynamic, intellectual, æsthetic, or whatever), to exhibit more diversified and appropriate behavior in every situation, and to modify their behavior more readily after untoward experiences—such organisms we call higher. They live more and

they live better. They are more successful in what Stevenson happily calls 'the continent art of living well.' "

C. Judson Herrick, *Fatalism or Freedom* (New York, Norton, 1926), p. 25.

342. JAMES ON IGNORING BAD FEELINGS

"The sovereign voluntary path to cheerfulness, if our spontaneous cheerfulness be lost, is to sit up cheerfully, to look around cheerfully, and to act and speak as if cheerfulness were already there. If such conduct does not make you soon feel cheerful, nothing else on that occasion can. So to feel brave, act as if we *were* brave, use all our will to that end, and a courage-fit will very likely replace the fit of fear. Again, in order to feel kindly toward a person to whom we have been inimical, the only way is more or less deliberately to smile, to make sympathetic inquiries, and to force ourselves to say genial things. One hearty laugh together will bring enemies into a closer communion of heart than hours spent on both sides in inward wrestling with the mental demon of uncharitable feeling. To wrestle with a bad feeling only pins our attention on it, and keeps it still fastened in the mind: whereas, if we act as if from some better feeling, the old bad feeling soon folds its tent like an Arab, and silently steals away."

William James, *On Vital Reserves* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 45-46.

343. HAPPINESS FOUND ONLY IN SUCCESS

"Happiness is not, however, a bare possession; it is not a fixed attainment. Such a happiness is either the unworthy selfishness which moralists have so bitterly condemned, or it is, even if labelled bliss, an insipid tedium, a millennium of ease in relief from all struggle and labor. It could satisfy only the most delicate of molly-coddles. Happiness is found only in success; but success means succeeding, getting forward, moving in advance. It is an active process, not a passive outcome. Accordingly it includes the overcoming of obstacles, the elimination of sources of defect and ill. Ästhetic sensitiveness and enjoyment are a large constituent in any worthy happiness."

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1920), pp. 179-80.

344. A STATIC LIFE INTOLERABLE

"Desire, activity, purpose, are essential to a tolerable life, and a millennium, though it may be a joy in prospect, would be intolerable if it were actually achieved."

Bertrand Russell, *Why Men Fight* (New York, Century, 1917), p. 138.

345. THE STRUGGLE ELEMENT IN LIFE

"A life absolutely free from pain and fear would, so long as we are what we are, soon become insipid and intolerable. For if the causes of pain were eliminated, life would be devoid of all danger, conflict, and failure, exertion and struggle, the love of adventure, the longing for battle, the triumph of victory, all would be gone. Life would be pure satisfaction without obstacles, success without resistance. We should grow as tired of all this as we do of a game which we know we are going to win. What chess player would be willing to play with an opponent whom he knows he will beat? What hunter would enjoy a chase in which he had a chance to shoot at every step he took, and every shot was bound to hit? Uncertainty, difficulty, and failure are as necessary in a game, if it is to interest and satisfy us, as good luck and victory."

Friedrich Paulsen, *System of Ethics* (Trans. by Thilly. New York, Scribner, 1899), p. 260.

346. DAWDLING

"Next to the youth who has no calling, he is most to be pitied who toils without heart, and is therefore forever dawdling—loitering and lingering, instead of striking with all his might."

William Mathews, *Getting On in the World* (Chicago, Griggs, 1883), p. 165.

347. HAPPINESS AND MONEY

"The man who worships money has ceased to hope for happiness through his own efforts or in his own activities: he looks upon happiness as a passive enjoyment of pleasures derived from the outside world. The artist or the lover does not worship money in his moments of ardor, because his desires are specific and directed towards objects which only he can create. And,

conversely, the worshipper of money can never achieve greatness as an artist or lover."

Bertrand Russell, *Why Men Fight* (New York, Century, 1917), p. 118.

348. A SATISFYING CIVILIZATION

"What human nature . . . demands in civilization, if it is to stand as a high end and satisfying civilization, is best described by the word *interesting*. Here is the extraordinary charm of the old Greek civilization: that it is so *interesting*."

Matthew Arnold, *Civilization in the United States* (Boston, DeWolfe Fiske, 1888), p. 170.

349. INTEREST IN WORK AND DESIRE FOR EXCITEMENT

"From the outset [in Germany], and through much of the unsophisticated later course of this industrial era, both the men in charge and the body of workmen appear to have taken a lively interest in industrial, perhaps especially technological, concerns of all kinds. One consequence of this naïve attitude toward their work being that they have had no crying need of systematic diversion, in the way of sports, cabals, sensational newspapers, drunkenness, political campaigns, religious dissension, and the like. Also, from the same cause, the relative absence of ennui, there was not the same need of vacations and occasional holidays as in those more mature industrial communities where industrial concerns and technological information has grown stale in men's taste from long familiarity and conventional irksomeness."

Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (New York, Macmillan, 1915), p. 191.

350. HEART-PRIDE IN ONE'S WORK

"I once knew [in Japan] a workman—one who was paid by the job, not the hour—to voluntarily undo half a day's work, at the cost of much heavy lifting, just to alter, by a few inches, the position of a stepping-stone in a garden. After it was placed to his satisfaction, he wiped the perspiration from his face, then took out his tiny pipe, and squatted down, near by, to waste still more unpaid-for-time in gazing at the re-set stone, with pleasure and satisfaction in every line of his kindly old face.

"As I thought of the old man, I wondered if it was worthwhile to exchange the delight of heart-pride in one's work for—*anything*. My mind mounted from the gardner to workman, teacher, statesman. It is the same with all. To degrade one's pride—to loose one's hold on the best, after having had it—is death to the soul growth of man or nation."

Etsu Inagaki Sugimoto, *A Daughter of the Samurai* (Garden City, Doubleday Page, 1925), p. 195.

351. EAGERNESS AND LIFE

"Wherever a process of life communicates an eagerness to him who lives it, there the life becomes genuinely significant. Sometimes the eagerness is more knit up with the motor activities, sometimes with the perceptions, sometimes with the imagination, sometimes with reflective thought. But, wherever it is found, there is the zest, the tingle, the excitement of reality; and there is 'importance' in the only real and positive sense in which importance ever anywhere can be."

William James, *Talks to Teachers* (New York, Holt, 1900), p. 234.

352. HAPPINESS

"The emotional accompaniment of the progressive growth of a course of action, a continual movement of expansion and achievement, is happiness."

John Dewey, *Interest and Effort in Education* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1913), p. 35.

353. A CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

"So act as to increase the meaning of present experience."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), p. 283.

354. WESTERN WAYS TO A JAPANESE GIRL

"The [Western] teachers, whether working, playing, laughing, or even reproving, were a continual surprise. In my home, surprises had been infrequent. People bowed, walked, talked, and smiled exactly as they had bowed, walked, talked, and smiled yesterday, and the day before, and in all past time. But these astonishing teachers were never the same. They changed so

unexpectedly in voice and manner with each person to whom they spoke, that their very changeableness was a refreshing attraction."

Etsu Inagaki Sugimoto, *A Daughter of the Samurai* (Garden City, Doubleday Page, 1925), p. 138.

355. LESSING ON THE EVER-ACTIVE STRIVING AFTER TRUTH

"Not through the possession but through the pursuit of truth comes that widening of a man's powers by which alone is achieved his ever-growing perfection. Possession makes one stagnant, lazy, proud. If God were to hold in His right hand all truth, and in His left hand the single ever-active striving after truth with the certainty of ever and always erring, and say to me, 'Choose!' I should humbly reach toward His left hand, saying, 'Father, give me this! pure truth belongs to Thee alone!'"

Lessing, *Werke* (Zscharnack ed.), Vol. 23, "Theologische Schriften," IV, 1, pp. 58-59.

356. VARIETY

"Variety's the very spice of life."

William Cowper, *The Task*, line 606.

357. A FINITE UNIVERSE AND A DULL FUTURE

"It is not easy to believe that another quarter century or less can ever carry us quite so fast or so far. Indeed, if change at this rate got to be a habit, the human race would exhaust every possible innovation and invention in another century or two and the last few million years of its existence on earth might be rather dull."

Editorial comment on Mark Sullivan's "Our Times: the United States, 1900-1925," in *New York Times*, Dec. 5, 1930.

358. THE JADED EMOTIONAL STATE FROM INDUSTRIAL MONOTONY

"Perhaps the most insidious [by-product of current industrialism] is the jaded emotional state, seldom consciously recognized, that results from industrial monotony and denial of personal initiative. The fatigue-poisoned mind and body, too

dull to enjoy quiet beauty and true thought, crave the crude excitements so abused among us: restless speeding in motor cars from nowhere to nowhere; the rapid movements and trivial but exciting physical dangers of the amusement park; superlatives and exaggerations in talk; the artificial stimulants and feverish pumped-up gaiety of the 'wild party'; the 'thrills' so insistently demanded by the younger generation; violent plastic arts using harsh angles and garish colors; noisy, mechanical, over-accented music. The 'jazz-age,' in a word, is a jaded and joyless age, incapable of the happy serenity of creative leisure."

Daniel Gregory Mason, *The Dilemma of American Music* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), pp. 210f.

359. THORNDIKE ON THE TENDENCY TO NOVEL EXPERIENCE

"Merely to have sensations is, other things being equal, satisfying to man. Mental emptiness is one of his great annoyers." Man craves stimulation though no immediate gratification of any more practical want follows such action. "Novel experiences are to him their own sufficient reward."

And this interest in novel experience is not simply of direct sense stimulation. It may come as truly from more remote connections. "For example, a baby likes not only to see a pile of blocks tumble or a wheel go around, but also to find the blocks tumbling *when he hits them*, or the wheel revolving *when he pushes a spring*. Satisfactions of the second sort are, indeed, if anything the more potent. Merely hearing the toot of a horn is a feeble joy compared to blowing it. Now 'tumbling when I hit them,' 'whirling when I push,' 'tooting when I blow' are samples of these remoter connections." These tendencies to join old ways of thinking and doing in new ways take many, many forms and thus constitute a principal basis for growth and progress.

Adapted from Edward L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology* (New York, Teachers College, 1913), Vol. I, p. 141.

360. INDULGENCE

"Any power, whether of child or adult, is indulged when it is taken on its given and present level in consciousness. Its

genuine meaning is in the propulsion it affords toward a higher level. It is just something to do with. Appealing to the interest upon the present plane means excitation; it means playing with a power so as continually to stir it up without directing it toward definite achievement."

John Dewey, *The Child and the Curriculum* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1902), p. 21.

361. FREEDOM

Freedom is the "release of capacity from whatever hems it in."

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1920), pp. 207f.

362. WORDSWORTH ON POETRY

"The appropriate business of poetry (which, nevertheless, if genuine, is as permanent as pure science), her appropriate employment, her privilege and her *duty*, is to treat of things not as they *are*, but as they *appear*; not as they exist in themselves, but as they *seem* to exist to the *senses* and to the *passions*."

William Wordsworth, *Essay Supplementary to Preface, 1815-45.*

363. A DEFINITION OF THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

"The aesthetic experience is one in which, to use the words of Walter Pater, 'Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end.' . . .

"In sum: beauty is experience become significant as experience. Beauty is an unique relationship existing between a perceiving subject and a perceived object, the uniqueness consisting in the fact that the subject is completely immersed in the active contemplation of the object as object, a pure form, the subject thus existing in a state of complete intellectual and affective detachment from the world of facts or ideas that are outside the object present to mind. Such experience or activity is intrinsic, disinterested, objective, significant as form, psychically distanced, therefore reposeful, and therefore also cathartic. On the other hand, when experience or activity becomes sig-

nificant because of its consequences it is practical. Such experience or activity is extrinsic, interested, subjective, significant as meaning, psychically close, therefore restless and troublesome. And when practical experience becomes obnoxious, repugnant, it is ugly. Beauty is, in a word, pure experience. And whenever such experience is aroused by some object or phenomenon in nature, that object or phenomenon is termed beautiful. Whenever such experience is aroused by any product of man that product is called an art work."

Max Schoen, *Art and Beauty* (New York, Macmillan, 1932), pp. 147-49.

364. PLACE OF ART IN LIFE

"To feel the meaning of what one is doing and to rejoice in that meaning, to unite in one concurrent fact the unfolding of the inner emotional life and the ordered development of material external conditions—that is art. The external signs of its presence—rhythm, symmetry, arrangement of values, what you please—these things are signs of art in which they exhibit the union of joyful thought and control of nature. Otherwise they are dead and mechanical.

"Art, in a word, is industry unusually conscious of its own meaning—adequately conscious, emotionally and intellectually. In the impact of economic life under present conditions, there is slender opportunity for such consciousness—hence our art itself is corrupt with the separation of beauty from use, of leisure from work."

John Dewey, "Culture and Industry in Education," reprinted in *Teachers College Bulletin*, Tenth Series, No. 10 (Mar. 1, 1919), p. 17.

365. ART AS RELEASE INTO CHANGE

"A static value, however serious and important, becomes unendurable by its appalling monotony of endurance. The soul cries aloud for release into change. It suffers the agonies of claustrophobia. The transitions of humor, wit, irreverence, play, sleep, and—above all—of art are necessary for it. Great art is the arrangement of the environment so as to provide for the soul vivid, but transient, values. Human beings require something which absorbs them for a time, something out of the

routine which they can stare at. But you cannot subdivide life, except in the abstract analysis of thought. Accordingly, the great art is more than a transient refreshment. It is something which adds to the permanent richness of the soul's self-attainment. It justifies itself both by its immediate enjoyment, and also by its discipline of the inmost being. Its discipline is not distinct from enjoyment, but by reason of it. It transforms the soul into the permanent realization of values extending beyond its former self."

Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), p. 283.

366. ART

"The highest because most complete incorporation of natural forces and operations in experience is found in art. . . . Art is a process of production in which natural materials are reshaped in a projection toward consummatory fulfillment through regulation of trains of events that occur in a less regulated way on lower levels of nature. Art is 'fine' in the degree in which ends, the final termini, of natural processes are dominant and conspicuously enjoyed. All art is instrumental in its use of techniques and tools. It is shown that normal artistic experience involves bringing to a better balance than is found elsewhere in either nature or experience the consummatory and instrumental phases of events. Art thus represents the culminating event of nature as well as the climax of experience."

John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York, Norton, 1929), pp. viii-ix.

367. ART IN RELATION TO THE INSTRUMENTAL AND CONSUMMATOR

"Distinctly fine art . . . occurs when activity is productive of an object which affords continuously renewed delight. This condition requires that the object be, with its successive consequences, indefinitely instrumental to new satisfying events. For otherwise the object is quickly exhausted and satiety sets in. Anyone who reflects upon the commonplace that a measure of artistic products is their capacity to attract and retain ob-

servation with satisfaction under whatever conditions they are approached, has a sure demonstration that a genuinely æsthetic object is not exclusively consummatory, but is causally productive as well. A consummatory object that is not also instrumental turns in time to the dust and ashes of boredom. The 'eternal' quality of great art is its renewed instrumentality for further consummatory experiences.

"When this fact is noted it is also seen that limitation of fineness of art to paintings, statues, poems, songs, and symphonies is conventional, or even verbal. Any activity that is productive of objects whose perception is an immediate good, and whose operation is a continual source of enjoyable perception of other events, exhibits fineness of art. There are acts of all kinds that directly refresh and enlarge the spirit and that are instrumental to the production of new objects and dispositions which are in turn productive of further refinements and replenishments. . . . In being predominantly fructifying the things designated means are immediately satisfying. They are their own excuses for being just because they are charged with an office in quickening apprehension, enlarging the horizon of vision, refining discrimination, creating standards of appreciation which are confirmed and deepened by further experiences. It would almost seem that when their non-instrumental character is insisted on what is meant were an indefinitely expansive and radiating instrumental efficacy."

John Dewey, in *Art and Education* (New York, Barnes Foundation Press, 1929), pp. 7-8.

368. JOHN ADAMS' RELIGION

"Allegiance to the Creator and the Governor of the Milky Way, and the Nebulæ, and benevolence to all His creatures, is my Religion."

John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, November 15, 1813.

369. A RELIGION WITH COSMIC BACKING

"Religion is a consciousness which comes to the dutiful, to the loyal, to those who are true to the highest values they know, that in being thus dutiful and loyal to their values, they are

doing what they were meant and appointed to do, and are putting themselves in line with the Eternal and have his backing behind them."

John Baillie, *The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul* (New York, Doran, 1926), pp. 112-13.

370. RELIGION AN ESSENTIAL ORGAN OF LIFE

"When all is said and done, we are in the end absolutely dependent on the universe; and into sacrifices and surrenders of some sort, deliberately looked at and accepted, we are drawn and pressed as into our only permanent positions of repose. Now in those states of mind which fall short of religion, the surrender is submitted to as an imposition of necessity, and the sacrifice is undergone at the very best without complaint. In the religious life, on the contrary, surrender and sacrifice are positively espoused: even unnecessary givings-up are added in order that the happiness may increase. *Religion thus makes easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary;* and if it be the only agency that can accomplish this result, its vital importance as a human faculty stands vindicated beyond dispute. It becomes an essential organ of life, performing a function which no other portion of our nature can so successfully fulfill."

William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York, Longmans Green, 1902), pp. 51-52.

371. WHITEHEAD ON RELIGION

"Above and beyond all things, the religious life is not a research after comfort. . . .

"Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest."

Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), pp. 267-68.

372. HOCKING'S DEFINITION OF RELIGION

"Religion is man's intuition of his destiny to have commerce with the ultimate powers of the world, and the impulse which accompanies that intuition. It nerves him to the audacious effort to match his thought against the whole of things, and to make that whole an object of contemplative enjoyment."

W. E. Hocking, *The Self: Its Body and Freedom* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1928), p. 5.

373. RELIGION

"I propose to define religion as: A sum of scruples which impede the free exercise of our faculties."

Solomon Reinach, *Orpheus: A General History of Religions* (Trans. by Simmonds. New York, Putnam, 1909), p. 3.

374. NATIONALITY A MODERN RELIGION

"Devotion to the nation is perhaps the deepest and most wide-spread religion of the present age."

Bertrand Russell, *Why Men Fight* (New York, Century, 1917), p. 116.

375. THE EFFECT OF BUDDHISM IN JAPAN

"Buddhism . . . furnished a sense of calm trust in Fate, a quiet submission to the inevitable, that stoic composure in sight of danger or calamity, that disdain of life and friendliness with death."

Inazo Nitobe, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan* (New York, Putnam, 1905), p. 11.

376. THE NEED FOR STABLE OBJECTS OF ALLEGIANCE

"The loyalties which once held individuals, which gave them support, direction, and unity of outlook on life, have well-nigh disappeared. In consequence, individuals are confused and bewildered. It would be difficult to find in history an epoch as lacking in solid and assured objects of belief and approved ends of action as is the present. Stability of individuality is dependent upon stable objects to which allegiance firmly attaches itself. There are, of course, those who are still militantly fundamental-

ist in religious and social creed. But their very clamor is evidence that the tide is set against them. For the others, traditional objects of loyalty have become hollow or are openly repudiated, and they drift without sure anchorage. Individuals vibrate between a past that is intellectually too empty to give stability and a present that is too diversely crowded and chaotic to afford balance or direction to ideas and emotion."

John Dewey, *Individualism Old and New* (New York, Minton Balch, 1930), pp. 52-53.

377. METHODS OF INQUIRY A BASIS OF REST AND PEACE

"The craving of human beings for something solid and unshakable upon which to rest is ultimate and unappeasable. . . .

"Two things are equally inept. One is to forget that human nature must have something upon which to rest; the other is to fancy that one's own preferred foundation-stones are the only things that will bring stability and security to others. . . .

"Those traditionalists and literalists who have arrogated to themselves the title of fundamentalists recognize of course no mean between their dogmas and blank, dark, hopeless uncertainty and unsettlement. Until they have been reborn into the life of intelligence, they will not be aware that there are a steadily increasing number of persons who find security in *methods* of inquiry, of observation, experiment, of forming and following working hypotheses. Such persons are not unsettled by the upsetting of any special belief, because they retain security of procedure. They can say, borrowing language from another context, though this method slay my most cherished belief, yet will I trust it. The growth of this sense, even if only half-consciously, is the cause of the increased indifference of large numbers of persons to organized religion. It is not that they are especially excited about this or that doctrine, but that the guardianship of truth seems to them to have passed over to the *method* of attaining and testing beliefs. In this latter fundamental they rest in intellectual and emotional peace."

John Dewey, *Characters and Events* (New York, Holt, 1929). Vol. II, pp. 453-57.

378. THE FUNCTION OF FAITH

We shall not adequately grasp the function of faith until we see its connection with the unpredictable aspect of life. The on-going stream of experience continually brings the unexpected to upset our plans and thwart our efforts. At best we have but limited knowledge and control. There is, however, a region within which effort itself is the crucial factor as to whether we shall control. Of this region the metes and bounds are not known in advance. In fact, they are fixed in part by effort. Here attitude counts. He who is faint-hearted attempts too little and so achieves less than he might. The firm-hearted seizes upon the basis of hope and on it hazards effectual effort. He it is who does the most that man can do. And this is faith, that a man should see with clear eye what basis there is for hope and by his resolved will make the most of that hope through zealous effort. Such choice and will are real factors to create. In the final sum of results such faith does effect.

William H. Kilpatrick, unpublished ms.

379. RELIGIOUS CERTITUDE IN SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE

"If science has robbed religion of many of its certitudes, those certitudes were in a sphere improper to religion. True religious certitude is not in the realm of intellect at all, but concerns values and a special attitude towards them. Science has evicted religion from the universal but uneasy throne she occupied in the Middle Ages, but she has helped her to ascend her true and permanent throne of spiritual experience."

Julian Huxley, *What Dare I Think?* (New York, Harper, 1931), p. 127.

380. SUPERNATURAL CREATOR NO EXPLANATION

"The popular idea of creation involves us in such insuperable difficulties that no philosophers—except as they have been subject to theologic influence—have maintained it. The scientific study of nature since the Greeks has always analyzed natural production as a transformation which requires previously existing material. Creation *ex nihilo* has no support in such study. Nor does it really explain anything to say that the animate or inanimate world began by an avowedly incomprehensible and

supernatural act. If you need a creator in time to answer the question who made the world, you are bound to face the question who made the creator, and so on ad infinitum. It seems therefore intellectually safer to limit ourselves (as regards production) to the infinite chain of natural events and to the relations which we can discover in it."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), pp. 288-89.

381. NO INTENTIONAL KINDNESS IN THE WORLD ORDER

"To ascribe kindness to the world order is a figure of speech. Nature, in many aspects, may be of support and benefit to man without giving him the slightest reason for attributing the bounties received to an interested intention. Speaking with a sense of responsibility for the meaning of words, we are forced to admit that we have no evidence whatsoever of the existence in the material world of any regard for human affairs."

M. C. Otto, *Natural Laws and Human Hopes* (New York, Holt, 1926), p. 76.

382. A BUDDHIST CONFESSION OF FAITH

"I am old and I am a woman, and it is not to be expected that a woman will know much of such subjects, but I will tell you what thoughts I have. I am weak and sinful, and have no hope in myself; my hope is all in Amida Buddha. I believe him to be the Supreme Being. Because of the wickedness of man, and because of human sorrow, Amida Buddha became incarnate and came to the earth to deliver man; and my hope and the world's hope is to be found only in his suffering love. He has entered humanity to save it; and he alone can save. He constantly watches over and helps all who trust in him. I am not in a hurry to die, but I am ready when my time comes; and I trust that through the gracious love of Amida Buddha I shall then enter into the future life which I believe to be a state of conscious existence, and where I shall be free from sorrow. I believe that he hears prayers, and that he has guided me thus far, and my hope is only in his suffering love."

Quoted in Tasuku Harada, *The Faith of Japan* (New York, Macmillan, 1914), pp. 103-4.

CHAPTER IX

RIGHT AND WRONG

383. ABSOLUTE RIGHT

“Because right is right, to follow right
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence.”

Tennyson, *Oenone*.

384. GOD'S WILL DECIDES RIGHT AND WRONG

“God does not require actions because they are right, but they are right because He requires them, just as others are evil because He forbids them.”

Quoted from “a contemporary churchman” by Durant Drake, in *The New Morality* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), p. 5.

385. CARDINAL NEWMAN ON SIN

“The Church holds that it were better for sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions who are upon it to die of starvation in extremest agony, than that one soul should commit one venial sin, should tell one willful untruth, though it harmed no one, or steal one poor farthing without excuse.”

Quoted by William Ralph Inge, in *More Lay Thoughts of a Dean* (New York, Putnam, 1932), p. 47.

386. POPE PIUS XI ON BIRTH CONTROL

“No reason, however grave, may be put forward by which anything intrinsically against nature may become conformable to nature and morally good. Since, therefore, the conjugal act is destined primarily by nature for the begetting of children, those who in exercising it deliberately frustrate its natural

power and purpose sin against nature and commit a deed which is shameful and intrinsically vicious."

Pope Pius XI, in *Four Great Encyclicals* (New York, Paulist Press, 1931), p. 91.

387. MARTINEAU ON THE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE OF RIGHT AND WRONG

"It is not, however, from the scene around us that we learn the nature of right and wrong; but from our own self-consciousness. Thither we must retreat, if we would consult the true and primitive oracle of God's will upon this matter."

James Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1889), p. 66.

388. NIETZSCHE ON MASTER-MORALITY AND SLAVE-MORALITY

"The distinctions of moral values have either originated in a ruling caste, pleasantly conscious of being different from the ruled—or among the ruled class, the slaves and dependents of all sorts. In the first case, when it is the rulers who determine the conception 'good,' it is the exalted, proud disposition which is regarded as the distinguishing feature, and that which determines the order of rank. The noble type of man separates from himself the beings in whom the opposite of this exalted, proud disposition displays itself: he despises them. . . . The noble type of man regards *himself* as a determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: 'What is injurious to me is injurious in itself'; he knows that it is he himself only who confers honor on things; he is a *creator of values*. He honors whatever he recognizes in himself: such morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of plenitude, of power, which seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and bestow:—the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not—or scarcely—out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the super-abundance of power. . . . The profound reverence for age and for tradition—all law rests on this double reverence,—the belief and prejudice in favor of ancestors and unfavorable to newcomers, is typical in the morality of the powerful; and if, reversely, men of 'mod-

ern 'ideas' believe almost instinctively in 'progress' and the 'future,' and are more and more lacking in respect for old age, the ignoble origin of these 'ideas' has complacently betrayed itself thereby. A morality of the ruling class, however, is more especially foreign and irritating to present-day taste in the sternness of its principle that one has duties only to one's equals; that one may act towards beings of a lower rank, towards all that is foreign, just as seems good to one, or 'as the heart desires,' and in any case 'beyond good and evil.' . . .

It is otherwise with the second type of morality, *slave-morality*. . . . Those qualities which serve to alleviate the existence of sufferers are brought into prominence and flooded with light; it is here that sympathy, the kind, helping hand, the warm heart, patience, diligence, humility, and friendliness attain to honor; for here these are the most useful qualities, and almost the only means of supporting the burden of existence. Slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility."

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (Trans. by Zimmern. New York, Modern Library, no date. 1st ed. 1885), pp. 201-3.

389. A NATURAL SCIENCE VIEW OF MORALITY

"Man exists as a natural and necessary product of universal forces and, like other organic beings, obeys the law of self-expression. . . . It is also a matter of fact that, in pursuing its own interests, every organism constantly finds itself in the presence of other organisms whose interests and welfare cannot but conflict with its own; whence results a struggle wherein the inferior organism must succumb and the superior organism survive and propagate. Whether this condition of affairs be repulsive or shocking, and whether it 'ought' to be different from what it is, are questions no longer to be asked, once we have discarded the old idea of an arbitrary will governing the phenomena of nature. . . .

"If I consult or scrutinize my conscience, I find that it is a sort of ghost whose authority is derived from the servility and slavery of my ancestors and whose 'imperative dictates' are the echoes of a state of oppression and superstition against which my present feelings of freedom protest and revolt. I

recognize no claims of others on me, no conscience, no obligation. I am my own master."

Antonio Llano, "Morality the Last of Dogmas," in *Philosophical Review* 5:379-83 (July 1896).

390. NO RULES FOR CONDUCT

"Your Washington was willing to shed blood in order to defy the constituted authorities. Your Lincoln was willing to shed blood to uphold the constituted authorities. They have both been justified. There can be no rule of conduct. That which brave men do with wisdom lesser men make rules to justify."

Walter Lippmann, *American Inquisitors* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), p. 110.

391. THE PLACE OF MORALS

"Morals has to do with all activity into which alternative possibilities enter. For wherever they enter a difference between better and worse arises. Reflection upon action means uncertainty and consequent need of decision as to which course is better. The better is the good; the best is not better than the good but is simply the discovered good. Comparative and superlative degrees are only paths to the positive degree of action. The worse or evil is a rejected good. In deliberation and before choice no evil presents itself as evil. Until it is rejected, it is a competing good. After rejection, it figures not as a lesser good, but as the bad of that situation.

"Actually then only deliberate action, conduct into which reflective choice enters, is distinctively moral, for only then does there enter the question of better and worse."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 278-79.

392. THE PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS

"Since human conduct is in the last analysis dependent upon the postures and manœuvres of our muscle-fabric, he who would understand ethics must first comprehend something of the mechanics of the human organism. Indeed, this book attempts to show, not only that ethics and physiology can no longer be

studied apart from one another, but also that it is the structure and functions of the human body which have determined just what our ethical values are. . . .

"The well-being of the physiological organism is the final criterion of whatever is ethically valuable. . . .

"The trend of ethical thought has been continually growing more and more mechanistic."

Robert Chenault Givler, *The Ethics of Hercules* (New York, Knopf, 1924), pp. i-iii.

393. THE ABSOLUTE NATURE OF HONESTY

"When we say that 'honesty is the best policy,' we are thinking of it in terms of something else, commanding it, not as honesty, but as expediency. But honesty is not expediency; it is a moral quality, simply itself, and to be desired for itself; and if you think of it as expediency, you cease to know what it is. So if you tell a boy that honesty is the best policy, you tell him what is often untrue. He finds out for himself soon enough that it is not always the best policy; and he may prefer policy to honesty, because he has never been taught what honesty is, nor why he should prefer it to dishonesty. What he needs to be taught is that there is in him a spirit which desires honesty for its own sake and not for any other reason whatever. This is a fact about his own nature of which education should make him fully conscious, and which he can prove to himself by experiment. If he will try to be honest for the sake of honesty, he will find that the spirit in him is satisfied; but it never will be satisfied by any kind of morality pursued for any other reason. If he thinks of morality in terms of something else, it will cease to be morality to him, and his spirit will not be satisfied with it."

Arthur Clutton-Brock, *The Ultimate Belief* (London, Constable, 1916), pp. 25-26.

394. DANGER FROM PRINCIPLES

"There is no danger in any state so great as that of men with principles. They don't try to do good but to be in the right; no sufferings trouble them."

Romain Rolland, *Danton*, Act I, sc. 2.

395. GOLDEN RULE AS A TOOL OF ANALYSIS

"We sometimes hear it stated . . . that the universal adoption of the Golden Rule would at once settle all industrial disputes and difficulties. But supposing that the principle were accepted in good faith by everybody; it would not at once tell everybody just what to do in all the complexities of his relations to others. When individuals are still uncertain of what their real good may be, it does not finally decide matters to tell them to regard the good of others as they would their own. Nor does it mean that whatever in detail we want for ourselves we should strive to give to others. Because I am fond of classical music it does not follow that I should thrust as much of it as possible upon my neighbors. But the 'Golden Rule' does furnish us a *point of view from which to consider acts*; it suggests the necessity of considering how our acts affect the interests of others as well as our own; it tends to prevent partiality of regard; it warns against setting an undue estimate upon a particular consequence of pain or pleasure, simply because it happens to affect us."

John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics* (New York, Holt, 1908), p. 334.

396. THE NATURE AND VALUE OF PRINCIPLES

"It is clear that all principles are empirical generalizations from the ways in which previous judgments of conduct have practically worked out. When this fact is apparent, these generalizations will be seen to be not fixed rules for deciding doubtful cases, but instrumentalities for their investigation, methods by which the net value of past experience is rendered available for present scrutiny of new perplexities. Then it will also follow that they are hypotheses to be tested and revised by their further working."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 240-41.

397. DANGERS OF AUTHORITARIAN MORALITY

"The ascription of morality to supernatural sources is not only irrelevant, it is dangerous. For a supposedly supernatural

morality is above criticism and resists improvement. The fact that the God pictured in the Old Testament incites his Chosen People to invade and take possession of the land of a neighboring people, and takes their side in their battles, has made the condemnation of war far more difficult for the Christian world than, for example, for the Buddhists. The picture of the terrible fate that awaits unbelievers, together with such texts as 'Constrain them to come in,' and 'Gather up the tares in bundles and burn them,' served for generations to justify the persecution and martyrdom of the more promising and daring liberal thinkers. The text 'A witch shall not live' made it possible to torment and put to death many a harmless old soul. Such verses as 'I suffer not a woman to teach . . . but to be in silence,' have had great influence in perpetuating the subjection of women. In our day Bible texts and ecclesiastical pronouncements claiming divine authority serve to impede the free discussion of such important matters as divorce and birth control.

"In short, authoritarian morality is blindfolded morality. Not being founded upon a study of the consequences of conduct, it is not open to correction by the sight of disastrous results. It may be exploited by fanatics and schemers, as when it was made to sanction the Crusades, and later the Inquisition. In our day it is interfering with education (as in the anti-evolution bills) and preventing multitudes from learning important facts about human life."

Durant Drake, *The New Morality* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), pp. 8-9.

398. BASIS OF MORALITY NOT OPINION BUT FACT

"A good deed is not made good by the fact that an individual or a community *judges* it good, *approves* it, or *imposes* it. It is a matter not of opinion but of fact. A deed is good if it is the sort of deed that has good results; whether any one recognizes it as good is quite secondary. Any act that is of the sort to have harmful results is a bad act, whether or not any one condemns it. The purpose of considering moral problems is precisely to adjust our opinions to facts, to consider in detail what consequences various types of conduct have, and to develop in ourselves an approval for conduct which has good consequences

and a disapproval of conduct which we find to be, in the end, harmful."

Durant Drake, *The New Morality* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), p. 18.

399. MORALS BASED ON A STUDY OF HUMAN NATURE

"Morals based upon concern with facts and deriving guidance from knowledge of them would at least locate the points of effective endeavor and would focus available resources upon them. It would put an end to the impossible attempt to live in two unrelated worlds. It would destroy fixed distinction between the human and the physical, as well as that between the moral and the industrial and political. A morals based on study of human nature instead of upon disregard for it would find the facts of man continuous with those of the rest of nature and would thereby ally ethics with physics and biology. It would find the nature and activities of one person coterminous with those of other human beings, and therefore link ethics with the study of history, sociology, law, and economics.

"Such a morals would not automatically solve moral problems, nor resolve perplexities. But it would enable us to state problems in such forms that action could be courageously and intelligently directed to their solution. It would not assure us against failure, but it would render failure a source of instruction. It would not protect us against the future emergence of equally serious moral difficulties, but it would enable us to approach the always recurring troubles with a fund of growing knowledge which would add significant values to our conduct even when we overtly failed—as we should continue to do. Until the integrity of morals with human nature and of both with the environment is recognized, we shall be deprived of the aid of past experience to cope with the most acute and deep problems of life. . . . The intelligent acknowledgment of the continuity of nature, man, and society will alone secure a growth of morals which will be serious without being fanatical, aspiring without sentimentality, adapted to reality without conventionality, sensible without taking the form of calculation of profits, idealistic without being romantic."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 12-13.

400. THE IDEAL SOCIAL SELF

"When for motives of honor and conscience I brave the condemnation of my own family, club, and 'set'; when, as a protestant, I turn catholic; as a catholic, freethinker; as a 'regular practitioner,' homeopath, or what not, I am always inwardly strengthened in my course and steeled against the loss of my actual social self by the thought of other and better *possible* social judges than those whose verdict goes against me now. The ideal social self which I thus seek in appealing to their decision may be very remote: it may be represented as barely possible. I may not hope for its realization during my lifetime; I may even expect the future generations, which would approve me if they knew me, to know nothing about me when I am dead and gone. Yet still the emotion that beckons me on is indubitably the pursuit of an ideal social self, of a self that is at least *worthy* of approving recognition by the highest *possible* judging companion, if such companion there be. This self is the true, the intimate, the ultimate, the permanent Me which I seek. This judge is God, the Absolute Mind, the 'Great Companion.' "

William James, *Principles of Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1899), Vol. I, pp. 315-16.

401. BRADLEY ON FREE-WILL

"Free-will means Non-determinism. The will is not determined to act by anything *else*; and, further, it is not determined to act by anything *at all*. Self-determination means that the self, the universal, *may* realize itself by and in this, that, and the other particular; but it also implies that there is no reason why it should identify itself with this one, rather than with that one; there is no rational connection between the two sides; there is nothing in the self which brings this, and not that, act out of it. Turn it as we will, the *libertas arbitrii* is no more at last than *contingentia arbitrii*. Freedom means *chance*; you are free, because there is no reason which will account for your particular acts, because no one in the world, not even yourself, can possibly say what you will, or will not, do next. You are 'accountable,' in short, because you are a wholly 'unaccountable' creature.

"We cannot escape this conclusion. If we always can do

anything, or nothing, under any circumstances, or merely if, of given alternatives, we can always choose either, than it is always possible that any act should come from any man."

F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies* (London, King, 1876), pp. 10-11.

402. SPINOZA: MEN NOT FREE

"Men are . . . deceived in thinking themselves free, a belief which rests upon this alone, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes which determine them. This, then, is their idea of freedom, that they know no cause of their actions. Their statement that human actions are due to will is a collection of words, for which they have no idea. For all are ignorant of what will is, and how it moves the body. Those who boast that they know, and imagine seats and habitations for the soul, usually provoke either laughter or disgust."

Spinoza, *Ethics* (Trans. by Fullerton), Part II, Prop. 35, Scholium.

403. SELF-CONTROL AND FREEDOM REAL

"When we recognize that human nature is different from that of brutes, that our powers of self-control and self-culture are vastly greater than theirs, we have before us the instrumentalities of a freedom that is enlarged in corresponding measure. A denial of the reality and efficacy of my power to shape my own character in accordance with consciously fabricated ideals and so to exercise genuine freedom to enlarge, purify, and ennoble my personality is a reversion to a primitive and tawdry fatalistic mythology of a barbarous age."

C. Judson Herrick, *Fatalism or Freedom* (New York, Norton, 1926), pp. 94f.

404. BASIS OF FREEDOM

"A moth cannot avoid the impulse to fly toward the light, and it does not learn by experience to avoid the flame. Its reactions are relatively fixed and machine-like. Many other animals learn by experience to inhibit responses to certain stimuli; a tame fish or frog will take food from your hand, but if it is repeatedly frightened when it attempts to take food it will not come near

you though it is starving,—it inhibits the strong impulse of a hungry animal to take food by the counter impulse of unpleasant memories or of fear. Here we have the beginnings of what we call freedom, the immediate response to a stimulus is suppressed, internal stimuli are balanced against external ones and final action is determined largely by past experience. Owing to his vastly greater power of memory, reflection, and inhibition man is much freer than any other animal. Animals which learn little from experience have little freedom and the more they learn the freer they become. . . .

“Such freedom is not uncaused activity, but freedom from the mechanical responses to external or instinctive stimuli, through the intervention of internal stimuli due to experience and intelligence. To the person accustomed to think of will and choice as absolutely free this may seem to be a sort of freedom so limited as to be scarcely worth the having; and yet ‘it is the dawning grace of a new dispensation,’ the beginnings of rational life, social obligations, moral responsibility.”

Edwin G. Conklin, *Heredity and Environment* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1929), pp. 336–37.

405. DETERMINISM NOT FATALISM

“All that is meant by that term [determinism] in science and in actual life is that every effect is the resultant of antecedent causes and that identical causes yield identical results. Determinism does not mean predeterminism; the one finds every effect to be due to a long chain of preceding causes, the other attributes every effect to a single original cause; the one is scientific naturalism, the other is fatalism.

“Applying this to personality, actual experience teaches that constant conditions of heredity and environment give constant results in development and that different conditions give different results. Undoubtedly the entire personality, body and mind, undergoes development, and modifications of either heredity or environment modify personality. This is scientific determinism, but it is not fatalism and it is not incompatible with a certain amount of freedom and responsibility. . . .

“Even the most extreme mechanists, who maintain that we are mere automata and that we could never do otherwise than

we do, admit the possibility of a certain amount of control over phenomena outside ourselves. They tell us that the aim of science is not merely to understand but also to control nature. But if man may to a limited extent control physical, chemical, and biological processes in the world around him, if he may control to a limited extent the behavior of a star-fish or dog or child, on what ground is it possible to deny a similar control of his own behavior? Does it not come to this that all such control means intelligent action, or rather the introduction of intelligence as a factor in the chain of cause and effect? Before the appearance of intelligence, whether in ontogeny or in phylogeny, no such control of phenomena or of self is possible, but when intelligence becomes a factor in behavior a limited control of the world and of the self is made possible."

Edwin G. Conklin, *Heredity and Environment* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1929), pp. 334-35.

406. HOCKING: COMPLETE FORE-KNOWLEDGE OF HUMAN REACTIONS IMPOSSIBLE

"Let us say that in the order of nature I am a lazy man. Then I remain a lazy man, thoroughly subject to the causal laws of inheritance or habit, until such time as it may occur to me to observe my own laziness. But let me, in a moment of reflection, recognize this trait, and judge 'I am lazy.' The judgment is true: yet it is not the whole truth. For I am also a man who observes and criticizes his laziness. This criticism is possible because of some standard, belonging to my hope—some standard of what a man might well be. In this moment of reflection, or self-judgment, the self has in its power the beginning of a departure from laziness. Reflection is a beginning of freedom. . . .

"There is, in this capacity for reflection, a promise of indefinite growth. Infinitude is on the side of the self which knows itself to be finite. And for the self which knows itself to be caused, *causation has ceased to be the whole truth*. . . .

"Because of this trait of freeing himself by reflection from every causal series he discovers, it is never possible to know all the reactions of any man. If any psychologist or friend thinks

that he knows all the reactions of any individual, he has only to tell him so, and he will get a new one!"

William E. Hocking, *The Self: Its Body and Freedom* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1928), pp. 149-52.

407. RESPONSIBILITY AND LEARNING

"He is responsible who can be made to become responsible. The ground of responsibility in conduct is 'not in antecedent conditions but in liability for future consequences.' That which is done is done. The educator is concerned with that which has been done only in so far as it gives guidance to that which must still be done if an individual is to develop an adequate sense of responsibility for his conduct. Praise and blame, rewards and punishments can be justified only to the extent that they help and do not hinder the attainment of this end. In any given situation due regard must be given to the specific results which the exercise of these forms of control is actually tending to produce. Is it building or destroying the confidence of the individual child in his own possibilities and capacities? Does it tend to make him more careful in his observation, planning, and evaluating in connection with the situations with which he has to do, or does it stimulate him to pay attention to ways of 'getting by' through cleverness in appearing to comply with the demands of adults? Above all, does the use of such means of control tend to weaken or to strengthen the habit of assuming responsibility for acts and for active interest in learning from what is done? Capacity for intelligent self-direction, which is capacity for individuality and freedom, is dependent upon acquiring the disposition of continuing to learn from experience."

John L. Childs, *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism* (New York, Century, 1931), pp. 157-58.

408. WHAT WE DESIRE

"We sit down at a table hungry. Is pleasure our end, and is eating related to it as an absolutely indifferent means . . . ? The lover of music goes to a concert. Is pleasure his end, and music the means? . . . No, impulses and powers slumbered in him which craved for exercise and development, just like the forces dwelling in the seed of a plant. And when these powers

were exercised and unfolded, pleasure ensued, but this pleasure did not preëxist in consciousness as an end of which the other things were the means. *The impulse and the craving for activity preceded all consciousness of pleasure.* The consciousness of pleasure did not exist before the impulse, and produce or arouse it. Only the blasé and worn-out idler first experiences a desire for pleasure, and then looks about him for some means of procuring it. Healthy men do not act that way."

Friedrich Paulsen. *System of Ethics* (Trans. by Thilly. New York, Scribner, 1899), p. 254.

409. NATURE OF MOTIVE

"The hungry person seeks food. We may say, if we please, that he is moved by hunger. But in fact hunger is only a name for the tendency to move toward the appropriation of food. To create an entity out of this active relation of the self to objects, and then to treat this abstraction as if it were the cause of seeking food is sheer confusion. The case is no different when we say that a man is moved by kindness, or mercy, or cruelty, or malice. These things are not independent powers which stir to action. They are designations of the kind of active union or integration which exists between the self and a class of objects. It is the man himself in his very self who is malicious or kindly, and these adjectives signify that the self is so constituted as to act in certain ways towards certain objects. Benevolence or cruelty is not something which a man *has*, as he may have dollars in his pocket-book; it is something which he *is*; and since his being is active, these qualities are *modes of activity*, not forces which produce action."

John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics* (New York, Holt, 1932), p. 322.

410. KANT ON CONSCIENCE

"Conscience is not an acquisition, and there is no obligation to acquire it; but every man, as an ethical being, has it originally in himself. To be bound in duty to conscience is as much as saying, to have the duty to recognize duties."

Edward F. Buchner. *Kant's Educational Theory* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1904), p. 288.

411. BISHOP BUTLER ON CONSCIENCE (1726)

"There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man; which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the doer of them, accordingly;

"Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world."

Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752), *Sermons* (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, no date), pp. 94-102.

412. CONSCIENCE A PRODUCT OF MORALIZING

"Conscience is not a faculty which gives all normal men identical guidance. On the contrary, the consciences of different men differ to an extraordinary degree; and it is clear that this internal moral sense is the *product*, rather than the *source*, of our moral standards. It can be exalted as a safe guide only by those whose interest in morals is limited to the morals of a single tradition. For that matter, even within a single community, within a single family, there are often profoundly different conceptions of duty. But when we look farther afield, when we consider, for example, the conscientiousness with which religious fanatics have destroyed great libraries, monuments of art, and other priceless possessions of humanity, or when we consider the conscientiousness with which Japanese look upon suicide, in certain circumstances, as a grave duty, while Roman Catholics look upon it as a mortal sin, we cannot but recognize the arbitrariness of the particular sense of duty that we happen to have developed."

Durant Drake, *The New Morality* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), pp. 17f

413. NATURAL ORIGIN OF OUGHT

"There is no need to assume an original moral sense in order to account for the expression, 'You ought,' or at least for some closely similar expression. If human nature is equipped with

instincts such as we have described, and with the preferences that go with them, and if these interests are mightily affected by the neighbor's behavior, a generalizing animal would hardly fail to perceive the value of an habitual disposition on the neighbor's part to consider the feelings of others; and a language-using animal would hardly fail to invent a term to express to his neighbor his sense of the importance of that disposition. What most of us strongly prefer you should do would inevitably be conveyed to you by a phrase such as, 'You ought to behave thus and so.' "

W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1918), p. 91.

CHAPTER X

REGARD FOR OTHERS

414. KANT'S "MAN AS AN END IN HIMSELF"

"Man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end. . . .

"Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."

Immanuel Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics* (Trans. by Abbot. London, Longmans Green, 1895), pp. 55-56.

415. MARTIN LUTHER: WOMEN A MEANS TO AN END

"Even though they grow weary and wear themselves out with child-bearing, that is of no consequence; let them go on bearing children till they die, that is what they are there for."

Hartmann Grisar, *Luther* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Truebner, 1915), Vol. IV, p. 144.

416. SLAVERY

The evil of slavery is that in it one set of individuals attempt to set bounds for the development of the personality of others.

Adapted.

417. TAGORE ON HUMAN PERSONALITY

"My soul cries out: 'The complete man must never be sacrificed to the patriotic man, or even to the merely moral man.' To me humanity is rich and large and many-sided. Therefore I feel deeply hurt when I find that, for some material gain,

man's personality is mutilated in the Western world and he is reduced to a machine. The same process of repression and curtailment of humanity is often advocated in our own country under the name of patriotism. Such deliberate impoverishment of our nature seems to be a crime. It is a cultivation of callousness, which is a form of sacrilege. For God's purpose is to lead man into that perfection of growth which is the attainment of a unity comprehending an immense manifoldness. But when I find man, for some purpose of his own, imposing upon his society, a mutilation of mind, a niggardliness of culture, a puritanism which is spiritual penury, it makes me inexpressibly sad."

Letters from Rabindranath Tagore, *Modern Review* (Calcutta), 30:304 (Sept. 1921).

418. MAKING OTHERS HAPPY

"To 'make others happy' except through liberating their powers and engaging them in activities that enlarge the meaning of life is to harm them and to indulge ourselves under cover of exercising a special virtue. Our moral measure for estimating any existing arrangement or any proposed reform is its effect upon impulses and habits. Does it liberate or suppress, ossify or render flexible, divide or unify interest? Is perception quickened or dulled? Is memory made apt and extensive or narrow and diffusely irrelevant? Is imagination diverted to fantasy and compensatory dreams, or does it add fertility to life? Is thought creative or pushed one side into pedantic specialisms? . . . To foster conditions that widen the horizon of others and give them command of their own powers, so that they can find their own happiness in their own fashion, is the way of 'social' action."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 293-94.

419. MAN'S PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

"On the occasion of every act he exercises every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness. . . .

"Man, from the very constitution of his nature, prefers his own happiness to that of all other sensitive beings put together."

Jeremy Bentham, *Works* (Edinburgh, William Tait, 1843), ix, 5; x, 80.

420. DISINTEGRATION OF SOCIETY

"The danger that, above all others, a democratic nation must avoid is the disintegration of society into units with no immediate concern but self-interest, into individuals to whom social duties and bonds are gradually ceasing to appeal."

Alfred Fouillée, *Education from a National Standpoint* (New York, Appleton, 1892), p. 4.

421. SELFISHNESS

"It is not necessary to go very far into that form of hair-splitting analysis which considers whether benevolence is not merely another form of selfishness. It is sometimes argued by a certain kind of sophist that the benevolent person is benevolent because he gets pleasure from being benevolent. Since it gives him pleasure, it is only a form of self-gratification; and since it is only a form of self-gratification, it is only another form of selfishness. It may be true, from a certain point of view, that a man may get more pleasure from the taste of food upon the palates of his children than upon his own. A sophist might say that he was as truly selfish as a man who got no pleasure whatever from the taste of food upon any palate but his own. However, no sensible person would remain long in doubt as to which would make the better father. There is no doubt that the man who takes some delight in the welfare of his neighbors and fellow citizens is a better neighbor and citizen than a man who takes no pleasure whatever in such things."

T. N. Carver, *Principles of Political Economy* (Boston, Ginn, 1919), p. 23.

422. THE PURPOSE OF AMELIORATIVE LEGISLATION

"The deeper if unconscious purpose of recent ameliorative legislation is, not to establish freedom, but to supply such palliatives as will make the continuance of a parasitic class possible."

Attributed to Hilaire Belloc

423. WHY GIVE ALMS?

"I give no alms to satisfy the hunger of my brother, but to fulfill and accomplish the will and command of my God."

Sir Thomas Browne, *Religio Medici* (London, Cassell, 1886. 1st ed. 1643), p. 106.

424. CHARITY AS DEFENSE OF THE STATUS QUO

"The theory which erects charity in and of itself into a supreme excellence is a survival of a feudally stratified society, that is, of conditions wherein a superior class achieved merit by doing things gratuitously for an inferior class. The objection to this conception of charity is that it too readily becomes an excuse for maintaining laws and social arrangements which ought themselves to be changed in the interest of fair play and justice. 'Charity' may even be used as a means for administering a sop to one's social conscience while at the same time it buys off the resentment which might otherwise grow up in those who suffer from social injustice. Magnificent philanthropy may be employed to cover up brutal economic exploitation."

John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics* (New York, Holt, 1932), p. 334.

425. INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONALITY

"When self-hood is perceived to be an active process it is also seen that social modifications are the only means of the creation of changed personalities. Institutions are viewed in their educative effect:—with reference to the types of individuals they foster. The interest in individual moral improvement and the social interest in objective reform of economic and political conditions are identified. And inquiry into the meaning of social arrangements gets definite point and direction. We are led to ask what the specific stimulating, fostering, and nurturing power of each specific social arrangement may be. . . . Just what response does *this* social arrangement, political or economic, evoke, and what effect does it have upon the disposition of those who engage in it? Does it release capacity? If so, how widely? Among a few, with a corresponding depression in others, or in an extensive and equitable way? Is the capacity which is set free also directed in some coherent way, so that it

becomes a power, or is its manifestation spasmodic and capricious?

"Since responses are of an indefinite diversity of kind, these inquiries have to be detailed and specific. Are man's senses rendered more delicately sensitive and appreciative, or are they blunted and dulled by this and that form of social organization? Are their minds trained so that the hands are more deft and cunning? Is curiosity awakened or blunted? What is its quality: is it merely aesthetic, dwelling on the forms and surfaces of things, or is it also an intellectual searching into their meaning? Such questions as these (as well as the more obvious ones about the qualities conventionally labelled moral) become the starting-points of inquiries about every institution of the community when it is recognized that individuality is not originally given but is created under the influences of associated life."

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1920), pp. 196-98.

426. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE

"We take then our point of departure from the objective fact that human acts have consequences upon others, that some of these consequences are perceived, and that their perception leads to subsequent effort to control action so as to secure some consequences and avoid others. Following this clew, we are led to remark that the consequences are of two kinds, those which affect the persons directly engaged in a transaction, and those which affect others beyond those immediately concerned. In this distinction we find the germ of the distinction between the private and the public. When indirect consequences are recognized and there is effort to regulate them, something having the traits of a state comes into existence. When the consequences of an action are confined, or are thought to be confined, mainly to the persons directly engaged in it, the transaction is a private one. When A and B carry on a conversation together the action is a trans-action: both are concerned in it; its results pass, as it were, across from one to the other. One or other or both may be helped or harmed thereby. But, presumably, the consequences of advantage and injury do not extend beyond A and B; the activity lies between them; it is private. Yet if

it is found that the consequences of conversation extend beyond the two directly concerned, that they affect the welfare of many others, the act acquires a public capacity, whether the conversation be carried on by a king and his prime minister or by Cataline and a fellow conspirator or by merchants planning to monopolize a market."

John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, Holt, 1927), pp. 12-13.

427. DECATUR: "OUR COUNTRY, RIGHT OR WRONG"

"Our country: in her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be right; but our country, right or wrong."

Stephen Decatur, Toast given at Norfolk, April, 1816.

428. TAGORE ON THE EVIL EFFECTS OF NATIONALISM

"The idea of the Nation is one of the most powerful anaesthetics that man has invented. Under the influence of its fumes the whole people can carry out its systematic program of the most virulent self-seeking without being in the least aware of its moral perversion,—in fact feeling dangerously resentful if it is pointed out."

Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism* (New York, Macmillan, 1917), p. 57.

429. GOVERNMENT AS CLASS CONTROLLED

"Government is never completely under the control of a total community. There is always some class, whether economic overlords or political bureaucrats, who may use the organs of government for their special advantages."

Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York, Scribner, 1932), p. 239.

430. THE FASCIST DOCTRINE OF WAR

"For Fascism, society is the end, individuals the means, and its whole life consists in using individuals for its social ends. . . .

"Society has historical and immanent ends of preservation, expansion, and improvement quite distinct from those of the individuals which at a given moment compose it; so distinct, in fact, that they may even be in opposition. Hence the necessity, for which the older doctrines make little allowance, of sacri-

fice, even up to the total immolation of individuals in behalf of society: hence the true explanation of war, eternal law of mankind, interpreted by the liberal-democratic doctrines as a degenerate absurdity or as a maddened monstrosity.

Alfredo Rocco, in *International Conciliation Bulletin*, No. 223, pp. 403, 402 (Oct. 1926).

431. THE FUNCTION OF STATE COERCION

Coercion "has its value in the action that it sets free. . . . The function of State coercion is to override individual coercion, and, of course, coercion exercised by any association of individuals within the State. It is by this means that it maintains liberty of expression, security of person and property, genuine freedom of contract, the rights of public meeting and association, and finally its own power to carry out common objects undefeated by the recalcitrance of individual members."

L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (New York, Holt, no date), pp. 145ff.

432. INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY

"The coercion of an individual or a group by force is always in itself more or less harmful. But if there were no government, the result would not be an absence of force in men's relations to each other; it would merely be the exercise of force by those who had strong predatory instincts, necessitating either slavery or a perpetual readiness to repel force with force on the part of those whose instincts were less violent. This is the state of affairs at present in international relations, owing to the fact that no international government exists. The results of anarchy between states should suffice to persuade us that anarchism has no solution to offer for the evils of the world."

Bertrand Russell, *Political Ideals* (New York, Century, 1917), pp. 28-29.

433. STATE SOVEREIGNTY NOT ETHICALLY FINAL

"Consider, now, that the modern state represents the modern industrial and economic order, especially its leaders, and that it therefore gravitates toward economic imperialism; then consider what would be involved in the thoughtless acceptance of the sovereignty of such a state as an ethical principle. It would mean permitting ourselves to act corporately upon prin-

ciples that we could not approve in private life; and it would mean giving ethical authority over ourselves to any government officials who happen at the moment to be able to determine what the sovereign state shall do or abstain from doing."

George A. Coe, *What Ails Our Youth?* (New York, Scribner, 1924), p. 32.

434. CHRISTIAN MORALITY OUT OF PLACE IN STATE RELATIONS

"Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. 'Love God above all things and thy neighbor as thyself.' This law can claim no significance for the relations of one country to another, since its application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love for his own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably lead men astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and in its nature, cannot be political."

F. von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (New York, Longmans Green, 1912), p. 29.

435. THE STATE MORALLY BOUND

"Since the state is a community of human beings it is as truly subject to the moral law as any private society. The fact that it is a necessary society does not affect its character as a moral person. Its acts are the acts of an organized group of human beings. While its end is primarily the welfare of its own members, it must attain that end with due regard to the welfare of persons who are outside its jurisdiction, just as the acts of a family must be consistent with the rights and claims of other families. Hence, the state is bound by the precepts of justice, charity, veracity, and all the other moral rules which govern human relations."

Catholic Association for International Peace, *International Ethics* (New York, Paulist Press, 1928), p. 9.

436. "GOOD" CHILDREN

"Everybody knows that good children are those who make as little trouble as possible for their elders."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), p. 2.

437. RELENTLESS REGULARITY

"In the training of animals and the education of children it is the perfection, inevitableness, invariableness, and relentlessness of routine which tells. They should never experience any exception or irregularity."

William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, Ginn, 1906), p. 60.

438. PURPOSES FIXED EXTERNALLY TO THE PUPILS

"The purpose of the rural school is avowedly to prepare rural folk for useful, contented lives on the land."

Harold W. Foght, *The Rural Teacher and His Work* (New York, Macmillan, 1917), p. 151.

439. PURPOSES FIXED BY OTHERS FOR OUR RURAL YOUTH

"The great task of twentieth-century education is, then, to instill in the country boys and country girls this very love for the country and all that pertains to country life; to fit them, through thoroughly practical courses of study, to receive and preserve their wonderful heritage. . . .

"But the work of reform is merely begun. The old-fashioned, blind teaching is, alas! very prevalent. The subject matter taught is still borrowed from the city curriculum. It is foreign to the country child's world—the farm. In the country the soil must ever remain the real factor. Nature study in its broadest meaning together with manual training and instruction in the various crafts which shall make the farm child satisfied with his lot in life are the real essentials. . . . The teacher of tomorrow must be able to take the child in its own little world, and lead it along the pathway of life, directing its native adaptabilities, sentiments, and powers; he must develop in the child's breast a sympathy with its environment, and in the child's mind an understanding of nature and nature's intent. The twentieth-century teacher must teach the child to love nature for nature's own sake—and not to judge it by a mere commercial or money standard. The teacher must lead the child to see in the old farmstead with its God-given acres the most precious heritage that can come to mortal man. He must teach

the child that the farm is his treasure, then there will his heart be also."

Harold W. Foght, *The American Rural School* (New York, Macmillan, 1912), pp. 13-15.

440. WHO OWNS YOUR CHILD?

"There is wide diversity of attitude in this matter of 'indoc-trination.' Possibly most still cling to it, though in varying degrees. Both lingering practice and, in lesser degree, asserted right and duty illustrate it. 'Who owns your child? The state? Do not you?' These questions were asked during the Oregon school controversy. And the answer was given in a question counted to answer itself: 'If you don't own your own child, what in the wide world do you own?' Others said, 'The right of the parent to select the mental and moral training of the child is fundamental and inalienable—the most primary right recognized by enlightened countries.' We need not take sides over the question there at issue to see in these quotations an unquestioned assumption of child 'ownership.' Admittedly, so runs the implication, somebody 'owns' the child in such manner as to carry with it the right to decide 'his mental and moral training' and this seems regarded as the necessary correlative of childhood. What if any part the state should have in such ownership might be debated, but a just right to 'own-ship' somewhere resident in the older generation,—that was not questioned."

William H. Kilpatrick, "Thinking in Childhood and Youth," in *Religious Education*, 23:132 (Feb. 1928).

441. YOUR CHILDREN NOT YOURS

"Your children are not your children,
They are the sons and daughters of Life's longing for itself.

You may give them your love, but not your thoughts,
For they have their own thoughts.

You may house their bodies, but not their souls,
For their souls dwell in the house of tomorrow, which you
cannot visit, not even in your dreams.

You may strive to be like them but seek not to make them like you,

For life goes not backward nor tarries with yesterday."

Kahlil Gibran, *The Prophet* (New York, Knopf, 1923), pp. 21-22.

442. A COAL COMPANY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ITS MEN

"Don't explain to the men what they are about. They will get the attitude of asking why."

Direction to a student of the editor (1920-21) while working as foreman in a coal mine the year before.

443. MODERN INDUSTRY AND THE SANCTITY OF PERSONALITY

"If it is true—and who can doubt it?—that the sanctity of personality is a fundamental idea of Christian teaching, it is evident that Christians are bound to judge their industrial organization by that principle and to ask whether in modern industry human beings are regarded always as ends and never as means. We do not venture to give a dogmatic answer to that question. But we submit that the criticism which the thoughtful workman passes upon the economic system is that it often treats him and his class as instruments of production, and that this criticism is a very weighty one, because it cuts to the root both of modern industrial relationships and of modern social ethics. . . .

"Workmen are often engaged when there is work and dismissed when there is not. They are employed casually, if casual employment is economically convenient. Unless protected by law or by trade unionism, they are liable to be worked inhuman hours, to be paid the lowest wage which they can be forced by fear of unemployment to accept, and to be bound by regulations which they have no voice in making. That such conditions must produce poverty is obvious, for they leave the weaker members of the community without protection against the downward thrust of economic pressure. But that is not the gravest stricture to be passed upon them. The fundamental objection to them is that they tend to result in men and women being treated as instruments of production, and that to treat human beings as instruments of production is morally wrong."

Report of the Archbishop's Fifth Committee (London, 1918), pp. 14-15.

444. THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF POVERTY (1785)

‘‘It seems to be a law of nature,’’ wrote the Rev. Joseph Townsend, a popular clergyman in 1785, in a work which was repeatedly reprinted during the next thirty years, and quoted with approbation in contemporary government reports, ‘that the poor should be to a certain degree improvident, that there may always be some to fulfill the most servile, the most sordid, and the most ignoble offices in the community. The stock of human happiness is thereby much increased whilst the more delicate are not only relieved from drudgery, and freed from those occasional employments which would make them miserable, but are left at liberty without interruption, to pursue those callings which are suited to their various dispositions, and most useful to the State. As for the lowest of the poor, by custom they are reconciled to the meanest occupations, to the most laborious works, and to the most hazardous pursuits. . . . There must be a degree of pressure, and that which is attended with the least violence will be the best. When hunger is either felt or feared, the desire of obtaining bread will quietly dispose the mind to undergo the greatest hardships, and will sweeten the severest labor.’’

Rev. Joseph Townsend. Quoted in Charles A. Beard, *Whither Mankind* (New York, Longmans Green, 1928), pp. 115-16.

445. THE NORDIC THEORY

‘There are absolutely no data at present available to prove that the Nordics are equipped biologically with a greater capacity than that possessed by the other two white races. And yet what a part the Nordic hypothesis has played in current discussions as a weapon held over the actions of individuals and states!’’

Alfred M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), p. 76.

446. INTELLIGENCE TESTS AND RACIAL GROUPS

‘The intelligence test, as it has been developed, is a test of what the individual has *picked up*, aside from specific training. . . . The word ‘intelligence’ as used in these connections,

does not mean for psychologists any specific or even general 'faculty' but merely any capacity to acquire any sort of performance under unspecified or vaguely specified conditions. . . .

"This seems to mean that the hopes for a significant comparison of the mental capacities of different racial groups, and different cultural groups, by mental tests, is vain. That conclusion is indeed a certain one. Not merely does the logic of the case leave us no doubt, but the doleful picture of the whole series of attempts to make these comparisons confirms it. You may give the same mental test to Americans, Japs, Swedes, and Bretons, and find an average difference in their scores, but it means nothing useful. That chapter of the seamy side of mental testing is practically closed.

Knight Dunlap, in *Progressive Education*, 7:64-66 (Mar. 1930).

447. RACE PREJUDICE AND NATIONAL ANTAGONISM AS ESSENTIAL TO PROGRESS

"This antipathy or race prejudice Nature has implanted within you for her own ends—the improvement of mankind through racial differentiation. Race prejudice, I believe, works for the ultimate good of mankind, and must be given a recognized place in all our efforts to obtain natural justice for the world. . . . It means a continuation of Nature's old scheme of intertribal rivalries and eternal competition. Without competition, mankind can never progress; the price of progress is competition. Nay, race prejudice, and, what is the same thing, national antagonism, has to be purchased, not with gold, but with life. . . . Nature keeps her human orchard healthy by pruning; war is her pruning-hook. We cannot dispense with her services. This harsh and repugnant forecast of man's future is wrung from me."

Sir Arthur Keith, Rector of Aberdeen University, Scotland. Quoted in *The World Tomorrow*, 14:317 (Oct. 1931).

448. DISCRIMINATION, LOSS OF SELF-RESPECT, INSECURITY

"With tears in his eyes, one Jew told me this story. For months he had been out of work. Finally a position was offered him by an employment agency, the manager counseling him:

'I know that your family is suffering slow starvation. If you go to this place as "the Jew, Lefkowitz" your chances of getting the job are zero. I know that you fill their requirements abundantly, so I advise you to go as "Loft, the Christian." . . . He got the job. But he lost his identity and his self-respect. He walks and works in terror of discovery."

J. X. Cohen, "Jews, Jobs, and Justice," in *Opinion*, Vol. I, No. 2, p. 7 (Dec. 14, 1931).

449. POPE PIUS XI ON EUGENIC STERILIZATION

"There are some who . . . wish by public authority to prevent from marrying all those who, even though naturally fit for marriage . . . would, through hereditary transmission, bring forth defective offspring. And more, they wish to legislate to deprive these of that natural faculty by medical action despite their unwillingness. . . . Those who act in this way are at fault in losing sight of the fact that the family is more sacred than the State, and that men are begotten not for the earth and for time, but for heaven and eternity. . . .

"Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of their subjects; therefore, where no crime has taken place and there is no cause present for grave punishment, they can never directly harm or tamper with the integrity of the body, either for the reasons of eugenics or for any other reason."

Pope Pius XI, in *Four Great Encyclicals* (New York, Paulist Press, 1931), pp. 95-96.

450. VINDICTIVE PUNISHMENT

"There is a kind of justice which aims neither at the amendment of the criminal, nor at furnishing an example to others, nor at the reparation of the injury. This justice is founded in pure fitness, which finds a certain satisfaction in the expiation of a wicked deed. The Socinians and Hobbes objected to this punitive justice, which is properly vindictive justice, and which God has reserved for himself at many junctures. . . . It is always founded in the fitness of things, and satisfies not only the offended party, but all wise lookers-on, even as beautiful music or a fine piece of architecture satisfies a well-constituted mind. It is thus that the torments of the damned continue, even though

they serve no longer to turn any one away from sin, and that the rewards of the blest continue, even though they confirm no one in good ways."

Leibnitz, *Théodicée*. Quoted in William James, *Pragmatism* (New York, Longmans Green, 1907), pp. 26f.

451. KAISER WILLIAM II ON MILITARY VIRTUES

"The chief pillars of the army are courage, honor, and unconditional blind obedience."

Quoted in Wm. H. Dawson, *What Is Wrong with Germany?* (New York, Longmans Green, 1915), p. 117.

452. MILITARY DISCIPLINE

"A perfect army would be one in which each part would respond to the will of the commander as quickly and certainly as the muscles of the body respond to the impulses of the brain."

Quoted in E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, Century, 1921), p. 254.

453. TRAINING TO HATE AND KILL

"The training principle had recently been revised. *Infantry Training*, 1914, had laid it down politely that the soldier's ultimate aim was to put out of action or render ineffective the armed forces of the enemy. This statement was now not considered direct enough for a war of attrition. Troops were taught instead to HATE the Germans and KILL as many of them as possible. In bayonet-practice the men were ordered to make horrible grimaces and utter blood-curdling yells as they charged. The bayonet-fighting instructors' faces were permanently set in a ghastly grin. 'Hurt him now! In at his belly! Tear his guts out!' they would scream as the men charged the dummies. 'Now that upper swing at his privates with the butt. Ruin his chances for life. No more little Fritzes! . . . Naaoh! Any-one would think you loved the bloody swine, patting and stroking him like that. BITE HIM, I SAY! STICK YOUR TEETH IN HIM AND WORRY HIM! EAT HIS HEART OUT.' "

Robert Graves, *Good-bye to All That* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1929), p. 295.

454. A WAR-BORN TRAGEDY: TEACHING INDIAN SCHOOL CHILDREN TO HATE THE GERMANS

"The Germans are indeed a savage and a brutal race. In this war they have broken every law of God and every law of man. They say openly that solemn treaties are 'mere scraps of paper' to be broken at any time they please; they kill their prisoners in cold blood, they torture those they do not kill; they murder women and children, toss them on the points of their swords and laugh at their screams of agony; they destroy churches and hospitals, they shoot doctors and nurses; they poison wells and the streams and the air; they cut down the crops and the fruit trees; they lay waste the whole country as they go over it, burning down the villages and leaving the towns heaps of smoking ruins. They are without religion and in their cruel hearts there is no mercy, no pity, no kindness, no truth, no honor. They cannot be counted among civilized nations and are indeed more like wild beasts than men."

E. Marsden, *History of India for Junior Classes*, p. 234.

455. COBDEN ON THE UNREASON WHICH WAR BRINGS

"From the moment the first shot is fired, or the first blow is struck in a dispute, then farewell to all reason and argument; you might as well reason with mad dogs as with men when they have begun to spill each other's blood in mortal combat."

John Morley, *Life of Richard Cobden* (New York, Macmillan, 1908). Vol. II, p. 159.

456. AN OLDER GLORIFICATION OF WAR

Saint Bernard (1090-1153) urging recruits for the second crusade said:

"The Christian who slays the unbeliever in the Holy War is sure of his reward, the more sure if he himself be slain. The Christian glories in the death of the infidel, because Christ is glorified."

Quoted in Geoffrey Parson, *The Stream of History* (New York, Scribner, 1928), p. 363.

457. HOW WAR MAY BE ETHICAL

"A rational society will probably place a greater emphasis upon the ends and purposes for which coercion is used than upon the elimination of coercion and conflict. It will justify coercion if it is obviously in the service of a rationally acceptable social end, and condemn its use when it is in the service of monetary passions. The conclusion which has been forced upon us again and again in these pages is that equality, or to be a little more qualified, that equal justice is the most rational ultimate objective for society. If this conclusion is correct, a social conflict which aims at greater equality has a moral justification which must be denied to efforts which aim at the perpetuation of privilege. A war for the emancipation of a nation, a race or a class is thus placed in a different moral category from the use of power for the perpetuation of imperial rule or class dominance."

Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York, Scribner, 1932), p. 234.

458. THE CHURCHES AND WAR

"We hold that the churches of Jesus Christ should be a mighty dynamic in abolishing war. War denies the Fatherhood of God, scorns the brotherhood of Man, mocks the sacredness of human life, is merciless to helpless women and children, uses falsehood, ignores justice, releases the passions, and cultivates hate. War means everything that Jesus did not mean, and means nothing that He did mean."

"Excerpts from the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Second Study Conference on the Churches and World Peace," in *The World Tomorrow*, 12:178 (Apr. 1929).

CHAPTER XI

DEMOCRACY

459. DEMOCRACY IN GOVERNMENT

“Democracy is a form of *social organization* in which the participation of each individual in the various phases of group activities is free from such artificial restrictions as are not indispensable to the most efficient function of the group, and in which group policy is ultimately determined by the will of the whole society.”

Article on “Democracy,” *Encyclopedia Americana* (ed. of 1932), Vol. VIII, p. 639.

460. DEMOCRACY AND CIVILIZATION

“Civilization consists in teaching men to govern themselves by letting them do it.”

Quoted in W. Jethro Brown, *The Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation* (New York, Dutton, 1915), p. 8.

461. THE HAPPINESS OF CITIZENS IS THE END

“This same criterion of the universal happiness of individuals justifies the Christian doctrine of love, not merely as poetry, but as science. Judged by the same criterion, the ideal polity must be that in which the happiness of citizens is the end, and their enlightened consent the seat, of sovereignty; or that form of society in which men rule themselves by discussion, persuasion, and agreement, for the sake of their common and maximum happiness. Hence democracy strikes me as Utopian only in the sense in which the best is always beyond the reach of present attainment; and the skeptics of democracy appear to me, not as shrewd political discoverers (for the failures of democracy are as old as human history), but as shallow opportunists, or victims of circumstance, or blind fanatics, or rhetorical adven-

turers, who are unconsciously retracing more primitive stages of political development."

Ralph Barton Perry, in Geo. P. Adams and Wm. P. Montague (eds.), *Contemporary American Philosophy* (New York, Macmillan, 1930), Vol. II, p. 207.

462. DEMOCRACY A LAW OF HISTORY

"Democracy has on the whole justified its existence and made probable its permanence by more wise legislation and administration than any other form of government has given. This is perhaps a hard saying, but a careful historical comparison of the works of autocracy, aristocracy, so-called representative government, and democracy will show, I believe, greater vigor, greater ability, greater justice, and greater enlightenment in the service of the last than of either of the others."

Edward P. Cheyney, in *American Historical Review*, 29:242 (Jan. 1924).

463. POPULAR GOVERNMENT INDICTED

"To support the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when they seem to be going badly, this, in spite of all that has been said about tweedledum and tweedledee, is the essence of popular government."

Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1925), p. 126.

464. THE IMPOTENCE OF THE PRIVATE CITIZEN

"The private citizen today has come to feel rather like a deaf spectator in the back row, who ought to keep his mind on the mystery off there, but cannot quite manage to keep awake. He knows he is somehow affected by what is going on. Rules and regulations continually, taxes annually, and wars occasionally remind him that he is being swept along by great drifts of circumstance.

"Yet these public affairs are in no convincing way his affairs. They are for the most part invisible. They are managed, if they are managed at all, by unnamed powers. As a private person he does not know for certain what is going on, or who is doing it, or where he is being carried. No newspaper reports his environment so that he can grasp it; no school has taught

him how to imagine it; his ideals, often, do not fit with it; listening to speeches, uttering opinions, and voting do not, he finds, enable him to govern it. He lives in a world which he cannot see, does not understand, and is unable to direct.

"In the cold light of experience he knows that his sovereignty is a fiction. He reigns in theory, but in fact he does not govern."

Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1925), pp. 13f.

465. THE PUBLIC DECREASINGLY ABLE TO JUDGE PUBLIC AFFAIRS

"It is not improbable . . . that the amount of knowledge needed for the administration of public affairs is increasing more rapidly than the diffusion of such knowledge, and that this is lessening the capacity of the ordinary citizen to form an opinion of his own on the various matters that arise in conducting the government. If so, the range of questions about which the public cannot form a real opinion tends to enlarge, or at least does not diminish. This is particularly true where the special knowledge of experts is involved, because it is not easy for the community at large to weigh expert opinion. Few things are, in fact, more difficult, or require greater experience; and yet the number of questions on which the advice of experts is indispensable grows with every advance in technical knowledge and mechanical invention."

A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York, Longmans Green, 1914), pp. 49f.

466. THE FASCIST THEORY OF THE STATE

"The relations, therefore, between state and citizens are completely reversed by the Fascist doctrine. Instead of the liberal, democratic formula, 'Society for the Individual,' we have 'individuals for Society,' with this difference, however: that while the liberal doctrines eliminated society, Fascism does not submerge the individual in the social group. It subordinates him, but does not eliminate him; the individual as part of his generation ever remaining an element of society, however transient and insignificant he may be. Moreover, the develop-

ment of individuals in each generation, when coördinated and humanized, conditions the development and prosperity of the entire social unit.

"At this juncture the antithesis between the two theories must appear complete and absolute. Liberalism, Democracy, Socialism look upon social groups as aggregates of living individuals; for Fascism they are the recapitulating unity of the indefinite series of generations. For liberalism, society has no purpose other than those of the members living at the present moment. For Fascism, society has historical and immanent ends of preservation, expansion, improvement, quite distinct from those of the individuals who at a given moment compose it; so distinct, in fact, that they may even be in opposition. . . .

"For liberalism, society has no life distinct from the life of the individuals, or as the phrase goes: *Solvitur in singularitatem*. For Fascism, the life of society overlaps the existence of individuals and projects itself into the succeeding generations through centuries and millennia. Individuals come into being, grow, and die, followed by others, unceasingly; social unity remains always identical to itself. For liberalism, the individual is the end and society the means; nor is it conceivable that the individual, considered in the dignity of an ultimate finality, be lowered to mere instrumentality. For Fascism, society is the end, individuals the means, and its whole life consists in using individuals as instruments for its social ends. The state, therefore, guards and protects the welfare and development of individuals not for their exclusive interest, but because of the identity of the needs of individuals with those of society as a whole. . . .

"There is a liberal theory of freedom, and there is a Fascist concept of liberty. For we, too, maintain the necessity of safeguarding the conditions that make for the free development of the individual; we, too, believe that the oppression of individual personality can find no place in the modern state. We do not, however, accept a bill of rights which tends to make the individual superior to the state and to empower him to act in opposition to society. Our concept of liberty is that the individual must be allowed to develop his personality in behalf of the state, for these ephemeral and infinitesimal elements of the

complex and permanent life of society determine by their normal growth the development of the state. But this individual growth must be normal. A huge and disproportionate development of the individual or classes, would prove as fatal to society as abnormal growths are to living organisms. . . .

"Democracy vests sovereignty in the people, that is to say, in the mass of human beings. Fascism discovers sovereignty to be inherent in society when it is juridically organized as a state. Democracy, therefore, turns over the government of the state to the multitude of living men that they may use it to further their own interests; Fascism insists that the government be intrusted to men capable of rising above their own private interests and of realizing the aspirations of the social collectivity, considered in its unity and in its relation to the past and future.

"Fascism, therefore, not only rejects the dogma of popular sovereignty and substitutes for it that of state sovereignty, but it also proclaims that the great mass of citizens is not a suitable advocate of social interests for the reason that the higher demands of society and of history is a very rare gift and the privilege of the chosen few. Natural intelligence and cultural preparation are of great service in such tasks. Still more valuable perhaps is the intuitiveness of rare great minds, their traditionalism and their inherited qualities."

Address . . . delivered by Signor Rocco at Perugia on August 30, 1923. Quoted in Milford W. Howard, *Fascism* (New York, Revell, 1928), pp. 60-63.

467. JEFFERSON ON THE VALUE OF A NATURAL ARISTOCRACY

"I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents. . . . There is also an artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents; for with these it would belong to the first class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature, for the instruction, the trust, and government of society. . . . May we not even say, that that form of government is the best, which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of these natural *aristoi* into the offices of government? The artificial aristocracy is a mischievous in-

gredient in government, and provision should be made to prevent its ascendancy."

Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, October 28, 1813.

468. FINNEY ON THE DULLER HALF IN A DEMOCRACY

"Democracy never has worked, except temporarily. The leadership of the wise and the good has never been anything more than a beautiful wish. . . . To date, in western society, the mobilization of the masses has never been secured except by force—or superstition. . . . Successful democracy demands the ascendancy of the wise and good. . . . But if leadership by the intelligent is ever to be achieved, followership by the dull and ignorant must somehow be assured. Followership, quite as much as leadership, is, therefore, the crucial problem of the present crisis. . . .

"Every culture system accumulates an enormous capital of catchwords, proverbs, epigrams, slogans, witticisms, rhymes, old sayings, catechisms, and the like. They are the capsules in which concentrated philosophies are swallowed. . . .

"Imitation is the normal method of human mentation, and . . . epigrams, proverbs, slogans, and the other symbols of condensed concepts are as necessary to collective thinking as are words themselves. . . .

"What the duller half of the population needs, therefore, is to have their reflexes conditioned into behavior that is socially suitable. And the wholesale memorizing of catchwords—provided they are sound ones—is the only practical means."

Ross L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), pp. 386–95.

469. RELATION OF LEADERS TO THE PEOPLE

"Only if there be an abundance of inquiring minds among the people can the leaders who are striving to answer riddles of the time meet a sympathetic response from the masses whose support is essential to their success."

Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *The Inquiring Mind* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1928), p. 15.

470. PREY OF THE DEMAGOGUE

"To accustom people to act without understanding is to make them the prey of the demagogue."

John Dewey (reference not located).

471. MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE MASSES SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE INTELLECTUALS

"The thought of what we call the educated classes is controlled essentially by those ideals which have been transmitted to us by past generations. . . .

"When we bear this in mind we may understand the characteristics of the behavior of the intellectuals. It is a mistake to assume that their mentality is, on the average, appreciably higher than that of the rest of the people. Perhaps a greater number of independent minds find their way into this group than into some other group of individuals who are moderately well-to-do; but their average mentality is surely in no way superior to that of the workingmen, who by the conditions of their youth have been compelled to subsist on the produce of their manual labor. In both groups mediocrity prevails; unusually strong and unusually weak individuals are the exceptions. For this reason the strength of character and intellect that is required for vigorous thought on matters in which intense sentiments are involved is not commonly found,—either among the intellectuals or in any other part of the population. This condition, combined with the thoroughness with which the intellectuals have imbibed the traditions of the past, makes the majority of them in all nations conventional. It has the effect that their thoughts are based on tradition, and that the range of their vision is liable to be limited. . . .

"It is therefore not surprising that the masses of the people, whose attachment to the past is comparatively slight, respond more quickly and more energetically to the urgent demands of the hour than the educated classes, and that the ethical ideals of the best among them are human ideals, not those of a segregated class."

Franz Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life* (New York, Norton, 1932), pp. 196-99.

472. SOCIAL VERSUS NON-SOCIAL PROBLEMS

"There is . . . one outstanding difference between social and non-social problems. It is this: Frequently a skilled individual can, single-handed, solve a non-social problem, be it in engineering, agriculture, or medicine. But no one person, however skilled he may be, can solve a social problem all by himself, precisely because the solution of a social problem is found in the coming to agreement of groups of men who have been holding conflicting positions. The solution of the so-called Mexican problem, for example, cannot be attained by the President of the United States, by Congress, or even by all of the people of the United States. It can be reached only by a meeting of the minds of leading American *and* Mexican officials, or of the American *and* the Mexican people. While, therefore, one man may be the agent by which an agreement is brought about, he cannot solve the problem. The agreeing must be done for themselves by the persons or groups concerned. It follows then, as we shall see, that the means by which social adjustments are at present usually sought are in fact unavailing to bring about the desired ends."

E. L. Clarke, *The Art of Straight Thinking* (New York, Appleton, 1929), p. 364.

473. ONLY THE FEW NEED TO REASON

"It is only for the professions and executive positions in business that it is necessary to be able to reason logically from cause to effect."

G. Montague Butler, in *School and Society*, 33:150 (Jan. 31, 1931).

474. GOVERNMENT BY THE WISE, THE RICH, AND THE GOOD

"As to intrusting the power of government solely to a class composed of presumably the most intelligent members of the community, the history of New England shows us again and again, as a matter of practical statecraft, how the 'wise, the rich, and the good' have shown less collective wisdom than the members of the despised lower orders, as well as a more bitter

class spirit, a narrower intellectual outlook, and a less broadly human attitude toward life."

James Truslow Adams, *New England in the Republic, 1776-1850* (Boston, Little Brown, 1926), p. 301.

475. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE EXPERT

"The day of the plain man has passed. . . . This is, we are told, a big and complex world, about which we have to find our way at our peril. The plain man is too ignorant and too uninterested to be able to judge the adequacy of the answers suggested to our problems. . . . Either we must trust the making of fundamental decisions to experts, or there will be a breakdown in the machinery of government. . . .

"No one, I think, could seriously deny today that in fact none of our social problems is capable of wise resolution without formulation of its content by an expert mind. . . .

"But it is one thing to urge the need for expert consultation at every stage in making policy; it is another thing, and a very different thing, to insist that the expert's judgment must be final. . . . Above all, perhaps, and this most urgently where human problems are concerned, the expert fails to see that every judgment he makes not purely factual in nature brings with it a scheme of values which has no special validity about it. He tends to confuse the importance of his facts with the importance of what he proposes to do about them. . . .

"The expert, I suggest, sacrifices the insight of common sense to the intensity of his experience. No one can read the writings of Mr. F. W. Taylor, the efficiency engineer, without seeing that his concentration upon the problem of reaching the maximum output of pig-iron per man per day made him come to see the laborer simply as a machine for the production of pig-iron. He forgot the complexities of human nature, the fact that the subject of his experiments had a will of his own whose consent was essential to effective success. . . .

"The expert, again, dislikes the appearance of novel views. Here, perhaps, the experience of science is most suggestive since the possibility of proof in this realm avoids the chief difficulties of human material. Every one knows of the difficulties encountered by Jenner in his effort to convince his medical

contemporaries of the importance of vaccination. The Royal Society refused to print one of Joule's most seminal papers. The opposition of men like Sir Richard Owen and Adam Sedgwick to Darwin resembled nothing so much as that of Rome to Galileo. Not even so great a surgeon as Simpson could see merit in Lister's discovery of antiseptic treatment. The opposition to Pasteur among medical men was so vehement that he declared regretfully that he did not know he had so many enemies. La-croix and Poisson reported to the French Academy of Sciences that Galois' work on the theory of groups, which Cayley later put among the great mathematical achievements of the nineteenth century, was quite unintelligible. Every one knows how biologists and physicists failed to perceive for long years the significance of Gregor Mendel and Willard Gibbs. . . .

"The Duke of Wellington was never brought to see the advantage of the breech-loading rifle. . . .

"The expert, in fact, simply by reason of his immersion in a routine, tends to lack flexibility of mind once he approaches the margins of his special theme. He is incapable of rapid adaptation to novel situations. He unduly discounts experience which does not tally with his own. He is hostile to views which are not set out in terms he has been accustomed to handle. No man is so adept at realizing difficulties within the field that he knows; but, also, few are so incapable of meeting situations outside that field. Specialism seems to breed a horror of unwonted experiment, a weakness in achieving adaptability, both of which make the expert of dubious value when he is in supreme command of a situation. . . .

"The expert, in short, remains expert upon the condition that he does not seek to coördinate his specialism with the total sum of human knowledge. The moment that he seeks that co-ordination he ceases to be an expert. . . .

"We must ceaselessly remember that no body of experts is wise enough, or good enough, to be charged with the destiny of mankind. Just because they are experts, the whole of life is, for them, in constant danger of being sacrificed to a part; and they are saved from disaster only by the need of deference to the plain man's common sense."

Harold J. Laski, "The Limitations of the Expert," in *Harpers Magazine*, 162:101-9 (Dec. 1930).

476. JOHN ADAMS ON THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY

"The fundamental article of my political creed is, that despotism, or unlimited sovereignty, or absolute power, is the same in a majority of a popular assembly, an aristocratical council, and oligarchical junto, and a single emperor. Equally arbitrary, cruel, bloody, and in every respect diabolical."

John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, November 13, 1815.

477. TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY

"When society is itself the tyrant—society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it—its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism."

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (London, Parker, 1859), pp. 13f.

478. RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE MAJORITY

"The relation of an individual to democracy is a paradox. If every one respected the opinions of the majority, those opinions

would never improve. If everybody defied the opinions of the majority, there would be no government."

Walter Lippmann, *American Inquisitors* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), pp. 107-8.

479. THE RIGHT OF THE MINORITY TO SPEAK

"If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind."

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (London, Parker, 1859), p. 33.

480. MINORITIES AND THEIR SERVICE

"Active, unabashed, good-natured minorities are needed wherever our life is organized, and indeed wherever, organized or not, we move in masses. . . .

"The indispensable functions of minorities, then, are these: To bring into the open any oppression, injustice, untruth, failure, or defect that the powers that be are committing or permitting or failing to perceive; to apprehend and to define new issues, especially in situations in which the majority has a strong motive for continuing the *status quo*; to bring it to pass that ideas shall be thrashed out before action is taken; to protect the ruling majority from becoming the victim of its own power; finally, being convinced where truth and right lie, to stick to the conviction through thick and thin without compromise unless right reason shows that the conviction is erroneous. . . .

"The most significant part of any society is some minority in which creative changes are germinating. Without minorities society, as an order of reason, would perish."

George A. Coe, *The Motives of Men* (New York, Scribner, 1928), pp. 224-29.

481. IRRECONCILABLE SUB-GROUPS

"In several nations at the present day there are large bodies of irreconcilables who are unwilling for other reasons to abide by the decision of the majority on the most fundamental of all political questions, the form of government and the right of

the existing authorities to rule. They submit, for the moment, because there is no immediate prospect of successful resistance, but so far as they are concerned no general or public opinion can be said to exist in the land. . . .

"Examples of irreconcilables, always more or less bitter, may be found in the cases of the Irish Nationalists, of the Clericals in Italy, of the Poles, Danes, and Alsatians in Germany, and of the many struggling races in the conglomerate of Austria-Hungary—to speak only of countries that have enjoyed for some time representative institutions. We have had in America also our own painful experience during the period of Reconstruction after the Civil War, when the white people of the states under carpet-bag rule may be fairly said to have been irreconcilable."

A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York, Longmans Green, 1914), pp. 32f.

482. DEMOCRACY

"A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), p. 115.

483. FREEDOM IN SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

"The essence of freedom is not irrelevant spontaneity but the fullness of relation. We do not curtail our liberty by joining with others; we find it and increase all our capacity for life through the interweaving of willings. It is only in a complex state of society that any large degree of freedom is possible, because nothing else can supply the many opportunities necessary to work out freedom."

M. P. Follett, *The New State* (New York, Longmans Green, 1920), p. 69.

484. DEMOCRACY

"Democracy inevitably carries with it increased respect for the individual as an individual, greater opportunity for freedom, independence, and initiative in conduct and thought, and

correspondingly demand for fraternal regard and for self-imposed and voluntarily borne responsibilities."

John Dewey, article "Democracy and Education," in Paul Monroe (ed.), *Cyclopedia of Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1911), 2:294.

485. DEMOCRACY OPPOSED TO ORIGINALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY

"The progress of democracy means—the production of the very state of things as unfavorable as possible to the development of individual energy. Make all men equal, so far as laws can make them equal, and what does that mean but that each unit is to be rendered hopelessly feeble in the presence of an overwhelming majority. Could one man retain any independence of thought when he begins to realize the fact that there are thirty millions of people each with as good a right to form an opinion as himself and as good a chance of enforcing it? . . . Place all mankind on a dead level, and a crushing public opinion will be generated as spontaneously as electric action will set up when you form a galvanic battery."

L. S., article on "Social Macadamization," in *Fraser's Magazine* (London), N.S. 6:153 (Aug. 1872).

486. NIETZSCHE ON AN ÉLITE

"The essential thing, however, in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should *not* regard itself as a function either of the kingship or the commonwealth, but as the *significance* and highest justification thereof—that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, *for its sake*, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is *not* allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher existence. . . .

"Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is *essentially* appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation;—but why should one for ever use precisely these words on which for ages a disparaging

purpose has been stamped? . . . ‘Exploitation’ does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the *nature* of the living being as a primary organic function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the Will to Life.”

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (Trans. by Zimmern. New York, Modern Library, no date. 1st ed. 1885), pp. 198–200.

487. FREEDOM AND FAMINE MUTUAL EXCLUSIVES

“He who is absorbed by the mere fight against starvation is in bondage to the subhuman conditions of biological existence. His life, like the wild animal’s, is exhausted by the struggle to keep alive. His humanity is established, maintained, and advanced by the secondary, tertiary, and remoter interests that branch out from the main stem and grow to independence and competitive value.

“In a word, freedom and famine cannot live together. Freedom begins where economic necessity ends.”

Horace M. Kallen, *Individualism: An American Way of Life* (New York, Liveright, 1933), p. 200.

488. LIBERTY FOR INJUSTICE

“Democratic liberty has been sought as an end in itself. The result has been that the victory of democratic principles has bestowed equal liberty on privileged power and on its victims, on the valid opinions which were suppressed by tyranny and on the irrational tyranny which oppressed them. Democratic liberty, like the rain from heaven, has fallen alike upon the just and the unjust. It has made privileged power inviolable, it has made the authority of tradition inviolable. By aiming at liberty as a good in itself, and not as a means, it has, in the name of liberty, set aside justice and the criteria of valid opinion.”

Robert Briffault, *Breakdown* (New York, Coward McCann, 1932), pp. 165–66.

489. DISCUSSION THE TECHNIQUE OF DEMOCRACY

“The aim of true democracy is to secure the active participation of every individual up to the limit of his capacity in the conduct of all his social, vocational, and political affairs. It

is intended to be all-inclusive with the qualification noted; it is meant to take cognizance of the immature child, of the moron, and even of the criminal. It embraces every social relationship, whether of a president to all American citizens, or a man to a single companion.

"While democracy really involves a philosophy of life and an attitude toward people, it requires also a technique. The difficulty in securing democracy has been that more attention has been paid to defending it as a philosophy than to developing the methodology by which it could be made to function in life. If all are to participate up to the limit of their capacity in the groupings of which they are a part, they must learn how to participate."

Harrison S. Elliott, *The Process of Group Thinking* (New York, Association Press, 1928), p. 1.

490. INTELLECTUAL METHODS OF DEMOCRACY INADEQUATE

"There has long been maturing a conviction that the intellectual methods of democracy are inadequate to the issues with which a democracy has to deal. So inadequate to their task have been its methods of initiating and formulating policies, that decisions have for the most part been made by small bodies of persons who may have indeed a public purpose to serve, but who may also have private ends to gain. These are then 'put over' on the public for discussion and adoption, the appeal being largely emotional and directed toward securing adherence rather than criticism and understanding. We have had much condemnation of the process, but little suggestion as to how better methods might be developed and employed. . . .

"One . . . may well . . . ask whether there is any way out save the more and more expanded use of the method of group discussion."

John Dewey, Introduction to A. D. Sheffield, *Training for Group Experience* (New York, The Inquiry, 1929), pp. x-xi.

491. HOW TO CREATE SOCIAL WILL

"All our ideas of conscious self-determination lead us to a new method: it is not merely that we must be allowed to govern ourselves, we must learn how to govern ourselves; it is not only

that we must be given 'free speech,' we must learn a speech that is free; we are not given rights, we create rights; it is not only that we must invent machinery to get a social will expressed, we must invent machinery that will get a social will created."

M. P. Follett, *The New State* (New York, Longmans Green, 1920), pp. 8f.

492. DISCUSSION AN ESSENTIAL OF GOVERNMENT

"Now surely, if we reflect upon it, what matters most in the tiny democratic societies which we feel to be thoroughly satisfactory forms of government is what comes out of the free give and take of discussion. When men who are serving a common purpose meet to pool their experience, to air their difficulties and even their discontents, there comes about a real process of collective thinking. The narrowness and one-sidedness of each person's point of view are corrected, and something emerges which each can recognize as embodying the truth of what he stood for, and yet (or rather therefore) is seen to serve the purpose of the society better than what anyone conceived for himself. That is of course an ideal. Such perfect agreement is not often reached. But it is an ideal which is always to some extent realized when there is open and frank discussion. And anyone with experience of the effectiveness of discussion in a small democratic society must recognize how valuable is the contribution of those who are not easily convinced but can stand up resolutely for their own point of view. Where discussion of that kind prevails, we recognize that democracy is not a make-shift or a compromise or a means of keeping people quiet by the production of a sham unanimity, or a process of counting heads to save the trouble of breaking them, but the ideal form of government."

A. D. Lindsay, *The Essentials of Democracy* (London, Oxford University Press, 1929), pp. 36-37.

493. MY OPPONENT'S CASE

"Paradoxical as it may seem, if I am a sincere seeker for truth, I shall help my antagonist to put his case in the most favorable light and coöperate with him in securing an opportunity for putting his theory to the test. I shall do this because

I am convinced that his theory will not work, and that the sooner it is demonstrated that it will not work, under conditions which he himself chooses as being especially favorable for success, the better for my own position."

N. G. McCrea, in *Columbia University Quarterly*, 19:27 (Dec. 1916).

494. DEMOCRACY ESSENTIALLY THE EDUCATIVE EFFECT OF SHARING

"The best guarantee of collective efficiency and power is liberation and use of the diversity of individual capacities in initiative, planning, foresight, vigor, and endurance. Personality must be educated, and personality cannot be educated by confining its operations to technical and specialized things, or to the less important relationships of life. Full education comes only when there is a responsible share on the part of each person, in proportion to capacity, in shaping the aims and policies of the social groups to which he belongs. This fact fixes the significance of democracy. It cannot be conceived as a sectarian or racial thing nor as a consecration of some form of government which has already attained constitutional sanction. It is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when its elements take part in directing things which are common, things for the sake of which men and women form groups—families, industrial companies, governments, churches, scientific associations, and so on. The principle holds as much of one form of association, say in industry and commerce, as it does in government."

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1920), p. 209.

495. REAL FREEDOM

"There can be no real freedom or democracy until the men who do the work in a business also control its management."

Bertrand Russell, *Political Ideals* (New York, Century, 1917), p. 26.

496. AN EQUAL START DENIED

"Among the many drawbacks that mar the system of private ownership of capital, as it has been hitherto developed, an ob-

vious blot has already been noted . . . that if only every one had a fair start it would be difficult to devise a more stimulating arrangement for human nature as it is with its instinct for acquisition and rivalry. Under private ownership of capital this fair start has not been given. . . . The owning class not only controls the equipment of industry, but also, by its greater individual wealth, can give its sons, daughters, and dependents a better and longer education and bring them up under conditions—in the matter of food, clothing, and access to good air—that give them a long start in life's race. Convention and custom increase the inequality."

Hartley Withers, *The Case for Capitalism* (New York, Dutton, 1920), pp. 24-26.

497. THE NECESSITY OF SECURITY

"Food, clothing, shelter, health; protection against losing these goods by disemployment or because of accident, disease, old age, by 'overproduction,' technological improvements, and all the other excuses for throwing men on the scrap heap like so many unwanted machine parts—these are indispensable preliminaries to fulfilling, self-realizing individuality. No person can be quite himself who lives in constant deprivation or in constant anxiety over these things. These things are the springs of power, the sustenance of character and personality. Men lacking the security which these things bring become brutalized, and if possession thereof does not necessarily make them human, it is also true that humanity is impossible to achieve without such possession."

Horace M. Kallen, *Individualism: An American Way of Life* (New York, Liveright, 1933), p. 199.

498. HEREDITARY SELECTION OF OCCUPATION

"At present, it is very difficult to enter upon such a profession as law or medicine unless one's parents have a certain amount of money, since the training is expensive and earnings do not begin at once. The consequence is that the principle of selection is social and hereditary, not fitness for the work. . . . Farmers are selected mainly by heredity; as a rule, they are

the sons of farmers. . . . The hereditary principle has been abandoned in government, but it lingers in many other departments of life. Wherever it exists, it promotes the inefficiency to which it formerly led in public affairs. We must replace it by two correlative rules: first, that no one shall be allowed to undertake important work without having acquired the necessary skill; secondly, that this skill shall be taught to the ablest of those who desire it, quite independently of their parents' means. It is obvious that these two rules would enormously increase efficiency."

Bertrand Russell, *Education and the Good Life* (New York, Boni & Liveright, 1926), pp. 306-7.

499. INHERITED WEALTH

"I have been concerned here to argue that a political democracy is bound by its very nature to resent, and ultimately, therefore, to seek to overthrow, distinctions among its citizens which are built upon wealth or birth. It will therefore move, slowly it may be, but nevertheless inevitably, to the organization of an institutional framework in which the advantages of either are suppressed. It will move slowly so long as the society shows itself capable of making the adjustments by consent within a reasonable time. But those adjustments, of themselves, produce an egalitarian temper which feels the burden of remaining inequalities much more fiercely than was the case when they seemed, by their extent, a part of the fixed order of nature."

Harold J. Laski, *Democracy in Crisis* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1933), p. 218.

CHAPTER XII

DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION

500. DEMOCRACY IMPLIES EDUCATION

“A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity. These more numerous and more varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond; they consequently put a premium on variation in his action. They secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed as long as the incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a group which in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests. . . .”

“Obviously a society to which stratification into separate classes would be fatal, must see to it that intellectual opportunities are accessible to all on equitable and easy terms. A society marked off into classes need be specially attentive only to the education of its ruling elements. A society which is mobile, which is full of channels for the distribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see to it that its members are educated to personal initiative and adaptability. Otherwise, they will be overwhelmed by the changes in which they are caught and whose significance or connections they do not perceive. The result will be a confusion in which a few will appropriate to themselves the results of the blind and externally directed activities of others.”

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916).
pp. 101-2.

501. EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

"Children in school must be allowed freedom . . . to develop active qualities of initiative, independence, and resourcefulness, before the abuses and failures of democracy will disappear."

John Dewey and Evelyn Dewey, *Schools of Tomorrow* (New York, Dutton, 1915), p. 304.

502. DEMOCRACY BEGINS AT HOME

"The family is the child's first educational group; no other has equal power. An autocratic family makes a poor school for democratic society. Yet nearly all families are either autocracies or dual monarchies. We still hold to the theory of the divine right of paternal kings to absolute rule. True, in American homes, the rule is largely a fiction. . . . But the strife of wills, the asserted and ignored authority of parents, works only to develop individualists. The young often experience a society in which they either live in subjection or in perpetual conflict of wills, devoid of all attempts to work out a common goodwill."

Henry F. Cope, *Education for Democracy* (New York, Macmillan, 1920), p. 109.

503. FREDERICK WILLIAM IV OF PRUSSIA ON THE WIDER EDUCATION OF THE MASSES (1849)

"All the misery which has come to Prussia during the past year [i.e., from the revolution of 1848] is to be credited to you [teachers in the training colleges] and only you. You deserve the blame for that godless pseudo-education of the common people which you have been propagating as the only true wisdom and by means of which you have destroyed faith and loyalty in the minds of my subjects and turned their hearts away from me. Even while I was yet Crown Prince I hated in my innermost soul this tricked-out, false education strutting about like a peacock, and while I was Regent I made every effort in my power to overthrow it. I will go ahead on this beaten path without allowing myself to deviate from it. First of all, these seminaries every one must be removed from the large cities to small villages, in order that they may be kept away from the

unholy influence which is poisoning our times. And then everything that goes on in them must be subjected to the closest supervision. I am not afraid of the populace, but my bureaucratic government in which up to now I have had proud confidence, is being undermined and poisoned by these unholy doctrines of a modern, frivolous, worldly wisdom. But as long as I hold the sword hilt in my hands, I shall know how to deal with such a nuisance."

Quoted in Edward H. Reisner, *Nationalism and Education since 1789* (New York, Macmillan, 1922), pp. 161-62.

504. HUMILITY AND OBEDIENCE IN AN AUTOCRATIC SOCIETY (RUSSIA, 1819)

"The soul of education and the supreme virtue of a citizen is humility; and therefore obedience is the most important virtue in a student."

Quoted in Thomas Darlington, *Education in Russia* (Special Report on Educational Subjects, Vol. 24, London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1909), p. 58.

505. INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION

"For every 1,000 men engaged in the professions Counts showed that there are 360 children in the high schools; the same number of men engaged in the machine trades, personal service, and common labor had 169, 50, and 17 children respectively in secondary schools. Moreover, of every 100 children from these groups in the ninth grade, 60 of those whose fathers were in the professions remained until the last year. Of those whose fathers were in the machine trades, personal service, and common labor only 21, 22, and 12 respectively remained. From such facts it appears that democracy provides from three to five times as well in secondary education for those from the economically superior families as for those with most need. Truly democracy gives to those who have."

Thomas H. Briggs, in *Junior-Senior High School Clearing House*, 6:75 (Oct. 1931).

506. TERMAN ON DIFFERING EDUCATIONAL NEEDS

"Graduation is well beyond the intellectual endowment of a large proportion of children. Below 90 I.Q. graduation is by

no means likely, and nearly a third of all children test this low or lower. Proctor found that 70 per cent of those testing below 95 I.Q. failed in more than half of their studies. A nation falls short of the true ideals of democracy which refuses to furnish suitable training to a third of its children merely because their endowment does not enable them to complete a course of study which will satisfy the requirements for college entrance. . . .

"High schools at present are in a measure 'class' schools. The child of 75 to 85 I.Q. has an inalienable right to the kind of training from which he can derive profit. Since there are so many who cannot master the usual high-school studies, new lines of work of a more practical nature will have to be added. . . . Instead of being undemocratic, as some have argued, such differentiation of courses and enlargement of opportunities for vocational training of the humbler sort is a necessary corollary of the truly democratic ideal."

Lewis M. Terman, *The Intelligence of School Children* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1919), pp. 90-91.

507. WASTE

"The waste of attempting to give every one irrespective of ability a high school education is colossal."

J. L. Tildsley, "The High Schools of New York City," in *Phi Beta Kappa Key*, 7:509 (May 1930).

508. NIETZSCHE ON THE EDUCATION OF THE FEW

"The education of the masses cannot, therefore, be our aim; but rather the education of a few picked men for great and lasting works. We well know that a just posterity judges the collective intellectual state of a time only by those few great and lonely figures of the period."

Friedrich Nietzsche, Lecture (Bâle, 1872) on *The Future of Our Educational Institutions* (Trans. by Kennedy. New York, Macmillan, 1911), p. 75.

509. THE FEAR OF INDOCTRINATION

"In general the American people express a fear of using the schools for purposes of indoctrination. In the great majority of cases, however, this fear is found only in its naïve form. Like

other peoples the world over they firmly believe that they are in a sense the chosen people of God, that their culture is obviously superior to all others, and that their institutions are the pure product of human reason. Moreover, these views are commonly held by every group, sect, or locality in the country. As a consequence, when any segment of the American people teach to their children that their views of the universe, from the functions of the county sheriff to the destiny of man, are good, true, and right, they do not feel that they are indoctrinating the coming generation with the peculiar set of beliefs which they have inherited from their fathers. To be sure, when they behold their neighbors behaving in similar fashion, they recognize the process at once as indoctrination of the most dangerous and unjustifiable character; but when they behave thus themselves they sincerely believe that they are merely guarding their boys and girls from error."

George S. Counts, *The American Road to Culture* (New York, John Day, 1930), pp. 185-86.

510. UNQUESTIONING ACCEPTANCE OF THE WISDOM OF THE AGES

"Unless the child possesses a faith in his teacher which will make it possible for him to accept without question the wisdom of the ages as his guide in the building up of his own character and in the formation of his attitude toward his fellowman and the institutions of civil life, it will be impossible for the adult generation to assimilate and to bind to itself in solidarity the succeeding generation. The state would thus be unable to perpetuate itself."

Thomas E. Shields, *Philosophy of Education* (Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1917), p. 265.

511. COUNTS ON IMPOSITION IN EDUCATION

"The child will be imposed upon in some fashion by the various elements in his environment, the real question is not whether imposition will take place, but rather from what source it will come. . . .

"Education as a force for social regeneration must march hand in hand with the living and creative forces of the social

order. In their own lives teachers must bridge the gap between school and society and play some part in the fashioning of those great common purposes which should bind the two together.

"This brings us to the question of the kind of imposition in which teachers should engage, if they had the power. Our obligations, I think, grow out of the social situation. We live in troublous times; we live in an age of profound change; we live in an age of revolution. Indeed it is highly doubtful whether man ever lived in a more eventful period than the present. . . . Today we are witnessing the rise of a civilization quite without precedent in human history—a civilization founded on science, technology, and machinery, possessing the most extraordinary power, and rapidly making of the entire world a single great society. Because of forces already released, whether in the field of economics, politics, morals, religion, or art, the old molds are being broken. And the peoples of the earth are everywhere seething with strange ideas and passions. If life were peaceful and quiet and undisturbed by great issues, we might with some show of wisdom center our attention on the nature of the child. But with the world as it is, we cannot afford for a single instant to remove our eyes from the social scene or shift our attention from the peculiar needs of the age. . . .

"The point should be emphasized, however, that the present situation is also freighted with hope and promise. The age is pregnant with possibilities. There lies within our grasp the most humane, the most beautiful, the most majestic civilization ever fashioned by any people. . . .

"If the schools are to be really effective, they must become centers for the building, and not merely for the contemplation, of our civilization. This does not mean that we should endeavor to promote particular reforms through the educational system. We should, however, give to our children a vision of the possibilities which lie ahead and endeavor to enlist their loyalties and enthusiasms in the realization of the vision. Also our social institutions and practices, all of them, should be critically examined in the light of such a vision."

George S. Counts, *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* (New York, John Day, 1932), pp. 27-37,

512. ONE ATTITUDE TOWARD INDOCTRINATION

"Indoctrination (the process of inducing uncritical belief) is our best method for transmuting into 'second nature' the inherited wisdom of the race. It establishes lifelong habits and outlooks, freeing the mature mind from settled and routine matters, so that it can meet new problems as they arise. But indoctrinate error and it also will remain as evil second nature, to poison life, perpetuate sectarianism, and create disharmony. How can well-meaning but fallible men discriminate? . . . The only right use of indoctrination is for the inculcation of convictions, outlooks, and habits concerning the truth or wisdom of which educated, intelligent men are in substantially universal agreement. On controversial or uncertain matters the mind of youth should be left uncommitted until the years of critical inquiry, when such matters should be dealt with in the spirit of free inquiry, or left as part of the unsolved problems of existence."

Antioch [College] Notes, Dec. 1, 1925.

513. DOCILITY

"When we think of the docility of the young we first think of the stocks of information adults wish to impose and the ways of acting they want to reproduce. Then we think of the insolent coercions, the insinuating briberies, the pedagogic solemnities by which the freshness of youth can be faded and its vivid curiosities dulled. Education becomes the art of taking advantage of the helplessness of the young; the forming of habits becomes a guarantee for the maintenance of hedges of custom."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), p. 64.

514. AUTOMATIC INHERITANCE OF ALLEGIANCE

"It is chiefly competition that keeps institutions adapted to the conditions they face and the people they serve. Without this spur the institution stands still or even degenerates. . . .

"An institution that has the children of its members for nothing need not cater to them, and if it will content itself with such following, it may petrify in its tracks. It is not good, therefore, that the sons should inherit creed, party allegiance, college

allegiance, local allegiance from their fathers; they should choose in freedom. The parent that fastens unescapable bonds upon the child before it has reached the age of choice confiscates the child's personality.

"If, instead of inheriting their adherents, organizations had to win them, they would accommodate themselves to today. The contrasts between organizations would connect less with differences of origin and history and more with the actual contrasts of type in contemporary society."

E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, Century, 1921), p. 220.

515. DOCTRINAL CONDITIONING AND FREEDOM

"Any religious, economic, social, or political doctrine which is so insinuated into the experience of a child that he is unable to think critically about it in so far forth robs him of his freedom. To illustrate: The experimentalist believes that a person who has been trained in a variety of patriotism through certain types of flag-drill, etc., so that he has not learned to think critically about his nation's policies, but has been conditioned to follow his country's flag wherever it goes and no matter what the nature of its mission, is in this realm of his experience in much the same position as the moth that has only one response to a bright flame. His freedom to act as an intelligent citizen has been confiscated by those who have thus conditioned him to follow unthinkingly the men who, for the time being, control his nation's policies. . . . The experimentalist believes that any response which is so fixed that it cannot be modified in the light of consequences is a dangerous response to acquire. Such fixed ideas, particularly when charged with emotion, are apt to become enslaving prejudices. He believes it an immoral procedure for adults thus to seek to determine the future thought and conduct of the child. As far as possible, he wants his own most fundamental values, such as faith in the experimental method and regard for the principle of social democracy, so to be accepted that the way is kept open for their further critical examination by each individual. Even the process of criticism is not exempt from further criticism."

John L. Childs, *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism* (New York, Century, 1931), pp. 161-62.

516. DEMOCRACY IN SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

"Modern life means democracy, democracy means freeing intelligence for independent effectiveness—the emancipation of mind as an individual organ to do its own work. We naturally associate democracy, to be sure, with freedom of action, but freedom of action without freed capacity of thought behind it is only chaos. If external authority in action is given up, it must be because internal authority of truth, discovered and known to reason, is substituted.

"How does the school stand with reference to this matter? Does the school as an accredited representative exhibit this trait of democracy as a spiritual force? Does it lead and direct the movement? Does it lag behind the work at cross-purposes? I find the fundamental need of the school today dependent upon its limited recognition of the principle of freedom of intelligence. This limitation appears to me to affect both of the elements of school life: teacher and pupil. As to both, the school has lagged behind the general contemporary social movement; and much that is unsatisfactory, much of conflict and of defect, comes from the discrepancy between the relatively undemocratic organization of the school, as it affects the mind of both teacher and pupil, and the growth and extension of the democratic principle in life beyond school doors.

"The effort of the last two-thirds of a century has been successful in building up the machinery of a democracy of mind. It has provided the ways and means for housing and equipping intelligence. . . . But when we turn to the aim and method which this magnificent institution serves, we find that our democracy is not yet conscious of the ethical principle upon which it rests—the responsibility and freedom of mind in discovery and proof—and consequently we find confusion where there should be order, darkness where there should be light. The teacher has not the power of initiation and constructive endeavor which is necessary to the fulfillment of the function of teaching. The learner finds conditions antagonistic (or at least lacking) to the development of individual mental power and to adequate responsibility for its use. . . .

"If there is a single public-school system in the United States

where there is official and constitutional provision made for submitting questions of methods of discipline and teaching, and the questions of the curriculum, textbooks, etc., to the discussion and decision of those actually engaged in the work of teaching, that fact has escaped my notice. Indeed, the opposite situation is so common that it seems, as a rule, to be absolutely taken for granted as the normal and final condition of affairs. The number of persons to whom any other course has occurred as desirable, or even possible—to say nothing of necessary—is apparently very limited. But until the public-school system is organized in such a way that every teacher has some regular and representative way in which he or she can register judgment upon matters of educational importance, with the assurance that this judgment will somehow affect the school system, the assertion that the present system is not, from the internal standpoint, democratic seems to be justified. Either we come here upon some fixed and inherent limitation of the democratic principle, or else we find in this fact an obvious discrepancy between the conduct of the school and the conduct of social life—a discrepancy so great as to demand immediate and persistent effort at reform.

"The more enlightened portions of the public have, indeed, become aware of one aspect of this discrepancy. Many reformers are contending against the conditions which place the direction of school affairs, including the selection of textbooks, etc., in the hands of a body of men who are outside the school system itself, who have not necessarily any expert knowledge of education and who are moved by non-educational motives. Unfortunately, those who have noted this undemocratic condition of affairs, and who have striven to change it, have, as a rule, conceived of but one remedy, namely the transfer of authority to the school superintendent. In their zeal to place the center of gravity inside the school system, in their zeal to decrease the prerogatives of a non-expert school board, and to lessen the opportunities for corruption and private pull which go with that, they have tried to remedy one of the evils of democracy by adopting the principle of autocracy. For no matter how wise, expert, or benevolent the head of the school system, the one-man principle is autocracy.

"The logic of the argument goes farther, very much farther,

than the reformer of this type sees. The logic which commits him to the idea that the management of the school system must be in the hands of an expert commits him also to the idea that every member of the school system, from the first-grade teacher to the principal of the high school, must have some share in the exercise of educational power. The remedy is not to have one expert dictating educational methods and subject matter to a body of passive, recipient teachers, but the adoption of intellectual initiative, discussion, and decision throughout the entire school corps. The remedy of the partial evils of democracy, the implication of the school system in municipal politics, is an appeal to a more thoroughgoing democracy.

"The dictation, in theory at least, of the subject matter to be taught, to the teacher who is to engage in the actual work of instruction, and frequently under the name of close supervision, the attempt to determine the methods which are to be used in teaching, mean nothing more or less than the deliberate restriction of intelligence, the imprisoning of the spirit. Every well graded system of schools in this country rejoices in a course of study. It is no uncommon thing to find methods of teaching such subjects as reading, writing, spelling, and arithmetic officially laid down; outline topics in history and geography are provided ready-made for the teacher; gems of literature are fitted to the successive ages of boys and girls. Even the domain of art, songs and methods of singing, subject matter and technique of drawing and painting, come within the region on which an outside authority lays its sacrilegious hands.

"I have stated the theory, which is also true of the practice to a certain extent and in certain places. We may thank our heavens, however, that the practice is rarely as bad as the theory would require. Superintendents and principals often encourage individuality and thoughtfulness in the invention and adoption of methods of teaching; and they wink at departures from the printed manual of study. It remains true, however, that this great advance is personal and informal. It depends upon the wisdom and tact of the individual supervisory official; he may withdraw his concession at any moment; or it may be ruthlessly thrown aside by his successor who has formed a high ideal of 'system.'

"I know it will be said that this state of things, while an evil, is a necessary one; that without it confusion and chaos would reign; that such regulations are the inevitable accompaniments of any graded system. It is said that the average teacher is incompetent to take any part in laying out the course of study or in initiating methods of instruction or discipline. Is not this the type of argument which has been used from time immemorial, and in every department of life, against the advance of democracy? What does democracy mean save that the individual is to have a share in determining the conditions and the aims of his own work; and that, upon the whole, through the free and mutual harmonizing of different individuals, the work of the world is better done than when planned, arranged, and directed by a few, no matter how wise or of how good intent that few? How can we justify our belief in the democratic principle elsewhere, and then go back entirely upon it when we come to education?

"Moreover, the argument proves too much. The more it is asserted that the existing corps of teachers is unfit to have voice in the settlement of important educational matters, and their unfitness to exercise intellectual initiative and to assume the responsibility for constructive work is emphasized, the more their unfitness to attempt the much more difficult and delicate task of guiding souls appears. If this body is so unfit, how can it be trusted to carry out the recommendations or the dictations of the wisest body of experts? If teachers are incapable of the intellectual responsibility which goes with the determination of the methods they are to use in teaching, how can they employ methods when dictated by others, in other than a mechanical, capricious, and clumsy manner? The argument, I say, proves too much.

"Moreover, if the teaching force is as inept and unintelligent and irresponsible as the argument assumes, surely the primary problem is that of their improvement. Only by sharing in some responsible task does there come a fitness to share in it. The argument that we must wait until men and women are fully ready to assume intellectual and social responsibilities would have defeated every step in the democratic direction that has ever been taken. The prevalence of methods of authority and

of external dictation and direction tends automatically to perpetuate the very conditions of inefficiency, lack of interest, inability to assume positions of self-determination, which constitute the reasons that are depended upon to justify the régime of authority.

"The system which makes no great demands upon originality, upon invention, upon the continuous expression of individuality, works automatically to put and to keep the more incompetent teachers in the school. It puts them there because by a natural law of spiritual gravitation, the best minds are drawn to the places where they can work most effectively. The best minds are not especially likely to be drawn where there is danger that they may have to submit to conditions which no self-respecting intelligence likes to put up with; and where their time and energy are likely to be so occupied with details of external conformity that they have no opportunity for free and full play of their own vigor. . . .

"All other reforms are conditioned upon reform in the quality and character of those who engage in the teaching profession. The doctrine of the man behind the gun has become familiar enough, in recent discussion, in every sphere of life. Just because education is the most personal, the most intimate, of all human affairs, there, more than anywhere else, the sole ultimate reliance and final source of power are in the training, character, and intelligence of the individual. If any scheme could be devised which would draw to the calling of teaching persons of force of character, of sympathy with children, and consequent interest in the problems of teaching and of scholarship, no one need be troubled for a moment about other educational reforms, or the solution of other educational problems. But as long as a school organization which is undemocratic in principle tends to repel from all but the higher portions of the school system those of independent force, of intellectual initiative, and of inventive ability, or tends to hamper them in their work after they find their way into the schoolroom, so long all other reforms are compromised at their source and postponed indefinitely for fruition."

John Dewey, in *Elementary School Teacher*, 4:193-99 (Dec. 1903).

517. REGARDING THE OREGON SCHOOL LAW OF 1922

(a) Affirmative (various Masonic bodies):

"Our children must not under any pretext, be it based upon money, creed, or social status, be divided into antagonistic groups, there to absorb the narrow views of life as they are taught. If they are so divided, we will find our citizenship composed and made up of cliques, cults, and factions each striving, not for the good of the whole, but for the supremacy of themselves. A divided school can no more succeed than a divided nation."

(b) Negative (a committee of Lutherans):

"This bill if enacted into law would be

A Terrific Blow to Personal Liberty

"Who owns your child? The state? Do not you? Who feeds and clothes your child? The state? Not while you are living and able to care for your own. *Why* do you feed and clothe your child? Because it is *your child*. If you don't own your own child, what in the wide world do you own?

"Now if you own your child and are in duty bound to feed and clothe it, you certainly have 'some say' about your child's education and its teacher. . . . This bill, if enacted into law, will deal *a terrific blow to your constitutional rights, confiscate your parental authority, and undermine your personal liberty.*" . . .

(c) Negative (certain citizens of Portland):

"We, in Oregon, are justly proud of our school system but we have already felt the burden of taxes necessary for its support. If the number of children now attending the public schools is to be increased by adding those now taught in private schools it is inevitable that overcrowding must result, and it is also certain that taxes must be materially increased or that the present standards of instruction must be materially lowered."

(d) Negative (certain non-sectarian private schools):

" . . . The public schools necessarily and properly educate the vast majority, but by methods exacted by large numbers. The private schools educate comparatively few but with more attention to the individual. The ordinary branches of learning

are acquired in both systems. The public schools can afford no more. The private schools by their independent position offer varied opportunities and individual development impossible or unsuitable in the public schools. . . .

"This law will destroy schools which provide desirable methods and courses of study, which the public schools have not adopted and probably never can adopt."

(e) Negative (the Catholic Civic Rights Association):

"The right of the parent to select the mental and moral training of the child is fundamental and inalienable. It is the most primary right recognized by enlightened countries."

Official State Election Pamphlet, 1922, pp. 21-32.

518. SEGREGATION IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS

"The very segregation of children in private schools with the pretension of affording special privileges, whether they do or not, makes it difficult for them not to look on themselves as in one sense or another superior to the masses, who have to attend public schools. 'Nothing,' writes Dean Inge in *Labels and Libels*, 'has contributed so much to create "two nations" in England as the tradition of a "gentleman's education." ' Many parents who have sought for their children special advantages are regretfully conscious of a loss in them of democratic sentiments. They may have gained many other things, but in greater or in less degree they have lost or have never acquired a faith in democracy and a genuine understanding and of sympathy for the common man."

Thomas H. Briggs, *The Great Investment* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1930), p. 92.

519. BAD EFFECTS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS

"Independent schools . . . have other effects that are similarly bad. They tend to weaken or to destroy the interest of their patrons in public education. It is unusual to find a man who sends his children to a private school at the same time active in the promotion of public education and generous in his support of it. Exceptions do exist, and as exceptions they are conspicuous. The generous and occasionally princely donations

of patrons to the upbuilding of private schools would have been beneficent contributions to society if turned to the improvement of popular education. Sometimes they excuse the withheld greater by proffering the lesser. It is often stated that the private schools, benefiting by munificence of patrons, are free to experiment and thus to lead public schools to superior practices. Whatever is possible, the fact remains that a relatively small number, almost an insignificant number, of private schools have in the past engaged in any pioneering important to public schools or are doing so today. The exceptions can be matched fifty for one by those that are reactionary and complacent. It is a safe statement that today the experimenting most significant for social welfare is being done in schools under public control. It is in them that the new and reasonable philosophy of education and the findings of scientific researches have found most fertile soil. And if education is an essential instrument of democracy, the experimentation ought to be done with public funds under democratic conditions. The set-ups in the notable private experimental schools are too artificial to make easy transfer of their findings to public schools."

Thomas H. Briggs, *The Great Investment* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1930), pp. 90-91.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS

520. THE TERMS CHANGE, PROCESS, EVOLUTION, AND PROGRESS

“The term *change* itself is wholly neutral, implying nothing but a difference through time in the object to which it is applied. When we speak of social change, we suggest so far no law, no theory, no meaning, no direction, no continuity even. The idea of continuity is introduced when we refer to a social change as a *process*. A process means continuous change taking place in a definite manner through the operation of forces present from the first within the situation. . . . A process may be up or down, forward or backward, towards integration or disintegration. All that is meant by process is the definite step-by-step manner through which one state or stage merges into another.

“Another set of terms is needed when we express not only continuity but direction of change, and for scientific purposes the most important of these is *evolution*. The idea of evolution is in other sciences, and especially the biological, the grand key to the comprehension of change. . . . Evolution means more than growth. The latter term does connote a direction of change but only one of a quantitative character. Evolution, as we shall presently see, involves something more intrinsic, a change not merely in size but at least in structure also. So do the associated terms *development*, *regression*, *retrogression*. The suggestion of ‘forward’ or ‘backward,’ of ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ in respect of some scale, is present in them all. . . .

“We should beware of confusing the *concept* of evolution and the *concept* of progress. When we speak of progress we imply not merely direction, but direction towards some final goal, some destination determined ideally, not simply by objective

consideration of the forces at work. What defines this goal is the value-judgment of the spectator, not the inevitability of causation. It may be that the evolutionary process moves in accord with our conception of desirable change, but there is no *logical* necessity that it should, and in any event the judgment of final value varies with the mentality and experience of the individual and the group, whereas the process of evolution is objectively given, waiting only to be discovered and understood. If the process so revealed satisfies also *our* sense of values, if the direction of evolutionary change brings also a fuller realization of the values we cherish, then for *us* it is also progress."

R. M. MacIver, *Society: Its Structure and Changes* (New York, Ray Long and R. R. Smith, 1931), pp. 399-401.

521. OGBURN: CULTURAL LAGS

"The various parts of modern culture are not changing at the same rate, some parts are changing much more rapidly than others; and since there is a correlation and interdependence of parts, a rapid change in one part of our culture requires readjustments through other changes in the various correlated parts of culture. . . . Where one part of culture changes first, through some discovery or invention, and occasions changes in some part of culture dependent upon it, there frequently is a delay in the changes occasioned in the dependent part of culture. . . .

"If the material culture should continue to accumulate and change with increasing rapidity, it would seem that the cultural lags will pile up even more than at the present time. Such a development creates quite a task for those who would direct the course of social progress, the task of eliminating these mal-adjustments by making the adjustments to material changes more rapid. It is thinkable that the piling up of these cultural lags may reach such a point that they may be changed in a somewhat wholesale fashion. In such a case, the word revolution probably describes what happens."

William F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York, Huebsch, 1922), pp. 200f., 280.

522. DIFFERING RATES OF CULTURAL CHANGE

"The preceding pages have revealed Middletown as learning new ways of behaving towards material things more rapidly than new habits addressed to persons and non-material institutions. New tools and inventions have been the most prolific breeders of change. They have entered Middletown's industrial life more rapidly than new business and management devices. Bathrooms and electricity have pervaded the homes of the city more rapidly than innovations in the personal adjustments between husband and wife or between parents and children. The automobile has changed the leisure-time life more drastically than have the literature courses taught the young, and tool-using vocational courses have appeared more rapidly in the school curriculum than changes in the arts courses. The development of the linotype and radio are changing the technique of winning political elections more than developments in the art of speech-making or in Middletown's methods of voting. The Y.M.C.A., built about a gymnasium, exhibits more change in Middletown's religious institutions than do the weekly sermons of its ministers or the deliberations of the Ministerial Association."

Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1929), p. 499.

523. THE INEVITABILITY OF PROGRESS

"Progress . . . is not an accident, but a necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial, it is a part of nature; all of a piece with the development of the embryo of the unfolding of a flower. The modifications mankind have undergone, and are still undergoing, result from a law underlying the whole organic creation; and, provided the human race continues and the constitution of things remains the same, those modifications must end in completeness. As surely as the tree becomes bulky when it stands alone, and slender if one of a group; as surely as the same creature assumes the different forms of cart-horse and race-horse, according as its habits demand strength or speed; as surely as a blacksmith's arm grows large, and the skin of a laborer's hand thick; as surely as the eye tends to become long-sighted in the sailor, and short-sighted in the student; as surely

as a clerk acquires rapidity in writing and calculation; as surely as the musician learns to detect an error of a semitone amidst what seems to others a very babel of sounds; as surely as a passion grows by indulgence and diminishes when restrained; as surely as a disregarded conscience becomes inert, and one that is obeyed active; as surely as there is any efficacy in educational culture, or any meaning in such terms as habit, custom, practice; so surely must the human faculties be molded into complete fitness for the social state; so surely must the things we call evil and immorality disappear; so surely must man become perfect."

Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics* (New York, Appleton, 1878. 1st ed. 1850), pp. 79-80.

524. THE OBSESSION OF PROGRESS AND ITS ILL EFFECTS IN AMERICA

"With the stereotype of 'progress' before their eyes, Americans have in the mass seen little that did not accord with that progress. They saw the expansion of cities, but not the accretion of slums; they cheered the census statistics, but refused to consider overcrowding; they pointed with pride to their growth, but would not see the drift from the land, or the unassimilated immigration. They expanded industry furiously at reckless cost to their natural resources; they built up gigantic corporations without arranging for industrial relations. They grew to be one of the most powerful nations on earth without preparing their institutions or their minds for the ending of their isolation."

Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1922), p. 110.

525. NO REAL NOVELTY: SAME OLD WORLD, SAME OLD WAY, ETERNAL PRINCIPLES

"Why not realize that we are living in the same old world today, that it must be saved and improved in the same old way, by adhering to the eternal principles and guarding the fundamental institutions that history and experience and common sense teach so clearly are the milestones on the highway of progress?"

Harry F. Atwood, *Safeguarding American Ideals* (Chicago, Laird & Lee, 1921), pp. 123-24.

526. A CHINESE MANDARIN ON INVENTION

"There is nothing extraordinary in the motorcar. There is nothing extraordinary in anything. Men invented it yesterday. They will invent something else tomorrow. Still the world goes around, and we are not an atom the happier."

New York Times, Sept. 28, 1908.

527. INSIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN EFFORT

"Examined closely, weighed and measured carefully, set in true perspective, the personal, the casual, the individual influence in history sinks in significance, and great cyclical forces loom up. Events come of themselves, so to speak; that is, they come so consistently and unavoidably as to rule out as causes not only physical phenomena but voluntary human effort."

Edward P. Cheyney, "Law in History," in *American Historical Review*, 29:235 (Jan. 1924).

528. CULTURAL LOSS

"In the year 1500 Europe knew less than Archimedes who died in the year 212 B.C."

Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), p. 8.

529. BEFORE AND AFTER 1830

"Today the external conditions of life in civilized communities differ more from those of 1830 than did the conditions of 1830 from those at the time of Noah's flood."

J. B. S. Haldane, "Is History a Fraud?", in *Harpers Magazine*, 161:474f. (Sept. 1930).

530. THE FECUNDITY OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY

"Competent scholars estimate that in the field of biology alone in 1926 there were some 40,000 [studies] of significance reported throughout the world."

Donald P. Bean, in *Saturday Review of Literature*, 4:969 (June 16, 1928).

531. HOW THOUGHT GROWS

"The original presentation of Professor Albert Einstein's theory of relativity filled only three pages and has been fol-

lowed by expositions and elucidations in the form of 3,775 books."

New York Times, Jan. 19, 1929.

532. NO INVENTION FOR 30,000 YEARS

"In the very earliest times of mankind culture must have changed almost imperceptibly. The history of man, of a being that made tools, goes back maybe 150,000 years, more or less. The tools belonging to this period are found buried in the soil. They are stone implements of simple form. For a period of no less than 30,000 years the forms did not change. When we observe such permanence among animals we explain it as an expression of instinct."

Franz Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life* (New York, Norton, 1932), p. 132.

533. MORAL PROGRESS

"There seems to be a law of moral progress. Obscurely and slowly, yet visibly and measurably, moral influences in human affairs have become stronger and more widely extended than material influences. . . .

"Moral ideals have become increasingly predominant in the heat and unreason of war, . . . they have asserted themselves with still more rapidly increasing force in the realm of peace. The disappearance of slavery, of serfdom, of the whipping of soldiers and sailors, criminals, apprentices, and school children, the diminution of personal oppression, of man's physical and legal power over women, of the greater advantages granted by the law to employers over employees and to landlords over tenants, the spread of sympathy, of mercy, of helpfulness, are just so many proofs of the existence of a law of moral progress. . . .

"Not only intensively but extensively moral forces have tended to become predominant. There was a time when fidelity to contract, justice, mercy, applied only within the family. The validity of these principles gradually extended from the family to the tribe, to the nation, and now in these later ages from the nation to international relations."

Edward P. Cheyney, "Law in History," in *American Historical Review*, 29:244-45 (Jan. 1924).

534. THE GOAL AS THOUGHTFUL CONTROL

"Modern civilization stands above that of Greece or Rome not because it has realized greater happiness for the world or a more beautiful order of life or greater works of genius. These things none can measure. . . . If the world process were to be arrested here, it might plausibly be contended that in the actual fruition the life of Athens was something finer and more worth having than the life of England or France. The modern world stands higher because it is further on the road to the goal, though it may be that its portion of the road lies through less smiling country, and it is further on the road because its Thought has advanced a clear stage in the control of the conditions of life and in the conception of its own aim and end. For the same reason it is gradually subduing both the barbarian without the gate and the Philistine within."

L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose* (London, Macmillan, 1913), p. 230.

535. PROGRESS NOT NECESSARY BUT CONTINGENT

"Far from being necessary and universal, progress has been in an eminent degree contingent and partial. Its career has been frequently interrupted by periods of stagnation or declension, and wherever it has gone on, it has been forwarded, not by an inexplicable tendency of *nusus*, but by a concurrence of favorable conditions, external and internal. We must remember moreover, as Sir Henry Maine reminds us (*Ancient Law*, p. 24), that the communities which have attained to a conspicuous degree of civilization constitute a numerical minority of mankind. Contemporaneous with the rapidly advancing nations of Europe exist the sluggish nations of Asia, and the almost stationary tribes of Africa and Polynesia."

John Fiske, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1891. 1st ed., 1874), Vol. II, p. 195.

536. SOCIAL POSSIBILITIES

"Few men seem to realize how many of the evils from which we suffer are wholly unnecessary, and that they could be abolished by a united effort within a few years. If a majority in

every civilized country so desired, we could, within twenty years, abolish all abject poverty, quite half the illness in the world, the whole economic slavery which binds down nine-tenths of our population; we could fill the world with beauty and joy, and secure the reign of universal peace. It is only because men are apathetic that this is not achieved, only because imagination is sluggish, and what always has been is regarded as what always must be."

Bertrand Russell, *Political Ideals* (New York, Century, 1917), p. 35.

537. OUR DOUBTS ARE TRAITORS

"Our doubts are traitors,
And make us lose the good we oft might win,
By fearing to attempt."

Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*, Act I, sc. 5.

538. THE MEANING OF PROGRESS

"Progress means increase of present meaning, which involves multiplication of sensed distinctions as well as harmony, unification. This statement may, perhaps, be made generally, in application to the experience of humanity. If history shows progress it can hardly be found elsewhere than in this complication and extension of the significance found within experience. It is clear that such progress brings no surcease, no immunity from perplexity and trouble. If we wished to transmute this generalization into a categorical imperative we should say: 'So act as to increase the meaning of present experience.' But even then in order to get instruction about the concrete quality of such increased meaning we should have to run away from the law and study the needs and alternative possibilities lying within a unique and localized situation. The imperative, like everything absolute, is sterile. Till men give up the search for a general formula of progress they will not know where to look to find it."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), p. 283.

539. CULTURE AND RACIAL DIFFERENCES

"It is well to confess our ignorance. We have no knowledge as yet of the precise limits between a race's mental endowment and

its culture, between its inborn mental ability and its mental acquisitions. An innate difference among races, as we have seen, doubtless exists and may be far more important than we have yet discovered. But the difference which strikes the eye is a difference of culture, and we are quite unable to decide the degree in which this is due to happy or unhappy externals or to psychic constitution."

G. M. Stratton, *Social Psychology of International Conduct* (New York, Appleton, 1929), pp. 37-38.

540. THE DOGMATISM OF RACE DIFFERENCES

"It becomes increasingly evident that much of the dogmatism regarding biological race differences rests upon a very slender scientific foundation, and indeed approaches the most transparent jingoism, differing little from the childish boastings of the juvenile playground, accompanied by savage growls derived from the subhuman stage of animal evolution."

Charles E. Merriam, *The Making of Citizens* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 253.

541. INNATE RACIAL DIFFERENCES

"There is . . . no evidence whatever that would stigmatize the negro as of weaker build, or as subject to inclinations and powers that are opposed to our social organization. An unbiased estimate of the anthropological evidence so far brought forward does not permit us to countenance the belief in a racial inferiority which would unfit an individual of the negro race to take his part in modern civilization. We do not know of any demand made on the human body or mind in modern life that anatomical or ethnological evidence would prove to be beyond the powers of the negro.

"The traits of the American negro are adequately explained on the basis of his history and social status. The tearing-away from the African soil and the consequent complete loss of the old standards of life, which were replaced by the dependency of slavery and by all it entailed, followed by a period of disorganization and by a severe economic struggle against heavy odds, are sufficient to explain the inferiority of the status of the

race, without falling back upon the theory of hereditary inferiority."

Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York, Macmillan, 1911), p. 272.

542. CHINA'S EARLIER PREÉMINENCE

"If we go back to the fifteenth century, we shall find that the standard of civilization, as the term is usually understood, was still much higher in China than in Europe; while Marco Polo, the famous Venetian traveler of the thirteenth century, who actually lived twenty-four years in China, and served as an official under Kublai Khan, has left it on record that the magnificence of Chinese cities and the splendor of the Chinese court, outrivaled anything he had ever seen or heard of."

Herbert A. Giles, *Civilization of China* (New York, Holt, 1911), p. 119.

543. CONDORCET ON INDEFINITE PERFECTIBILITY

"The result of my work will be to show, by reasoning and by facts, that there is no limit set to the perfecting of the powers of man; that human perfectibility is in reality indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth independent of any power that might wish to stop it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us. . . . What a picture of the human race, freed from its chains, removed from the empire of chance as from that of the enemies of its progress, and advancing with a firm and sure step on the pathway of truth, of virtue, and of happiness."

Marquis de Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, 1886. 1st ed. c. 1794), I, 19; II, 99.

544. AN ARMY VIEW: WAR INERADICABLE

"To abolish war we must remove its cause which lies in the imperfections of human nature. Man's spirit must be changed. . . . In his political life no less than in his daily occupations, man indulges his passions and defends them with his intellect, and has thereby produced a social system based primarily on force. . . . The cardinal impulse of the typical human society is toward war, and the nemesis of the typical social unit is its inability to escape from this destiny of its own character. All

social institutions carry within themselves the seeds of violence and death. . . .

"War is inherent in our way of life. And war will persist until men achieve a spiritual abdication in which they will prefer to abandon to others the fruit of their labors, scorn to receive more than they give, cast aside their present ideals of manhood and honor, and substitute for them the bleak ideas of service and self-effacement. Yet these passive ideas are exactly those which spell suicide to a man, to a race, to a civilization. . . . The way of man is the way of the passionate deed."

Words attributed to a prominent army officer of this country but denied by him. See *The World Tomorrow*, 14:312-16 (Oct. 1931).

545. PSYCHOLOGISTS ON WAR INSTINCTS

"The writer addressed a question to the members of the American Psychological Association, the returns from which he is herewith submitting. . . .

"The question . . . was stated as follows: Do you as a psychologist hold that there are present in human nature ineradicable, instinctive factors that make war between nations inevitable?

"There are 528 members of the association. Of these 378, or 70 per cent., answered. The vote stands as follows: No, 346; yes, 10; unclassified, 22. . . .

"Of those who voted in the negative 71 gave emphasis to their answers by heavy underscoring, exclamation marks, repetitions, etc. Other negative voters indicated impatience at being called upon to vote on a question which to them seemed so obvious. . . .

"Of the 10 persons who voted in the affirmative 7 gave unequivocal answers without comment. Three gave answers modified, as follows: 'Yes, for a long time. Maybe could breed it out after a while—doubt if education alone would do it.'—*H. E. Burtt*. 'Yes, when operating through crowd behavior.'—*L. W. Kline*. 'Yes. This does not imply an "instinct to make war." '—*L. H. Lanier*."

John M. Fletcher, "The Verdict of Psychologists on War Instincts," in *Scientific Monthly*, 35:142-44 (Aug. 1932).

546. BERTRAND RUSSELL ON CHANGING HUMAN NATURE

"Those who like existing evils are fond of asserting that human nature cannot be changed. If they mean that it cannot be changed after six years old, there is a measure of truth in what they say. If they mean that nothing can be done to alter the instincts and reflexes with which an infant is born, they are again more or less in the right, though of course eugenics could, and perhaps will, produce remarkable results even here. But if they mean, as they usually do, that there is no way of producing an adult population whose behavior will be radically different from that of existing populations, they are flying in the face of all modern psychology. Given two infants with the same character at birth, different early environments may turn them into adults with totally different dispositions. It is the business of early education to train the instincts so that they may produce a harmonious character, constructive rather than destructive, affectionate rather than sullen, courageous, frank, and intelligent."

Bertrand Russell, *Education and the Good Life* (New York, Boni & Liveright, 1926), pp. 314-15.

547. ADVANCING CIVILIZATION IN TIME DESTROYS ITSELF

"Here, then, is the anthropological theory of the decline of peoples:

"Every human being, and therefore every community of human beings, every populace, inherits from its ancestry a stock of innate qualities which enable it to enjoy, to sustain, to promote, a civilization of a certain degree of complexity. As civilization advances, it makes greater and greater demands on these qualities, requires their exercise and development in ever fuller degree; until it approaches a point at which its complexity outruns the possibilities of the innate qualities. At the same time it tends positively to impair those qualities; so that, as the demands increase, the latent reserves of human quality are diminished. Therefore a time comes when the supply no longer equals the demand; that moment is the culminating point of that civilization and of that people, the turning-point of the curve from which the downward plunge begins. This downward

tendency may be gradual and difficult to discern at first; but history seems to show that it is apt to be an accelerating process."

William McDougall, *Is America Safe for Democracy* (New York, Scribner, 1921), p. 17.

548. WIGGAM: HEREDITY THE SIGNIFICANT FACTOR

"The . . . warning of biology to statesmanship is brief and simple: that heredity and not environment is the chief maker of men; . . . that [man] is not, as the glib reformer has taught you to believe, the helpless victim of the passing education, philosophy, and theories of pedagogy of his time; but that, in the germ cell, from which every man is born, there are resident those powerful personal forces by which he can rise in well-nigh any environment and, within the limits of human freedom, exclaim: 'I am the master of my fate; I am the captain of my soul.'

"The social and political import of this warning is that nearly all the happiness and nearly all the misery of the world are due, not to environment, but to heredity; that the differences among men are, in the main, due to the differences in the germ cells from which they are born; that social classes, therefore, which you seek to abolish by law, are ordained by nature; that it is, in the large statistical run of things, not the slums which make slum people, but slum people who make the slums; that primarily it is not the Church which makes people good, but good people who make the church; that godly people are largely born and not made; that if you want church members you will have to give nature a chance to produce them; that if you want artists, poets, philosophers, skilled workmen, and great statesmen you will also have to give nature a chance to breed them."

Albert Edward Wiggam, *The New Decalogue of Science* (copyright 1923, by The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, and used by their special permission), pp. 42-43.

549. WHAT THE EXTREME DOCTRINE MEANS

"Hereditarians of the stricter sort now teach that acts, habits, and character were foreordained from the foundation of the family. . . . If personality is determined by heredity alone, all teaching, preaching, government is useless; freedom, respon-

sibility, duty are delusions; whether men are useful or useless members of society depends upon their inheritance, and the only hope for the race is in eugenics—always supposing that enough freedom is left to the individual or to society to control the important function of choosing a mate."

Edwin G. Conklin, *Heredity and Environment* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1929), p. 328.

550. JENNINGS ON EUGENICS

"Domesticated animals and plants have been greatly improved by selective breeding. Why should not the same thing be done for man? This project of improving the human stock through selective breeding is called Eugenics.

"What are the prospects for such improvement? What may we hope from eugenics? To some the promise of eugenics appears very great. . . .

"How far are such hopes justified? What results can be expected from eugenic procedures? . . . What sort of an enterprise is it on which we are embarking in the project of eugenics? Is it a long-range undertaking, whose time scale is centuries or millennia? Or is it something that will presently give tangible results? . . .

"By stopping the propagation of the feeble-minded of the present generation, we get rid of about 11 per cent of the feeble-minded of the next generation. That generation still contains 89 per cent produced by the carriers. If the original number of feeble-minded was 330,000, in the next generation the number is about 293,700. . . .

"It has been computed that if the proportion of feeble-minded in the population is one per thousand, to decrease that proportion to one per ten thousand will require about 68 generations, or two to three thousand years. . . .

"With our present knowledge, eugenics may enable us to get rid of a certain proportion of such defectives as the feeble-minded. Beyond this it represents, in the present situation, an aspiration, a hope, rather than a present remedy for present ills. . . .

"It is probable that changes in environment—changes in treatment of infancy, in education, in tradition, in customs, in

ideals, in economic situation and the organization of society—can do much more for the ills of society than can be done through direct attempts to change the genetic constitution of the population."

H. S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature* (New York, Norton, 1930), pp. 223-24, 241-42, 251, 246.

551. PUBLIC OPINION ACTS NOT ON FACTS, BUT ON STEREOTYPES

"The orthodox theory holds that a public opinion constitutes a moral judgment on a group of facts. The theory I am suggesting is that, in the present state of education, a public opinion is primarily a moralized and codified version of the facts. I am arguing that the pattern of stereotypes at the center of our codes largely determines what group of facts we shall see, and in what light we shall see them. That is why, with the best will in the world, the news policy of a journal tends to support its editorial policy; why a capitalist sees one set of facts, and certain aspects of human nature, literally sees them; his socialist opponent another set and other aspects, and why each regards the other as unreasonable or perverse, when the real difference between them is a difference of perception. That difference is imposed by the difference between the capitalist and socialist pattern of stereotypes."

Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1922), p. 125

552. HOW PUBLIC OPINION IS MADE

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. . . .

"In almost every act of our daily lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of persons—a trifling fraction of our hundred and twenty million—who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires which control the pub-

lic mind, who harness old social forces and contrive new ways to bind and guide the world. . . .

"In theory, every citizen makes up his mind on public questions and matters of private conduct. In practice, if all men had to study for themselves the abstruse economic, political, and ethical data involved in every question, they would find it impossible to come to a conclusion about anything. . . . There is consequently a vast and continuous effort going on to capture our minds in the interest of some policy or commodity or idea.

"It might be better to have, instead of propaganda and special pleading, committees of wise men who would choose our rulers, dictate our conduct, private and public, and decide upon the best types of clothes for us to wear and the best kinds of food for us to eat. But we have chosen the opposite method, that of open competition."

Edward L. Bernays, *Propaganda* (New York, Liveright, 1928), pp. 9-12.

553. THE CRITICAL HABIT OF THOUGHT

"The critical habit of thought, if usual in a society, will pervade all its mores because it is a way of taking up the problems of life. Men educated in it cannot be stampeded by stump orators and are never deceived by dithyrambic oratory."

William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, Ginn, 1906), p. 633.

554. PUBLIC OPINION IN DEMOCRACY

"We want not only a genuine public opinion, but a progressive public opinion. We cannot understand once for all, we must be constantly understanding anew. At the same time that we see the necessity of creating the common will and giving voice to it, we must bear in mind that there should be no crystallizing process by which any particular expression of the common will should be taken as eternally right because it is the expression of the common will. It is right for today but not for tomorrow. The flaming fact is our daily life, whatever it is, leaping forever and ever out of the common will. Democracy is the ever-increasing volume of power pouring through men and shaping itself as the moment demands."

M. P. Follett, *The New State* (New York, Longmans Green, 1920), p. 226.

555. DANGER FROM PROPAGANDISM

“Propaganda is the most terrible weapon so far developed by the war. It is worse than poison gas. If the wind is in the right direction, gas may kill a few and injure others; but the possibilities of manipulating the public mind, by withholding or discoloring the facts, are appalling. One is so helpless in face of it. No one can think intelligently without knowing the facts; and if the facts are controlled by interested men, the very idea of democracy is destroyed and becomes a farce.”

J. H. Newton, in *Atlantic Monthly*, 128:158 (Aug. 1921).

556. PATRIOTIC LYING

“During the war the lie became a patriotic virtue. It was forced upon us by the Government and the censor, and through the peril of losing the war considered a necessity.”

A French Chief Editor. Quoted in Arthur Ponsonby, *Falsehood in War-Time* (New York, Dutton, 1928), p. 179.

557. WAR-TIME PROPAGANDA: A GROWING EPISODE

“THE FALL OF ANTWERP

“November, 1914

“When the fall of Antwerp got known, the church bells were rung” [i.e., in Germany and to celebrate the victory]. *Kölnische Zeitung* (Cologne).

“According to the *Kölnische Zeitung*, the clergy of Antwerp were compelled to ring the church bells when the fortress was taken.” *Le Matin* (Paris).

“According to what *Le Matin* has heard from Cologne, the Belgian priests who refused to ring the church bells when Antwerp was taken have been driven away from their places.” *The Times* (London).

“According to what *The Times* has heard from Cologne via Paris, the unfortunate Belgian priests who refused to ring the church bells when Antwerp was taken have been sentenced to hard labor.” *Corriére della Sera* (Milan).

“According to information to the *Corriére della Sera* from Cologne via London, it is confirmed that the barbaric conquer-

ors of Antwerp punished the unfortunate Belgian priests for their heroic refusal to ring the church bells by hanging them as living clappers to the bells with their heads down." *Le Matin* (Paris).

Quoted in Arthur Ponsonby, *Falsehood in War-Time* (New York, Dutton, 1928), p. 161.

558. EDUCATION VERSUS PROPAGANDA

"One of the serious results of propaganda is that it has caused the public to think that education and propaganda are the same thing, and thus make an ignorant multitude believe it is being educated when it is only being manipulated. Education aims at independence of judgment. Propaganda offers ready-made opinion for the unthinking herd. Education and propaganda are directly opposed both in aim and method."

Everett Dean Martin, in *The Forum*, 81:145 (Mar. 1929).

559. SKEPTICISM AGAINST PROPAGANDA

"The development of skepticism should be one of the great educational aims of our time. If education is to produce independent, discriminating minds, it must set some counter-tendency to the fostering of emotional gullibility which is occurring by reason of the widespread use of propaganda. On the basis of an analysis of present-day methods of propaganda, a series of nine lessons was developed for experimentation. . . .

"On the whole, the material has proved its power to increase skepticism in response to literary material. This is an important result for democratic countries.

"As an educational procedure, it is possible to produce skepticism and resistance to the autistic appeals of modern propaganda. Skepticism in social thinking may be a desirable end; but it is not enough. It is negative, not positive. It sets up a resistance, a refusal to believe, a tendency to discount emotional thinking. If we are to become intelligent in our social thinking, we must engage in positive, creative thought as well."

Wm. W. Biddle, *Propaganda and Education* (New York, Teachers College, 1932), pp. 69-70.

560. IN SUPPORT OF CENSORSHIP

Howard Elliott, president of railroads, not of a university:

"In giving young people their physical nourishment we do not spread before them every kind of food and say, 'Eat what you like whether it agrees with you or not.' We know that the physical machine can absorb only a certain amount and that all else is waste and trash, with the result that bodies are poisoned and weakened. In giving them mental nourishment, why lay before young and impressionable men and women un-American doctrines and ideas that take mental time and energy from the study and consideration of the great fundamental and eternal truths, and fill the mind with unprofitable mental trash? . . . After they get into the real world it takes them considerable time to become convinced that certain laws controlling social and material affairs are as unchangeable as the law of gravitation, and some never learn it."

Quoted in Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *The Inquiring Mind* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1928), pp. 19-20.

561. STAGE CENSORSHIP UNAVAILING

"Impure thoughts can be manufactured in any willing audience under any system of censorship."

Hiram Motherwell, in *New Republic*, 65:217 (Jan. 7, 1931).

562. THE MOTIVES OF CENSORSHIP

"According to this view, those in authority are to prevent a youth from making a bad choice by protecting him from influences which they consider harmful. This philosophy results from at least three emotions. The first and strongest is fear. Men advocate the suppression of forces they think bad because they distrust the strength of the countervailing forces they think good. They want to substitute force for argument because they are afraid that their view of truth will not prevail if left to a fair fight. 'It is not faith that lights the fagot, but the lurking doubt.' When the choice between good and evil is to be made by a child or a youth there exists of course a real danger that he will be too immature to reject evil if it is presented to him completely unmasked, but the advocates of cen-

sorship come to deny that anybody is sufficiently mature to be trusted to make a wise choice. High school superintendents say that open discussion of controversial questions is all very well for college students. Mr. Coolidge when Vice President expressed great concern in the *Delineator* at the presence of radical teachers in the women's colleges. And others have a similar fear about professional schools, while legislators endeavor to safeguard full-grown citizens from communistic books and speeches. Secondly, coupled with this disbelief by the advocates of suppression in the common sense of others, is a strong belief in their own superior power to discern the truth. The books forbidden to the Roman Catholic layman by the Index Expurgatorius may be read by cardinals and bishops. Trust in ourselves tends to increase with distrust of others. The belief grows that a few men—and the speaker naturally counts himself among their number—are so much wiser than the masses that they can safely regulate their views for them. Finally, this philosophy is based on a longing for stability, that the world shall go on unchanged from what it was in the days of our youth."

Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *The Inquiring Mind* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1928), pp. 29-30.

563. EVILS OF SUPPRESSING INQUIRY

"It is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most, by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by fear of heresy. Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in something which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral. . . . Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think. Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as much, and even more

indispensable, to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of."

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (London, Parker, 1859), pp. 61f.

564. NEWSPAPER INFLUENCE FOR BAD

"The writer's treatment [Seligmann, *The Negro Faces America*] of city mob outrages at Chicago, East St. Louis, Washington, Omaha, and other places does fix, by downright line and verse, much responsibility for those nightmares of brutality upon certain named newspapers which whipped up race prejudice for their own immediate advantage."

New Republic (book review by L. B. W.), 24:151 (Oct. 6, 1920).

565. NEWSPAPERS SUPPLY NEWS, NOT TRUTH

"News and truth are not the same thing, and must be clearly distinguished. The function of news is to signalize an event, the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them into relation with each other, and make a picture of reality on which men can act. Only at those points, where social conditions take recognizable and measurable shape, do the body of truth and the body of news coincide. That is a comparatively small part of the whole field of human interest. In this sector, and only in this sector, the tests of the news are sufficiently exact to make the charges of perversion or suppression more than a partisan judgment. There is no defense, no extenuation, no excuse whatever, for stating six times that Lenin is dead, when the only information the paper possesses is a report that he is dead from a source repeatedly shown to be unreliable. The news, in that instance, is not 'Lenin Dead' but 'Helsingfors Says Lenin Is Dead.' And a newspaper can be asked to take the responsibility of not making Lenin more dead than the source of the news is reliable; if there is one subject on which editors are most responsible it is in their judgment of the reliability of the source. But when it comes to dealing, for example, with stories of what the Russian people want, no such test exists. . . .

"If the press is not so universally wicked, nor so deeply conspiring, as Mr. Sinclair would have us believe, it is very much more frail than the democratic theory has as yet admitted. It

is too frail to carry the whole burden of popular sovereignty, to supply spontaneously the truth which democrats hoped was inborn. And when we expect it to supply such a body of truth we employ a misleading standard of judgment. We misunderstand the limited nature of news, the illimitable complexity of society; we overestimate our own endurance, public spirit, and all-round competence. We suppose an appetite for uninteresting truths which is not discovered by any honest analysis of our own tastes."

Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1922), pp. 358-62.

566. WHAT "NEWS" IS

"A would-be reporter on probation under the famous Charles A. Dana of the New York *Sun* brought in an account of a man bitten by a mad dog. 'A man bitten by a mad dog!' exclaimed Mr. Dana, 'That's no news. Go out and find a mad dog bitten by a man, and we will give you plenty of space for the story.'"

Anonymous.

567. ALLPORT ON SOCIAL LEADERSHIP

"Social change . . . results also from another type of personal agency, namely leadership. Leadership produces social change, not through contributions to knowledge or material culture, but through the immediate social behavior of the leader. Leadership, according to our present usage, means the direct, face-to-face contact between leader and followers: it is personal social control. The promoter and organizer are leaders *par excellence*, for they compel others to carry out their suggestions. . . .

"The most important factor in the rise of a leader is personal prestige. . . . Control through leadership is based largely upon the suggestion process. . . . In leadership, as in all suggestion processes, it is necessary that all the inhibitions blocking the acceptance of the suggestion be overcome. Leadership thus knows no half-way stage; it is a matter of 'all or none.' While the public is *with* the leader it follows slavishly his every direction. His character is regarded as without flaw. He is the ideal. . . .

"Since leaders usually secure their power through suggestion and crowd control, rather than through reason, one may question whether leadership is wholly desirable. It would doubtless be better if we could moderate its all-or-none character and introduce discriminating action among the followers."

F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1924), pp. 419-21.

568. DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP

"Under a despotic system of government leadership and drivership are identical and the leader is one who succeeds in imposing his will upon his subordinates. Benevolent despots and successful military leaders have discovered, however, the value of identifying the wills of their followers with their own purposes. . . .

"This is still a prevalent conception of leadership. Even in so-called democratic societies the ability to appropriate the wills of others and to weave them into preconceived patterns is thought to constitute genuine leadership. Leadership thus becomes synonymous in many respects with what the psychologist calls 'suggestion,' and the most successful leader exercises an influence not unlike a hypnotic influence over his followers. . . .

"Democratic leadership is consequently no more synonymous with mere dominance than with drivership. The democratic leader may express the common will of his group, but this common will represents the outcome of coöperative thinking and testifies to more than one individual's contribution. Leadership consists in focusing the best thought of oneself and one's colleagues upon a common problem and organizing the results of this united deliberation into an accepted program of action."

H. B. Albery and V. T. Thayer, *Supervision in the Secondary School* (Boston, Heath, 1931), pp. 92-94.

569. LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE SOCIAL PROCESS

"We believe in the influence of the good and the wise, but they must exert their influence within the social process; it must be by action and reaction, it must be by a subtle permeation, it must be through the sporting instinct to take back the ball

which one has thrown. The wise can never help us by standing on one side and trying to get their wisdom across to the unwise. The unwise can never help us (what has often been considered the most they could do for the world) by a passive willingness for the wise to impose their wisdom upon them. We need the intermingling of all in the social process. We need our imperfections as well as our perfections. . . . Moreover, there is the ignorance of the ignorant and the ignorance of the wise; there is the wisdom of the wise and the wisdom of the ignorant. Both kinds of ignorance have to be overcome, one as much as the other; both kinds of wisdom have to prevail, one as much as the other."

M. P. Follett, *The New State* (New York, Longmans Green, 1920), pp. 157f.

570. SCIENTIFIC TREATMENT OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS

"If we can effect the use of intelligence as method of control in the physical and mechanical field, why should we not strive to develop it in the field of human relations? . . . The heart of the problem is whether the experimental method can be made as fundamental in social knowledge and action as it now is in physical. If it cannot, the split between mere drift in human affairs and mastery in material things is bound to widen, and possibly to result in the destruction of civilization. . . .

"Science in itself is method: a method of inquiry, discovery, testing. . . . In its application . . . it has had a revolutionary effect on daily life. But in itself as a method of observation and reasoning, of investigation and verification, it remains the possession of a comparatively small number of specialists. It has not become the organ of everyday ways of thinking in formation of beliefs. It is not a part of the popular mind. The ways of thought of the latter remain much as they were before the rise of science. . . .

"The cause for this enduring remoteness of science as method is a matter for most searching thought. . . . It should be a matter of surprise that the idea of the possibility and desirability of impartial and coöperative methods of inquiry should hardly have made an impression on the public mind. It should be a matter of surprise that, while it is assumed as a matter of course

that beliefs regarding physical things should be reached through a skilled technique of investigation and testing, the great mass, including even scientific men eminent in their special fields, should rest content with moral and political beliefs which express tradition, dogma, emotional appeal, and the vested interests of classes. It should be a matter of surprise that, whereas it is taken for granted in the physical field that planned invention and control of natural conditions should follow from discovery of facts and relations, the very idea of inventiveness and planned control in the social area is ignored or recognized only to be frowned upon as dangerous radicalism.

"The difference of attitudes points to some deep-seated source of resistance on the social side. The dead inertia of custom and habituation counts for much. But resistance is active and often aggressive. These facts point to class interests which fear the free play of critical inquiry and constructive invention in social institutions. Otherwise a universal organ of observation and thinking would not have been changed from an instrumentality into an end in itself and given almost superstitious reverence as something apart, while it is opposed as the method to be used in the institutions and arrangements of society. . . .

"The vested interest which most definitely and actively blocks emancipation of method and prevents the experimental attitude from becoming universal is business as an institution carried on for profit. This welcomes 'science' as long as it produces discoveries which can be utilized in ways that will show on the credit side of the financial ledger. It stimulates—and appropriates—invention within the same limits. But the publicity, the coöperativeness, the common and gratuitous sharing which are inherent in the scientific method of inquiry and verification are hostile to this end of private and competitive gain and so are resisted as subversive of law and order."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 307, 59-62.

571. VOLTAIRE ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH

"I wholly disapprove of what you say—and will defend to the death your right to say it." (Letter to Helvetius.)

S. G. Tallentyre, *Voltaire in His Letters* (London, Murray, 1919), p. 65.

572. HERESY AND PROGRESS

“Progress depends more on safe-guarding the rights of heresy than on the protection of orthodoxy.”

Glenn Frank, in *Century Magazine*, 100:357 (July 1920).

573. THOMAS JEFFERSON ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH

“If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union, or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.”

First Inaugural Address.

574. JOHN MILTON ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH

“And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”

John Milton, *Areopagitica* (London, 1644).

575. THE NEED FOR FREEDOM OF SPEECH

“We have now recognized the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds; which we will now briefly recapitulate.

“First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.

“Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.

“Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who

receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience."

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (London, Parker, 1859), pp. 94f.

576. JUSTICES BRANDEIS AND HOLMES ON SUPPRESSION OF FREE SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY

"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of lawbreaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.

"To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the proc-

esses of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression."

Whitney *v.* California, U. S. Reports, 274:376-77.

577. THE BROADER EDUCATIONAL OUTLOOK

"As we learn that man is altogether social and never seen truly except in connection with his fellows, we fix our attention more and more on group conditions as the source, for better or worse, of personal character, and come to feel that we must work on the individual through the web of relations in which he actually lives.

"The school, for instance, must form a whole with the rest of life, using the ideas generated by the latter as the starting-point of its training."

Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York, Scribner, 1909), p. 48.

578. THE POWER OF EDUCATION AND SOAP

"Soap and education are not as sudden as a massacre, but they are more deadly in the long run."

Mark Twain, *Sketches Old and New* (New York, Harper, 1903), p. 350.

579. SPEEDING THE SPREAD OF INTELLIGENCE

"He who first shortened the labor of copyists by device of movable type was disbanding hired armies and cashiering most Kings and Senates and creating a whole new Democratic world: he had invented the Art of printing."

Thomas Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, Book 1, Chapter V.

580. THE NEW ADULT EDUCATION

"We must inaugurate an epoch-making system of adult education, newly conceived to meet the actual confronting

situation. Nothing less than a new epoch will serve. Adulthood is two-thirds of life, surely it is worth at least half our educational efforts.

"Mere school education cannot possibly suffice for the whole of life. To think otherwise is to misconceive and belie the very meaning of education in relation to life. . . . Education is most truly conceived as being life itself creatively facing its novelly emerging problems. Under such circumstances education must continue all through life. We need, then, a new type of adult education, thoroughgoing, widely-inclusive, ever-continuing. Only on this basis can modern civilization hope to meet intelligently its problems. . . .

"The essential aim for the matter immediately at hand is that our whole people may come to an intelligent understanding of our social and economic situation. . . .

"What we wish is that the great body of adults, even if they hold college or university degrees, shall seriously study our social order and its possible improvement in all significant aspects: how inefficiently we produce and why; how unjustly and inefficiently we distribute and why; how badly our political system works and why; how much better our economic needs might be cared for; what rich and happy living for the individual calls for and how this good life needs study that we may really use art, music, religion, to make life better. . . . These are but samples of what the new adult education must study. Nothing human shall be foreign to it, but all will be studied that together we may open our eyes and see. We must build a more intelligent understanding of what we have and why, and what we might have and how."

William H. Kilpatrick, *Education and the Social Crisis* (New York, Liveright, 1932), pp. 49-51.

581. EDUCATION FOR BETTER SOCIAL CHANGE

"This is and ought to be a changing social world, and . . . the prime function of educated men and women is to make appropriate social changes. . . .

"Education, then, is to aim at variability in the student, a cultivated variability! The youth brings to high school and college the precious treasure of youth, a feeling that the world is

not finished and done, but in the making. He is hospitable to change in the world and in himself. Right here, in the natural variability of youth, the possibility of a progressive civilization chiefly lies. In the human species, and in it alone, is there provision for voluntary variation, for foresighted progress, for evolution by the economical process of analysis, discrimination, and agreement, as against the wasteful processes of chance and of strife. And youth, itself changing from the relative irresponsibility of childhood to the self-guidance of maturity, is the ever-renewed organ of this part of the creative process. . . .

"How shall we ever have a deliberate, thought-guided social evolution—as against perhaps revolution, certainly as against social floundering—unless our educational system, from the bottom to the top, is reorganized with reference thereto? And is it not clear that the key position to be won in such a reorganization is the experience of youth in high school and college? Within these institutions themselves, within their stated curriculum, scope must be found for youthful variability. Here is the place to form a habit of thoughtfully making such changes in oneself and in society as experience may show the need of. And here is the place to train the eyes to see needs. This is the way to produce citizens who are open-eyed toward social needs, and not terrified at the costs of progress; citizens for whom life, whether of the individual or of the state, is not a repetition of even a worthy past; for whom success is not a mere adding of resource to resource, but an ever-living adventure in readjustment, a continuous participation with God in the creation of a better and better world."

George A. Coe, *What Ails Our Youth?* (New York, Scribner, 1924), pp. 45-48.

582. TEACHING MAN'S GRADUAL CHEQUERED PROGRESS

"We should keep in our own minds, as a guiding thread, the conception of gradual chequered progress, perpetually hampered by the savagery which we inherit from the brutes, and yet gradually leading on towards mastery of ourselves and our environment through knowledge. The conception is that of the human race as a whole, fighting against chaos without and darkness within, the little tiny lamp of reason growing gradu-

ally into a great light by which the night is dispelled. The divisions between races, nations, and creeds should be treated as follies, distracting us in the battle against Chaos and Old Night, which is our one truly human activity.

"I should give first the illustrations of this theme, and only afterwards, if ever, the theme itself. I should show savage man cowering in the cold, gnawing the raw fruits of the earth. I should show the discovery of fire, and its effects; in this connection, the story of Prometheus would be in place. I should show the beginnings of agriculture in the Nile Valley, and the domestication of sheep and cows and dogs. I should show the growth of ships from canoes to the largest liners, and the growth of cities from colonies of cave-dwellers to London and New York. I should show the gradual growth of writing and of numerals. I should show the brief gleam of Greece, the diffused magnificence of Rome, the subsequent darkness, and the coming of science. The whole of this could be made interesting in detail even to very young children. I should not keep silence about wars and persecutions and cruelties, but I should not hold up military conquerors to admiration. The true conquerors, in my teaching of history, should be those who did something to dispel the darkness within and without—Buddha and Socrates, Archimedes, Galileo and Newton, and all the men who have helped to give us mastery over ourselves or over nature. And so I should build up the conception of a lordly splendid destiny for the human race, to which we are false when we revert to wars and other atavistic follies, and true only when we put into the world something that adds to our human dominion."

Bertrand Russell, *Education and the Good Life* (New York, Boni & Liveright, 1926), pp. 267-68.

583. THE UNIVERSITY THE TEST OF A FREE PEOPLE

"The supreme test is whether the people of the state will on the one hand tax themselves to support it [the state university], and on the other impose upon themselves a self-denying ordinance to leave it severely alone, so that it may select its own members by the application of its intellectual standards and the members thus chosen will be absolutely free to

investigate, to teach, and to publish what they believe to be the truth."

Jacob Gould Schurman, in *Transactions and Proceedings of the National Association of State Universities*, 1909, p. 24.

584. PRESIDENT LOWELL ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM

"Experience has proved, and probably no one would now deny, that knowledge can advance, or at least can advance most rapidly, only by means of an unfettered search for truth on the part of those who devote their lives to seeking it in their respective fields, and by complete freedom in imparting to their pupils the truth that they have found. This has become an axiom in higher education, in spite of the fact that a searcher may discover error instead of truth, and be misled, and mislead others, thereby. We believe that if light enough is let in, the real relations of things will soon be seen, and that they can be seen in no other way. . . . One must distinguish between the matters that fall within and those that lie outside of the professor's field of study; then there is a difference in the professor's position in his class room and beyond it. These two cross divisions raise four distinct problems that may profitably be discussed in succession.

"The teaching by the professor in his class room on the subjects within the scope of his chair ought to be absolutely free. He must teach the truth as he has found it and sees it. This is the primary condition of academic freedom, and any violation of it endangers intellectual progress. . . .

"This brings us to . . . the freedom of the professor within his field of study, but outside of his class room. . . . The object of institutions of learning is not only the acquisition but also the diffusion of knowledge. Every professor must, therefore, be wholly unrestrained in publishing the results of his study in the field of his professorship. . . .

"Much more serious difficulty . . . arises from the other half of our subject, the right of a professor to express his views without restraint on matters lying outside the sphere of his professorship. This is not a question of academic freedom in its true sense, but of the personal liberty of the citizen. . . .

"The argument in favor of a restraining power on the part

of the governing boards of universities and colleges is based upon the fact that by extreme, or injudicious, remarks that shock public sentiment a professor can do great harm to the institution with which he is connected. . . .

"In spite, however, of the risk of injury to the institution, the objections to restraint upon what professors may say as citizens seem to me far greater than the harm done by leaving them free. In the first place, to impose upon the teacher in a university restrictions to which the members of other professions, lawyers, physicians, engineers, and so forth, are not subjected, would produce a sense of irritation and humiliation. . . .

"There is another [objection], not less weighty, from [the standpoint] . . . of the institution itself. If a university or college censors what its professors may say, if it restrains them from uttering something that it does not approve, it thereby assumes responsibility for that which it permits them to say. This is logical and inevitable, but it is a responsibility which an institution of learning would be very unwise in assuming."

Annual Report, 1916-17 (Cambridge, Mass.), pp. 17-20.

585. WHAT KIND OF CITIZENSHIP

"The aim of education for citizenship as now conceived is a preparation for the same old citizenship which has so far failed to eliminate the shocking hazards and crying injustices of our social and political life. . . .

"Instead of having today's institutions and ideals represented to the young as standardized and sacred, they should be taught to view them as representing half-solved problems."

James Harvey Robinson, *Mind in the Making* (New York, Harper, 1921), pp. 22, 220.

586. DANGER FROM BAD TEACHING

"One bad teacher can undo all that is accomplished through the wholesome patriotic teaching of 50,000 good ones."

Extract from speech of Dwight Braman, President of the Allied Patriotic Societies, at Lusk bill hearing, May 22, 1923. Quoted in *New York Times*, May 23, 1923.

587. THE SOPORIFIC OF CONVENTIONALITY

"The chief danger that the young encounter is not any temptation to radicalism, but the soporific of conventionality. They imitate us too much, not too little; alas, that so few of them are aware of our faults! The best policy is to increase the number of critical youth as fast as we can."

George A. Coe, *What Ails Our Youth?* (New York, Scribner, 1924), p. 86.

588. UNTRAMMELED INTELLIGENT CONTROVERSY

"I should encourage a habit of intelligent controversy among the older boys and girls, and I should place no obstacles in their way even if they questioned what I regarded as important truths. I should make it my object to teach thinking, not orthodoxy, or even heterodoxy. And I should absolutely never sacrifice intellect to the fancied interest of morals. It is generally held that the teaching of virtue demands the inculcation of falsehood. In politics, we conceal the vices of eminent statesmen of our own party. In theology, we conceal the sins of Popes if we are Catholics, and the sins of Luther and Calvin if we are Protestants. In matters of sex, we pretend before young people that virtue is much commoner than it is. . . . The holders of power wish to conceal the truth from their slaves, in order that they may be misled as to their own interests; this is intelligible. What is less intelligible is that democracies should voluntarily make laws designed to prevent themselves from knowing the truth. This is collective quixotism; they are resolved not to be told that the helmet is less good than they wish to believe. Such an attitude of abject funk is unworthy of free men and women. In my school, no obstacle to knowledge shall exist of any sort or kind. I shall seek virtue by the right training of passions and instincts, not by lying and deceit. In the virtue that I desire, the pursuit of knowledge, without fear and without limitation, is an essential element, in the absence of which the rest has little value."

Bertrand Russell, *Education and the Good Life* (New York, Boni & Liveright, 1926), pp. 287-89.

589. JEFFERSON AND LINCOLN ON REVOLUTION

"The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions that I wish it always to be kept alive. It will often be exercised when wrong, but better so than not to be exercised at all."

The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Ford, ed. New York, Putnam, 1894), Vol. IV, p. 370.

"Whenever they [the American people] grow weary of their existing government they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it."

Letters and Addresses of Abraham Lincoln (New York, Bell, 1903), p. 197.

590. NO ONE CAUSE OF REVOLUTION

"The outbreak of revolution is never due to any one cause. It is due to a complicated accumulation of stresses, to a multiplication of nervous tensions, to a concurrence of provocations, any one of which by itself would be of little moment."

Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 105.

591. IN BEHALF OF REVOLUTION

"The American people are thinking seriously today, but in the wrong direction. They are devoting their energies to the common task of averting revolution, when what they should be doing is thinking in terms of revolution, breaking the ground for it in preparation for its arrival. Not a revolution tomorrow—but the day after tomorrow, if you will, for in the end, whether we like it or not, it is only a revolution which can solve the social problem at stake. . . .

"Now, why won't the evolutionary program work? Why won't the finespun logic of the 'evolutionists,' the 'planners,' work out in practice? There are two fundamental reasons why it will not work: first, because the bankers and industrialists who constitute the ruling class in every advanced nation will not surrender their power except by force, but will naturally use

every means at their disposal to perpetuate their power; and second, since the power of the modern nation inheres in their hands, they will not agree to dispense with the essential incentive of our society—namely profit-seeking, for it is through the profit drive that they have acquired and continue to maintain their power. It is the profit motivation which makes the whole system revolve. Subtract the profit motif and their power would be robbed of its efficacy and meaning. . . .

"It is only by revolution that that realization can be translated into action. Society can be saved in no other way. Our task is to create that revolution, to cultivate the forces that are necessary to its success. It is no little task that confronts us, and it behooves us to gather up all our energies and dedicate all our strength to its achievement. To do less is but to fail. And to fail in that task is to betray the cause of human progress, to sacrifice the future freedom of the human race."

V. F. Calverton, *For Revolution* (New York, John Day, 1932), pp. 1-3, 24.

592. WHO ARE TO BLAME FOR REVOLUTIONS?

"The rebel is not self-generated. In the beginning no one is a revolutionist simply for the fun of it, however it may be after the furor of destructive power gets under way. The rebel is the product of extreme fixation and unintelligent immobilities. Life is perpetuated only by renewal. If conditions do not permit renewal to take place continuously it will take place explosively. The cost of revolutions must be charged up to those who have taken for their aim arrest of custom instead of its readjustment. The only ones who have the right to criticize 'radicals'—adopting for the moment that perversion of language which identifies the radical with the destructive rebel—are those who put as much effort into reconstruction as the rebels are putting into destruction. The primary accusation against the revolutionary must be directed against those who having power refuse to use it for ameliorations. They are the ones who accumulate the wrath that sweeps away customs and institutions in an undiscriminating avalanche. Too often the man who should be criticizing institutions expends his energy in criticizing those who would re-form them. What he really objects to is any dis-

turbance of his own vested securities, comforts, and privileged powers."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 167-68.

593. THE ETHICAL USE OF VIOLENCE

"If a season of violence can establish a just social system and can create the possibilities of its preservation, there is no purely ethical ground upon which violence and revolution can be ruled out. This could be done only upon the basis of purely anarchistic ethical and political presuppositions. Once we have made the fateful concession of ethics to politics, and accepted coercion as a necessary instrument of social cohesion, we can make no absolute distinctions between non-violent and violent types of coercion or between coercion used by governments and that which is used by revolutionaries. If such distinctions are made they must be justified in terms of the consequences in which they result. The real question is: what are the political possibilities of establishing justice through violence?"

Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York, Scribner, 1932), pp. 179-80.

CHAPTER XIV

THE STATE AND EDUCATION

594. SPENCER'S DENIAL OF STATE SUPPORT FOR EDUCATION

"In the same way that our definition of state-duty forbids the state to administer religion or charity, so likewise does it forbid the state to administer education. Inasmuch as the taking away, by government, of more of a man's property than is needful for maintaining his rights, is an infringement of his rights, and therefore a reversal of the government's function towards him; and inasmuch as the taking away of his property to educate his own or other people's children is not needful for the maintaining of his rights; the taking away of his property for such a purpose is wrong.

"Should it be said that the rights of the children are involved, and that state-interposition is required to maintain these, the reply is that no cause for such interposition can be shown until the children's rights have been violated, and that their rights are not violated by a neglect of their education. For, as repeatedly explained, what we call rights are merely arbitrary subdivisions of the general liberty to exercise the faculties; and that only can be called an infringement of rights which actually diminishes this liberty—cuts off a previously existing power to pursue the objects of desire. Now the parent who is careless of a child's education does not do this. The liberty to exercise the faculties is left intact. Omitting instruction in no way takes from a child's freedom to do whatsoever it wills in the best way it can; and this freedom is all that equity demands. . . .

"For if the benefit, importance, or necessity, of education be assigned as a sufficient reason why government should educate, then may the benefit, importance, or necessity, of food, clothing, shelter, and warmth be assigned as a sufficient reason why government should administer these also. So that the alleged right

cannot be established without annulling all parental responsibility whatever."

Herbert Spencer, *Social Statics* (New York, Appleton, 1878. 1st ed. 1850), pp. 360-62.

595. HORACE MANN ON UNIVERSAL EDUCATION

"Surely nothing but universal education can counterwork this tendency to the domination of capital and the servility of labor. If one class possesses all the wealth and the education, while the residue of society is ignorant and poor, it matters not by what name the relation between them may be called: the latter, in fact and in truth, will be the servile dependants and subjects of the former. But, if education be equably diffused, it will draw property after it by the strongest of all attractions; for such a thing never did happen, and never can happen, as that an intelligent and practical body of men should be permanently poor. . . .

"Education, then, beyond all other devices of human origin, is the great equalizer of the conditions of men,—the balance-wheel of the social machinery. . . . It gives each man the independence and the means by which he can resist the selfishness of other men. It does better than to disarm the poor of their hostility towards the rich: it prevents being poor."

Horace Mann, in *Annual Report on Education, 1848* (Boston, Rand & Avery), pp. 668-69.

596. THE D.A.R. AND THE LEGION TEXTBOOK IN AMERICAN HISTORY

"The D.A.R. recognize the importance of history textbooks, and stress 'the most commendable purpose' of the American Legion who, 'in splendid coöperation with our own and 32 other patriotic societies, has prepared a two-volume textbook of American history for public-school children throughout the country.' Their endorsement is based upon the conviction that 'no effort has been omitted to make its presentation entirely truthful and nationally acceptable,' and because it is designed 'to present an accurate survey and appraisal of our institutions, to foster faith in the purposes and ideals of our government, to

inculcate belief in its sincerity, to instill patriotism and unswerving loyalty to the United States.''"

Bessie L. Pierce, *Citizens' Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth* (New York, Scribner, 1933), pp. 19-20.

597. PATRIOTIC HISTORY WRITING

(Extracts from the history textbook referred to in the preceding excerpt)

"We tell you here the story of our country, that you may gather from the tale a just pride of race and an earnest sense of your responsibility. . . .

"America has existed for uncountable centuries. It is perhaps the oldest continent in the world. . . .

"When Columbus came, . . . the lands which now form the United States were inhabited only by scattered and partly barbaric redmen, less than a million of them altogether. Vast portions of our territory must have lain empty of mankind during many centuries. . . .

"The fact that our continent lay so long unused has seemed to many earnest thinkers one of the world's most striking manifestations of the Divine Purpose of God. They have believed that all this wealth of field and forest and mines was held untouched until civilization should grow worthy of it. America was to be a new rich heritage for man, not to be revealed to him until he had learned how to conserve it, how to govern both it and himself. . . .

"Gradually, man has toiled upward out of tragic deeps. And, fortunately indeed for the fate of the human race, when the darkest of those early days had been overcome, America still lay ready at man's hand—untouched. . . .

"Who were the people who came to occupy this rich and sheltered and long hidden land?

"Again we may well pause in awe to contemplate the idea of a Divine Purpose working out some mighty aim for America. By natural processes, the world of Europe was sifted and sorted that there might be planted here some of its richest seed."

Charles F. Horne, *The Story of Our American People* (New York, U. S. History Publishing Company, 1926), pp. 4-7.

598. HAMILTON FISH ON OUR ADMIRABLE GOVERNMENT

"After eleven years' service in the Congress of the United States, I have no criticism of our form of Government, in spite of the fact that the Communists say that our Government is one of wealth and is owned by fifty-nine men in Wall Street. Our Government is owned by the sovereign people. We still have a popular government; not only have we a republican form of government, but our people control that government through their legislators.

"So my main message is that we have nothing whatever to gain from Communism, from Socialism, or from dictatorship. Our Government is still the soundest, the fairest, the most honorable, and the wisest form of government yet devised by the mind of man."

Hamilton Fish, Jr., in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 156:61 (July 1931).

599. A MILITARY IDEA OF OUR GOVERNMENT

"Government and patriotism . . . are absolutely synonymous in my mind. . . . We have got the greatest Government on the top of God's green earth, conceived by our Maker and transmitted to George Washington."

Rear Admiral C. P. Plunkett in a public address reported in *New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1928 (and later corroborated by him).

600. TEACHING CITIZENSHIP ACCORDING TO THE LUSK COMMITTEE

"The prime purpose of the public educational system is to prepare students in the public schools to assume the obligations and duties of citizenship in this State. The public school teacher is a representative and officer of the State *as it now exists*. He is employed by that State to teach loyalty to its institutions and obedience to its laws. He is not employed to explore the controversial fields of political economy with the view of championing Utopian schemes of reform or change.

"In entering the public school system the teacher assumes certain obligations and must of necessity surrender some of his intellectual freedom. If he does not approve of the present so-

cial system or the structure of our government he is at liberty to entertain those ideas, but must surrender his public office. If a change in our social system or in the structure of our government is at any time demanded by the people of this State or of the United States, the mandate must be disclosed by the verdict of the polls. The public school must not be employed as a rostrum for distinctive propaganda of any character. Its teaching staff must not be allowed to spread the gospel of discontent among the people. No person who is not eager to combat the theories of social change should be entrusted with the task of fitting the young and old of this State for the responsibilities of citizenship."

Revolutionary Radicalism, Report of the Joint Legislative Committee of the State of New York Investigating Seditious Activities, Clayton Lusk, Chairman (Albany, 1920), Vol. 3, p. 2,343.

601. INFLATED PATRIOTISM

"Students of history and international relations are practically unanimous in placing inflated patriotism and arrogant nationalism as among the chief elements in the development of war psychology, and among the chief influences working today against the restoration of international good will and economic prosperity."

Harold Underwood Faulkner, "Perverted American History," in *Harpers Magazine*, 152:337-38 (Feb. 1926).

602. HOW SCHOOLS MAY MISLEDUCATE

"Elementary education, in all advanced countries, is in the hands of the State. Some of the things taught are known to be false by the officials who prescribe them, and many others are known to be false, or at any rate very doubtful, by every unprejudiced person. Take, for example, the teaching of history. Each nation aims only at self-glorification in the school textbooks of history. When a man writes his autobiography he is expected to show a certain modesty; but when a nation writes its autobiography there is no limit to its boasting and vain-glory. When I was young, school books taught that the French were wicked and the Germans virtuous; now they teach the opposite. In neither case is there the slightest regard for truth.

German school books, dealing with the battle of Waterloo, represent Wellington as all but defeated when Blucher saved the situation; English books represent Blucher as having made very little difference. The writers of both the German and the English books know that they are not telling the truth. . . . One of the chief purposes of education in the United States has been to turn the motley collection of immigrant children into 'good Americans.' . . . A 'good American' is a man or woman imbued with the belief that America is the finest country on earth, and ought always to be enthusiastically supported in any quarrel. . . . It is a suspicious circumstance that such propositions are never believed outside the particular country which they glorify. Meanwhile the whole machinery of the State, in all the different countries, is turned on to making defenceless children believe absurd propositions the effect of which is to make them willing to die in defence of sinister interests under the impression that they are fighting for truth and right."

Bertrand Russell, *Free Thought and Official Propaganda* (New York, Huebsch, 1922), pp. 20-23.

603. UNCRITICIZED HERO WORSHIP

"The uncritical use of tradition and of indoctrination in the ideologies of a special order is usually hostile to the quality of adaptability. They set up as the ideal type of political behavior adherence to a form of theory or a historical character, and tend to regard these type forms as sacred and unchangeable. In this way the critic and the rebel are inhibited, but also the inventor and the constructive genius. A true view of national heroes and of national doctrines becomes difficult and is placed under the ban of the law or of public opinion. . . .

"In no atmosphere does the demagogue thrive more freely than in that of excited intolerance and over-inflamed civic enthusiasm built upon over-emphasized tradition.

"The citizen trained in hero-worship alone finds himself in a strangely different world when the time comes for real action. His texts and dates and biographical narratives do not seem sufficient. His book heroes made no mistakes; their lives were never gray but always either white or black; their policies were always wholly right and never wrong, or partly right and partly

wrong. Their decisions seem to have been made under conditions strangely unlike those puzzling situations confronting the modern citizen and consequently of little help to him. . . .

"It would be a supreme tragedy if government alone still worshiped at the shrine of the past, satisfying itself with the symbols and ceremonials of outlived situations. For this can only mean that the new masters of mob psychology weave out of the patterns of traditionalism the cloaks for their own daring enterprises in popular confusion and control. The demagogue and the rogue will not fail to utilize the prejudices, the hates, and the bigotries of mankind for their own purposes, and with their tongues in their cheeks take over the government of mankind in the name of the supreme order of the charlatan."

Charles E. Merriam, *The Making of Citizens* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1931), pp. 295-300.

604. THE SCHOOL PROPAGANDA OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES

"In attempting contacts with the schools three national organizations, the National Electric Light Association, the American Gas Association, and the American Railway Association, assumed the leadership. Forming a publicity organ representing corporations with invested capital of more than seventeen billions they entered into a coöperative undertaking with twenty-eight regional and state committees in an effort to reach the public in a campaign of publicity regarding their own business.

"The first of the so-called public utility information committees, or committees on public relations, was established in 1919 by Samuel Insull in Illinois. . . .

"The Committee discovered 'plenty of government ownership propaganda in public and school libraries; . . . school textbooks obsolete in relation to this great and pervasive industry. . . . Many of these textbooks . . . expressed a distinct bias in favor of government ownership and they sometimes used language that would have been *prima facie* libelous if applied to persons or companies.' . . .

"In general, exceptions were raised [in the committee report] to statements regarding monopolies, private as opposed to public ownership, franchises, regulation of public utilities.

watered stock, and the alliance alleged sometimes to exist between politicians and those in corporations. . . .

"To put into the hands of school children a book conforming to the theories held by the utilities became one of the problems of the Public Relations Committees. This was considered necessary in order that 'future generations of Americans will be staunch friends of the public utilities.' . . .

"During the same year [1928] appeared *Aladdin, U. S. A.* by Ernest Greenwood, who received monthly payments from the utilities against prospective royalties . . . *Aladdin, U. S. A.* takes the reader through the history of electrical development and expansion, painting the picture of the benefits gained by the use of electrical devices, from the home to the factory, from country to city—benefits gained through private initiative and direction. On the other hand, government ownership of electrical and other utilities, it is said, would necessarily be uneconomical. . . .

"The Ohio Committee alone distributed approximately 51,000 copies of 'Aladdins of Industry' during the first semester of the school year 1927-1928, making a total of 136,000 copies going out since the publication of the booklet. . . .

"In 1922 the New England Bureau of Public Service Information published a 'New England Primer of Public Utilities,' which it was hoped would attract the attention of school superintendents. In 1927 this bureau placed in the schools of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island 68,629 pamphlets. From May to November, 1927, it is reported that 410,000 pamphlets on gas, street railways, electric light and power, and the telephone industries were printed and distributed to the schools.

"By the time of the hearing before the Federal Trade Commission, the distribution of pamphlets and miscellaneous literature had reached considerable proportions: Colorado recorded 4,500; Connecticut, 10,670; Illinois, 125,000; Indiana, 36,191; Iowa, 64,000; Kansas, 13,000; Kentucky, 500; Louisiana-Mississippi area, 23,500; Michigan, 20,000; Missouri, 32,700; Nebraska, 1,000; New England, not including Connecticut, 165,000; New Mexico, 250; New York, 114,195; Ohio, 136,000; Oklahoma, 8,845; Oregon, 7,000; Pennsylvania, 60,000; Ten-

nesssee, 7,281; Texas, 41,000; Washington, 1,184; West Virginia, 11,000; Wisconsin, 18,000; and Wyoming, 550, making a total of 871,366."

Bessie L. Pierce, *Citizens' Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth* (New York, Scribner, 1933), pp. 242-61.

605. PUBLIC UTILITIES' HELP ON DEBATES AND ESSAYS

"Essays and debates on subjects relating to public utilities were also sponsored. In Colorado 300 pamphlets were issued against the Swing-Johnson Bills for debate purposes. In Washington where material was furnished for the negative in debates in municipal ownership the chairman on coöperation with educational institutions proudly asserted that 'we have a record of 100 per cent in winning the debates where we supplied the information.'

"Local operators were asked to give prizes to students writing the best essays and speeches on the utility business. Illinois, it was said, being particularly successful in this undertaking. In connection with essay writing, the Northwest Electric Light and Power Association offered a four-year scholarship to be competed for annually by seniors in high school the amount of \$1,000 going to the person writing the best essay on 'State Regulation of Public Utilities.' This competition received the approval of the State Department of Education.

"In the area served by the Louisiana-Mississippi Committee, a pamphlet 'Essential Servants of Civilization' became the basis for essays by school children to whom 'worth-while prizes' were offered. So successful was the publicity attending this enterprise that the Director of the Committee reported that they had put 'nearly 4,000 copies in 655 high schools' and that they were 'sending more every day.' Thus, he declared, 'you can readily see how many birds we are going to kill with that one stone!'"

Bessie L. Pierce, *Citizens' Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth* (New York, Scribner, 1933), pp. 267-68.

606. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES PROPAGANDA

"In the words of the Rocky Mountain Committee on Public Utility Information:

"As contrasted with a few years ago, before we began to direct our attention to this great job of building up better public relations, university and high school students are being given a friendly understanding of the utility industry. . . .

"In the universities the effect of our work will not be so direct or instantaneous. But the papers and talks that have been provided for the high school students and the pupils of the upper classes of the grade schools are making their effect immediately apparent. Those informed youngsters are taking the utility message into their homes. Utility subjects are being made topics for dinner-table discussions among sons and daughters, fathers and mothers. The utilities are finding that they have keen, vigorous, and enthusiastic champions among the high and grade school pupils."

Bessie L. Pierce, *Citizens' Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth* (New York, Scribner, 1933), pp. 273-74.

607. FASCIST EDUCATION

"Fascism represents the last and utmost exertion of the Italian idea to free itself from evil temptations and abstract idols as well as from foreign examples. It is the Italian tradition which resumes its path and which leads to the truly Latin and truly original education. So it is the direct task to work simply and unpresumptuously at the development of this culture. The value of the idea and of the man, who gave it first concrete political life, afford us enough security, and we need no aims fixed in advance in order to be certain that we follow the right path."

Balbino Giuliano, Minister of Public Worship and Instruction, in *Fascist Civilization*, 1928. Quoted in *International Education Review*, II, p. 195 (1932-33).

608. THE FASCIST OATH

"New members [of the Fascist Party] will take the following oath before the Secretary: 'I swear to obey the orders of the Duce without question and to serve the cause of the Fascist Revolution with all my strength and, if necessary, with my blood.'"

Quoted in Herbert W. Schneider and Shepard B. Clough, *Making Fascists* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929). p. 151.

609. OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO FASCISM IN ITALIAN UNIVERSITIES

"The oath which the professors are required to take reads: 'I swear to be faithful to the king and his royal successors and to the Fascist régime, to observe loyally the statutes and the other laws of the state; to exercise the teaching function and to fulfill all academic duties with the purpose of forming citizens active, bold, and devoted to the fatherland and to the Fascist régime. I swear that I do not belong and will never belong to any association or party the activities of which are not in harmony with the duties of my office.' "

Quoted in *School and Society*, 35:47-48 (Jan. 9, 1932).

610. FROM A FASCIST TEXTBOOK

"As there is only one official religion of the State, the Catholic, so today there must be only one political faith, Fascism, which is synonymous with the Italian Nation. As the Catholic must have a blind belief in the Catholic faith and obey the Catholic Church blindly, so the perfect Fascist must believe absolutely in the principles of Fascism and obey the hierarchical heads to whom he owes allegiance without reserve.

"Religious dogmas are not discussed because they are truths revealed by God. Fascist principles are not discussed because they come from the mind of a Genius: Benito Mussolini."

Quoted in Herbert W. Schneider and Shepard B. Clough, *Making Fascists* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 101.

611. SOCIAL EVOLUTION THROUGH AN INCLUSIVE SCHEME OF EDUCATION

"If the present experiment in Russia is allowed to work itself out naturally, it seems entirely probable that the power of formal education will be tested as it has never before been tested in human history. A favorite subject of speculation on the part of philosophers for ages has been the question of the possibility of directing the course of social evolution through control of educational agencies. Soviet Russia may provide an answer to this question. On the one hand, we see an educational program organized from top to bottom for the purpose

of achieving a fairly definite objective—the building of a collectivistic social order; and, on the other, we see an educational program of extraordinary scope. The system of public instruction of Russia today consists not only of a system of schools for the coming generation, but also of a system of schools for adults, of the press and the library, of the theater and the moving picture, of art galleries and museums, of young peoples' clubs and Communist societies and practically all of the organized educational agencies of society except the home and the church. The struggle going on in contemporary Russia between this far-reaching educational system and the informal educational influences of social life is a truly magnificent spectacle. . . .

"Perhaps the greatest value, however, of the Russian educational experiment . . . is the intellectual challenge which it throws out to the American educator. With the passing of the old agrarian order and the coming of industrial civilization we will be forced eventually to turn our attention to a number of very fundamental questions which today we are inclined to ignore. In constructing their educational program the Russian leaders have given thought to these questions. No one can read the present work without coming to a very keen realization of this fact. They have, for example, faced very squarely such questions as the purpose of education, the relation of education to society, the rôle of science in the study of education, the place of the school among the educational agencies, and the function of education in the evolution of culture."

George S. Counts, in Introduction to Albert P. Pinkevitch, *The New Education in the Soviet Republic* (New York, John Day, 1929), pp. xi-xii.

612. NO PERSONAL AIMS, BUT PARTY AIMS, IN SOVIET RUSSIA

"There is no division of opinion among those who are leading Russia's educational thought. The communist party is, to use its own word, monolithic. 'I want your personal view,' I would say to various leaders, 'not the official party view.' . . .

"'You cannot separate our personal views from those of the party,' was the universal reply. 'Our views are worked out collectively as members of the party and they are based on

the Marx-Lenin dialectic. There is no difference of opinion as to our aims. We have no personal aims. Our aims are the party's aims.' "

Carleton W. Washburne, *Remakers of Mankind* (New York, John Day, 1932), pp. 161-62.

613. STATE AIM IN SOVIET EDUCATION

"*Instruction* may be defined as the systematic and prolonged action of one or more persons upon another for the purpose of creating in him a complete and definite outlook upon the world and of making accessible to him the knowledge necessary for the selection and the practicing of an occupation. . . .

"Every state naturally strives to dominate completely the education of the young. The contemporary state as an organization of class interests constantly struggles for supremacy, that is, for the supremacy of the class which for the time is in power. Public education, aiming, as it does, to mold the future citizen is a mighty instrument which the government cannot pass on to others. In other words, regardless of the clamor which bourgeois educators may raise regarding the matter, the school and the other educational institutions cannot be outside of politics. The slogan 'down with politics in the school' is an hypocrisy, for its realization is possible to a certain extent only in the socialistic society of the future. If we cast the eye back over the history of public education, we shall see that at no time and at no place has the school been outside of politics. . . . And our great Russian Revolution pursues an identical policy, but with greater clarity and with greater honesty than the capitalistic nations."

Albert P. Pinkevitch, *The New Education in the Soviet Republic* (New York, John Day, 1929), pp. 4, 24.

614. LENIN ON BOURGEOIS EDUCATION

"The more cultured was a bourgeois state, the more subtly it deceived, asserting that the school can remain outside of politics and thus serve society as a whole. In reality the school was wholly an instrument of class domination in the hands of the bourgeoisie; it was throughout permeated with the spirit

of caste; and its aim was to give to the capitalists obliging serfs and competent workers."

Lenin. Quoted in Albert P. Pinkevitch, *The New Education in the Soviet Republic* (New York, John Day, 1929), p. 25.

615. SOVIET EDUCATION DURING THE PERIOD OF PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

"What is the problem of authority during the period of dictatorship? Obviously, it is to destroy the remnant of the capitalistic order, to create new organs of proletarian dictatorship, and to destroy the old and construct a new ideology in all fields of thought. Undoubtedly during this period the school and the other educational institutions will attract the liveliest interest of the proletarian power. The aim of all workers in the sphere of public education will be to instill into the growing generation socialistic (communistic) ideas and thereby to increase the ranks of those who are fighting for the establishment of the socialistic (communistic) state. The aim is, so to speak, the indoctrination of the youth in the proletarian philosophy. And this does not in any wise concern the proletarian children only. In the words of the accepted program, 'the school must be not only a vehicle of the principles of communism in general, but also an instrument through which the proletariat may affect the proletarian and non-proletarian strata of the laboring masses with a view to training up a generation capable of finally establishing communism.'

Albert P. Pinkevitch, *The New Education in the Soviet Republic* (New York, John Day, 1929), pp. 29-30.

616. SOCIALLY USEFUL WORK IN SOVIET RUSSIA

"Are we to regard socially useful work as work of a social character which is useful to the school and its pupils, or as work of the school which is useful to the surrounding community? To our way of thinking the entire meaning of the problem depends on the acceptance of the second interpretation. Because of the general character of the soviet school and the principles underlying the organization of the children's collective, it follows with indisputable clearness that our school does of course carry on work of this kind as a factor in the social edu-

cation of children. But when we speak of the socially useful work of the school, of participation in the life of society, and of the usefulness of such participation, we are thinking first of all of the significance for the surrounding community of the entire work of the school. . . .

"One may find two different types of activity. One is concerned with agitation for something useful and valuable or with the propagation of certain ideas which we regard as right and desirable. Thus in the field of agricultural economy we spread propaganda for the improvement of the methods of land cultivation, and in the realm of health protection we carry on campaigns against the unhygienic living habits of peasants. The other type includes various concrete practical activities which are conducted by the school for the benefit of the population."

Albert P. Pinkevitch, *The New Education in the Soviet Republic* (New York, John Day, 1929), pp. 269-70.

617. EDUCATION NECESSARY AT WHATEVER COST

"Education is a necessity for the perpetuation of the democratic State and for the promotion of its interests. There is no other instrument for insuring these ends. Therefore it follows that whatever the cost the State must for its own salvation appropriate it. Industry has repeatedly shown the wisdom of scrapping plants, of reorganizing its personnel, or of undertaking new enterprises at staggering expenditures when such radical action was thought wise for increasing dividends. The corporations that were timorous of doing so have never achieved the prosperity of those that were intelligently daring. How much wiser is such a program for democracy!"

Thomas H. Briggs, *The Great Investment* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1930), pp. 112-13.

618. WIDE VERSUS NARROW AREAS OF SUPPORT

"The problem of financing public education is profoundly affected by the manner in which educational functions are divided among the various political divisions of the state and the manner in which the state is districted for raising school funds. . . .

"The state not only includes highly developed industrial and commercial districts, but it includes also large agricultural areas of varying degrees of fertility and large tracts of sparsely inhabited mountain land suitable only for forest growth and of very small value.

"If the state were to be split into small districts and each district required to provide by local taxation the entire cost of maintaining its own schools, wide variations would necessarily result either in the educational facilities furnished, or in the rates of taxation for educational purposes. In some of the districts where the tax-paying ability of the residents is low, the number of children of school age is large, and the cost of providing school facilities high, the burden of supporting a very modest educational offering might be crushing in weight. On the other hand, if the state were to regard public education exclusively as a state function, to be supported by taxation on a state-wide basis, the state's economic resources might be gathered into a single pool, in which case the educational facilities of the poor sections would be limited, not by the size of local resources alone, but by the size of the resources of the state as a whole."

George D. Strayer and Robert Murray Haig, *The Financing of Education in the State of New York* (New York, Macmillan, 1923), p. 161.

619. FEDERAL CONTROL OF EDUCATION

"It is particularly unwise to centralize in the Federal Government the power of determining the social purposes to be served by educational institutions or of establishing the techniques of educational procedure. . . .

"A system of decentralized school management is best adapted to a democratic nation of wide geographical expanse and varied economic, social, and other human conditions. The political domination of education by a remote central government, managed by administrative officers far removed from local conditions and sympathies, has always led to the evils of bureaucratic unresponsiveness to local and to changing needs, to bureaucratic standardization, red tape, and delay, and to official insensitivity to the criticism of far-distant parents and citizens. Education is of too intimate concern to the American

parents to be brought under a far-removed civil administration which tends towards relative inflexibility. . . . A decentralized system of management and control of schools is the one absolutely reliable antidote to the easy capture of schools by the propagandists of an economic, social, or political cult."

Federal Relations to Education, Report of the Nat'l Advisory Com. on Educ. (Washington, 1931), Part I, p. 29.

620. FEDERAL SUPPORT OF EDUCATION

"Any federal financial support for education in the States shall be given only for education in general and not for special phases of education. The amounts and methods of distribution of such federal financial support, if any, shall be determined on the basis of adequate educational and financial studies such as are recommended elsewhere in this report. Such grants shall not be centrally administered by the Federal Government, but by state, territorial, or other regional governments."

Federal Relations to Education, Report of the Nat'l Advisory Com. on Educ. (Washington, 1931), Part I, pp. 83-84.

621. J. S. MILL ON THE EVILS OF STATE EDUCATION

"That the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as anyone in deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mold in which it cases them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An education established and controlled by the State, should only exist, if at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence."

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (London, Parker, 1859), pp. 190f.

622. DEMANDS ON TEACHING IN TIME OF WAR

"Public school teachers are state servants. They have obligations to the state higher than those of ordinary citizens. They must discharge these obligations actively, not passively. Teachers are in a position analogous to that of the army and the police force; it is their business to support organized institutions, not to oppose them.

"A lot of these teachers at DeWitt Clinton High School believe that by giving absolute freedom of discussion to children you enable them to reach proper conclusions. I differ with them absolutely on that point. . . . When the government has once authorized the issuance of Liberty Bonds, the wisdom of that course is no longer open to question. It may be discussed until Congress has acted, not after. If the question of a second issue comes up, it is again open to discussion until settled. Issues are temporarily closed to discussion while governmental policies are being carried out. . . .

"In the DeWitt Clinton, Stuyvesant and Boys' High Schools, where the pupils are largely foreign-born or of foreign-born parents, it cannot be denied that Socialistic views are in the ascendancy. This tends to create antagonism to the government. The attitude of some of the teachers is to blame, because, being themselves pacifists, internationalists, or even Socialists, they only mildly rebuke pupils who express unpatriotic sentiments. We intend this week, if possible, thoroughly to stamp out this evil. Every teacher who does not come up to the proper standard of patriotism will be severely dealt with."

A New York City public school official. Quoted in *The Survey*, 39:250 (Dec. 1, 1917).

623. THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL PUBLIC SCHOOLING

"This is the first generation which has realized that it is divided within itself about religion and about national destiny. A generation ago John T. Scopes would probably not have thought of teaching evolution in Tennessee. Or if he had, no one would have noticed the implications of such teaching. Or if the implications had been noticed, he would have been disciplined as a matter of course, and that would have been

the end of it. But today the division of opinion between fundamentalists and modernists has become acute owing to the increasing strength of the modernists. Because both sides were so representative, the struggle at Dayton interested everybody. So it is with the Thompson crusade in Chicago. A generation ago American history was universally taught as an exercise in piety and patriotism. But within our time criticism and skepticism have succeeded in shaking the whole legendary creed of patriotism, and, in the chaos which has followed, a variety of patriotic sects have appeared, each contending that it alone expresses the true American patriotism.

"If I read the signs rightly, we are at the beginning of a period of intense struggle for the control of public education. There is no longer a sufficient like-mindedness in most American communities to insure an easy harmony between the teachers and the mass of their fellow citizens. I shall not attempt to enumerate all the different groups actually or potentially in conflict. But there is, for example, a conflict between fundamentalists and modernists which has the profoundest bearing on the future of scientific inquiry in many parts of the West and South; there is a latent and unresolved conflict in the North and East between Catholics and Protestants, in which the extremists among the Catholics are demanding a share of the school funds for their parochial schools, and the extremists among the Protestants are demanding a state monopoly of education which would abolish the parochial schools.

"There is a kind of war within the schools between the militarists and the pacifists which comes to a head every so often in rows about military training, in inquisitions as to the patriotism of teachers, in pleas that the schools should emphasize the military virtues, or that they should expound the horrors of war and the blessings of peace. Chambers of Commerce also have taken a hand in the conduct of schools, insisting that they be purged of what is usually called bolshevism; and trades unions have arisen to plead that the schools should give more attention to the struggle of labor for a better life. All the important national groups of which we are composed have their eye on the schools. The Anglophiles wish the schools to teach that George III was only a miserable German King, and not a

good Englishman at all. The Anglophobes wish it made very clear that George V still broods and plots at night over the misfortunes of George III. The unreconstructed Irish wish every school child to dwell long and portentously upon the fact that we have had two wars with Great Britain. Others among us like to dwell upon the fact that we have had no war with Great Britain for a hundred years, and shall have none ever again if we care for the future of civilization. The German societies would like a large place in the textbooks for von Steuben who drilled Washington's troops. The Polish societies would like a large place for Kosciusko. The professional Jews want the schools to stop reading the *Merchant of Venice*. And so it goes."

Walter Lippmann, *American Inquisitors* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), pp. 24-27.

624. PRACTICE IN INDEPENDENT JUDGING

"A youth is not well-educated until he has had practice in the critical valuation of the institutions and the ways of the society of which he is a part. He must have practice in making his own judgments; his teachers cannot possibly do this for him, though they can spur him to judge his own judgments. Twenty years hence, when the student comes to the peak of his responsibilities, not only will he not have his old teachers as guides, but he will have to face problems that neither he nor they can now define or even guess. The only conceivable way in which the student can get ready for independent judgment then is by practising independent judging now and securing correction for his errors before they become too costly."

George A. Coe, *What Ails Our Youth?* (New York, Scribner, 1924), p. 50.

625. TEACHING THE OFFICIAL DOCTRINE

"The social science teacher may often be of minority groups. In these connections he is entitled to hold such opinions as he sees fit. But *teaching* is his field of social behavior. Here, in his public capacity, he must conform to the will of the majority and, so far as overt act or influence is concerned, uphold the social order under such democratic auspices as now represent the democratically expressed will of the majority. . . .

"Every public-school teacher is and ought to be a 'hired

propagandist' of the best moral and civic values that we know today—and by 'we' is meant, of course, the American people directed in truly democratic fashion, as to overt action, by that majority to whom we have, at least temporarily, entrusted directive responsibilities."

David Snedden, in *School and Society*, 13:191, 355 (Feb. 12, Mar. 19, 1921).

626. EDUCATION AND THE CRITICISM OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS

"As yet the state has not found any adequate way to develop through the schools habits of such free social criticism. Indeed, current effort runs almost entirely in the opposite direction. To make pupils believe in our country, not as a noble achievement that opens the way to something still more noble, but as something good enough; to close the mind against being taught anything by other political precedents and experiments; to make pupils as contented as possible with our industrial order; to maintain . . . the social *status quo* rather than to develop intelligent ethical judgment upon it—is not this the trend of recent events? . . .

"There are signs, too, that organized religion is not altogether unready to apply the idea in our modern world. To say nothing of the Quakers, who by quiet persistence have wrung exceptional immunities from the state, it is worth noting that Catholic forces are moving toward the reorganization of society upon a basis other than the capitalistic. One may pause, too, to consider the educational possibilities opened to our view by the Steel Strike Report. Here is displayed a critical interest at once scientific and religious, not merely in what is usually called welfare, but also in social organization, both industrial and political. What is to hinder the schools of the churches from leading the young to look similarly with unclouded eyes at the actual processes and results of our social order, and to judge it by its fruits?

"'Don't do it! The young are too much unsettled already,' pleaded a Sunday-school worker. But if we really—that is, practically—believe in the idea of a brotherly society, must we not do a deal of unsettling, and must we not do it with the young? To question the validity of the assumptions of our

defective social order only after they have become firmly rooted in the minds of the young is to commit educational folly.

"Therefore, to the question, What specific contribution to training for citizenship have we a right to expect from religious education? the answer is: This above all—Habituating the young to judge all social relations, processes, and institutions, the state included, from the standpoint of the command, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.'"

George A. Coe, "Religious Education and Political Conscience," in *Religious Education*, 17:431-35 (Dec. 1922).

627. DALLAS L. SHARP ON NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS

"American education . . . is growing ever more divided. Instead of leveling class distinctions, our schools are erecting them—the vocational school its class wall, the private school its class wall, shutting in between them the common public school—after the order of the Old World, with all its Old-World antagonisms.

"A private school in a democratic system of education is a sort of dress circle seat in heaven, un-American and anti-American, and no substitute at all for the common public school. . . .

"The genius of this country is Anglo-Saxon, English, both by inheritance and custom. Be it so. Nevertheless, there is not a single existing English institution, habit, or attitude, that, unmodified, will express what this country now is. Yet, over all the land, we are importing English aristocratic schools, and importing English masters, not a few, to administer them. And we are sending our democratic children to these aristocratic schools to have them educated for democracy! Do men gather grapes of thorns? . . .

"One of the most mistaken institutions in America is the parochial school. If it is the purpose, as it seems, of the Catholic Church to build parochial high schools, in addition to the grade schools and colleges, so that every Catholic child can be fully educated without entering an American public school, then the Catholic Church becomes educationally a rival to the State. . . . But let the millions of Methodists do as the Catholics do; let the Baptists, let the Jews, let Capital, let Labor—let every tribe and trade, every caste and creed, thus set about

the building-up, by the powerful means of education, of its own closed mind, and our House of Democracy, founded upon the Rock of mutual understanding and support, comes crashing to its fall! . . .

"The Law of Heaven, and of our approach to Heaven, which we call Democracy, demands that we love one another. Love waits on understanding; understanding on personal acquaintance; and such acquaintance waits nowhere else so naturally, so unreservedly, so honestly, so generously, as at the wide-open door of the common school. Greater love (speaking democratically) hath no man than this: that a man, rich and cultured, send his son and his *little daughter* to his neighborhood public school; and if he is afraid of the school, that he and his wife go with their children and camp in that school, and get other fathers and mothers to camp with them, until they have made that school safe and fit for their children. For verily, verily, I say unto them, a school in their neighborhood that is not fit and safe for their children, is unfit and unsafe for all children, and is a menace to the neighborhood."

Dallas Lore Sharp, *Education in a Democracy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1922), pp. 56, 9-11, 63-64.

628. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC POSITION

"If, upon examination, it should be found that the Catholic school is incapable of educating for citizenship or that it neglects its obvious duty in the attainment of this aim, it would become the duty of the state to interfere. On the other hand, if the Catholic school should prove itself capable and show that it does, in fact, attain the ultimate aim of state education as well or even better than the state system, then it is obvious that the state system should not only tolerate the Catholic school, but it should, as far as possible, free the portion of the population who support and attend the Catholic school from the burden of supporting public schools, which while less efficient in attaining the aim of the state, prove themselves wholly inadequate for the attainment of the higher aims maintained by the Church and cherished by the Catholic population."

Thomas E. Shields, in *Catholic Education Association*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Nov. 1916), p. 55.

629. HOW THE ADVERTISER APPEALS TO SNOBBERY

"Every youth sent to a Private School makes needed room for one in the public school. The individual pupil-advantage of the Private School is not only a cultural advantage to the boy and girl educated there; it is a double parental service to the State. The world needs leaders. Give the State leaders who are rationally and *individually* trained in the Private School, and patriotic parents, with a wise interest in their children and the race, will not only have made room for the under-privileged child in or still denied the public school, but they will have given the nation a substantial citizen for its multiplying problems.

"The parental patriotism that provides leaders developed by the superior individual training, discipline, and spiritual forces of the qualified Private School, will forward our civilization and serve mankind while serving itself.

"Parents with a sturdy sense of self and national interest will find the Private School their surest opportunity toward an Americanism that will be shock-proof."

M. Mercer Kendig, "The Privilege of Patriotic Parents," in *Red Book Magazine*, advertising pages (Nov. 1923).

CHAPTER XV

SOCIAL PLANNING AND EDUCATION

630. THE AMERICAN DREAM: LONG ISLAND (N. Y.), 1670

"If there be any terrestrial happiness to be had by people of all ranks, especially of an inferior rank, it must certainly be here: here anyone may furnish himself with land, and live rent-free . . . You may travel by Land upon the same Continent hundreds of miles, and passe through Towns and Villages, and never hear the least complaint for want, nor hear any ask you for a farthing; there you may lodge in the fields and woods, travel from one end of the Countrey to another, with as much security as if you were lockt within your own Chamber. . . . If there be any terrestrial Canaan, 'tis surely here, where the Land floweth with milk and honey. The inhabitants are blest with Peace and plenty, . . . blessed in whatsoever they take in hand, or go about."

Daniel Denton, *A Brief Description of New York* (New York, William Gowans, 1845. 1st ed. 1701), pp. 19-21.

631. LAISSEZ FAIRE DIVINELY ARRANGED

"Thus God and Nature link'd the gen'ral frame
And bade Self-love and Social be the same."

Alexander Pope, *Essay on Man*, Third Epistle, lines 317-18.

632. LAISSEZ FAIRE

The principle of Laissez faire is suggested by the meaning of the term, Let-alone. It stands for a policy of non-interference with the free play of social forces. In economics it would advocate free-trade as opposed to protection. In general it would reduce the sphere of governmental action to lowest terms, and is accordingly often spoken of as the police power theory, because it would limit the function of government to the bare pro-

tection of the citizens from violence directed either against themselves or their property. The most thoroughgoing advocate of this policy is Herbert Spencer. "In his *Social Statics*, published in 1850, he holds it to be the essential duty of government to *protect*—to maintain men's rights to life, to personal liberty, and to property; and the theory that the government ought to undertake other offices besides that of protector he regards as an untenable theory. Each man has a right to the fullest exercise of all his faculties, compatible with the same right in others. This is the fundamental law of equal freedom, which it is the duty and the only duty of the state to enforce. If the state goes beyond this duty, it becomes, not a protector, but an aggressor. Thus all state regulations of commerce, all religious establishments, all government relief of the poor, all state systems of education and of sanitary superintendence, even the state currency and the post-office, stand condemned, not only as ineffective for their respective purposes, but as involving violations of man's natural liberty."

Adapted from the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., article on "Government," XII, p. 298.

633. JUSTICE FIELD ON SAFEGUARDING PROPERTY (1878)

"All history shows that rights of persons are unsafe where property is insecure. Protection to one goes with protection to the other; and there can be neither prosperity nor progress where this foundation of all just government is unsettled. 'The moment,' said the elder Adams, 'the idea is admitted into society that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence.' "

Justice Field, in *U. S. Reports*, 99:767.

634. PAUL DOUGLASS: THE OUTWORN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

"Money is the supreme good since it alone can give protection against the dangers of life, provide leisure and beauty, obtain power, and grant social esteem. In the struggle for this *summum bonum*, men are rivals because the good things of life are limited by nature, and the victory of one must necessarily mean the defeat of another. A man's first and almost exclusive

duty is to himself and to his family, since if he does not look out for his own, no one else will. Let each man therefore work for himself, first, last, and all the time. There is little to be gained and much to be lost by uniting with one's fellows, as this merely enables the insiders to sell one out more effectively. Reform is consequently hopeless, and ideals of human coöperation are false. There is nothing to do but to let the savage struggle go on and to protect oneself as best one can."

Paul H. Douglas, *The Coming of a New Party* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1932), pp. 19-20.

635. THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER

"The primitive environment of the frontier created no social philosophy other than the anarchic individualism of the jungle."

Matthew Josephson, in *New Republic*, 68:78 (Sept. 2, 1931).

636. INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

"The fatal mistake in their philosophy which liberals have from the beginning tended to overlook—a mistake which has become more obvious and more harmful with the growth of technical civilization and the consequent closer interweaving of the interests of men, is failure fully to understand that the true fulfillment of the individual requires, not merely regard for the individual, but intelligent integration of the society of which he is a part."

George Soule, *A Planned Society* (New York, Macmillan, 1932), p. 89.

637. HOW THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION HAS ALTERED HUMAN SOCIETY

"During the last century the industrial revolution has altered the complexion of human society far more radically than anything has ever done before since the beginning of recorded history. To find anything comparable to this new disruptive force, we must turn back to the invention of fire in the dim ages when man was just becoming man, or to the change from a hunting and nomadic pastoral life to the settled order of an existence founded upon agriculture. It is literally true that for the ordinary man the main facts of human toil and enjoyment

did not change appreciably from the days of Cheops the pyramid-builder to those of Washington, and that in the interval from Washington to our own time the transformation has been little short of miraculous. More rapid social change now takes place in a single decade than in whole centuries in the past; and the rate is being continually accelerated. The single invention of the automobile has in the last fifteen years altered rural life far more fundamentally than anything in the last thousand years. Cities grow by magic, with their promise and their problems; their life twenty years back now seems quaint and almost unbelievable."

John Herman Randall, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1926), p. 594.

638. TECHNOLOGIC REDUCTION OF HUMAN LABOR

"So far as engineering progress alone is considered, in the automotive industry, it is claimed that the requisite number of man-hour per each vehicle was reduced as follows:

"1904.....	1921	man-hours
1919.....	380	" "
1929.....	92	" "

The Economic Significance of Technological Progress, Committee Report of the Society of Industrial Engineers (New York, Continental Committee on Technocracy, 1933), p. 10.

639. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN 1933

"The study indicates unmistakably that the changed production technique has profoundly altered the economic relations heretofore existing in industry and rendered measures which were pertinent under the past production methods not only inoperative but socially harmful, when these new technological and managerial forces were disregarded. . . .

"Briefly summed up, our findings indicate that the present economic condition naturally evolved from the disregard and misunderstanding of the changes that have taken place in productive activities due to engineering advance.

"That, had these productive forces been properly recorded, studied, and evaluated, a major portion of our sufferings could have been allayed. . . .

"We hold that the present unemployment and attendant misery is not due to technological progress, but to the financial strangulation of life-sustaining activities and the disemployment of technology."

The Economic Significance of Technological Progress, Committee Report of the Society of Industrial Engineers (New York, Continental Committee on Technocracy, 1933), pp. 3, 1.

640. SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

"1. Society has become in fact corporate. Its interests and activities are so tied together that human beings have become dependent upon one another, for good or for harm, to an unprecedented degree. This is a statement of fact, whether the fact be welcomed or deplored. This interdependence is increasing, not lessening. It must be taken into account by education. We must not only educate individuals to live in a world where social conditions beyond the reach of any one individual's will affect his security, his work, his achievements, but we must (and for educational reasons) take account of the total incapacity of the doctrine of competitive individualism to work anything but harm in the state of interdependence in which we live.

"2. Not merely the material welfare of the people, but the cultural and moral values, which are the express concern of the educational profession, demand a reorganization of the economic system, a reconstruction in which education has a great part to play.

"3. The crucial problem is no longer one of stimulating production, but one of organization of distribution with reference to the function of consumption and use, so as to secure a stable basis of living for all, with provision against the hazards of occupation, old age, maternity, unemployment, etc., in order that an abundant cultural development for all may be a reality.

"4. Strictly speaking, the idea of *laissez faire* has not been carried out for a long time. Monopolistic ownership of land and of values socially created, privileged control of the machinery of production and of the power given by control of financial credit, has created control by a class, namely, control over production, exchange, and distribution. Hence general and public repudiation of the doctrine of *laissez faire* in behalf

of the principle and practice of general social control is necessary. Education has a responsibility for training individuals to share in this social control instead of merely equipping them with ability to make their private way in isolation and competition. The ability and the desire to think collectively, to engage in social planning conceived and conducted experimentally for the good of all, is a requirement of good citizenship under existing conditions. Educators can ignore it only at the risk of evasion and futility.

"5. The interdependence spoken of has developed on a world-wide scale. Isolated and excessive nationalism renders international interdependence, now existing as a fact, a source of fear, suspicion, antagonism, potential war. In order that interdependence may become a benefit instead of a dread evil and possible world-wide catastrophe, educators must revise the conception of patriotism and good citizenship so that it will accord with the imperative demands of world-wide association and interaction.

"6. We are in possession of a method of controlled experimental action which waits to be extended from limited and compartmentalized fields of operation and value to the wider social field. In the use of this method there lies the assurance not only of continued planning and inventive discovery, but also of continued reconstruction of experience and of outlook. The expanded and generalized use of this method signifies the possibility of a social order which is continuous by self-repairing, a society which does not wait for periodic breakdowns in order to amend its machinery and which therefore forestalls the breakdowns that are now as much parts of social activity as storms of nature are of the physical order."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 68-70.

641. THE FAILURE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

"It is generally agreed that there is something seriously wrong with private enterprise as at present operating. It has succeeded in organizing the technique of machine production with marvelous efficiency, but it has failed miserably to utilize this technique to anything like its full capacity.

"The income from production is inequitably distributed; and this reacts on the amount and character of consuming power and this sets limits on our power to produce.

"Unemployment and poverty still exist, even in the most prosperous periods; while, despite large aggregate profits, a large proportion of business enterprises (by number) do not make earnings adequate for safety and stability.

"Periodic depressions cause untold misery and suffering. At times we enjoy prosperity ever rising to new high levels, and at other times, with the same needs to meet and the same powers to meet them, in natural resources, labor energy, productive equipment, and technical skill, we are unable to use these powers to meet these needs. Modern society can no longer acquiesce in this misuse of the powers which nature and science have bestowed upon it."

"Long-Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry," Supplement to *New Republic*, Jan. 13, 1932.

642. CURRENT BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH INDUSTRIAL REALITIES

"It is this visibly growing failure of the present businesslike management to come up to the industrial necessities of the case; its unfitness to take anything like reasonable care of the needed correlation of industrial forces within the system; its continual working at cross purposes in the allocation of energy resources, materials, and man power—it is this fact, that any businesslike management of necessity runs at cross purposes with the larger technical realities of the industrial system, that chiefly goes to persuade apprehensive persons that the régime of business enterprise is fast approaching the limit of tolerance. So it is held by many that this existing system of absentee ownership must presently break down and precipitate the abdication of the Vested Interests, under conviction of total imbecility."

Thorstein Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System* (New York, Huebsch, 1921), pp. 118-19.

643. MAN TODAY A SLAVE TO HIS OWN CREATIONS

"When we observe modern industry failing to give steady employment and to produce to capacity even when millions of

people urgently need more goods; unnecessarily killing and maiming thousands of men each year; wasting irreplaceable natural resources simply because it is more profitable under existing economic arrangements to waste them than to conserve them; employing thousands of experts for the purpose of making men desire certain things, not because they are good for men to use, but because they are profitable for business enterprises to sell; denying to wage earners an opportunity to participate in making the rules under which they work; when we observe all these things, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that man, in no small degree, is a slave to his creations, dominated by industry instead of making it serve his ends—that, in the words of Emerson, ‘Things are in the saddle and ride mankind.’ How to make industry more of a tool and less of a tyrant, how to prevent the process of making a living from interfering with the opportunity and the capacity of men to lead the good life, how, indeed, to make the process of getting a living a part of the good life itself, these are the supreme economic problems, and at few stages in human history have they been more acute or more fascinating than they are today.”

Sumner H. Slichter, *Modern Economic Society* (New York, Holt, 1928), pp. 9–10.

644. WHY STRESS THE ECONOMIC

“The necessary relation between means and ends explains the attention we have given to the economic phase of society. Our emphasis does not imply that economic values are superior as *values*. But economic forces are at the present time superior to others in causal power. They condition what people can do and how they can develop more than do other forces. Moreover, the habit of separating economic interests from ideal interests affords a typical instance of the too common separation of means and ends, with the result that ideals become empty and impotent, while means, left to themselves in isolation from service to ends, produce brutal and unjust consequences. The emphasis laid upon the economic is not due therefore to any *a priori* theory of its necessary importance but is due to the power of economic factors in contemporary culture. Because of the or-

ganic relation of ends and means and because the economic is so potent both as potential means for values and as a retarding and distorting force, and because it is the means most susceptible of modification by concerted effort, it is, strategically, the key at present to other values."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), p. 296.

645. OUR CIVILIZATION DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF

"If ever there was a house of civilization divided within itself and against itself, it is our own today."

John Dewey, in Kirby Page (ed.), *Recent Gains in American Civilization* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1928), p. 257.

646. THINGS IN THE SADDLE

"Things are in the saddle
And ride mankind."

Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Ode inscribed to W. H. Channing*.

647. REPULSIVE AND NEVER-ENDING DRUDGERY

(a) "Political Economy regards self-interest as a universal motive of human action, and it studies the mutual relations and intercourse of men as governed by that motive. It assumes that labor is irksome, and that everybody desires the utmost possible gratification with the least possible exertion."

Francis Wayland (Aaron L. Chapin, ed.), *Elements of Political Economy* (New York, Sheldon, 1883), p. 6.

(b) "For a man to be the whole of his life engaged in performing one repulsive and never-ending task is an arrangement fit enough for the hell imagined by the theologians, but scarcely fit for any form of society."

William Morris, *Useful Work versus Useless Toil*, Socialist Platform, No. 2 (London, Socialist League Office, 1886), p. 38.

648. DIVORCE OF LABOR FROM JOY IN WORK

"The most disastrous distortion of our modern economics-minded civilization is that labor is a sort of punishment to be

compensated by a wages that is divorced from all sense of joy in work, or that business is a calculation in commodities having but a showing of profits (balance-sheeted) as the sign of its success,—no judgment of the actual living of the most vital hours of the men in the enterprise being taken into the reckonings, nor of human interests for their humanity's sake; and it is this distortion which most besets such a society as America's, where the virtues of reflection are reduced to their minimum, every hour held suspect."

H. B. Alexander, in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), *Higher Education Faces the Future* (New York, Liveright, 1930), pp. 37-38.

649. THE OLD FREEDOM A NEW SLAVERY

"Instead of personal freedom for all men, there has been created for the great majority of men a new and far more extensive form of dependence, all the more extreme for being concealed. Instead of civil liberty, there is a daily and hourly compulsion upon the great mass of the population which is much more pervasive and effective because it is economic instead of legal. Instead of the principle of private property guaranteeing to the worker the fruits of his labors, that very principle has become an impassable obstacle forever preventing him from obtaining them. . . .

"The cause of individualistic freedom is today the cause of everything that is reactionary, stupid, barbaric, and repressive in the world, and . . . it can only triumph by destroying civilization and pulling us back into an age of darkness."

John Strachey, *The Coming Struggle for Power* (New York, Covici Friede, 1933), pp. 48-49, 156.

650. AVOIDING CRITICISM

"Our teacher treats plutocracy
As if it were democracy;
He's teaching us hypocrisy."

Student in DeWitt Clinton High School, New York City. Quoted in *School and Society*, 37:302 (Mar. 4, 1933).

651. EVIL EFFECTS OF THE MACHINE

"The entry of the machine into the sphere of the mind, its mass production, and the mass thinking which results from it, are the most sinister tendencies of this age."

L. Stanley (President of British Library Association), Address Sept. 23, 1930, Cambridge, *New York Times*, Sept. 24, 1930.

652. OUR MACHINES NOT TO BLAME

"There is no greater sign of the paralysis of the imagination which custom and involvement in immediate detail can induce than the belief, sedulously propagated by some who pride themselves on superior taste, that the machine is itself the source of our troubles. Of course immense potential resources impose responsibility, and it has yet to be demonstrated whether human capacity can rise to utilization of the opportunities which the machine and technology have opened to us. But it is hard to think of anything more childish than the animism that puts the blame on machinery. For machinery means an undreamed-of reservoir of power. If we have harnessed this power to the dollar rather than to the liberation and enrichment of human life, it is because we have been content to stay within the bounds of traditional aims and values although we are in possession of a revolutionary transforming instrument. Repetition of the older credo of individualism is but the evidence of contentment within these bonds. I for one think it is incredible that this particular form of confession of inferiority will endure very much longer. When we begin to ask what can be done with the machine for the creation and fulfillment of values corresponding to its potency and begin organized planning to effect these goods, a new individual correlative to the realities of the age in which we live will also begin to take form."

John Dewey, *Individualism Old and New* (New York, Minton Balch, 1930), pp. 95-96.

653. POLITICAL GOVERNMENT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS

"Government is run, not by common citizens choosing representatives to serve them, but by professionals who make a business of politics, and who conduct this business for self-

interest and profit. Political machines are the necessary instruments for nominating candidates, financing and carrying on campaigns. Political machines are costly to operate. They must be maintained by the patronage of appointments, by graft, and by campaign contributions from those who have favors to seek from government. Service to the citizen, if it arises out of the operation of this huge business—in which the two principal parties are merely commercial competitors for the plums of office—is purely incidental. The best the dissatisfied citizen can do is to transfer his custom from one political profiteer to another.

"As a rule, the richest political machine wins the elections, because persuading voters is a matter, if not of direct bribery, as in some close contests, at least of costly publicity and advertising, which involves the hiring of expert talent and the payment for canvassing, traveling expenses, halls, radio, postage, and advertising space, to say nothing of influence exerted on leaders of opinion. The consequence is that various rich groups employ politics to exploit the rest of the community."

George Soule, *A Planned Society* (New York, Macmillan, 1932), pp. 30-31.

654. ART AND THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

"No one can doubt that art and appreciation are among the values which preëminently enrich experience and make life worth living. So true is this that no question probes deeper into any culture than inquiry as to how it stands with reference to the creative arts and æsthetic enjoyment. But here again values are vacuous and impotent as ends in the degree in which they lack means for expansion.

"It is customary, for example, to refer the relatively low level of æsthetic use of leisure time in this country, as reflected in the movie, radio, and amusement generally, to an inherently low grade of taste. This explanation leaves out of account the commercialization which uses these things to make money instead of to serve the values involved. As long as the conditioning means remain unchanged, there is little benefit likely to accrue from eulogizing fine art no matter how ecstatic the admiration. When conditions confine the development of taste to a privileged few, its status in the community will be that of a contrast effect with the things of ordinary life. Popular art will then be a rebound to

stimulation and excitement from those activities of working hours which lack freedom and meaning. Art will be a widespread enhancement of the joy and significance of living only when economic barriers do not switch it off to the esoteric for the few and the sensational for the many. The humanizing of the economic system will detract from the power of the acquisitive and add to that of the creative aspect of life. It will surely prove more efficacious in extending the scope of the arts than any amount of praise of them uttered in the face of forces which keep persons aloof from their enjoyment, and which induce disregard of the ugly as long as it is not shown to be pecuniarily unprofitable."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 297-98.

655. ANYTHING MAY Now HAPPEN

"Up to 1930, Americans had no interest in economic change. They were aboard what seemed to be a perpetual motion machine. Politics and government, as we have noted, were laughed at and neglected. Economics resolved itself into a pleasant and stimulating game of trying to get rich. Change lacked psychological imperative. Into this vacuum, Socialism, Communism, the Single Tax, the I.W.W., the coöperative movement, reform, fell headlong. At last, 1932, the perpetual motion machine has stripped its gears, and economic change has acquired psychological imperative. For this reason, all generalizations based on the past about what America will or will not do, about the impotence and corruption of government, the impossibility of political realignments, all the windy phrases about the imperishable traditions of democracy and the immaculate conception of the Constitution, stand suspect and tottering. Anything may happen—even the running of a redesigned economic machine by those most competent to run it."

Stuart Chase, *A New Deal* (New York, Macmillan, 1933), p. 251.

656. FRILLS FOR THE FEW OR SECURITY AND COMFORT FOR ALL

"What would be the balance of advantage to civilization if the planned economy of a classless society, while failing to keep up the variety of such luxuries and conveniences, secured,

as it undoubtedly could secure, to every single citizen of the community an adequate supply of the necessities of life? Of course, the mere psychological gain in the removal of the neurosis of anxiety which today prevents about two-thirds of the population of even the richest communities from ever being able to attend whole-heartedly to anything but their daily bread, would make possible a quite unparalleled advance in civilization. (It is not necessary even to speak of the actual physical improvement which adequate food, clothes, and house-room would achieve.) When once people *know* that by working a reasonable number of hours they can assure adequate and satisfactory food, housing, and clothing for themselves and their dependants, the provision of further commodities should become a quite secondary social objective. And yet while the free trader economists condemn planned economy because it might not, at first, be able to provide all the frills of life to which they are accustomed, they tolerate and defend a capitalist system which is failing utterly to provide the necessities of life to perhaps half the population of the world."

John Strachey, *The Coming Struggle for Power* (New York, Covici Friede, 1933), pp. 139-40.

657. RUSSIA: NEW LIFE AND NEW PEOPLE

"We live badly. We change Nature, but as yet we have not changed our own selves. . . .

"We need machines in order that we may work less and accomplish more. . . . After we build socialism all will have equally healthy faces. Men will cease to regard work as a punishment, a heavy obligation. They will labor easily and cheerfully. But if work will be a joy, rest will be a double joy.

"After all man is not just muscles with which to work. He is not a machine. He has a mind that wants to know, eyes that want to see, ears that want to hear, a voice that wants to sing, feet that want to run and jump and dance, hands that want to row and swim and throw and catch. And we must organize life so that not merely certain lucky ones but all may be able to feel the joy of living.

"After socialism is built there will no longer be dwarfs—people with exhausted, pale faces, people reared in basements

without sunshine or air. Healthy, strong giants, red-cheeked and happy—such will be the new people.

"But to accomplish this we must have new cities and new houses, our whole life even to the last kitchen pot must be changed.

"Down with the kitchen! We shall destroy this little penitentiary! We shall free millions of women from housekeeping. . . . We shall force machines to peel the potatoes, wash the dishes, cut the bread, stir the soup, make the ice-cream. Down with the dark and small and crowded dwelling!"

M. Ilin, *New Russia's Primer* (Trans. by Counts and Lodge. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1931), pp. 148-51.

658. CONTRAST BETWEEN A PLANNED AND AN UNPLANNED ECONOMY

"1. *The Project of our Country.*

"The Five-Year Plan is a project: not of one factory, but of two thousand four hundred factories. And not only of factories, but also of cities, of electric stations, of bridges, of ships, of railroads, of mines, of state farms, of rural communes, of schools, of libraries. It is a project for the rebuilding of our whole country and was prepared, not by one man or by two men, but by thousands of trained persons. To the work of building came not tens, but millions of workers. All of us will help to build the Five-Year Plan.

"The plan was first discussed in December, 1927, at the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party.

"On the 1st of October, 1928, its fulfillment was begun.

"And before the end of 1929 it became clear that the plan will be achieved, not in five years, but much more quickly.

"Such a project has never been undertaken before. America has many large factories, many more than we have. There factories turn out four automobiles a minute; there some buildings are sixty stories high; there a huge steel bridge was recently constructed in one day; there a million tractors work in the fields. The Americans are proud of their machines, of their factories.

"But how do these factories work? According to some general plan, do you suppose? No, they work without a general plan.

"2. What Happens When They Work Without a Plan.

"Mr. Fox acquires money—one million dollars. But money must not remain idle. Mr. Fox looks through newspapers, he consults friends, he employs agents. From morning till night the agents comb the city, look about, and make inquiries. What is to be done with the money of Mr. Fox?

"At last a business is found. Hats! That is what one should make. Hats sell; men get rich. There is nothing to hesitate about. Mr. Fox builds a hat factory.

"The same idea occurs at the same time to Mr. Box, and Mr. Crox, and Mr. Nox. And they all begin to build hat factories simultaneously.

"Within half a year there are several new hat factories in the country. Shops are filled to the ceiling with hat-boxes. Storerooms are bursting with them. Everywhere there are posters, signs, advertisements: Hats, Hats, Hats. A great many more hats are made than are needed—twice as many, three times as many. And the factories continue to work at full speed.

"And here something happens that neither Mr. Fox, nor Mr. Box, nor Mr. Nox, nor Mr. Crox anticipated. The public stops buying hats. Mr. Nox lowers his price twenty cents; Mr. Crox, forty cents; Mr. Fox sells hats at a loss in order to get rid of them. But business grows worse and worse. In all of the papers advertisements appear:

YOU MAY HAVE ONLY ONE HEAD, BUT THAT DOES
NOT MEAN AT ALL THAT YOU SHOULD WEAR ONLY
ONE HAT. EVERY AMERICAN SHOULD HAVE
THREE HATS.

BUY THE HATS OF MR. FOX!

"Mr. Box offers to sell hats on a three-year installment plan. Mr. Nox announces a sale:

ONLY FOR ONE DAY. TAKE ADVANTAGE
OF THIS OPPORTUNITY!

"But this does not help. Mr. Fox lowers the wages of his workers one dollar a week. Mr. Crox lowers the wages two dollars a week. Again business grows worse and worse.

"All at once—STOP! Mr. Fox closes his factory. Two thousand workers are discharged and permitted to go wherever they please. The following day the factory of Mr. Nox stops. In a week practically all hat factories are standing idle. Thousands of workers are without work. New machines grow rusty. Buildings are sold for wreckage.

"For what purpose does Mr. Fox build a hat factory? Is it really in order to make hats? Not at all, but rather to make money. To him every factory is a money factory, a profits factory.

"And for Mr. Fox and Mr. Box a worker is not a worker, not a man, but a machine for making profits."

M. Ilin, *New Russia's Primer* (Trans. by Counts and Lodge. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1931), pp. 5-9, 15.

659. ACQUISITIVE INDIVIDUALISM NOT NECESSARY

"The loose, individualistic, and acquisitive democracy of the nineteenth century is compelled to give way to a much more highly integrated socially conscious form of government in the future.

"There will be many who will tell you that such a change in the orientation of human life is impossible, that human nature is and always must be as individualistic, as competitive, and as acquisitive as the political thinkers of the nineteenth century assumed that it was. I do not read this lesson in the records of experience. The individualism of nations and of persons is a comparatively recent ideal among civilized men. It is perhaps a transient ideal. For the two thousand years which preceded the modern age, during all those centuries in which Western civilization was establishing itself, men believed that they belonged to an order which comprehended their whole world, and that in this order all communities and all persons had their status, and their rights and their duties. . . . [This] was the central idea of mankind until in the modern age of exploration and invention and restless ambition and adventure it was thrust aside and temporarily forgotten."

Walter Lippmann, *A New Social Order* (New York, John Day, 1933), pp. 22-23.

660. MUCH GREATER OUTPUT POSSIBLE (1921)

"If the country's productive industry were completely organized as a systematic whole, and were then managed by competent technicians with an eye single to maximum production of goods and services; instead of, as now, being manhandled by ignorant business men with an eye single to maximum profits; the resulting output of goods and services would doubtless exceed the current output by several hundred per cent."

Thorstein Veb.en, *The Engineers and the Price System* (New York, Huebsch, 1921), pp. 120-21.

661. POSSIBILITIES OF INTELLIGENT MANAGEMENT (1918)

"So I went to the biggest production engineer I could find in the United States, Mr. H. L. Gantt, former Vice-President of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and consulting expert for many of America's greatest industrial organizations. . . .

"[He said]: 'If America seriously sets out to eliminate ALL the friction in her industrial system, we may expect a four, or perhaps a two-hour day. With production simplified and power utilized to its fullest capacity, we could probably produce all we want in much less than six hours; and with distribution simplified, we would have no trouble in securing the product for our own enjoyment.'

"'Socialism?' I asked.

"'Engineering,' he corrected."

Charles W. Wood, *The Great Change* (New York, Boni & Liveright, 1918), pp. 41, 111.

662. AN OPINION FAVORABLE TO VIOLENCE

"Great events rise only from a sea of blood."

Archbishop of Prague, in *New York Times*, Nov. 7, 1930.

663. REVOLUTION NECESSARY

"The assumption of power by the workers can occur by means of revolution alone; by means, that is, of an event which takes place over a limited number of years, and of which there

may be a critical moment, such as the conquest of the existing State apparatus in a capital city, which can be 'dated' to a given week of a given month of a given year. The coming of communism itself, however, after the achievement of working-class power, must be a gradual process. And it is only gradually, with the emergence of communism, with the creation—and that, we may be sure, only by Herculean labors and painful sacrifices—of the essential economic basis for a classless society, that the problems which today threaten civilization with eclipse will actually be solved."

John Strachey, *The Coming Struggle for Power* (New York, Covici Friede, 1933), pp. 357-58.

664. REVOLUTIONISTS TOO ARE STANDPATTERS

"Revolutions will be unavoidable for generations to come because both conservatives and revolutionists have the same way of thinking about society. They are both 'standpatters.' They both have the concept of a perfect state which is to be preserved inviolate. Their ideals differ, but the attitude of the revolutionist toward his ideal state is exactly the same as the attitude of the 100 per cent American toward the Constitution. The scheme of things which the revolutionist believes in becomes sacred to him through the struggle to attain it. So when his revolution succeeds and his form of social order is in some degree realized, he becomes the strongest of all opponents of further change. The Russian government is the only one on earth which is more conservative than the American government."

Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 213-14.

665. HOW REVOLUTIONS COME

"Smug contentment and sullen despair are equally perilous to society. Revolutions are caused more often by reactionaries than by agitators. If the privileged groups remain blind to injustice and exploitation, they are sure to provoke their victims into violent revolt. If, on the other hand, those who are laboring for a new social order become convinced that success cannot

be attained by peaceable means, they are likely to advocate violence. Social progress is impeded alike by those ardent defenders of things-as-they-are who say that America is ninety-eight per cent all right, and by those extreme pessimists who despair of orderly change."

Kirby Page (ed.), in Foreword to *Recent Gains in American Civilization* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1928), p. i.

666. REVOLUTION NOT NECESSARILY VIOLENT

"Changes in human society are, at times, accompanied by wars and violence. But such outbreaks are, for the most part, mere symptoms. They are the visible evidence that changes have already taken place. The changes themselves are generally so gradual and peaceable as to be almost imperceptible. . . .

"The much-dreaded 'social revolution,' if it comes at all, will probably not be associated with violence. It will be caused by the sum total of peaceable changes and developments which have taken place since the last revolution. There need be no violence in it at all. There was almost none during the Industrial Revolution of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Yet that was probably the greatest social revolution which has ever occurred on this planet. A real revolution is almost always a slow, essentially peaceable, and largely unnoticed process. The violent outbreaks commonly called revolutions are, in great measure, due to that conservatism which makes the economically favored classes unwilling to recognize the fact that a real and peaceable revolution has already occurred."

Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 7-9.

667. JOHN ADAMS ON WHAT WAS THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

"What do we mean by the revolution? The war? That was no part of the revolution; it was only an effect and consequence of it. The revolution was in the minds of the people, and this was effected from 1760 to 1775, in the course of fifteen years, before a drop of blood was drawn at Lexington."

John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Aug. 24, 1815.

668. SALVATION THROUGH BRUTALITY

"From Moscow to the Mediterranean there reigns a pathetic faith in salvation through brutality."

Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 4.

669. A TYRANNY WHICH FIGHTS ABUSES

"A tyranny which denies liberty to predatory individual self-interests, which goes the length of restraining and punishing swindlers and defrauders, which impinges on the right to rob and to exploit, which places restrictions on the liberty to corrupt and stultify the minds of children, of terrorizing the weak and the ignorant, which checks the liberty to delude and misrepresent, a tyranny which shows scant tenderness for all the tyrannies and abuses which thrive in lands of liberty, is the sort of tyranny which bids fair to bestow upon the human race a measure of liberty which it has never previously known."

Robert Briffault, *Breakdown* (New York, Coward McCann, 1932), p. 197.

670. AMERICAN EDUCATORS ON A NATIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL

"We must then modify the self-regulating way of our pioneer period and devise instead coöperative measures fitted to deal with modern industrial conditions. At many specific points we have already made this change, but not yet consciously as a comprehensive program of action. The time has now come to make the fact of *interdependence* the foundation base of American thought and action. To develop the needed social arrangements will of course take time, but the direction is clear. Consciously devised arrangements must supplant mere drift and selfish opportunism. Our social and economic life must be directed primarily for the good of all. . . .

"The urgency of the situation, the magnitude of the task and the necessity for continuous and inclusive study and consistent action point unmistakably to the need of a national council fully representative of our total social life. The economic aspects of the problem are so essential that agriculture, labor, and industrial management must all be included. But it is also of the

utmost importance that other social interests—medicine, engineering, education, law, and welfare—be represented in order that everything that is done may be directed with an intelligent understanding of the larger social issues involved."

"The Economic and Educational Crisis" [Manifesto of American Educators], in *School and Society*, 37:261-62 (Feb. 25, 1933).

671. HOW BEGIN PLANNING

"The more pertinent course seems to be to see what can be done to introduce collective planning into our existing system. This must be done experimentally, with the expectation that measures will change and develop with experience. It does not appear to us important either to safeguard private enterprise for its own sake, or to seek a collective economy for its own sake. What is important is to organize for the purpose of making the best possible use of our resources, and to take whatever measures such organization requires. We hold that this task of organization is not beyond human powers, and that a beginning at it must immediately be made. We cannot foresee the end, but we can outline first steps.

"We are therefore advocating an elastic system of organizations for planning, relying on voluntary action to the fullest extent consistent with ensuring that whatever action is taken is guided by the interests of the whole community, and that these interests are adequately protected."

"Long-Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry," Supplement to *New Republic*, Jan. 13, 1932.

672. OBJECTIVES OF NATIONAL PLANNING

"The true objective of planning is not stabilization at any static level, but regularized growth. It is the full utilization of our powers of production, which are continually growing, in order that our consumption may grow correspondingly. To this end the purchasing power of the masses must be maintained and must expand. Viewed from the other side, then, the objective is the progressive raising of the purchasing power and the standard of living of the people to the full extent which our powers of production make possible. Increased production and a raised

standard of living must go hand in hand; neither end can be gained without the other. . . .

"Another major objective is greater equality in the distribution of incomes, increasing the proportion going to wages and the lowest salaries, to farmers and to the lower-income groups in general. The result will naturally be that more incomes will be spent for consumable products, thus striking at the problem of restricted demand for the things mass production is waiting to produce."

"Long-Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry," Supplement to *New Republic*, Jan. 13, 1932.

673. A NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION

"We propose a National Economic Board, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and with preliminary advice from various national organizations. The members of the Board should represent special types of expert knowledge rather than special economic interests. They should include men expert in finance, scientific management, labor relations, economics, and agriculture or agricultural economics; but should be chosen for their ability to represent the interests of the public at large. The Board should have a corps of statisticians, economists, and technical experts."

"Long-Range Planning for the Regularization of Industry," Supplement to *New Republic*, Jan. 13, 1932.

674. WHICH FIRST: SOCIAL CHANGE OR A NEW EDUCATION?

"It is possible to put the processes of social change and of education in opposition to one another, and then debate whether desirable social change would follow education, or whether radical social change must come before marked improvements in education can take place. We hold that the two are correlative and interactive. No social modification, slight or revolutionary, can endure except as it enters into the action of a people through their desires and purposes. This introduction and perpetuation are effected by education. But every improvement in the social structure and its operations releases the educative resources of mankind and gives them a better opportunity to enter into

normal social processes so that the latter become themselves more truly educative.

"The process of interaction is circular and never-ending. We plead for a better, a more just, a more open and straight-forward, a more public, society, in which free and all-round communication and participation occur as a matter of course in order that education may be bettered. We plead for an improved and enlarged education in order that there may be brought into existence a society all of whose operations shall be more genuinely educative, conducive to the development of desire, judgment, and character. The desired education cannot occur within the four walls of a school shut off from life. Education must itself assume an increasing responsibility for participation in projecting ideas of social change and taking part in their execution in order to be educative. The great problem of American education is the discovery of methods and techniques by which this more direct and vital participation may be brought about."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 318-19.

675. A GREAT AND INTELLIGENT GROUP PURPOSE

"Since the group interests override the individual interests, the selection and determination of group purposes is a function of the greatest importance and an act of the greatest effect on individual welfare. The interests of the society or nation furnish an easy phrase, but such phrases are to be regarded with suspicion. Such interests are apt to be the interests of a ruling clique which the rest are to be compelled to serve. On the other hand, a really great and intelligent group purpose, founded on correct knowledge and really sound judgment, can infuse into the mores a vigor and consistent character which will reach every individual with educative effect. The essential condition is that the group purpose shall be 'founded on correct knowledge and really sound judgment.' The interests must be real, and they must be interests of the whole, and the judgment as to means of satisfying them must be correct."

William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, Ginn, 1906), pp. 63-64.

676. PASSIONATE FAITH NECESSARY TO GREAT PLANNING

"If the great ideas of the Soviet experiment are to be put to the proof, millions of citizens within the Union must believe in them. They must believe in them so passionately that they will find the very meaning of life in the struggle for their fulfillment. Suppose, for example, that the members of the Communist Party should suddenly withdraw from the revolutionary movement and assume the detached manner of a biologist studying the processes of reproduction among the paramecia. Obviously the experiment would immediately terminate and the fruitfulness of the ideas involved would never be known. Back of every great venture of mankind there must lie a supreme act of faith. In the world of human relationships certain things will be found true only if men believe them true from the beginning and are prepared to make every sacrifice to prove them so."

George S. Counts, *The Soviet Challenge to America* (New York, John Day, 1931), pp. 326-27.

677. INDIVIDUALITY THROUGH DEVELOPING A SHARED CULTURE

"So regarded, the problem is seen to be essentially that of creation of a new individualism as significant for modern conditions as the old individualism at its best was for its day and place. The first step in further definition of this problem is realization of the collective age which we have already entered. When that is apprehended, the issue will define itself as utilization of the realities of a corporate civilization to validate and embody the distinctive moral element in the American version of individualism: Equality and freedom expressed not merely externally and politically but through personal participation in the development of a shared culture."

John Dewey, *Individualism Old and New* (New York, Minton Balch, 1930), pp. 33-34.

678. COUNTS: DARE PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION BE PROGRESSIVE?

"The weakness of Progressive Education thus lies in the fact that it has elaborated no theory of social welfare, unless it be that of anarchy or extreme individualism. In this, of course,

it is but reflecting the viewpoint of the members of the liberal-minded upper middle class who send their children to the Progressive schools—persons who are fairly well-off, who have abandoned the faiths of their fathers, who assume an agnostic attitude towards all important questions, who pride themselves on their open-mindedness and tolerance, who favor in a mild sort of way fairly liberal programs of social reconstruction. . . .

"If Progressive Education is to be genuinely progressive, it must emancipate itself from the influence of this class, face squarely and courageously every social issue, come to grips with life in all of its stark reality, establish an organic relation with the community, develop a realistic and comprehensive theory of welfare, fashion a compelling and challenging vision of human destiny, and become less frightened than it is today at the bogies of *imposition* and *indoctrination*. In a word, Progressive Education cannot place its trust in a child-centered school.

"This brings us to the most crucial issue in education—the question of the nature and extent of the influence which the school should exercise over the development of the child. The advocates of extreme freedom have been so successful in championing what they call the rights of the child that even the most skillful practitioners of the art of converting others to their opinions disclaim all intention of molding the learner. And when the word indoctrination is coupled with education there is scarcely one among us possessing the hardihood to refuse to be horrified. . . .

"The issue is no doubt badly confused by historical causes. The champions of freedom are obviously the product of an age that has broken very fundamentally with the past. . . . At any suggestion that the child should be influenced by his elders they therefore envisage the establishment of a state church, the formulation of a body of sacred doctrine, and the teaching of this doctrine as fixed and final. If we are forced to choose between such an unenlightened form of pedagogical influence and a condition of complete freedom for the child, most of us would in all probability choose the latter as the lesser of two evils. But this is to create a wholly artificial situation: the

choice should not be limited to these two extremes. Indeed today neither extreme is possible.

"I believe firmly that a critical factor must play an important rôle in any adequate educational program, at least in any such program fashioned for the modern world. An education that does not strive to promote the fullest and most thorough understanding of the world is not worthy of the name. Also there must be no deliberate distortion or suppression of facts to support any theory or point of view. On the other hand, I am prepared to defend the thesis that all education contains a large element of imposition, that in the very nature of the case this is inevitable, that the existence and evolution of society depend upon it, that it is consequently eminently desirable, and that the frank acceptance of this fact by the educator is a major professional obligation. I even contend that failure to do this involves the clothing of one's own deepest prejudices in the garb of universal truth and the introduction into the theory and practice of education of an element of obscurantism."

George S. Counts, *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* (New York, John Day, 1932), pp. 7-12.

679. PROPAGANDA AND INDOCTRINATION

"The common thought about propaganda and indoctrination has come down to us from the past when men thought in terms of orthodoxies as fixed-in-advance and clear-cut rivals. Acceptance or rejection was an out-and-out either-or affair. Propaganda thus came to be thought of as the effort to win grown-ups from heterodoxy to orthodoxy, while indoctrination was the method of fixing orthodoxy once for all in the minds and hearts of the young. It was in this period of our thinking that the state adopted neutrality as between rival church orthodoxies, and the public school became so 'neutral' that it refused to consider live issues, even though this refusal meant continued indoctrination of now out-of-date positions. But a change in thinking has come about. History has convinced the modern-minded that doctrines themselves have their life histories of birth, acceptance, and decay. With this conception of continued change and becoming, propaganda and indoctrination do not fit. Instead the public school must accept re-

sponsibility for the building of intelligence in and for the wise choice between growing and decaying doctrines and programs. Neutrality, in the sense of avoidance of this responsibility, becomes thus, as we see it, a cowardly refusal to face inherent duty. It is amid this shift of thinking that many are now confused.

"As conscious education, whether of young or old, faces then such a situation as our hang-over economic system, it cannot be neutral. To do nothing is in so far to perpetuate out-worn and now hurtful doctrines. And probably most American schools do in effect thus join hands with reactionary influences to maintain the *status quo*. As in such a situation we seek a defensible positive program two things must characterize our educational endeavors. On the one hand, we must distinguish a proper education from anything that is in effect prejudice building or mere training; we cannot in general rest content with the unthinking acceptance of what is learned. On the other hand, we must help any we touch, whether old or young, to study the rival claims of contending new ideas that progress in thought and action may more surely take the defensibly best road, while the individual himself shall in the process thereby best learn to help forward such progress."

William H. Kilpatrick, in *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 146-47.

680. THE NEW DUTY OF THE PROFESSION OF EDUCATION

"In the service of public intelligence the educator has at length become clearly conscious of what had all the while been implicit in his work: first, that his rendezvous with childhood and youth is a service to the whole culture and involves both keen insight and responsibility in community relations; and second, that the crux of the whole front of social intelligence is at those points where adults are making the decisions and shaping the influences which in turn shape the lives of the oncoming generation. If the educator will once realize that when he educates he does something to the culture and then will follow on with the lively sense of responsibility into the paths and functions which that realization dictates, he will be close to the intelligent heart of society's urge toward a richer and more

fitting culture. He will work at the task in the interests of childhood and youth and in the interests of the baffled and confused adults of the modern community. He will work with his profession to make our civilization give up its secrets and its leads, good and bad, and both singly and collectively with his colleagues he will use and multiply his powers for effectiveness in furthering the good and averting the bad.

"And as basic to all this, the profession must sooner or later be uplifted and impelled by a realistic vision of what, in terms of our modern society, *is* better. It need not be an orthodoxy and certainly not an over-simplified radicalism, but it can have the power of a gospel and at the same time present a new frontier, a working philosophy of education and social progress. Our joint effort in this book is to move toward this realistic vision, one which we can hold in common; and having reached it to set it forth with the faith that it inspires in us."

R. B. Raup, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 120-21.

681. A NEW ADULT EDUCATION

"Our analysis is concerned with . . . the potential 'thinking minority.' It is these 25,000,000 persons who can transform the assumptions of political democracy into established fact. . . . It is upon these that our program of adult education must be concentrated. . . .

"In the fullest sense the task which confronts us is that of education—emergency adult education, long-time continuing adult education, and a new education of childhood and youth. The most urgent of these is emergency adult education.

"Just as truly as in April, 1917, we are at war! At war with forces that may indeed destroy mankind. This war situation must be met with a warlike psychological program. Every agency of communication must be coördinated into a great organism of education. Tens of thousands of face-to-face groups now in existence—the public press, the pulpit, the platform, the movies, the radio, and the theater—must be organized to contribute to the formation of a new mental climate.

"To do so, let us employ the techniques of the high-powered salesman of corporate business. The shoe manufacturers make

the people 'shoe-conscious'; let us make them 'starvation-in-the-midst-of-riches-conscious.' The rubber manufacturers make the people 'tire-conscious'; let us make them 'futility-of-palliative-conscious.' The tooth paste manufacturers make the people 'pink-toothbrush-conscious'; let us make them 'production-in-terms-of-consumption-needs-conscious,' 'economic-government-conscious,' 'scientific-technology-conscious.' . . .

"But emergency propaganda for intelligent understanding will achieve even more than this. It will also build the groundwork for that new philosophy of life which conceives of education as continuing throughout all life and as enlisting all of the activities of the community. Now is the time to get adults accustomed to the processes of education. Now is the strategic moment to ingrain a new conception of the school. There is a fair chance that if, confronted by a serious crisis, they can be persuaded to bind themselves together for the purpose of common educational action, the new concepts will persist. Thus the foundation for a new and permanent concept of adult education will be laid."

Harold Rugg, *The Great Technology* (New York, John Day, 1933), pp. 201-3.

682. THE TASK OF THE SCHOOL TODAY

"The school today faces a new task. It must find its place in the scheme for social reconstruction which is needed to lift society from its present chaotic state. New conditions set the task with great definiteness. The social-economic situation has taken a form which the school can ignore only if it is ready to recognize that as it fails to contribute to the regeneration of society so does it become ineffective itself. To this sorry end the school is not likely to go. It must be quite clear, however, that unless reality is faced such an end will result. And reality in the present social-economic situation makes sharp demands. The individual citizen must be brought to a realizing sense of the values that are implicit in the struggle for security by the common man in a society where corporate action has now become a basic characteristic. He must likewise be sensitized to the fact of international interdependence in the world situation. He must achieve an abiding concern for the educative

effect of all social institutions as men plan together to establish a social order in which life for all may flow from a stable source. Furthermore, he must rise to a method of action which naturally brings old values up for reconstruction as changing conditions necessitate new attitudes. . . .

"The educator must be sensitive to the conditions that have precipitated our present social confusion and difficulty. He needs to recognize that the school is not the all-important agency it has too long been assumed to be. He needs to realize that as a member of the social order he has an obligation to bring about its steady reconstruction. Finally, he needs particularly to recognize that within the school situation he may move positively to accomplish tangible results in the direction of bringing to the social process individuals who are not only increasingly more capable of dealing with it intelligently but who are increasingly disposed so to act. This represents a distinct contribution, one that gives to the school a significant and directing program, and to the educator an impelling purpose."

H. Gordon Hullfish, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 160-61.

683. CHALLENGE TO SOCIALISTIC COMPETITION IN U. S. S. R.

"I, Pioneer Lida Brobova, pupil of the sixth grade of School No. 59, challenge to socialistic competition my mother, employed at the factory Dynamo. On my part I promise not to miss one day at school and to be promoted into the next grade. I further promise to help my schoolmates who are lagging in their work. . . . From my mother I request: to increase the turnover of her factory and to improve the quality and lower the cost of production. I further expect my mother not to stay away from the factory for trivial reasons and to be a conscientious worker."

Quoted by Nucia P. Lodge, in *Child Study*, 9:234 (Apr. 1932).

684. WHAT OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION MIGHT DO

"Occupational distribution is important in determining wages, in reducing unemployment, in stabilizing business, in

increasing the total production of society, in determining the attitude one should have toward improving the social order, and in bringing real economic freedom."

Harold F. Clark, *Economic Theory and Correct Occupational Distribution* (New York, Teachers College, 1931), p. 7.

CHAPTER XVI

DYNAMIC LOGIC

685. DEWEY ON LOGIC

"If thinking is the way in which deliberate reorganization of experience is secured, then logic is such a clarified and systematized formulation of the procedures of thinking as will enable the desired reconstruction to go on more economically and efficiently. In language familiar to students, logic is both a science and an art; a science so far as it gives an organized and tested descriptive account of the way in which thought actually goes on; an art, so far as on the basis of this description it projects methods by which future thinking shall take advantage of the operations that lead to success and avoid those which result in failure."

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1920), pp. 134-35.

686. HOW MODERN THINKING IS DIFFERENT

"Aristotle and Leonardo da Vinci and Newton and Huxley, if not Darwin, could all have met in the same room and understood one another with no great difficulty. Their beliefs about many things would have been different but their methods of reasoning would have been about the same. If any of these men, however, were to sit down for a chat with Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Paul Valery, and Stravinsky, in a room hung with the paintings of Matisse and Picasso, the amount of explaining which would be necessary before an *entente cordiale* could be established would probably be an effective bar to a satisfactory exchange of opinion. They would find that things were no longer either black or white, but might be both; that there were no longer any 'standards' in works of art or in morals. These changes which they would have found difficult to accept calmly cause us few qualms; we look upon them, indeed, as

blessings. To explain them simply is not easy, but they follow almost as a matter of course from the changes to the kind of logic which is now prevalent.

"In broadest terms, our modern thought differs in three respects from the thinking of the past. One can state them technically as, first—the substitution of statistics for Aristotelian logic, which may loosely be called a shift from absolute, final 'truth' to changing and growing 'probability.' Second—the substitution of the notion that change is growth for the notion that it is mechanical impact. Third—the substitution of what may be called the 'will' for the 'reason' as the source of human acts."

George Boas, *Our New Ways of Thinking* (New York, Harper, 1930), pp. xiv–xv.

687. THE NEW OUTLOOK ON CHANGE

"The ideal of permanence and unity was characteristic of the Aristotelian class concept, whereas change and variety [are] characteristics of the statistical class. But the former properties are also characteristic of a mechanical world, and the latter of a vital. Change in mechanics is appearance; matter remains immutable. Permanence in growth is illusion; the very stuff out of which things are made is impermanent. If, then, change is impact, the world will be seen to be made up of underlying permanent substance; if change is growth, it will be vain to look for substance, for one can never find it. . . .

"At present the classic ideal of unified and permanent immobility strikes us with horror. What was once eternal and divine now seems to us monotonous and dead. The very word 'static' has become a term of reproach. We speak of static civilizations . . . as bad without any further discussion. Things which do not change seem monstrous to us, yet it was not much more than one hundred years ago that Joseph de Maistre proved the divinity of the Catholic Church by the fact that it had not been altered for two thousand years. The word 'dynamic' on the contrary, has become our term of highest praise. We hear of dynamic personalities, dynamic wills, dynamic books, as if they were at the pinnacle of human ambition. Movement, progress, change are all indices of worth. Time is no longer a destroyer; it is a creator. We no longer bemoan the passing of the old,

but rejoice over the coming of the new. The vital, the creative, the progressive meant nothing to our forefathers; they mean everything to us."

George Boas, *Our New Ways of Thinking* (New York, Harper, 1930), pp. 137-39.

688. PHILOSOPHIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "ORIGIN OF SPECIES"

"That the publication of the 'Origin of Species' marked an epoch in the development of the natural sciences is well known to the layman. That the combination of the very words origin and species embodied an intellectual revolt and introduced a new intellectual temper is easily overlooked by the expert. The conceptions that had reigned in the philosophy of nature and knowledge for two thousand years, the conceptions that had become the familiar furniture of the mind, rested on the assumption of the superiority of the fixed and final; they rested upon treating change and origin as signs of defect and unreality. In laying hands upon the sacred ark of absolute permanency, in treating the forms that had been regarded as types of fixity and perfection as originating and passing away, the 'Origin of Species' introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was bound to transform the logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of morals, politics, and religion."

John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1910), pp. 1-2.

689. ENDS AND MEANS ARE CORRELATIVES

"A goal cannot be intelligently set forth apart from the path which leads to it. Ends cannot be conceived as operative ends, as directors of action, apart from consideration of conditions which obstruct and means which promote them. If stated at large, apart from means, ends are empty. Ends may begin as the plan and purpose in the rough. This is useful if it leads to search for and discovery of means. So the otherwise bare idea of building a house may be the first stage in thinking out detailed plans and specifications for its erection, and thus be translated over into a statement of means."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), p. 296.

690. SUSPENDED JUDGMENT

"Doubt is not a pleasant condition, but certainty is an absurd one."

Voltaire.

691. NO COMPLETE ASSURANCE POSSIBLE

"Practical activity deals with individualized and unique situations which are never exactly duplicable and about which, accordingly, no complete assurance is possible."

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, Minton Balch, 1929), p. 6.

692. NO ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY

"One disciplined in the fine art of doubting can never be *absolutely* certain. Absolute certainty is a privilege of uneducated minds—and fanatics. It is, for scientific folk, an untenable ideal."

Cassius J. Keyser, *Mathematical Philosophy: A Study of Fate and Freedom* (New York, Dutton, 1922), p. 120.

693. MATHEMATICS IMPERFECT

"There is no longer any basis for the idealization of mathematics, and for the view that our imperfect knowledge of nature is responsible for failure to find in nature the precise relations of mathematics. It is the mathematics made by us which is imperfect and not our knowledge of nature. . . .

"As at present constructed, mathematics reminds one of the loquacious and not always coherent orator, who was said to be able to set his mouth going and go off and leave it. What we would like is some development of mathematics by which the equations could be made to cease to have meaning outside the range of numerical magnitude in which the physical concepts themselves have meaning."

P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), pp. 62-63.

694. THE EVIL EFFECTS OF UNIVERSAL LAWS

"The doctrine that nature is inherently rational was a costly one. It entailed the idea that reason in man is an outside spec-

tator of a rationality already complete in itself. It deprived reason in man of an active and creative office; its business was simply to copy, to re-present symbolically, to view a given rational structure. Ability to make a transcript of this structure in mathematical formulæ gives great delight to those who have the required ability. But it *does* nothing; it makes no difference in nature. In effect, it limits thought in man to re-traversing in cognition a pattern fixed and complete in itself. The doctrine was both an effect of the traditional separation between knowledge and action and a factor in perpetuating it. It relegated practical making and doing to a secondary and relatively irrational realm.

"Its paralyzing effect on human action is seen in the part it played in the eighteenth and nineteenth century in the theory of 'natural laws' in human affairs, in social matters. These natural laws were supposed to be inherently fixed; a science of social phenomena and relations was equivalent to discovery of them. Once discovered, nothing remained for man but to conform to them; they were to rule his conduct as physical laws govern physical phenomena. They were the sole standard of conduct in economic affairs; the laws of economics are the 'natural' laws of all political action; other so-called laws are artificial, man-made contrivances in contrast with the normative regulations of nature itself.

"*Laissez faire* was the logical conclusion. For organized society to attempt to regulate the course of economic affairs, to bring them into service of humanly conceived ends, was a harmful interference.

"This doctrine is demonstratively the offspring of that conception of universal laws that phenomena must observe, which was a heritage of the Newtonian philosophy."

John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York, Minton Balch, 1929), pp. 211-12.

695. YERKES ON BRIGHAM'S 1923 FINDINGS

"The volume which is the outcome of Mr. Brigham's inquiry, and which I now have the responsibility and satisfaction of recommending, is substantial as to fact and important in its practical implications. It is not light or easy reading but it is

better worth re-reading and reflective pondering than any explicit discussion of immigration which I happen to know. The author presents not theories or opinions but facts. It behooves us to consider their reliability and their meaning, for no one of us as a citizen can afford to ignore the menace of race deterioration or the evident relations of immigration to national progress and welfare."

Robert M. Yerkes, in Foreword to Carl C. Brigham, *A Study of American Intelligence* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1923), p. vii.

696. BRIGHAM'S 1923 FINDINGS ON INTELLIGENCE TESTS AND RACIAL ABILITY

"Our study of the army tests of foreign born individuals has pointed at every step to the conclusion that the average intelligence of our immigrants is declining. This deterioration in the intellectual level of immigrants has been found to be due to two causes. The migrations of the Alpine and Mediterranean races have increased to such an extent in the last thirty or forty years that this blood now constitutes 70% or 75% of the total immigration. The representatives of the Alpine and Mediterranean races in our immigration are intellectually inferior to the representatives of the Nordic race which formerly made up about 50% of our immigration. In addition, we find that we are getting progressively lower and lower types from each nativity group or race."

Carl C. Brigham, *A Study of American Intelligence* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1923), p. 197.

697. BRIGHAM IN 1930 ON BRIGHAM IN 1923

"This review has summarized some of the more recent test findings which show that comparative studies of various national and racial groups may not be made with existing tests, and which show, in particular, that one of the most pretentious of these comparative racial studies—the writer's own—was without foundation."

Carl C. Brigham, "Intelligence Tests of Immigrant Groups," in *Psychological Review*, 37:165 (Mar. 1930).

698. A FIXED MIND THE REFUGE OF STANDPATTERS

"The ultimate refuge of the standpatter in every field, education, religion, politics, industrial and domestic life, has been the notion of an alleged fixed structure of mind. As long as mind is conceived as an antecedent and ready-made thing, institutions and customs may be regarded as its offspring. By its own nature the ready-made mind works to produce them as they have existed and now exist. There is no use in kicking against necessity. The most powerful apologetics for any arrangement or institution is the conception that it is an inevitable result of fixed conditions of human nature. Consequently, in one disguise or another, directly or by extreme and elaborate indirection, we find the assumed constitution of an antecedently given mind appealed to in justification of the established order as to the family, the school, the government, industry, commerce, and every other institution."

John Dewey, "The Need for Social Psychology," in *Psychological Review*, 24:273 (July 1917).

699. FIXITY OF NATURE IN GREEK MYTHOLOGY

"I find nothing so subtly and inconsolably mournful among all the explicit miseries of the Greek mythology as this fixity of nature in the god or the man, by which the being is suspended, as it were, at a certain point of growth, there to hang forever."

Sidney Lanier, *The English Novel* (New York, Scribner, 1892), p. 88.

700. FUNCTION AND STRUCTURE

"The distinction between structure and function depends on what we are interested in at the time. What we call function at any time is the movement we are now concerned to study. If so, structure is the name we give to those other events which are then conditioning the movement. Thus if an engineer were studying the Niagara as a water power, he would count the banks and bed as structure and conditions. But if he were asking whether the falls will not in time cease, banks and bed become movements and he studies them accordingly as results of other things as conditions. In like manner if we are studying curiosity we take eye and ear and fingers as structure and con-

ditions of expression; but at another time we may ask how eye or ear or fingers were developed during the long ages and these then become movements and processes and are studied accordingly."

William H. Kilpatrick, *Our Educational Task* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1930), p. 88.

701. HOW FACTS DIFFER ACCORDING TO THE OBSERVER

"One may say broadly that all the animals that have been carefully observed have behaved so as to confirm the philosophy in which the observer believed before his observations began. Nay, more, they have all displayed the national characteristics of the observer. Animals studied by Americans rush about frantically, with an incredible display of hustle and pep, and at last achieve the desired result by chance. Animals observed by Germans sit still and think, and at last evolve the solution out of their inner consciousness. To the plain man, such as the present writer, this situation is discouraging. I observe, however, that the type of problem which a man naturally sets to an animal depends upon his own philosophy, and that this probably accounts for the differences in the results. The animal responds to one type of problem in one way and to another in another; therefore the results obtained by different investigators, though different, are not incompatible. But it remains necessary to remember that no one investigator is to be trusted to give a survey of the whole field."

Bertrand Russell, *Philosophy* (New York, Norton, 1927), pp. 29-30.

702. VERBS AND ADVERBS THE ONLY FINALITIES

"Since psychology studies activities, its terms are properly verbs, and adverbs. It needs one noun, *individual*, or *organism*, or the equivalent, as the subject of all its verbs; and, to be sure, it needs to name any number of objects that act upon the individual or are acted on by him. But the student will soon encounter an assortment of other nouns, names of activities and names of qualities, such as intelligence, memory, imagination, sensation, emotion, consciousness, behavior. All such nouns are properly verbs or adverbs, with 'individual' as their sub-

ject. Much confusion and controversy would be avoided if these nouns were constantly thought of as verbs.

"Instead of 'memory,' we should say 'remembering'; instead of 'thought' we should say 'thinking,' instead of 'sensation' we should say 'seeing, hearing,' etc. But, like other learned branches, psychology is prone to transform its verbs into nouns. Then what happens? We forget that our nouns are merely substitutes for verbs, and go hunting for the *things* denoted by the nouns; but there are no such things, there are only the activities that we started with, seeing, remembering, and so on.

"Intelligence, consciousness, the unconscious, are by rights not nouns, nor even adjectives or verbs; they are adverbs. The real facts are that the individual acts intelligently—more or less so—acts consciously or unconsciously, as he may also act skillfully, persistently, excitedly. It is a safe rule, then, on encountering any menacing psychological noun, to strip off its linguistic mask, and see what manner of activity lies behind."

R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1929), pp. 5-6.

703. NO ABSOLUTE CRITICISM

"All intelligent . . . criticism is comparative. It deals not with all-or-none situations, but with practical alternatives; and absolutistic indiscriminate attitude, whether in praise or blame, testifies to the heat of feeling rather than the light of thought."

John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, Holt, 1927), p. 110.

704. HOW INTEREST AFFECTS THE ASSIGNMENT OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

"Let us suppose that a man walking under a ladder is hit on the head by a brick dropped from the hod of a hod-carrier mounting the ladder. His skull is fractured and he dies. What is the cause of his death? It is easy to call the man the patient, the brick the cause, and the death the effect. But, there again, had his skull been stronger my tale had been longer, and hence the thinness of his skull has something to do with the effect, although it is directly affected by the cause. Similarly, had the

man passed under the ladder a few seconds earlier or a few seconds later, the brick would not have touched him; were there not *causes* of his appearing at exactly that moment? Or had the hod-carrier gone up the ladder more slowly or more quickly, his skull might again have escaped. Furthermore, just as the brick did something to the man's skull, so his skull did something to the brick: it at the least deflected it from its original path toward the earth; perhaps the skull is the cause and the brick the patient? Again we say that death is the effect, but when is the body dead? At most, all that we can conclude from this instance is that if the path of the man and the path of the brick had not intersected at that precise moment, the future of the little universe in which they moved would have been different. But which is cause and which is effect and which is patient is a matter of convention, determined by the interests of the person who uses the terms. The man's family was probably more interested in the fracture of his skull; a physicist might have been more interested in the path of the brick."

George Boas, *Our New Ways of Thinking* (New York, Harper, 1930), pp. 64-65.

705. HIGHER IN TERMS OF LOWER

"Human conduct is in the last analysis dependent upon the postures and maneuvers of our muscle-fabric."

Robert Chenault Givler, *The Ethics of Hercules* (New York, Knopf, 1924), p. i.

706. CHANGE ONLY SEPARATION AND ASSOCIATION AND MOTION

"While the Particles continue entire, they may compose Bodies of one and the same Nature and Texture in all Ages: But should they wear away or break in pieces, the Nature of Things depending on them, would be changed. . . . And therefore that Nature may be lasting, the Changes of corporeal Things are to be placed only in the various Separations and new Associations and Motions of these permanent Particles."

Sir Isaac Newton, *Opticks* (London, William and John Innys, 1721), p. 376.

707. EMERGENT EVOLUTION

"When carbon having certain properties combines with sulphur having other properties there is formed, not a mere mixture but a new compound, some of the properties of which are quite different from those of either component. Now the weight of the compound is an additive resultant, the sum of the weights of the components; and this could be predicted before any molecule of carbon-bisulphide had been formed. One could say in advance that if carbon and sulphur shall be found to combine in any ascertainable proportions there will be such and such weight as resultant. But sundry other properties are constitutive emergents which (it is claimed) could not be foretold in advance of any instance of such combination. Of course when one has learnt what emerges in *this* particular instance one may predict what will emerge in *that* like instance under similar circumstances. One has learnt something of the natural plan of emergent evolution."

C. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution* (New York, Holt, 1927), p. 3.

708. INTEGRATION VERSUS COMPROMISE

"In compromise . . . there is no qualitative change in our thinking. Partisanship starves our nature: I am so intent on my own values that other values have got starved out of me; this represents a loss in my nature, in the whole quality of my personality. Through an interpenetrating of understanding, the quality of one's own thinking is changed; we are sensitized to an appreciation of other values. By not interpenetrating, by simply lining up values and conceding some for the sake of getting the agreement necessary for action, our thinking stays just where it was. In integration all the overtones of value are utilized.

"Whoever advocates compromise abandons the individual: the individual is to give up part of himself in order that some action may take place. The integrity of the individual is preserved only through integration—and the similarity in these words is not insignificant. Moreover, if you believe in compromise it means that you still see the individual as static. If the self with its purpose and its will is even for a moment a finished

product, then of course the only way to get a common will is through compromise. But the truth is that the self is always in flux, weaving itself and again weaving itself."

M. P. Follett, *Creative Experience* (New York, Longmans Green, 1924), pp. 163f.

709. GROWING BIGGER SELVES

"To keep to our original opinion is sometimes considered a kind of moral self-preservation. But the question is: Do we want to preserve that self or grow a bigger self? The progress of individual or race is by integration. The biological law is growth by the continuous integration of simple, specific responses; in the same way do we build up our characters by uniting diverse tendencies into new action patterns; social progress follows exactly the same law."

M. P. Follett, *Creative Experience* (New York, Longmans Green, 1924), pp. 173f.

710. CHALLENGING PRESUPPOSITIONS

"Progress in thinking, without which learning is mere repeating, comes by examining foundations. The educated mind differs from the uneducated in the insight which enables it to file a demurrer, dismiss the case, or restate it in terms that lead somewhere. It is in getting us over our dilemmas that education frees our minds."

Everett Dean Martin, *The Meaning of a Liberal Education* (New York, Norton, 1926), p. 115.

711. EXAMINATION OF PRESUPPOSITIONS

"SOCRATES: Did you say you believe in the separation of church and state?"

"BRYAN: I did. It is a fundamental principle.

"SOCRATES: Is the right of the majority to rule a fundamental principle?

"BRYAN: It is.

"SOCRATES: Is freedom of thought a fundamental principle, Mr. Jefferson?"

"JEFFERSON: It is.

"SOCRATES: Well, how would you gentlemen compose your fundamental principles, if a majority, exercising its funda-

mental right to rule, ordained that only Buddhism should be taught in the public schools?

"BRYAN: I'd move to a Christian country.

"JEFFERSON: I'd exercise the sacred right of revolution. What would you do, Socrates?

"SOCRATES: I'd reëxamine my fundamental principles."

Walter Lippmann, *American Inquisitors* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), pp. 21-22.

712. TO EACH EPOCH ITS COMMON ASSUMPTIONS

"When you are criticizing the philosophy of an epoch, do not chiefly direct your attention to those intellectual positions which its exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend. There will be some fundamental assumptions which adherents of all the variant systems within the epoch unconsciously presuppose. Such assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know what they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them. With these assumptions a certain limited number of types of philosophic systems are possible, and this group of systems constitutes the philosophy of the epoch."

Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), p. 69.

713. QUESTIONING OUR ASSUMPTIONS

"Not only are concepts hazy around the edges and so incapable of fitting nature exactly, but there is always the chance that there are concepts other than those which we have adopted which would fit our present phenomena. Finding concepts to fit nature is much like solving a cross-word puzzle. In the puzzle there may be some parts of the pattern which we fill completely and easily, but sometimes we find parts in which we can fill in everything except one or two obstinate definitions, so that we are sure we are on the right track, and rack our brains for the missing words, when with a flash of inspiration we see that the obstinate words can be fitted in by a complete change in those which we had already accepted."

P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), p. 202.

714. HOW DISCUSSION MAY IRRITATE

"When a scientific argument tends to become rather emotional it undoubtedly prods some deep-rooted presupposition, the discussion of which is felt to be offensive. No one enjoys the discussion of what, for him, is secure beyond discussion."

Wolfgang Köhler, *Gestalt Psychology* (New York, Liveright, 1929), p. 90.

715. NON-RATIONAL OPINIONS

"When, therefore, we find ourselves entertaining an opinion about the basis of which there is a quality of feeling which tells us that to inquire into it would be absurd, obviously unnecessary, unprofitable, undesirable, bad form, or wicked, we may know that the opinion is a non-rational one, and probably, therefore, founded upon inadequate evidence."

W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (New York, Macmillan, 1917), p. 44.

716. DYNAMIC LOGIC: REINTERPRETING THE PROBLEM

"There is generally a common principle unconsciously assumed at the basis of two theories which to all outward appearances are the extreme opposites of each other. Such a common principle is presupposed by the theories of effort and interest in the one-sided forms in which they have already been stated.

"This identical assumption is the externality of the object or idea to be mastered, the end to be reached, the act to be performed, to the self. It is because the object or end is assumed to be outside self that it has to be *made* interesting, that it has to be surrounded with artificial stimuli and with fictitious inducements to attention. It is equally because the object lies outside the sphere of self that the sheer power of 'will,' the putting forth of effort without interest, has to be appealed to. The genuine principle of interest is the principle of the recognized identity of the fact or proposed line of action with the self; that it lies in the direction of the agent's own self-expression and is, therefore, imperiously demanded, if the agent is to be himself. Let this condition of identification once be secured, and we neither have to appeal to sheer strength of will nor do

we have to occupy ourselves with making things interesting to the child."

John Dewey, *Interest as Related to Will*, 2nd Supplement to Herbart Year Book for 1895, pp. 213-14.

717. PRINCIPLES AND THEIR USE

"It is clear that the various situations in which a person is called to deliberate and judge have common elements, and that values found in them resemble one another. It is also obvious that general ideas are a great aid in judging particular cases. If different situations were wholly unlike one another, nothing could be learned from one which would be of any avail in any other. But having like points, experience carries over from one to another, and experience is intellectually cumulative. Out of resembling experiences general ideas develop; through language, instruction, and tradition this gathering together of experiences of value into generalized points of view is extended to take in a whole people and a race. Through intercommunication the experience of the entire human race is to some extent pooled and crystallized in general ideas. These ideas constitute *principles*. We bring them with us to deliberation on particular situations."

John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics* (New York, Holt, 1932), p. 304.

718. ACTING ON FIXED PRINCIPLES

"If you want to make an ass of yourself try acting on principle."

"An Old Cambridge Schoolmaster." Quoted in *Federal Council Bulletin*, 11:11 (Oct. 1928).

719. LIMITATION UPON RIGHTS

"No man has a right to all of his rights."

Phillips Brooks.

720. THE LIMITED APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES

The right to equality of educational opportunity would, in a democratic society, be generally admitted. To say, however, that the right is absolute and should be enforced at every cost

would commit us to a program that many, probably most, will reject as soon as it is understood. For one thing, our children could no longer remain in their present homes; since homes are necessarily educative, and as educating agencies they are vastly unequal. Absolute equality of educational opportunity, being thus incompatible with separate homes, could be had, under present conditions, only at the cost of giving up, at least for several generations, the home as a place for children.

The important bearing of this discussion is that even so admirable and desirable a principle as equality of educational opportunity cannot be applied absolutely, but only in such way as shall take due account of other principles and factors necessarily involved. The considerations here brought forward hold in general: Under any given set of conditions the optimum application of any principle—however admirable the principle may be in itself—may well not be the absolute (or maximum) application of that principle. In each particular case the choice of conduct must be decided in the light of the total effect of all the factors involved. We cannot afford to be doctrinaire in the application of even the most important principles.

721. STEREOTYPES AND THEIR EFFECT ON THOUGHT AND ACTION

"For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture. . . . We are told about the world before we see it. We imagine most things before we experience them. . . .

"What matters is the character of the stereotypes, and the gullibility with which we employ them. . . .

"[The] hallmark [of the stereotype] is that it precedes the use of reason; is a form of perception, imposes a certain character on the data of our senses before the data reach the intelligence. The stereotype is . . . like the door-keeper at a costume ball who judges whether the guest has an appropriate masquerade. There is nothing so obdurate to education or to criticism as the stereotype. It stamps itself upon the evidence in the very act of

securing the evidence. That is why the accounts of returning travelers are often an interesting tale of what the traveler carried abroad with him on his trip. . . .

"There is in each set of stereotypes a point where effort ceases and things happen of their own accord, as you would like them to. The progressive stereotype, powerful to incite work, almost completely obliterates the attempt to decide what work and why that work. *Laissez faire*, a blessed release from stupid officialdom, assumes that men will move by spontaneous combustion towards a preëstablished harmony. Collectivism, an antidote to ruthless selfishness, seems, in the Marxian mind, to suppose an economic determinism towards efficiency and wisdom on the part of socialist officials. Strong government, imperialism at home and abroad, at its best deeply conscious of the price of disorder, relies at last on the notion that all that matters to the governed will be known by the governors. In each theory there is a spot of blind automatism.

"That spot covers up some fact, which if it were taken into account, would check the vital movement that the stereotype provokes. If the progressive had to ask himself, like the Chinaman in the joke, what he wanted to do with the time he saved by breaking the record, if the advocate of *laissez faire* had to contemplate not only free and exuberant energies of men, but what some people call their human nature, if the collectivist let the center of his attention be occupied with the problem of how he is to secure his officials, if the imperialist dared to doubt his own inspiration, you would find more Hamlet and less Henry the Fifth. For these blind spots keep away distracting images, which with their attendant emotions, might cause hesitation and infirmity of purpose. Consequently the stereotype not only saves time in a busy life and is a defense of our position in society, but tends to preserve us from all the bewildering effect of trying to see the world steadily and see it whole."

Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1922), pp. 81-114.

722. WHOLE AND PART

"The mechanistic conception of nature is based upon the false assumption that the complex is to be explained in terms of parts,

which in turn implies that parts come first. For example, a chemical compound is to be explained in terms of elements; the body by means of cells; consciousness by means of mental elements known as sense 'impressions,' ideas, and feelings; movements by means of elements known as reflexes. . . .

"*Wholes evolve as wholes.* We have already said that the apple, springing from a tiny germ in the flower, was an individual from the beginning. Likewise a melody is a unit from its conception, however undeveloped it may be at first. The square was never something else before it was a square. The human being is a biological individual from the instant of his origin. He is a psychological individual from the instant he begins to have experiences."

Raymond H. Wheeler and Francis T. Perkins, *Principles of Mental Development* (New York, Crowell, 1932), pp. 16, 24.

723. THE ATOMISTIC STUDY OF LITERATURE

"The higher study of literature was organized during the latter half of the nineteenth century, under the spell of determinist views and an 'atomistic' notion of the nature of mind. The main conceptions of psychology have since that time undergone a thorough change; but the influence of the associationist doctrine that prevailed fifty years ago is still strongly stamped upon the craft of the literary student.

"At the back of the vast effort which is being heroically pushed forward in thousands of advanced literary courses, there lies an unformulated faith, which might be expressed as follows: all facts have a cause; literary works are products; they are to be accounted for by their antecedents, and can be. Not only are they, in their mass, an aspect of mental and aesthetic civilization, to be studied and explained along with other symptoms of intellectual activity; and not only is the history of literature one of the minor moral sciences, entering with other branches into the concrete sociological study of man; but each work individually is to be analyzed into its component parts; it is, when all is said, the result of certain circumstances, which can and should be, as far as possible, investigated and known. The ideal aim of the research student is to gather all the elements that went to the making of a book, just as the chemist analyzes a compound into

its constituent principles. When each and every one of those data has been found, the study of literature is on a par with the sciences of the physical world, in the proud feeling of the complete satisfaction which it gives the inquiring mind. It reaches a thorough and final explanation of its object.

"Such is the prevailing ideal, under the spell of which literary research seems to have been everywhere organized. Its methods have been consciously worked out, so as to gather all the facts, to establish their connection safely, and to build them up into a system, the inner cogency of which would be identical with the very process which produced the work studied, as the cause produces the effect. . . .

"But the view of the human mind implied in that position is no longer held, or tenable. The stress has been shifted, from the combination of elementary ideas into complex ones, to the activity of consciousness, the interpenetration of its moments, the originality of qualitative states; and absolute determinism has lost its ascendancy. The spontaneous character of mental life is accepted on all hands."

Louis Cazamian, *Criticism in the Making* (New York, Macmillan, 1929), pp. 10-13.

724. PART AND WHOLE

"Here is suggested the difference between two ways of viewing a picture. Examined microscopically, it yields nothing more than minute depressions or elevations of the paper, peculiarities of its texture, or at best no more than minute areas of light and shade that are without meaning when studied apart from the total area. It is only when we view the picture macroscopically, so to speak, as in naked eye vision, that its significance comes to be revealed. It is intelligible only as a whole, and it is thus intelligible because the various individual details now get the supplement, reinforcement, and illumination of all of them. And it is this completion of part by whole, this contribution of whole to part, which we need for any sufficing view of the universe and for any adequate interpretation of the organism."

Edmund Noble, *Purposive Evolution* (New York, Holt, 1926), p. 355.

725. THE OPERATIONAL CHARACTER OF CONCEPTS

"Recognizing the essential unpredictability of experiment beyond our present range, the physicist, if he is to escape continually revising his attitude, must use in describing and correlating nature concepts of such a character that our present experience does not exact hostages of the future. . . .

"We may illustrate by considering the concept of length: what do we mean by the length of an object? We evidently know what we mean by length if we can tell what the length of any and every object is, and for the physicist nothing more is required. To find the length of an object, we have to perform certain physical operations. The concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations by which length is measured are fixed: that is, the concept of length involves as much as and nothing more than the set of operations by which length is determined. In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; *the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations.* If the concept is physical, as of length, the operations are actual physical operations, namely, those by which length is measured; or if the concept is mental, as of mathematical continuity, the operations are mental operations, namely those by which we determine whether a given aggregate of magnitudes is continuous. . . .

"We must demand that the set of operations equivalent to any concept be a unique set, for otherwise there are possibilities of ambiguity in practical applications which we cannot admit."

P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), pp. 3-6.

726. MEANINGLESS QUESTIONS

"Another consequence of the operational character of our concepts, almost a corollary of that considered above, is that it is quite possible, nay even disquietingly easy, to invent expressions or to ask questions that are meaningless. It constitutes a great advance in our critical attitude toward nature to realize that a great many of the questions that we uncritically ask are without meaning. If a specific question has meaning, it must be possible to find operations by which an answer may be given to it. It

will be found in many cases that the operations cannot exist, and the question therefore has no meaning. For instance, it means nothing to ask whether a star is at rest or not."

P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), p. 28.

CHAPTER XVII

MENTAL HYGIENE

727. WHO ARE PROPERLY BALANCED?

"Most of us are out of insane asylums simply because our little quirks are not obviously dangerous and do not prevent us from making a living."

Houston Peterson, *The Melody of Chaos* (New York, Longmans Green, 1931), p. 7.

728. BEHAVIOR LEARNED

"A baby at birth does not display violent temper, pouting, or long continued crying in order to gain what he desires; he learns such types of behavior because he is rewarded by his parents for the manifestation of the particular form which irritates them most easily. Hence, if you have a child as a pupil in school who sulks, who goes into a tantrum, who is a cry-baby, or has any other such method of securing his desires, you can be sure that some of his guardians are brought to terms very readily by such conduct. The only means of correction is to teach him some other and more desirable way of persisting in his endeavors to get what he desires."

John J. B. Morgan, *The Psychology of the Unadjusted School Child* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), p. 67.

729. THE EFFORT TO SHELTER OUR CHILDREN

"Our schools and colleges are under the necessity of mediating continually between the politics, the religion, and the morals taught to young people as absolute by their parents, and the different concepts of politics, religion, and morals which they find held in the outside world. Sometimes the educational authorities must also mediate between parental notions of clothes and manners and those of a changing society."

"In all these conflicts between absolute parental standards

and different social standards in the world at large lie possibilities of neurotic maladjustment for the child. . . .

"We cannot permanently shelter our children from other people's different modes of life. We cannot slice off a little corner of the world and teach our children to adjust to that. Sooner or later the barriers will be broken down and these hitherto sheltered young people will be plunged into the confusion. They need to be prepared to deal selectively with new influences. *Since we live in a changing world, our stability must be in our possession of powers of choice.*"

Floyd Dell, *Love in the Machine Age* (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1930), pp. 106, 114-15.

730. THE PSYCHIATRIST LOOKS AT THE SCHOOL

"This, then, is what the psychiatrist sees when he looks at school children; a young army from which will be recruited in the future the victims of mental diseases; the vocational misfits; the individuals who will swell the divorce statistics because they cannot adapt themselves to marriage relationships; the inmates of reformatories and prisons; the partially adjusted who will get along in some half tolerable fashion but with little chance for personal happiness, and—in the minority—a small number of children who will be healthy, well-adapted adults."

Ernest R. Groves and Phyllis Blanchard, *Introduction to Mental Hygiene* (New York, Holt, 1930), pp. 186-87.

731. BODILY FACTORS OF NORMALITY

"Disorders of the functional activity of the cells in man are responsible for the existence of many persons who are in greater or lesser degree removed from the normal and who are unable to adapt themselves to the environments in which they must live. . . .

"We have here a partial explanation of the problem of mental defectives. The formative process of the cells in the human embryo is dependent upon a chemically normal medium, a healthy condition of the mother's blood. If the embryo gets

a well-balanced food supply, it will probably develop into a normal individual."

C. E. Benson, James E. Lough, Charles E. Skinner, and Paul V. West, *Psychology for Teachers* (Boston, Ginn, 1926), pp. 46-47.

732. GLANDULAR ACTION

"The body is possessed of a variety of structures that in function amount to chemical laboratories. These are the glands. . . . A baby born with an inadequate thyroid gland is a misshapen, drooling, little being with protruding tongue and abdomen. He grows up to be a stunted, bandy-legged imbecile. Deficiency in a hormone from the pituitary gland causes a child to become a diminutive dwarf—not an infant but a man in miniature. Early over-activity of the same gland makes him a symmetrical giant. If the over-activity begins after puberty, when well-rounded development is no longer possible, over-growth still takes place in such parts of the body as are capable of responding. The result is a large misshapen individual who seems to have reverted to a gorilla type. An excess of one of the adrenal hormones causes marked accentuation of the masculine sex traits. Should this occur in a male, the result is an exaggeration of virility. In the female, it produces a masculinized caricature."

R. G. Hoskins, *The Tides of Life* (New York, Norton, 1933), pp. 17, 23.

733. THOMAS'S LIST OF INSISTENT IMPULSES

"The human wishes have a great variety of concrete forms but are capable of the following general classification:

"1. The Desire for New Experience. Men crave excitement, and all experiences are exciting which have in them some resemblance to the pursuit, flight, capture, escape, death which characterized the earlier life of mankind. Behavior is an adaptation to environment, and the nervous system itself is a developmental adaptation. It represents, among other things, a hunting pattern of interest. 'Adventure' is what the young boy wants, and stories of adventure. Hunting trips are enticing; they are the survival of natural life. All sports are of the hunting pattern; there is a contest of skill, daring, and cunning.

It is impossible not to admire the nerve of a daring burglar or highwayman. A fight, even a dog fight, will draw a crowd. In gambling or dice throwing you have the thrill of success or the chagrin of defeat. The organism craves stimulation and seeks expansion and shock even through alcohol and drugs. 'Sensations' occupy a large part of the space in newspapers. Courtship has in it an element of 'pursuit.' Novels, theaters, motion pictures, etc., are partly an adaptation to this desire, and their popularity is a sign of its elemental force. . . .

"2. The Desire for Security. The desire for security is opposed to the desire for new experience. . . . The desire for new experience implies . . . motion, change, danger, instability, social irresponsibility. The individual dominated by it shows a tendency to disregard prevailing standards and group interests. . . . The desire for security, on the other hand, is based on fear, which tends to avoid death and expresses itself in timidity, avoidance, and flight. The individual dominated by it is cautious, conservative, and apprehensive, tending also to regular habits, systematic work, and the accumulation of property. . . .

"3. The Desire for Response. The desire for response . . . is primarily related to the instinct of love, and shows itself in the tendency to seek and to give signs of appreciation in connection with other individuals. . . . In general the desire for response is the most social of the wishes. It contains both a sexual and a gregarious element. It makes selfish claims, but on the other hand it is the main source of altruism. The devotion to child and family and devotion to causes, principles, and ideals may be the same attitude in different fields of application. . . .

"4. The Desire for Recognition. This wish is expressed in the general struggle of men for position in their social group, in devices for securing a recognized, enviable, and advantageous social status. Among girls dress is now perhaps the favorite means of securing distinction and showing class. A Bohemian immigrant girl expressed her philosophy in a word: 'After all, life is mostly what you wear.' Veblen's volume, 'Theory of the Leisure Class,' points out that the status of men is established partly through the show of wealth made by their wives.

Distinction is sought also in connection with skillful and hazardous activities, as in sports, war, and exploration. Play-writers and sculptors consciously strive for public favor and 'fame.' . . . Boasting, bullying, cruelty, tyranny, 'the will to power' have in them a sadistic element allied to the emotion of anger and are efforts to compel a recognition of the personality. The frailty of women, their illness, and even feigned illness, is often used as a power-device, as well as a device to provoke response."

William I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl* (Boston, Little Brown, 1927), pp. 4-32.

734. THE DIVIDED SELF

"We discussed above how the organism responds as a whole. In spite of this fact we find disorganized selves. The apparent contradiction requires consideration. Behavior, as we saw, springs from some upset of equilibrium. If a succession of upsets arises consistently from one source, the self will likely build an organized aggregate of responses to fit this stimulating source. Such an aggregate will consist of habits of expectation, of likes and dislikes, of internal secretion adjustments, of neuromuscular adjustments, etc., etc. Since the organism acts as a whole, this recurring source of upset has in some measure rebuilt the whole self around this source as a center. Such a rebuilding about one center we often call 'an interest.' An interest will be healthy and desirable in the degree that action in accord with it can and will stand the test of open and shared criticism of consequences. Otherwise we call it a 'complex,' a tendency of conduct that has not been integrated for ready obedience to meanings approved after shared consideration. An active healthy interest may well be a clear addition to life.

"But it may happen that two sources of upset, more or less simultaneous, may act incomparably. They make opposed and inconsistent demands. The person is pulled in opposed directions. If one so assailed is able in fact to solve the problem thus set, well and good. His 'solution'—if real—integrates the hitherto opposed demands into one consistent line of action. Such a solution 'integrates the personality' concerned. The threatened split and opposition has been healed. But it often

happens that no such satisfactory solution seems feasible. If so, a working compromise may instead be effected. One set of demands may be given 'outward' sway before coercing eyes, while the other is preferred 'inwardly.' If these upsets continue consistently to oppose each other, this condition of division between 'outer' and 'inner' may become chronic. Two partial centers of reference have been set up within the personality, to divide sway, so to speak, over that personality. A 'divided self' is the result. Neither center can function efficiently because of the other. Life is less happy, the results generally are bad."

William H. Kilpatrick, "A Reconstructed Theory of the Educative Process," in *Teachers College Record*, 32:539-40 (Mar. 1931).

735. INTEGRATION WITHIN AND WITHOUT

"Moreover, these two types of integration—that of the objective world and that of the personal self—are interdependent and inseparable. Each is only one aspect of a larger total process of integration. Integration *within* the self is accomplished through integration *with* the objective world. At last, each person for himself must build a unified and consistent world by piecing together the meanings and values which he finds resident in his own experience of the world. If he is fortunate enough to live in a culture whose ideas and values are woven together into a consistent pattern, his task will be greatly facilitated. If he is unfortunate enough to live in a culture that is itself disorganized and atomistic, his personal task of building a unified world for himself will be that much more difficult. But whether unified, as in the great periods of cultural synthesis, or disorganized, as in the great periods of transition and rapid social change such as our own is, each must create his world of reality out of the raw materials of his own experience in adjusting himself to that world—a world bound together by the tissue of meanings and values that operate within his experience of it. The world of experience is the world of reality for each of us. There is and can be no other."

W. C. Bower, *Religion and the Good Life* (New York, Abingdon Press, 1933), p. 202.

736. CONDITIONS OF INTEGRATION

"A unified mind . . . can come into being only when conscious intent and consummation are in harmony with consequences actually effected. This statement expresses conditions so psychologically assured that it may be termed a law of mental integrity."

John Dewey, *Individualism Old and New* (New York, Minton Balch, 1930), p. 58.

737. THE MOODS OF THE ADOLESCENT

"The mood—the nursing of an emotion in the absence or after the withdrawal of its excitant—is a phase intermediate between the transitory emotions of childhood and the stable emotional sets of maturity. He may indulge in agreeable emotions for the pleasure of it, revel in the wonder, the tears, or the promise of life, or in the sheer joy of living. Depression brings up gloomy images, wonder suggests new beauties, and hopeful anticipation possible adventures and triumphs. Or—moods of another class—some thwarted constitutional urge (often sex, but also the urge for social recognition or self-exaltation) may baffle or worry him, and he has neither experience to take the long view nor discipline to control the emotion. Instead, he nurses it."

H. G. Wyatt, *The Art of Feeling* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1932), pp. 22-23.

738. UNHEALTHY- VERSUS HEALTHY-MINDEDNESS

"In the unhealthy-minded, apart from all sorts of old regrets, ambitions checked by shames, and aspirations obstructed by timidities, [this inner personal tone which we can't communicate or describe articulately to others] consists mainly of bodily discomforts not distinctly localized by the sufferer, but breeding a general self-mistrust and sense that things are not as they should be with him. Half the thirst for alcohol that exists in the world exists simply because alcohol acts as a temporary anæsthetic and effacer to all these morbid feelings that never ought to be in a human being at all. In the healthy-minded, on the contrary, there are no fears or shames to discover; and the sensations

that pour in from the organism only help to swell the general vital sense of security and readiness for anything that may turn up."

William James, *On Vital Reserves* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 48-49.

739. THE EVILS OF FAILURE

"The greatest difficulty in life, the greatest source of disharmony, apart from the influences of heredity, infectious disease, and poor feeding, and poor chances for growth, is the discrepancy between impulse, yearning, and ambition on the one hand and the actual opportunities and the actual efficiency of performance on the other. . . .

"In a large percentage of cases in which persons come to grief in their mental and moral health, the trouble is of just that kind. Failing with what is frequently impossible and undesirable anyhow, these persons develop emotional attitudes and habits and tendencies to fumble or to brood or to puzzle or to be apprehensive until what students of the functional diseases of the heart call 'a break of compensation' occurs, a break of nature's system of maintaining the balance, with a more or less sudden slump and implication of collateral functions."

Adolf Meyer, in *Suggestions of Modern Science concerning Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1917), pp. 201-2.

740. THE DANGERS FROM DAYDREAMING

"The dangerous aspect of daydreaming comes when it is employed definitely as an escape from reality. When such a process is started, a vicious circle results which has no ending. The individual fails to meet some actual situation adequately. Instead of admitting failure and attempting to strengthen the weak points so as to succeed better next time he daydreams of what he might have done, and reaps great satisfaction from this imaginary victory, thus submerging the chagrin of actual defeat. This method provides no preparation for a similar situation, and the next contact with reality brings a second failure, which in turn is buried in another series of daydreams. This training makes the person feel inferior and helpless in the face of actual situations, until he shuns all efforts toward success and lives

more and more in the artificial world he has built up in his imagination."

John J. B. Morgan, *The Psychology of the Unadjusted School Child* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), p. 96.

741. COMPENSATION

"Careful observation of human behavior indicates that when an individual finds one outlet for a need or desire closed to him, he seeks to find another form of outlet. This effort to make up to oneself for a thwarted desire or need is known as compensation."

Caroline B. Zachry, *Personality Adjustments of School Children* (New York, Scribner, 1929), p. 49.

742. INSECURITY

"Simply defined, insecurity is the feeling of not being at home and not wanted in the environment in which one finds oneself. To this is attached the feeling of inability to do things as well as other people. This carries over into other feelings that one is not as good looking as others, or that one is awkward, etc. . . . It is brought about by many different causes such as real physical or mental inferiority, financial insecurity, left handedness, feelings of social or racial inferiority, lack of affection, inability to meet the requirements of the environment, or by the fact that the child or his parents may be foreign-born and feel out of place in a new country. It may also be caused by the presence in the family of a younger or older brother or sister who seems, in some way, superior to the child in question."

Caroline B. Zachry, *Personality Adjustments of School Children* (New York, Scribner, 1929), pp. 47f.

743. RATIONALIZATION

"Another mechanism which we have already mentioned in this case is that of rationalization. Esther is wretched because the circumstances of her life have shut her away from free common intercourse with her fellows. The most painful of these effective causes in her life she is unwilling to recognize, she represses, and uses her rational powers to think up and over-emphasize less painful elements to explain her misery. She blames old furniture and the importance of lessons instead of her

own insecurity, and the painful situation at home, for her misery. This misuse of the intellect to find acceptable reasons instead of real causes is known as rationalization."

Caroline B. Zachry, *Personality Adjustments of School Children* (New York, Scribner, 1929), p. 116.

744. PROJECTION

"Projection is a form of rationalization. It is the tendency to put the blame for one's conduct on circumstances that are beyond one's control. We find Dick blaming the nerve in his leg for his irritability. His mother wants to think that all of his misconduct is due to his ill health rather than to her own mismanagement."

Caroline B. Zachry, *Personality Adjustments of School Children* (New York, Scribner, 1929), p. 175.

745. REGRESSION

"It frequently happens that when an individual fails to adjust on a mature level, he goes back to childhood levels and interests. This turning backward is called regression.

"Adults make use of this mechanism in many ways, i.e., in pouting, in losing their tempers when things go wrong, in imagining that they are ill, and in demanding undue attention when they are ill."

Caroline B. Zachry, *Personality Adjustments of School Children* (New York, Scribner, 1929), p. 179.

746. THE DEFENSE MECHANISM OF BLAMING HEREDITY

"The tendency to project the blame for the behavior of children on to heredity is itself only too often a defense mechanism on the part of those of us who deal with children. We are thus able to excuse ourselves by placing the blame seemingly on conditions entirely beyond our control. Mothers and teachers need to recognize that in spite of the part that heredity does play in the physical equipment habit patterns are, in fact, learned and the learning processes that take place are identical with the processes in all other learning."

Caroline B. Zachry, *Personality Adjustments of School Children* (New York, Scribner, 1929), p. 239.

747. THE ADVANTAGES OF CANDOR OVER SELF-DECEPTION

"There is no real or lasting gain to be derived from blinding ourselves to reality, and there are several distinct advantages that follow candor. They are:

"1. *One can learn the habit of success.* Each victory is a real victory and strengthens one for a more severe struggle. Self-deceit, on the other hand, is a pitiful compromise which leaves one mentally debilitated and less fit for future encounters.

"2. *One retains his mental integrity.* The man who has been frank with himself never suffers from a nervous breakdown unless there is some disease or organic lesion present.

"3. *One can hope to have some understanding of others.* By being candid with himself he can understand their motives, can be tolerant of their weaknesses, can admire their virtues, and can assist them when they need help.

"4. *One can keep his self-respect.* The self-respect that comes from self-deceit is hollow and ephemeral.

"5. Finally, *one can merit and receive the respect of his fellows.* A man who is not willing to face his own personality cannot be frank in his dealings with others; moreover, the effort to deceive himself so consumes his energy that he becomes an open book to those who observe him. The man who sees himself as he is, can devote some of his energy to bettering the less desirable features of his personality, instead of spending it all in a vain effort to hide the defects. The people with whom he comes in contact see that he is candid, they note that he is working for his own betterment, and consequently they have confidence in him and seek his friendship."

John J. B. Morgan, *The Psychology of the Unadjusted School Child* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), pp. 71-72.

748. TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS

"Our legal procedure . . . wobbles between a too tender treatment of criminality and a viciously drastic treatment of it. The vacillation can be remedied only as we can analyze an act in the light of habits, and analyze habits in the light of education, environment, and prior acts. The dawn of truly scientific criminal law will come when each individual case is approached with

something corresponding to the complete clinical record which every competent physician attempts to procure as a matter of course in dealing with his subjects."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), p. 46.

749. MENTAL HYGIENE AND CRIME

"As mental hygiene extends its principles it will be found that at no point do they clash with current practices more than in the field of crime. Legal theory rests upon the doctrine that the individual, free to choose between right and wrong conduct, willfully chooses, when he commits crime, what he knows to be wrong. This interpretation of human nature, especially when in the grip of passion, runs counter to all the teachings of psychology and psychiatry and therefore antagonizes the principles of mental hygiene. Not only is the legal theory the foundation of an elaborate machinery that has been created to deal with the criminal, it is also as firmly anchored in tradition as any idea that has become a part of the substance of public opinion. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that crime is the most baffling of all our social problems and possibly the one that society handles with the least success."

Ernest R. Groves and Phyllis Blanchard, *Introduction to Mental Hygiene* (New York, Holt, 1930), p. 445.

750. UNIFIED INDIVIDUALITY

"A unified individuality is hard to maintain where intelligence which is public by nature cannot operate effectually for public results, and where the ever-urgent demands of practice compel compromise, evasion, and conformity to ideals that do not command spontaneous loyalty."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), p. 66.

751. PARENTHOOD HYGIENE

"It is evident that the mental hygiene of childhood is essentially a problem of efficient parenthood. Parents who understand the emotional needs of their children are in a position to guarantee their young a well-rounded development. The first requisite of the child is that his parents shall have freed them-

selves from emotional dependence on their own mother and father. The adult who is still infantile in life attitude cannot hope to raise self-reliant children. Efficient parenthood is the work of self-controlled adults, alert to the implications of mental hygiene."

Ernest R. Groves and Phyllis Blanchard, *Introduction to Mental Hygiene* (New York, Holt, 1930), pp. 126-27.

752. MENTAL HYGIENE AND THE SCHOOL

"The especially important points in regard to the hygienic and educational significance of the school task are in part as follows:

"1. At the present time much confusion exists in regard to the aims of education.

"2. Something simple and fundamental as a starting point is needed.

"3. The minimal essential conditions of mental health and education alike are a task, a plan, and freedom.

"4. Evidence that these are the minimal essentials is furnished not merely by observation, educational experience, but also by the experience in occupational therapy for the feeble-minded, the nervously disordered, and many patients in general hospitals.

"5. Freedom to choose one's own task and form one's own plan is necessary in order to develop initiative, personal responsibility, and to avoid unfortunate inhibitions.

"6. Part of the work, both for normal children and the defective, should be group work, involving the social significance of the tasks.

"7. These minimal essential conditions are so simple that teachers and parents alike neglect them.

"8. Teachers and parents alike are prone to interfere, and by taking the tasks out of the hands of the children largely destroy the opportunity for responsibility and success.

"9. The school task has its wider social, ethical, and educational, as well as hygienic, significance.

"10. The function of the teacher is to provide opportunity for a suitable task and the conditions that make success for the individual possible.

"11. The doing of the school task under the conditions mentioned gives the best possible training for integration of the personality."

W. H. Burnham, *The Normal Mind* (New York, Appleton, 1924), pp. 228-29.

753. FACE LIFE'S CONFLICTS

"Do not let any child flee from the conflicts of life. Teach him the joys of victory. Give him some simple, but for him, difficult situation and arrange affairs so that he wins; then congratulate him on the victory. Follow this with another until you have changed the child from a coward to a hero. *The 'turning-in' is the hopeless surrender of the defeated* and you cannot correct such an attitude simply by telling the child why he was a coward. In addition to pointing out to him why he lost before, *you must make sure that the next time he wins*. The battle that you set should not be in the field in which he lost before. Start in another field where he is stronger and then, after you have given him self-confidence, it will be possible gradually to shift his battles to the field where he had before demonstrated his weakness."

John J. B. Morgan, *The Psychology of the Unadjusted School Child* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), p. 135.

754. CHILDREN'S BEHAVIOR AND TEACHERS' ATTITUDES

How teachers and mental hygienists may exactly reverse each other in judging the seriousness of behavior difficulties is well brought out by Wickman.* Rating fifty behavior problems, the mental hygienists put first the following ten in the order listed (the number after each item shows the contrasting rank given to it on the teachers' list): Unsocialness (40), suspiciousness (37), unhappy, depressed (22), resentfulness (29), fearfulness (36), cruelty, bullying (8), easily discouraged (23), suggestible (28), over-critical of others (45), sensitiveness (48). Similarly, the first ten of the teachers', with their contrasted rank by the mental hygienists, are: heterosexual activity (25), stealing (13), masturbation (41), obscene notes and talk (28), untruthfulness (23), truancy (22), impertinence, defiance (37), cruelty, bullying (6), cheating (24), destroying school materials (45).

From the foregoing contrasts we gather that teachers react most strongly against any infringements of the common social standards as well as against anything that interferes with their work. But we may go further. Recalling that "behavior problems" emerge as type responses adopted by children in facing difficult demands, and dividing these types as usual into "attacking" (as in anger, defiance, rebellion, etc.), and "withdrawing" (as in shyness, day-dreaming, unsocialness, dependency on adults, etc.), Wickman brings out that teachers are far more sensitive to children's "attacking" responses than to "withdrawing," probably because the former more interfere with school work. Moreover, teachers tend by counter-attacks to oppose pupils' "attacking" responses while they indulge pupils withdrawal behavior, the natural effect being in each case to increase the wrong tendency.

We need not accept the mental hygienists' ratings as final, but the contrast is too great to be disregarded. It seems clear that mental hygiene sees behavior problems in more fundamental fashion than is common with teachers.

* E. K. Wickman, *Children's Behavior and Teachers' Attitudes* (New York, Commonwealth Fund, 1928).

755. MENTAL HYGIENE DEMANDS ON THE TEACHER

- "She should herself be a well integrated person. . . .
- "She should maintain an objective attitude and not bring her own emotions into the picture.
- "She should respect the confidences and opinions of the students.
- "Her own attitude toward sex should be wholesome.
- "She should be willing and able to give frank and intelligent sex instruction and guidance.
- "She should remember that she is teaching boys and girls, using subject matter as a means to this end.
- "She should have knowledge of the most usual maladjustments of children and of how to deal with them.
- "She should understand the most usual mechanisms of adjustment and how to recondition them."

Caroline B. Zachry, *Personality Adjustments of School Children* (New York, Scribner, 1929), pp. 279-80,

CHAPTER XVIII

EDUCATION AND LIFE

756. THE DANGER OF WRONG AIMs

"The power of molding young minds which science is placing in our possession is a very terrible power, capable of deadly misuse; if it falls into the wrong hands, it may produce a world even more ruthless and cruel than the haphazard world of nature. Children may be taught to be bigoted, bellicose, and brutal, under the pretence that they are being taught religion, patriotism, and courage, or communism, proletarianism, and revolutionary ardour. The teaching must be inspired by love, and must aim at creating love in the children."

Bertrand Russell, *Education and the Good Life* (New York, Boni & Liveright, 1926), pp. 234-35.

757. THE SOCIAL NATURE OF OUR EDUCATIONAL TASK

"The task thus set for education is to work at the upbuilding of a civilization. It is perhaps customary to think of education more narrowly, especially as confined (so the conception goes) to the younger and now irresponsible and ineffective members of society, and these shut up in school houses, separated from society and its life and having with it only remote and preparatory connection.

"A different view is meant here, that education is actually life desirably carried on with ever more conscious intent to improve itself as it goes. Such an education begins, of course, with the tender years but should continue throughout the years that follow, building itself more and more on the insistent problems of social life. Being life and so inextricably interwoven with surrounding life, this education will—in the degree that it is sincere and alert—not consent to stay within any one house nor be cut off from its surrounding life. On the contrary, it will ever seek to enlarge its view and its consequent inten-

tional connections with the world about it. This education will use the school but will at all times extend beyond it and for each individual will eventually outgrow it. In every experience this education will seek to unite thought and action in their essential life unity, for otherwise thinking has neither adequate origin or test and educative responsibility has neither point nor possibility. This process carried on ever more and more broadly and efficiently is the plan herein conceived for discharging our educational task."

William H. Kilpatrick, *Our Educational Task* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1930), pp. vi-vii.

758. A GENERAL DEFINITION OF EDUCATION

"Speaking generally, education signifies the sum total of processes by which a community or social group, whether small or large, transmits its acquired power and aims with a view to securing its own continued existence and growth."

John Dewey, article on "Education," in Paul Monroe (ed.), *Cyclopedia of Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1911), p. 398.

759. A DEFINITION OF EDUCATION

Education is the process by which the individual comes into continually increasing possession of himself and his powers through continually increased participation in the race achievement.

Anonymous.

760. EDUCATION AS THE CONTINUOUS RECONSTRUCTION OF EXPERIENCE

"Education may be defined as a process of continuous reconstruction of experience with the purpose of widening and deepening its social content, while, at the same time, the individual gains control of the methods involved."

John Dewey, article on "Education," in Paul Monroe (ed.), *Cyclopedia of Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1911), Vol. II, p. 400.

761. EDUCATION AS MERE MEANS

"Education has always been regarded as a mere means to ends that have nothing to do with it. It is to be expected, there-

fore, that education in our day should be regarded primarily as a means of entrance to the already overcrowded professions, or to material gain or better social position."

Everett Dean Martin, *The Meaning of a Liberal Education* (New York, Norton, 1926), p. 3.

762. THE CONFLICT WITHIN MODERN EDUCATION

"The methods of education chosen depend upon our ideals. The imperialistic State that strives for power and mass action wants citizens who are one in thought, one in being swayed by the same symbols. Democracy demands individual freedom of the fetters of social symbols. Our public schools are hardly conscious of the conflict of these ideas. They instill automatic reactions to symbols by means of patriotic ceremonial, in many cases by indirect religious appeal and too often through the automatic reactions to the behavior of the teacher that is imitated. At the same time they are supposed to develop mind and character of the individual child. No wonder . . . that they create conflicts in the minds of the young, conflicts between the automatic attitudes that are carefully nursed and the teachings that are to contribute to individual freedom."

Franz Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life* (New York, Norton, 1932), pp. 187-88.

763. COUNTS: IMPARTIALITY IS IMPOSSIBLE

"There is the fallacy that the school should be impartial in its emphases, that no bias should be given instruction. We have already observed how the individual is inevitably molded by the culture into which he is born. In the case of the school a similar process operates and presumably is subject to a degree of conscious direction. My thesis is that complete impartiality is utterly impossible, that the school must shape attitudes, develop tastes, and even impose ideas. It is obvious that the whole of creation cannot be brought into the school. This means that some selection must be made of teachers, curricula, architecture, methods of teaching. And in the making of the selection the dice must always be weighted in favor of this or that. . . . Vigorous opponents of imposition unblushingly advocate the 'cultivation of democratic sentiments' in children or

the promotion of child growth in the direction of 'a better and richer life.' The first represents definite acquiescence in imposition; the second, if it does not mean the same thing, means nothing. I believe firmly that democratic sentiment should be cultivated and that a better and richer life should be the outcome of education, but in neither case would I place responsibility on either God or the order of nature. I would merely contend that as educators we must make many choices involving the development of attitudes in boys and girls and that we should not be afraid to acknowledge the faith that is in us or mayhap the forces that compel us."

George S. Counts, *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* (New York, John Day, 1932), pp. 19-20.

764. DEWEY'S CRITICISM OF OUR SCHOOLING

"Our schooling does not educate, if by education be meant a trained habit of discriminating inquiry and discriminating belief, the ability to look beneath a floating surface to detect the conditions that fix the contour of the surface, and the forces which create its waves and drifts. We dupe ourselves and others because we have not that inward protection against sensation, excitement, credulity, and conventionally stereotyped opinion which is found only in a trained mind.

"This fact determines the fundamental criticism to be leveled against current schooling, against what passes as an educational system. It not only does little to make discriminating intelligence a safeguard against surrender to the invasion of bunk, especially in its most dangerous form—social and political bunk—but it does much to favor susceptibility to a welcoming reception of it. There appear to be two chief causes for this ineptitude. One is the persistence, in the body of what is taught, of traditional material which is irrelevant to present conditions—subject matter of instruction which though valuable in some past period is so remote from the perplexities and issues of present life that its mastery, even if fairly adequate, affords no resource for discriminating insight, no protection against being duped in facing the emergencies of today. From the standpoint of this criterion of education, a large portion of current material of instruction is simply aside from the mark.

The specialist in any one of the traditional lines is as likely to fall for social bunk even in its extreme forms of economic and nationalistic propaganda as the unschooled person; in fact his credulity is the more dangerous because he is so much more vociferous in its proclamation and so much more dogmatic in its assertion. Our schools send out men meeting the exigencies of contemporary life clothed in the chain-armor of antiquity, and priding themselves on the awkwardness of their movements as evidences of deep-wrought, time-tested convictions.

"The other way in which schooling fosters an undiscriminating gulping mental habit, eager to be duped, is positive. It consists in a systematic, almost deliberate, avoidance of the spirit of criticism in dealing with history, politics, and economics. There is an implicit belief that this avoidance is the only way by which to produce good citizens. The more undiscriminatingly the history and institutions of one's own nation are idealized, the greater is the likelihood, so it is assumed, that the school product will be a loyal patriot, a well equipped good citizen. . . .

"The effect is to send students out into actual life in a condition of acquired and artificial innocence. Such perceptions as they may have of the realities of social struggles and problems they have derived incidentally, by the way, and without the safeguards of intelligent acquaintance with facts and impartially conducted discussion. It is no wonder that they are ripe to be gulled, or that their attitude is one which merely perpetuates existing confusion, ignorance, prejudice, and credulity. Reaction from this impossibly naïve idealization of institutions as they are produces indifference and cynicism. . . .

"What will happen if teachers become sufficiently courageous and emancipated to insist that education means the creation of a discriminating mind, a mind that prefers not to dupe itself or to be the dupe of others? Clearly they will have to cultivate the habit of suspended judgment, of scepticism, of desire for evidence, of appeal to observation rather than sentiment, discussion rather than bias, inquiry rather than conventional idealizations. When this happens schools will be the dangerous outposts of a humane civilization. But they will also begin to be supremely interesting places. For it will then have come

about that education and politics are one and the same thing because politics will have to be in fact what it now pretends to be, the intelligent management of social affairs."

John Dewey, *Characters and Events* (New York, Holt, 1929), Vol. II, pp. 779-81.

765. PRIMITIVE EDUCATION AS REPETITION OF THE PAST

"The boy imitates the work of his father, and the girl in the same way learns household duties by imitating the model placed before her by her mother. The end to be attained in both cases is the same, the exact reproduction of the knowledge or skill of the parents. Variation has no place in this scheme of education, for the children are not supposed to make any advance beyond the attainments of their parents. . . . The theoretical or inventive field remains an unknown land. The learner has placed before him a model which he endeavors to reproduce exactly. No time or material is wasted in attempting to improve upon the model, rude though it be. The one desideratum is the acquirement of a certain amount of skill in doing just the things his ancestors have done century after century before him. Indeed, in all their occupations requiring skill, such as building, weaving, basket and pottery making, the forms have become so conventionalized by their beliefs that a religious sanction is placed upon them, which it would be serious desecration to disregard."

F. C. Spencer, *Education of the Pueblo Child* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1899), pp. 90, 78f.

766. JUDD ON EDUCATION AS TRANSFORMING INTO CONFORMITY

"Modern society has reached the stage in its evolution when it aggressively imposes its institutions on the individual. It has gone so far as to set up special agencies in its schools in order to insure the transformation of every child, so far as possible, into a being able and willing to conform to the social pattern of action and thought. Not only so, but in many of its other institutional organizations society expends a great deal of energy in the aggressive promotion of social practices. We use the general term 'education' to describe these facts. . . .

"The sole purpose of this discussion is to make clear by concrete illustrations the fact that education is a socializing process. No consideration of individual traits however comprehensive can explain what goes on during the educational process. That process is one of transforming individuals so that they will conform to social institutions."

Charles H. Judd, *The Psychology of Social Institutions* (New York, Macmillan, 1926), pp. 333-40.

767. EDUCATION TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO

"What is considered in education is hardly ever the boy or the girl, the young man or the young woman, but almost always, in some form, the maintenance of the existing order. When the individual is considered, it is almost exclusively with a view to worldly success—making money or achieving a good position. To be ordinary and to acquire the art of getting on, is the ideal which is set before the youthful mind, except by the few rare teachers who have enough energy of belief to break through the system within which they are expected to work. Almost all education has a political motive: it aims at strengthening some group, national or religious, or even social, in the competitions with other groups. It is this motive in the main which determines the subjects taught, the knowledge offered, and the knowledge withheld, and also decides what mental habits the pupils are expected to acquire."

Bertrand Russell and Dora Russell, *Prospects of Industrial Civilization* (New York, Century, 1923), p. 159.

768. THE OLDER IDEA THAT CHANGE IS EVIL

"The classic systems [of civic education] were built upon the theory that change is an evil in the political world, and that if our intelligences were keen enough and adroit enough in inventing the necessary devices, the ideal state would remain static. This conception was unfolded by Plato and Aristotle, both of whom regarded the avoidance of change as the triumph of the political scientist, and advocated all manner of practical preventives against it. The ideal state must be set back from the sea to avoid contacts with roving sailors who might bring in new

and contraband ideas; only the adult may be allowed to go abroad and then must teach the superiority of the local system of government on his return; even new dances and new tunes must not be introduced lest they might start a new rhythm, even in the field of recreation. Nothing must come in to upset the established harmonies of the state. This continued to be the ideal of political savants until the sixteenth century, when Bodin declared the task of politics was not that of preventing change, but of recognizing its necessity and of making the necessary transitions as easy as possible with as little loss as might be to the community."

Charles E. Merriam, *The Making of Citizens* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1931), pp. 293-94.

769. PETERS: EDUCATION A KIND OF ENGINEERING

"Such procedure as we have described makes of education a kind of engineering. The engineer first plans the object he wishes to make—the house, the bridge, the electric transformer, the railroad bed. He sets up his plan in the form of a detailed blue-print and studies the adequacy of each of its parts from the standpoint of established theories. After he has perfected his blue-print in every detail, his next step is to have the plan embodied in concrete materials. Now precisely the same procedure characterizes the new education. Our first step is to get a blue-print of the individual of the society we want—a detailed picture of the good citizen, the man of culture, the vocationally efficient person, etc.—indicating the specific ideals, skills, bodies of information, attitudes of mind, prepared judgments, abilities to reason which are needed for getting on in his life. Our second step is, then, by using such instrumentalities as school subjects, discipline, and example as tools, to forge out individuals to conform to these blue-prints. In searching for means through which to attain clearly conceived ends, the educational engineer determines by scientific experiment which will most economically serve his purpose. When he is obliged to choose between a course in economics and one in history as a means of developing abilities needed in citizenship, he does not make his choice on the basis of tradition or of arm-chair philosophizing, but sets up an experiment in which he uses one kind of subject

matter with one group and the other with the other group, keeping all other conditions the same for the two contrasted groups, accurately measures his results from the two kinds of materials, and chooses for future uses the one which more largely achieves the ends he is seeking. Similarly he chooses between methods of handling his subject matter—for example, between the project method of teaching economics and the logically organized, textbook method—not on the basis of *a priori* reasoning but on the measured outcome of scientifically controlled parallel-group experimentation. . . .

“The possibility of handling education as a form of social engineering gives to it almost unlimited potentialities. We need only know what is wanted and, given time enough and sufficiently intelligent purposiveness, we can supply it within any reasonable degree. . . .

“We may as well recognize that one of the inevitable implications in the present trend of educational theory is indoctrination. The problems the individual will face in life are what they are, and one must become prepared to meet them as they exist. The individual needs, therefore, *certain* bodies of information and *certain* skills and perspectives and attitudes if he is to fit effectively into the world in which he will live. His training, if it is to be effective, must be directed toward these ends. . . .

“Directed growth need not be a forced process. . . . But it is the business of the teacher to manipulate the learner's thinking, to lead him quickly against the snags toward which the false elements of his notions will ultimately carry him, and to help him more speedily to swing into those currents of truth into which he would otherwise be destined to be drawn after long and costly fumbling. To start, thus, with the present interests and outlooks of the pupils and to manipulate these constantly and covertly toward ends that are known to be right, is one of the most delicate and challenging functions of a teacher. . . .

“It is well to remember that if we do not ourselves assume the responsibility of determining, by manipulation, what ideals children shall come to approve, they will get indoctrination from other sources—from the street, perhaps. They *will* be indoctrinated; all education must inevitably take the form of indoctrination, either by self or others, by the far-sighted or the

foolish, since all education consists in a set of preadjustments for meeting the problems of life. . . .

"In order, therefore, to plan a functioning education we need to know what the preadjustments are that the individuals in question will need in order that we may make the attainment of them the objectives of this education. That necessitates 'blue-printing' the outcomes we want, just as the mechanical engineer blue-prints the house or the electric transformer he wishes to build."

Charles C. Peters, *Objectives and Procedures in Civic Education* (New York, Longmans Green, 1930), pp. 21-26.

770. EDUCATION TO PROMOTE FIXED-IN-ADVANCE AIMS

"These considerations suggest a brief discussion of the effect of the present absolutistic logic upon the method and aims of education, not just in the sense of schooling but with respect to all the ways in which communities attempt to shape the disposition and beliefs of their members. Even when the processes of education do not aim at the unchanged perpetuation of existing institutions, it is assumed that there must be a mental picture of some desired end, personal and social, which is to be attained, and that this conception of a fixed determinate end ought to control educative processes. Reformers share this conviction with conservatives. The disciples of Lenin and Mussolini vie with the captains of capitalistic society in endeavoring to bring about a formation of dispositions and ideas which will conduce to a preconceived goal. If there is a difference, it is that the former proceed more consciously. An experimental social method would probably manifest itself first of all in surrender of this notion. Every care would be taken to surround the young with the physical and social conditions which best conduce, as far as freed knowledge extends, to release of personal potentialities. The habits thus formed would have entrusted to them the meeting of future social requirements and the development of the future state of society. Then and then only would all social agencies that are available operate as resources in behalf of a bettered community life."

John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, Holt, 1927), pp. 200-1.

771. THE BUSINESS MAN'S POLICY IN HAWAIIAN EDUCATION

"We are not primarily concerned with the so-called 'psychology of the native-born worker' or with the question of who is to blame for his failure to remain on the plantation or return there or with the question of his total income as compared with some other group. What we are primarily concerned about is the necessity that the sugar and pineapple interests should as soon as possible work out and publish some constructive policy and plan which will accomplish what must be done within a reasonable time—substitute native born for imported workers."

Reported by C. A. Prosser, in *Survey of Schools and Industry in Hawaii* (Honolulu, 1931), Sec. II, p. 98.

772. FUNCTION OF EDUCATION

"The function of education is to help the growing of a helpless young animal into a happy, moral, and efficient human being."

John Dewey and Evelyn Dewey, *Schools of Tomorrow* (New York, Dutton, 1915), p. 136.

773. THE TASK OF EARLY EDUCATION

"The peculiar problem of the early grades is, of course, to get hold of the child's natural impulses and instincts, and to utilize them so that the child is carried on to a higher plane of perception and judgment, and equipped with more efficient habits; so that he has an enlarged and deepened consciousness and increased control of powers of action. Wherever this result is not reached, play results in mere amusement and not in educational growth."

John Dewey, *School and Society* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1915), p. 123.

774. SECONDARY EDUCATION NOT NECESSARILY PREPARATION FOR COLLEGE

"Secondary education has been handicapped by the tradition that it is most respectable only when it is preparing for institutions of higher learning. So respectable is this tradition that any

critic of it at once places himself in jeopardy before those who have been stamped with degrees, whether they still contain the administered cultures or not."

Thomas H. Briggs, *The Great Investment* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1930), p. 102.

775. EDUCATION AS PREPARATION

"Education . . . as traditionally conducted . . . strikingly exhibits a subordination of the living present to a remote and precarious future. To prepare, to get ready, is its key-note. The actual outcome is lack of adequate preparation, of intelligent adaptation. The professed exaltation of the future turns out in practice a blind following of tradition, a rule of thumb muddling along from day to day; or, as in some of the projects called industrial education, a determined effort on the part of one class of the community to secure *its* future at the expense of another class. If education were conducted as a process of fullest utilization of present resources, liberating and guiding capacities that are now urgent, it goes without saying that the lives of the young would be much richer in meaning than they are now. It also follows that intelligence would be kept busy in studying all indications of power, all obstacles and perversions, all products of the past that throw light upon present capacity, and in forecasting the future career of impulse and habit now active—not for the sake of subordinating the latter but in order to treat them intelligently. As a consequence whatever fortification and expansion of the future that is possible will be achieved—as it is now dismally unattained."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), pp. 269f.

776. EFFICIENCY NOW THE BEST PREPARATION

"Efficiency now is the best preparation for efficiency later. . . . The curriculum should contribute primarily to helping boys and girls to be efficient in what they are now doing, only secondarily to helping them to be efficient later."

Junius L. Meriam, *Child Life and the Curriculum* (Yonkers, World Book, 1920), p. 157.

777. GROWING AS PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE

"It is not of course a question whether education should prepare for the future. If education is growth, it must progressively realize present possibilities, and thus make individuals better fitted to cope with later requirements. Growing is not something which is completed in odd moments; it is a continuous leading into the future. If the environment, in school and out, supplies conditions which utilize adequately the present capacities of the immature, the future which grows out of the present is surely taken care of. The mistake is not in attaching importance to preparation for future need, but in making it the mainspring of present effort. Because the need of preparation for a continually developing life is great, it is imperative that every energy should be bent to making the present experience as rich and significant as possible. Then as the present merges insensibly into the future, the future is taken care of."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), p. 65.

778. EDUCATION AS GROWING

"Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself. The criterion of the value of school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), p. 62.

779. NOT FACTS AND HABITS, BUT THE DISPOSITION TO LEARN

"It is not the facts and the habits that have been acquired in the learning process that count, as much as it is the disposition to learn new facts and acquire new habits."

S. S. Colvin, *The Learning Process* (New York, Macmillan, 1921), p. 70.

780. YOUTH VERSUS AGE

"It is customary to say that age should be considered, because it comes last. It seems just as much to the point, that youth comes first. And the scale fairly kicks the beam, if you

go on to add that age, in a majority of cases, never comes at all. Disease and accident make short work of even the most prosperous persons; death costs nothing, and the expense of a headstone is an inconsiderable trifle to the happy heir. To be suddenly snuffed out in the middle of ambitious schemes, is tragical enough at best; but when a man has been grudging himself his own life in the meanwhile, and saving up everything for the festival that was never to be, it becomes that hysterically moving sort of tragedy which lies on the confines of farce."

Robert Louis Stevenson, *Virginibus Puerisque* (New York, Scribner, 1923. 1st ed. 1881), pp. 89f.

781. CONTINUOUS LIVING

"It is good to have been young in youth and, as years go on, to grow older. Many are already old before they are through their teens; but to travel deliberately through one's ages is to get the heart out of a liberal education."

Robert Louis Stevenson, *Virginibus Puerisque* (New York, Scribner, 1923. 1st ed. 1881), p. vi.

782. LIFE THOUGHTFULLY LIVED IS EDUCATION

"From the broad point of view, all life thoughtfully lived is education. To give conscious attention to what one is about, to seek and note significant meanings in what is happening, to apply these meanings as intelligently as one may to the direction of one's affairs—all this is not only the path of efficient dealings, it is equally the process of education in possibly the only full sense."

William H. Kilpatrick, *Education and the Social Crisis* (New York, Liveright, 1932), p. 44.

783. EDUCATION AND LIFE

"A man's education never stops as long as he lives. All the experience of life is educating him. In school days he is undergoing education by the contact of life, and by what he does or suffers. This education is transferring to him the mores. He learns what conduct is approved or disapproved; what kind of man is admired most; how he ought to behave in all kinds of cases; and what he ought to believe or reject. This education

goes on by minute steps, often repeated. The influences make the man. All this constitutes evidently the most essential and important education. If we understand what the mores are, and that the contact with one's fellows is all the time transmitting them, we can better understand, and perhaps regulate to some extent, this education."

William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, Ginn, 1906), p. 638.

784. TO BE INTELLIGENT THE MAIN BUSINESS OF SOCIETY

"Thus far we have been a bit hesitant to state the obvious conclusion, that to try to be intelligent is the main business of society. The corollary is that society's primary and foremost occupation is education. The social process is the interplay of human impulses in the quest for a satisfactory state of affairs. To become aware of the ins and outs of this interplay and to seek its ordering and guidance through the foci of intellectual formulation is the business of public intelligence as it is also the function of public education. It is therefore with no apology that we propose the putting of the public educational function not only prominently, but uppermost, in the work that belongs to every special interest in society. Something of this sense may have been implicit in the development of the universal public school in America, but it has remained implicit. An error has been made in trusting that the education of youth would provide intelligence in adult public responsibility and function. This we now know has been an unwise faith. The business of living in this age is so everlasting novel, confusing, and complex that deliberate study and effort to understand it in its myriad relations and to control it for larger good must continue on without a break into the mature years where responsibilities are as keen and heavy as are the human consequences of our many special efforts."

R. B. Raup, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), p. 108.

785. FIXED OUTLOOK A DANGER

"The rate of progress is such that an individual human being, of ordinary length of life, will be called upon to face novel

situations which find no parallel in his past. The fixed person for the fixed duties, who in older societies was such a godsend, in the future will be a public danger."

Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), p. 275.

786. EMERSON ON THE EFFECT OF THINKING

"Beware when the great God lets loose a thinker on this planet. Then all things are at risk. It is as when a conflagration has broken out in a great city, and no man knows what is safe, or where it will end."

Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Circles," in *Essays*, 1st series (Centenary ed. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1903), p. 308.

787. HOW THINKING DISTURBS

"Let us admit the case of the conservative: if we once start thinking no one can guarantee what will be the outcome, except that many objects, ends, and institutions will be surely doomed. Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently stable world in peril, and no one can wholly predict what will emerge in its place."

John Dewey, *Characters and Events* (New York, Holt, 1929), Vol. I, p. 1.

788. HOW THE FEARFUL LOOK ON THOUGHT

"Men fear thought as they fear nothing else on earth—more than ruin, more even than death. Thought is subversive and revolutionary, destructive and terrible; thought is merciless to privilege, established institutions, and comfortable habits; thought is anarchic and lawless, indifferent to authority, careless of the well-tried wisdom of the ages. Thought looks into the pit of hell and is not afraid. It sees man, a feeble speck, surrounded by unfathomable depths of silence; yet it bears itself proudly, as unmoved as if it were lord of the universe. Thought is great and swift and free, the light of the world, and the chief glory of man.

"But if thought is to become the possession of many, not the privilege of the few, we must have done with fear. It is fear that holds men back—fear lest their cherished beliefs should

prove delusions, fear lest the institutions by which they live should prove harmful, fear lest they themselves should prove less worthy of respect than they have supposed themselves to be. ‘Should the working man think freely about property? Then what will become of us, the rich? Should young men and young women think freely about sex? Then what will become of morality? Should soldiers think freely about war? Then what will become of military discipline? Away with thought! Back into the shades of prejudice, lest property, morals, and war should be endangered! Better men should be stupid, slothful, and oppressive than that their thoughts should be free. For if their thoughts were free they might not think as we do. And at all costs this disaster must be averted.’ So the opponents of thought argue in the unconscious depths of their souls. And so they act in their churches, their schools, and their universities.”

Bertrand Russell, *Why Men Fight* (New York, Century, 1917), pp. 178–80.

789. NOT IMPARTIALITY BUT VARIED ENTHUSIASMS

“There should be no insistence that the teacher should preserve what is called ‘impartiality,’ i.e., should express only those opinions which are held by the majority of the education authority. The best teachers are not impartial; they are men of strong enthusiasms, to which they wish to give expression in their teaching. The impartiality of the learner is best secured by exposing him to teachers with opposite prejudices, not by giving him only such teaching as will seem colorless to men who think that the truth must be what is commonly believed. If the result is scepticism as to all violent opinions, so much the better; that is the very attitude of mind that the modern world most needs in the mass of mankind.”

Bertrand Russell and Dora Russell, *Prospects of Industrial Civilization* (New York, Century, 1923), p. 255.

790. THE UNREALITY OF SCHOOLING

“The fatal defect of schools . . . is their unreality. The only real problem with which any school presents its pupils is the problem of getting through school. The only real interest

in any textbook is an interest in getting up a subject for examination."

C. E. Ayres, in *New Republic*, 43:25 (May 27, 1925).

791. EDUCATION FROM THE SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW

"All education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race. This process begins unconsciously almost at birth, and is continually shaping the individual's powers, saturating his consciousness, forming his habits, training his ideas, and arousing his feelings and emotions. Through this unconscious education the individual gradually comes to share in the intellectual and moral resources which humanity has succeeded in getting together. He becomes an inheritor of the funded capital of civilization. The most formal and technical education in the world cannot safely depart from this general process. It can only organize it or differentiate it in some particular direction."

John Dewey, *My Pedagogic Creed* (Washington, Progressive Education Association, 1929. 1st ed. 1897), p. 3.

792. SCHOOL AND SOCIETY

"Whatever may be the view of the adult, the child knows but one society; and that is a society including persons of all ages. This does not mean that conflicts of interest may not occur or that on occasion adults may not abuse and exploit children. It does mean that in a proper kind of society the relationship is one of mutual benefit and regard in which the young repay in trust and emulation the protection and guidance provided by their elders. . . . Place the child in a world of his own and you take from him the most powerful incentives to growth and achievement. Perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of contemporary society lies in the fact that the child is becoming increasingly isolated from the serious activities of adults. Some would say that such isolation is an inevitable corollary of the growing complexity of the social order. In my opinion it is rather the product of a society that is moved by no great commanding ideals and is consequently victimized by the most terrible form of human madness—the struggle for private gain. As primitive peoples wisely protect their children

from the dangers of actual warfare, so we guard ours from the acerbities of economic strife. Until school and society are bound together by common purposes the program of education will lack both meaning and vitality."

George S. Counts, *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* (New York, John Day, 1932), pp. 16-17.

793. HOW THE COMMUNITY EDUCATES

"*Almost no child can escape his community.* He may not like his parents, or the neighbors, or the ways of the world. He may groan under the processes of living, and wish he were dead. But he goes on living, and he goes on living in the community. The life of the community flows about him, foul or pure: he swims in it, drinks it, goes to sleep in it, and wakes to the new day to find it still about him. He belongs to it: it nourishes him, or starves him, or poisons him: it gives him the substance of his life. And in the long run it takes its toll of him, and all he is. . . .

"It may be that the continuous drenching of children in the life of the community will eventually stir some community, and the parents of the children of that community, to an understanding of the fact that the primary thing about a community is that it is *an educational instrument*. The community likes its own defects too well to give them over on its own account. And on the whole parents still hold the doctrine that, in all essential matters, 'What was good enough for us, is good enough for our children!' Parents want their children to have more money, more houses, more automobiles, more power, more show; but where are the parents who want their children to have *more ideas*, more *critical intelligence*, more *personal morality*, more *reconstructive initiative*, a greater degree of *escape from the old folkway controls?*'"

Joseph K. Hart, *Adult Education* (New York, Crowell, 1927), pp. 82-84.

794. SCHOOL AND THE WIDER COMMUNITY LIFE

"The experimentalist believes the activities of the schools must be more intimately connected with the activities of the wider community life. As children grow older, artificial school projects are too superficial to call out whole-hearted responses.

This is as it should be, for maturing individuals cannot be expected to derive nourishment for significant development apart from contacts with actual life-situations. Dare the schools be adventurous enough to permit children to have meaningful intercourse with the wider community activities? Short of this, some believe they cannot meet the fundamental conditions for educational growth."

John L. Childs, *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism* (New York, Century, 1931), pp. 164-65.

795. SCHOOL AND LIFE

"At present, school and society are, as regards the typical case, sharply and widely separated. Thought and action in the two realms are divorced in space, in time, and in kind. The school is housed in a building set apart, peculiar to its kind. This is but the outward and visible sign of an even greater inner difference. So far as concerns the best-recognized school activities, the ordinary school subjects, there is in them but little of life with its inherent thinking or the inherent testing of this thought by the inevitable ever-widening consequences to life. As most of the subjects are now conceived, it seems all but impossible that the kind of thought here desired could find a place. Again—and still as regards the best-recognized subjects—there is, on the whole, but little connection between what is studied in school and what is going on in the world outside. There is all but no opportunity in these school subjects for these young people to share with their elders in actual social activities. School as conceived and defended is hardly, if at all, other than a supposed preparation for a future adult state. From this angle again are thought and action divorced, this time a decade or more. Effectual thinking—in terms of the relation of means to consequence—is thus again all but impossible. . . .

"We wish ultimately that schooling shall reach into the thick of life itself, not social life as we now know it but that better kind we hope to have. In that life the young will have abundant opportunity at close association with the old. So far as possible the young will share with the old in considering and reaching responsible decisions. Through all such, both young and old

alike will be building on the spot such social attitudes as seem after social consideration needed to care for the various matters undertaken. The whole population, young and old alike, will be consciously studying to criticize and improve society at any point of possibility and always for the common good. The thinking will always mean to lead to responsible consequences and will expect to test itself accordingly. On no other basis can thinking reach its best quality. Results will be tested by shared observable outcomes. All aspects of life—economic, ethical, æsthetic—will be considered, as they occur, together, because all do in fact bear on each other."

William H. Kilpatrick, *Education and the Social Crisis* (New York, Liveright, 1932), pp. 55-57.

796. ONE VIEW OF VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

(Instructions of a state director of vocational training to the principal of a vocational high school)

"This school should be run in the interest of industry. . . . So much English, history, and mathematics do more harm than good. . . . By the time your [four year high school] graduates have worked in a shop for three or four years they may want to become foremen or superintendents or something like that. . . . What we want you to do is to teach a boy to stand up to a lathe for nine hours a day for a dollar and a half a day and be satisfied. . . .

"You should not teach girls to make their own clothes, but for the trade. No girl will do careful accurate work except under the exacting requirements of a customer."

Reported by the principal to the editor, 1921.

797. LIFE'S EDUCATION AS IT IS AND AS IT MIGHT BE

"Industry is today our only real school of experience, drawing on the most potent motives of life for the learning and pursuing of the activities which constitute the industry. A large proportion of all the workers are minors in their most formative years. What are they learning in this school? The futility of effort, the discouragement of defeat, the cynicism which is bred by the hypocrisy of those in power, the hopelessness that

foresees inevitable unemployment at forty or fifty, the indigence of dependence—the concrete attitudes which we lightly refer to as ‘social unrest.’ Is there no remedy for such a condition? There is one, and that is to recover for work its educational and cultural significance, stripping it of its sordid absorption in mere things and mere rewards, and so organizing it that children may have their happy place in it. This would mean slowing it down to the point where overproduction would not result from the employment of half the people half the time. And this in turn would mean the translation of profits into earnings. Better a technically less perfect industrial scheme than one which destroys itself because of its single-minded devotion to financial gain.

“In accordance with the fantastic scheme I have just proposed, every worker would be a teacher and would have time to devote to helping children learn the skills and attitudes of his job, whether this be weaving, selling, growing wool, policing the streets, keeping house, nursing a patient, or trying a case in court. As a matter of fact, all these activities are or have been shared with youth. Apprenticeship in nursing is the common practice. Children often do the work of traffic officers. Rural boys and girls still take part in the daily work of the farm. Many a youngster conducts his own business, whether selling papers, blacking shoes, raising eggs for the market, or running a printing press. When such work is so conducted as to help one learn its skills and meanings without injury to himself, it is an education of the most effective kind for the lack of which those who merely ‘go to school’ suffer all their lives.”

Hugh Hartshorne, *Character in Human Relations* (New York, Scribner, 1932), pp. 288-89.

798. EDUCATION FOR INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY

“The gravest obstacle to the progress of education is the materialism which would subordinate the cultivation of human faculties to the exigencies, or alleged exigencies, of industry, which two generations ago condemned children of ten to inhuman toil in factories and mines, which still permits many thousand young persons to be stunted in body and mind by excessive and premature toil, and which regards the suggestion

of increased educational expenditure as an inroad upon its riches or a menace to its comfort. . . .

"Men are first of all men, not animals, servants, or tools. The first aim of education, therefore, must be to make, not more efficient workers, but better men, better citizens, and better Christians. Much emphasis is laid at the present time upon the contribution which education may make to productive efficiency, and we do not underestimate the importance of technical and professional training. But, valuable as such training is in its own sphere, it cannot, however highly it may be developed, relieve the community of the duty of cultivating through education those faculties of initiative, of judgment, and of intelligent sympathy with what is excellent in human achievement, which, because they are the attributes of man, are not distinctive of any class or profession of men. In particular, Christians cannot accept the view sometimes advanced which would regard a humane or liberal education as suitable only for those entering the professions, and which would estimate the success of the education offered to the great majority of the population by its ability to qualify them for more efficient labor in their various occupations. There must be diversity of educational methods because there are diversities of gifts. But the basis of differentiation should be differences of taste or of capacity, not differences of class or of income. The manual worker needs a liberal education for the same reason as the barrister or the doctor—that he may develop his faculties and play a reasonable part in the affairs of the community. . . .

"The only sound basis for technical training is the cultivation of mental alertness, judgment, and a sense of responsibility by means of education of a general and non-utilitarian character. A nation which aims primarily at developing to the fullest possible extent the character and intellect of its citizens may find that material prosperity and commercial success are added to it. A nation which regards education primarily as a means of converting its members into more efficient instruments of production is likely not only to jeopardize its moral standards and educational ideals, but to discover that by such methods it cannot attain even the limited success at which it aims."

799. AN IDEAL OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION

"The ideal which probably can never be attained, but which may be approximated, is such a redistribution of talent as to make each kind equally abundant with every other in proportion to the need for it. If we could bring it about that hand laborers were so scarce and business managers so abundant that the community would gain or lose about as much by the gain or loss of a single hand laborer as it would by the gain or loss of a single manager, then we would have the ideal redistribution of human talent. Incidentally, of course, we should have an ideal redistribution of wealth, because one kind of talent would be approximately as well paid as another. As has been said before, the ideal condition can be approached, however, only by training men out of, or away from, those occupations where men are abundant into those where men are scarce."

T. N. Carver, *The Economy of Human Energy* (New York, Macmillan, 1924), p. 170.

800. EDUCATION NOT SIMPLY FOR CHILDREN

"Until recently, people have thought of education as something for children, something which a man either got or missed in his early years, something which he generally forgot in his mature years."

Everett Dean Martin, *The Meaning of a Liberal Education* (New York, Norton, 1926), pp. 1-2.

801. ADULT EDUCATION

"A fresh hope is astir. From many quarters comes the call to a new kind of education with its initial assumption affirming that *education is life*—not a mere preparation for an unknown kind of future living. Consequently all static concepts of education which relegate the learning process to the period of youth are abandoned. The whole of life is learning, therefore education can have no endings. This new venture is called *adult education*—not because it is confined to adults but because adulthood, maturity, defines its limits. The concept is inclusive. . . . No one, probably, needs adult education so much

as the college graduate, for it is he who makes the most doubtful assumptions concerning the function of learning.

"Secondly, education conceived as a process coterminous with life revolves about *non-vocational* ideals. . . . Adult education more accurately defined begins where vocational education leaves off. Its purpose is to put meaning into the whole of life. . . .

"The approach to adult education will be via the route of *situations*, not subjects. Our academic system has grown in reverse order: subjects and teachers constitute the starting-point, students are secondary. In conventional education the student is required to adjust himself to an established curriculum; in adult education the curriculum is built around the student's needs and interests. Every adult person finds himself in specific situations with respect to his work, his recreation, his family-life, his community-life, et cetera—situations which call for adjustments. Adult education begins at this point. Subject matter is brought into the situation, is put to work, when needed. Texts and teachers play a new and secondary rôle in this type of education; they must give way to the primary importance of the learner. (Indeed, as we shall see later, the teacher of adults becomes also a learner.) The situation-approach to education means that the learning process is at the outset given a setting of reality. Intelligence performs its function in relation to actualities, not abstractions."

Eduard C. Lindeman, *The Meaning of Adult Education* (New York, New Republic, 1926), pp. 6-9.

802. THORNDIKE ON AGE AND LEARNING

"On the average, at the present time, individuals probably learn much less per year from twenty-five to forty-five than they did from five to twenty-five. . . . The learning of adults is [however] rarely *nil*. At the least, they learn a host of concrete particulars; new names and faces, new items about automobiles, baseball players, movie stars; what 'they are wearing' this year, and the like; some new skills as their jobs change and new recreations attract them; and a few general ideas about the war, prohibition, socialism, or religion. At the most, as in

the case of the scientific investigator or historical scholar, paid for learning in money or esteem or both, they may learn much more than they did in childhood.

"The decrease in learning, which does, on the average, occur, may be explained by various combinations of the four factors, general health and energy, ability to learn, interest in learning, and opportunity. . . .

"If we keep on learning we may expect to lose less of our ability to learn. We might even increase it enough year by year by practice to outweigh the losses due to the third factor of a weakening due to an essential, unavoidable inner decay. . . .

"We can assert with reasonable surety that the fact of inner growth favors adults in comparison with children. Unless it is counterbalanced by factors acting in the opposite direction, inner growth gives the person from twenty-five to forty-five as good an ability to learn as he had from twenty to twenty-five, a better ability than he had from fifteen to twenty, and a much better ability than he had from five to fifteen."

Edward L. Thorndike, *Adult Learning* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), pp. 146-47, 133, 129.

803. THE PROFESSIONAL PART IN ADULT EDUCATION

"How do we distinguish adult education as the whole people studying their inherent problems from adult education as one of the professional concerns of educators? The answer seems clear. Education wherever found is best conceived as a self-active process. If we accept democracy, we shall wish as widespread and effectual study of common problems among the whole people as can be got. This is both the democratic and the educative way of life. But the art of studying together is a matter which can itself be studied. Research in such will be needed, materials to help group study must be prepared, leaders and organizers will require professional preparation—in short, at least for the coming decades if not forever, we shall need professional workers to foster and guide at least some of the processes of the wider adult study. . . .

"Universal adult study of life's problems having become necessary, the profession of education must accept the enlarged

responsibility. Adult education, of a new kind and degree, enters as a necessary constituent of any inclusive social and educational outlook."

William H. Kilpatrick, in *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century 1933), pp. 130-31.

CHAPTER XIX

THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS

804. THORNDIKE ON SCHOOLING AND GROWING

“The history of schooling does not warrant a bigoted optimism concerning schools as benefactors to inner growth. They have indeed been chief sinners. According to the best present theory, the silent, motionless, memorizing elementary school, which was in vogue until about a generation ago, repressed and thwarted and deformed mental growth.”

Edward L. Thorndike, *Adult Learning* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), p. 187.

805. OUR FAILURE AT TEACHING

“Our secondary schools are not even reasonably successful in setting up attitudes so favorable to the subjects presented that any respectable fraction of students, even of those who have been stamped as successful, care enough for them to continue their studies in higher institutions or independently. It is a well-known fact that those students who enter colleges to a large extent refuse to elect, when they have the privilege, further study in subjects to which they have devoted much time, perhaps the major part of their time, in high schools. And the phenomenon of men and women independently continuing the pursuit and use of the foreign languages, mathematics, history, English literature, and science to which they have been introduced is so rare as always to excite comment.”

Thomas H. Briggs, in *Junior-Senior High School Clearing House*, 6:76-77 (Oct. 1931).

806. CLASSICAL EDUCATION

“The mistake of making the records and remains of the past the main material of education is that it cuts the vital connection of present and past, and tends to make the past a rival of

the present and the present a more or less futile imitation of the past. Under such circumstances, culture becomes an ornament and solace; a refuge and an asylum. Men escape from the crudities of the present to live in its imagined refinements, instead of using what the past offers as an agency for refining these crudities."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), p. 88.

807. EMERSON ON THE REAL EDUCATION

"The regular course of studies, the years of academical and professional education, have not yielded me better facts than some idle books under the bench at Latin School. What we do not call education is more precious than that which we call so. We form no guess, at the time of receiving a thought, of its comparative value. And education often wastes its effort in attempts to thwart and balk this natural magnetism, which is sure to select what belongs to it."

Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Spiritual Laws," in *Essays*, First Series (Centenary ed. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1903), p. 133.

808. LEARNING COMES INFORMALLY

"Let anyone review what he has learned in life. He will find that his effective and living knowledge has come in the most informal and seemingly casual manner. It has crystallized about unexpected nuclei. Chance happenings have aroused interest, and interest has bred curiosity, and curiosity has begotten learning. Most of what passes for learning is a kind of pitiful affectation. The student says, 'I have had' Latin or chemistry, or 'I took' science or literature. All is safely in the past or the perfect tense, as if it were an attack of pleurisy or a boil."

James Harvey Robinson, *The Humanizing of Knowledge* (New York, Doran, 1923), p. 85.

809. A 1923 FORECAST

"Eventually our schools will, in certain respects, resemble great manufacturing plants. The achievement tests will become accurate gauges of the educational (manufacturing) processes. In each subject the children will pass through a given

number of steps in as definite and sequential an order as the steps in a manufacturing process. The standard tests will measure the accomplishments as the machine products are gauged. Each process within each subject will be mastered before an advance is made. Each process will be taught by an expert, automatic devices and machines being used where possible.

"The achievement tests compel the child to aim each educational effort at one object where we are now aiming at a flock. For a certain definite and limited time, each child will attack his own specific difficulty after the application of the test has shown him what that difficulty is. The children will be grouped in such a manner that all who are overcoming a specific obstacle concentrate their efforts upon it at the same time."

Leonard Power, in *N.E.A. Bulletin of Elementary School Principals*, 2:16 (1923).

810. EDUCATION AS CONFORMITY TO A UNIFORM PATTERN

"The whole spirit in which education is conducted needs to be changed, in order that children may be encouraged to think and feel for themselves, not to acquiesce passively in the thoughts and feelings of others. It is not rewards after the event that will produce initiative, but a certain mental atmosphere. There have been times when such an atmosphere existed: the great days of Greece, and Elizabethan England, may serve as examples. But in our own day the tyranny of vast machine-like organizations, governed from above by men who know and care little for the lives of those whom they control, is killing individuality and freedom of mind, and forcing men more and more to conform to a uniform pattern."

Bertrand Russell, *Political Ideals* (New York, Century, 1917), pp. 24-25.

811. EDUCATION FOR A PYRAMIDAL SOCIETY

"For a pyramidal society putting a severe strain on obedience the safest and best education is one that wears away the energy of youth in mental gymnastics, directs the glance towards the past, cultivates the memory rather than inquiry, teaches to versify rather than to think."

E. A. Ross. *Social Control* (New York, Macmillan, 1915), p. 172.

812. TEACHING CHILDREN THE SPREAD-EAGLE ATTITUDE

"In the Constitutional Convention were assembled the greatest body of men, from the standpoint of physical vigor, mental acumen, and moral courage, that ever met together for human achievement. . . . It is to the everlasting discredit . . . of all foreign countries, that they have failed to make it [the Constitution] their model.

"The writing and adoption of our Constitution was unquestionably the greatest and most important human achievement since the Creation, and as an event it ranks in history second only to the Birth of Christ."

Harry F. Atwood, *Keep God in American History* (Chicago, Laird & Lee, 1919), pp. 4-5.

813. FINNEY ON HABITUATION BEFORE THE AGE OF REASONING

"The transmission of fundamental institutions is primarily a matter of habituation, and that before children arrive at the age of reasoning. The habituation upon which the permanence of institutions depends precedes thinking and deliberated choice upon the part of the younger generation to whom the institutions are being transmitted. The social processes to be transmitted should be selected after much deliberation and choice, as has just been pointed out, but deliberation and choice upon the part of the child's elders, not upon his own part. It is as silly to expect the child to select the social processes which he is to inherit as to expect him to build for himself the city into which he is to be born. Conservative education fears the shallow democracy of current educational theory because its over-emphasis upon individual choice throws the responsibility for social selection and conservation too much upon the children. To be sure, we have no right to impose institutions and the habits of which they are constituted upon our children, except such as racial experience makes it reasonably certain that they will thank us for when they do arrive at the age of discernment. Precisely what those habits and institutions are it is our bounden duty, therefore, to know; and for the performance of that duty they will hold us responsible. Nor can we

shirk that responsibility by giving them, instead, a ‘problem-solving attitude.’ For if we give them only attitudes instead of the sound solutions which they have a right to expect from our generation, they will be swamped with the problems of their own day plus those of our day that we have left unsolved for them; for there are problems that cannot be postponed without growing like a rolling snowball. In which case the ‘problem-solving attitude,’ of which we prattle so glibly, will not excite their gratitude, when once they get their eyes open to the predicament that our folly has gotten them into. But having once decided what institutions and social processes are to be transmitted, the first process in the pedagogy of that transmission is habituation. Children must first be habituated to what racial experience has demonstrated to be good; later the habits should be rationalized for them.”

Ross L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), pp. 467-68.

814. THE JAPANESE SAMURAI IDEAL

“My first lessons were from the ‘Four Books of Confucius.’ . . . I was only six years old, and of course I got not one idea from this heavy reading. . . . Sometimes I would . . . ask my teacher the meaning. His reply invariably was: ‘Meditation will untangle thought from words,’ or ‘A hundred times reading reveals the meaning.’ Once he said to me, ‘You are too young to comprehend the profoundly deep books of Confucius.’ . . .

“My priest-teacher taught these books with the same reverence that he taught his religion—that is, with all thought of worldly comfort put away. . . . Throughout my two-hour lesson he never moved the slightest fraction of an inch except with his hands and his lips. And I sat before him on the matting in an equally correct and unchanging position. Once I moved. . . . I was restless and swayed my body slightly, allowing my folded knee to slip a trifle from the proper angle. The faintest shade of surprise crossed my instructor’s face; then very quietly he closed his book, saying gently but with a stern air: ‘Little Miss, it is evident that your mental attitude today is not suited for study. You should retire to your room and meditate.’

My little heart was almost killed with shame. . . . The memory of that moment hurts like a bruise to this very day. . . .

"With the first gleam of sunrise . . . Ishi came to wake me [for the examination]. It was bitterly cold. . . . Since the absence of bodily comfort meant inspiration of mind, of course I wrote in a room without a fire. Our architecture is of tropical origin; so the lack of the little brazier of glowing charcoal brought the temperature down to that of the outside. Japanese picture-writing is slow and careful work. I froze my fingers that morning without knowing it until I looked back and saw my good nurse softly crying as she watched my purple hand. The training of children, even of my age, was strict in those days, and neither she nor I moved until I had finished my task. . . .

"The necessity of this rigid discipline was never questioned by anyone."

Etsu Inagaki Sugimoto, *A Daughter of the Samurai* (Garden City, Doubleday Page, 1925), pp. 19-22.

815. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL CONTROL

"Modern psychology is particularly concerned with avoiding the terminology of purpose and consciousness, not because purpose and consciousness are unrealities, but because they imply a point of view which does not yield to the scientific approach or is fruitless for control. There is no need to deny purpose. It exists and is a most powerful force. But the psychology which admits purpose as an explanation is a beaten science. It admits failure. It proposes to adopt an unanalyzable concept because it is too lazy to adopt the slow and painstaking experimentation necessary to make the analysis. . . . Purpose as a psychological concept is also useless as a control of conduct. Since purpose resides within the man, we are not told how to form or stimulate it. But a concept of conditioned response, to use one hypothesis of modern psychology, leads immediately to a method of control. Such a concept provides education with a technique."

Percival M. Symonds, *The Nature of Conduct* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), pp. 8-9.

816. THE ACT IN TOTO DETERMINES THE ACT IN DETAIL

"The daily activities of life are better represented by the dog coming at the sound of the whistle than by the simple reaction or the reflex. Behavior usually comes in lengths, not in separate reactions. You put on your coat and hat; you go out to the garage; you start the car; you back out; you take on your passengers; you drive them to the station. Thus one might list the acts performed in a certain quarter of an hour. Each of these acts includes a series of smaller acts leading up to some end result. When you start upon each series, you are starting towards the end-result of that series. You are set for that end-result. You have embarked upon a certain total activity, which immediately becomes your 'activity in progress,' and motivates all the detailed movements or preparatory reactions composing the total activity. What you are doing *in toto* determines what you do piecemeal."

R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology* (New York, Holt, 1929), p. 238.

817. LEARNING AS CREATIVE DEALING WITH NOVELTY

"From this discussion [on the nature of behavior] comes new light on what 'learn' means. Where the organism faces a novel situation, old responses will not suffice. A new response is called for or failure confronts. If fortunate, the organism will contrive a response new to it and adequate to cope with the novel difficulty. Such a contriving we call learning. A dog is upset at being shut in an enclosure. He finds or contrives a way out. It works. Thereafter, if shut in, he uses his new-found exit (or, more exactly, his newly contrived response). He has learned how to meet the situation. Since he did not have this way of responding before, we may, if we wish, say that he has created a response novel to him. . . . Each act of learning adds a certain change and increment to the very structure of the organism itself."

William H. Kilpatrick, "A Reconstructed Theory of the Educative Process," in *Teachers College Record*, 32:532-33 (Mar. 1931).

818. HOW GESTALT UNDERSTANDS LEARNING

"The first major fact of learning . . . evident at the outset in the animal scale, is that *movements are directional*. . . .

They are made in the course of resolving a stress of some kind toward equilibrium. . . .

"The second important fact derived from the preceding animal studies is that directional activities occur where discrimination is involved. This type of directional activity was present as low down in the animal scale as the goldfish. The goldfish made a choice between three lights . . . A choice involves the perception of one stimulus in its relation to others, or in other words, it involves insight. . . .

"The essence of the learning process is *discovery*. . . . If the essence of the learning process is discovery, *learning must come about by way of creative work*. Where drill methods are employed the child learns through making discoveries if he learns at all, but his progress is retarded. . . .

"The third major point derived from a study of learning in the animal scale is that *specialized movements are made in the course of arriving at goals*. . . .

"The relationship must be perceived in the course of a *strikingly creative* type of response. All of these facts may be summarized by the statement that, in the animal kingdom, there is observable a definite evolution of *creative insight*. It is this fact that should determine the attitude of education toward the child. Learning, any form of achievement, is *creative*. This is a law of organic life."

Raymond H. Wheeler and Francis T. Perkins, *Principles of Mental Development* (New York, Crowell, 1932), pp. 118-21.

819. HOLLINGWORTH'S CONCEPTION OF LEARNING

"Learning is that process in which small details of a total situation come to be able to produce an act or consequent which at first required the whole situation for its production. Another way of saying this, as we have already seen, is that learning is the process whereby signs or symbols come to have meaning.

"It is essential to get it clearly in mind that learning actually is this process. The details of a situation actually come to produce the response appropriate to the whole situation of which they once were parts. They do this directly; they lead imme-

dately to such acts, images, feelings, or other results, just as directly as originally the whole situation led to such results."

H. L. Hollingworth, *Educational Psychology* (New York, Appleton, 1933), pp. 30-31.

820. HOLLINGWORTH AVOIDS THE "LAW OF EFFECT"

"The burnt child shuns the fire, not because pain did anything to his movements, but because, since that pain, the stimulus has changed. It is no longer 'flame plus curiosity'; it is now 'flame plus fear.'

"For the present stimulus is not merely the flame, which may be, for the fireman, an abstract and isolated object. The present stimulus is the total situation of the moment, the complete antecedent of present behavior. This includes the seen flame, plus the imaged pain, plus the fearful emotion reintegration by the flame on the basis of the previous context. The 'avoiding reactions' are not merely to the flame but to this total situation. Once the stimulus was visual pattern, plus interest; now it is visual pattern, plus imaged pain pattern, plus emotional tone of strong fear."

H. L. Hollingworth, *Psychology* (New York, Appleton, 1928), pp. 218-19.

821. NO LEARNING FROM MERE REPETITION

"It has been supposed by many in the past that the mere repetition of a situation, in and of itself, somehow causes learning. . . .

"So far as I can now see, the repetition of a situation in and of itself has no selective power. If a certain state of affairs acts upon a man 10,000 times, he will, so far as any intrinsic action of the 10,000 repetitions is concerned, respond in the same way to the last thousand as to the first. The repetition of a situation may change a man as little as the repetition of a message over a wire changes the wire. In and of itself, it may teach him as little as the message teaches the switchboard. In particular, the more frequent connections are not selected by their greater frequency."

Edward L. Thorndike, *Human Learning* (New York, Century, 1931), pp. 10, 14.

822. THE MANUAL LABOR PSYCHOLOGY (1839)

"The Manual Labor System is moreover calculated to promote habits of industry, frugality and economy. Whatever is frequently repeated, by the influence of that repetition upon a law of our constitution, becomes a habit, and if originally offensive loses by degrees that offensiveness, and becomes not only easy or agreeable, but even desirable."

B. M. Sanders, *Valedictory Address*, Mercer University, 1839 (printed 1840), p. 13.

823. MANY SIMULTANEOUS LEARNINGS INEVITABLE

In considering educational outcomes the usual view has been in the case of any one activity to fix almost exclusive attention upon one primary outcome, the knowledge or skill immediately sought, for instance, a given list of spelling words, a given lesson in grammar, or a given event described in history. It has been assumed that one thing and one only could be learned at a time; that the proper business of the school was to fix such a list of things in a desirable order and to see that they were learned. Children have usually been promoted or not according as they have or have not learned the quota prescribed for the term or year; and teachers are often judged upon the success of their classes in this respect.

The advocates of the point of view here under consideration challenge the assumption that one thing and only one can be learned at a time. They believe contrariwise that no child can learn just one thing at a time. Whether we like it or not, whether we know it or not, a child learning the multiplication combinations is also at the same time learning something about dawdling or not dawdling. The way he studies his multiplication fixes or tends to fix him somewhere on the dawdling-alert-manner-of-learning scale; and his position on this scale is sometimes just as important as the thing which he and the teacher, both with a curious narrowness of vision, thought he was learning singly and alone. There are, moreover, many other scales on which he is simultaneously registering himself: the scale of liking or disliking arithmetic; the scale of liking or disliking school and teacher (how many of our children leave school as

soon as the law allows?); the scale of self-respect; the scale of a just or unjust estimate of one's powers; the scale of believing that it does or does not pay to try; the scale of believing that books and schools have nothing or something to do with life as I and my family know it and believe in it; the scale of believing that I have succeeded in the degree that I have "put it over" the teacher; the scale of believing that teachers, principals and the whole tribe of law-givers and law-enforcers wherever found do or do not represent a tyrannical effort to suppress real living.

There are, to be sure, many questions regarding these various scales and the transfer of the attitudes so built to other situations. But who can question that there are many such learnings going on in each child all the time, and that the sum of the concomitant, incidental, or by-product learnings may and often does vastly overshadow the specific school learnings, and may in the end determine whether the child shall continue in school and what he shall do in life?

William H. Kilpatrick, Adapted from *Teachers College Record*, 22:313-14 (Sept. 1921).

824. MAN NATURALLY LAZY

"Man is by nature lazy."

J. K. F. Rosenkranz, *The Philosophy of Education* (Trans. by Brackett. New York, Appleton, 1894. 1st ed. 1848), p. 116.

825. CHILDREN NOT LAZY BUT INDOLENT

"Children are seldom 'lazy,' but they are normally and constitutionally 'indolent.' In other words, they are not inactive,—activity indeed may be called the first law of child nature,—but they are averse to continued effort along a given line; they abhor monotony."

William C. Bagley, *The Educative Process* (New York, Macmillan, 1905), pp. 103-4.

826. MOTIVATION DEFINED

Motivation is "the stimulation of a desire upon the part of the learner to master the subject matter presented."

H. W. Nutt, *Principles of Teaching High School Pupils* (New York, Century, 1922), p. 109.

827. MOTIVATION AND DRILL

"The most effective device that can be applied to learning is to increase the amount of drill or practice. The prime function of motivation is to make the drill or practice palatable."

Percival M. Symonds and Doris H. Chase, "Practice vs. Motivation," in *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 20:34 (Jan. 1929).

828. HUMBUGGING THE CHILD

"It is just because civilized schooling requires us, due to its inherent and essential function, to offer its mental material to the child in advance of his *natural* interest in it that teachers, elementary teachers in particular, must be skillful in the invention of *artificial* situations that will inveigle the child into a semblance of interest. It should be clearly understood that motivation is artificial, not natural. Its trick is fortuitously to create a sort of counterfeit situation that will 'condition' the child's interest to civilized interests. There is a sense in which motivation is effective just in the degree in which the teacher succeeds in humbugging the child."

Ross L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), p. 365.

829. THE INADEQUACY OF THE EFFORT THEORY

"While we are congratulating ourselves upon the well disciplined habits which the pupil is acquiring, judged by his ability to reproduce a lesson when called upon, we forget to commiserate ourselves because the deeper intellectual and moral nature of the child has secured absolutely no discipline at all, but has been left to follow its own caprices, the disordered suggestions of the moment, or of past experience. I do not see how anyone can deny that the training of this internal imagery is at least equally important with the development of certain outward habits of action. For myself, when it comes to the mere moral question and not a question of practical convenience, I think it is infinitely more important. Nor do I see how anyone at all familiar with the great mass of existing school work can deny that the greater part of the pupils are gradually forming habits of divided attention. If the teacher is skillful

and wide-awake, if she is what is termed a good disciplinarian, the child will indeed learn to keep his senses intent in certain ways, but he will also learn to direct the fruitful imagery, which constitutes the value of what is before his senses, in totally other directions. I do not think it would be well for us to have to face the actual psychological condition of the majority of the pupils that leave our schools. We should find this division of attention and the resulting disintegration so great that we might be discouraged from all future endeavor. None the less, it is well for us to recognize that this state of things exists, and that it is the inevitable outcome of those conditions which require the simulation of attention without requiring its essence."

John Dewey, *Interest as Related to Will*, in 2nd Supplement to the Herbart Year Book for 1895, pp. 215-16.

830. WHEN INTEREST IS PROPER

"Interest is normal and reliance upon it educationally legitimate in the degree in which the activity in question involves growth or development. Interest is illegitimately used in the degree in which it is either a symptom or a cause of arrested development in an activity. . . .

"When interest is objected to as merely amusement or fooling or a temporary excitation (or when in educational practice it does mean simply such things), it will be found that the interest in question is something which attaches merely to a momentary activity apart from its place in an enduring activity—an activity that develops through a period of time. When this happens, the object that arouses (what is called) interest is esteemed just on the basis of the momentary reaction it calls out, the immediate pleasure it excites. 'Interest' so created is abnormal, for it is a sign of the dissipation of energy; it is a symptom that life is being cut up into a series of disconnected reactions, each one of which is esteemed by itself apart from what it does in carrying forward (or developing) a consecutive activity. As we have already seen, it is one thing to make, say, number interesting by merely attaching to it other things that happen to call out a pleasurable reaction; it is a radically different sort of thing to make it interesting by introducing it

so that it functions as a genuine means of carrying on a more inclusive activity."

John Dewey, *Interest and Effort in Education* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1913), pp. 41-43.

831. JOHN DEWEY ON MAKING THINGS INTERESTING

"I know of no more demoralizing doctrine—when taken literally—than the assertion of some of the opponents of interest that *after* subject matter has been selected, *then* the teacher should make it interesting." [*Interest and Effort* (Houghton Mifflin, 1913), p. 23.] "When things have to be *made* interesting it is because interest itself is wanting. Moreover, the phrase is a misnomer. The thing, the object is no more interesting than it was before. The appeal is simply made to the child's love of pleasure. He is excited in a given direction with the hope that somehow or other during this excitation he will assimilate something otherwise repulsive." [*Interest as Related to Will*, 2nd Supplement to Herbart Year Book for 1895, p. 216.]

832. THE PROBLEM OF LEARNING TO STUDY

"Learning how to study should begin in the elementary schools. The problem commences, therefore, with methods of *teaching the child*. . . .

"No pupil will learn how to study without the *will to learn* and without a definite goal. He can be given this will to learn only by making the task interesting and *necessary* for his happiness. The happiness that promotes learning is not the happiness from a bribe. Such joys are over when the grade is received! A geography lesson about South America, for example, may be in the nature of an imaginary trip that the child makes, but the scenes on the way should be scenes that the child would see, not what an adult would see. When these conditions are fulfilled the child not only *wants* to learn, but *must*; he will spend extra time in solving problems and accumulating facts about geography, outside of the schoolroom. *He cannot understand that the study of geography will make him an intelligent citizen; but he can understand that foreign lands are populated by interesting people, living interesting lives, and having interesting ideas;* his geography can be a story that one reads for pleasure.

The goal is definite, in this case, for it is *his own*. When the imposed goal is the abstract one of an adult, the child will not grasp it; instead, he sets up goals of his own, and if he cannot find them in the subject matter, which is usually the case, he will find them in daydreaming, getting by, or cheating the teacher. He should and could, if the chances were given him, pursue the task with the same enthusiasm that he learns football and baseball."

Raymond H. Wheeler and Francis T. Perkins, *Principles of Mental Development* (New York, Crowell, 1932), pp. 403-4.

833. STUDY DEFINED

"Study is a series of activities which are responses to situations created by an assignment."

Maxie N. Woodring and Cecile W. Flemming, in *Teachers College Record*, 30:46 (Oct. 1928).

834. SUBJECT MATTER DEFINED

"Subject matter of learning is identical with all the objects, ideas, and principles which enter as resources or obstacles into the continuous intentional pursuit of a course of action."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), p. 162.

835. THE STATIC CONCEPTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE LEARNING PROCESS

"For many, many generations—from the beginning of man almost to now—the world changed but slowly; so slowly that seldom was any significant change noted. History for the most part did not exist, so that there was seldom any way of telling how the arts and institutions had originated. . . . In general, older and more privileged people were the authoritative custodians—the elders in the tribe or nation, parents in the family, the master class as over against slaves or other underlings. Authoritative handing down was the acknowledged basis of knowledge. To these men the very nature of knowledge as existing prior to the act of learning was such that it required this treatment. . . .

"Under such circumstances any conception of learning was the correlative of such a conception of knowledge. As knowledge was basically a handing down on authority, so to learn was basically acquisition and acceptance on authority. At a later day when writing was invented, there came in favored regions an accumulation of written matter. . . .

"In keeping with tradition, knowledge was put down authoritatively in textbooks. The duty of the pupil was to accept and acquire the knowledge so set out. Docility as a virtue thus got its common meaning. The sign and test of learning was primarily the ability to give back on demand what was found in the book. Study meant the process—typically rote memorization—of acquiring an assignment. The curriculum was the orderly arrangement of what was thus to be studied and learned. An old Swedish writer has well expressed the general idea underlying this older procedure: The teacher gathers the fruit from the tree of knowledge, chews it, and the greatest virtue in the pupil is to swallow easily and readily. . . .

"With these conceptions strongly entrenched as to the nature of knowledge and the meaning of learn, the main question was how best to get such learning done. When numbers of pupils began to increase, the graded school with annual (or semi-annual) promotion was devised as a piece of institutional machinery for managing this mass learning. The course of study set out each year's quota—as well it could on such a theory—and those who mastered the annual quota, as shown by test, were promoted to the next grade. The point here to be insisted on is that this piece of institutional machinery exactly depends on the traditional conceptions of knowledge and learn. Knowledge (as existing before the act of learning can begin), learn (in the traditional sense above described), testing, promotion—these four fit together as do hand and glove. Each implies and fits into the other."

William H. Kilpatrick, "A Reconstructed Theory of the Educative Process," in *Teachers College Record*, 32:545-47 (Mar. 1931).

836. ACQUIRING AND STORING INFORMATION

"The acquiring and storing up of information is in itself a worthy aim for junior high school courses; the House of Thought

is not worthily to be built until there are brought together in one place all the materials for the building. A pathetic and disgraceful amount of time and energy has been wasted by conscientious teachers in trying to force immature children to think deeply about the things of which they have but just begun to learn, because of the insistence of misguided educators that children must apply everything they find out at once. Let the time in the junior high school rather be given to the acquisition of facts, thoroughly learned, arranged in orderly sequences, clearly understood in their concrete narrative aspects; but, except when clearly demanded by the children themselves, let the theoretical, abstract, controversial, and application aspects be left until the students are more mature and more broadly prepared to go surely in those more difficult paths."

Frances M. I. Morehouse, in *Historical Outlook*, 15:157 (Apr. 1924).

837. DEWEY ON THE VICE OF EXTERNALLY IMPOSED AIMs

"The vice of externally imposed ends has deep roots. Teachers receive them from superior authorities; these authorities accept them from what is current in the community. The teachers impose them upon children. As a first consequence, the intelligence of the teacher is not free; it is confined to receiving the aims laid down from above. Too rarely is the individual teacher so free from the dictation of authoritative supervisor, textbook on methods, prescribed course of study, etc., that he can let his mind come to close quarters with the pupil's mind and the subject matter. This distrust of the teacher's experience is then reflected in lack of confidence in the responses of pupils. The latter receive their aims through a double or treble external imposition, and are constantly confused by the conflict between the aims which are natural to their own experience at the time and those in which they are taught to acquiesce. Until the democratic criterion of the intrinsic significance of every growing experience is recognized, we shall be intellectually confused by the demand for adaptation to external aims."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), p. 127.

838. A PRINCIPAL AIM

"My main purpose must be that of encouraging an eager curiosity. I shall not care what particular subject matter the children learn so long as they are forming good habits of work and thought, an attitude of eager curiosity, and the habit of answering their own questions; so long as they are growing in knowledge of the sources of information and in ability and disposition to use these sources; so long as they are forming new and wider interests and gaining new appreciations, new meanings; so long as they are learning the facts that are necessary for drawing their conclusions, and realize that they must have facts in order to make conclusions. My general purpose, then, is to encourage the habit of looking below the surface of things for reasons, the habit of asking thoughtful questions and of trying to find the answers to such questions. My specific purpose is to help the children to see that on the whole the life and the needs of other people are much like our own, but that there are essential differences, and to find out why they exist."

Martha Peck Porter, *The Teacher in the New School* (Yonkers, World Book, 1930), pp. 58-59.

839. SCIENTIFIC SURVEYS INADEQUATE TO GIVE CURRICULUM OBJECTIVES

"Let us consider for a moment the contention that social needs can be discovered by a study of social institutions and practices, and that the objectives for curriculum making, accordingly, should be derived from educational sociology. . . .

"As an illustration, let us suppose that a survey of denominational schools should reveal a tendency to train children to give unquestioning adherence to a creed. This, then, is the fact. What is the need? Is this the kind of education that is needed, let us say in the field of religious education; or do we need training in the ability to make intelligent criticisms and revisions of the creeds? Turning to public education, we might ask the same question with regard to our faith in the federal Constitution, or with regard to such fundamental institutions and practices as matrimony, private property, and obedience to law. To say that such questions can be decided by taking observations of

the facts is at best merely trifling with a serious matter. How anyone can suppose that issues of this sort can be settled by jotting down observations in a notebook is past finding out. What these investigators actually do is to offer us their own uncriticized ideas of educational objectives or aims, under the guise of having discovered them from a survey of the facts. . . .

"It is high time to recognize the fact that the underlying questions in education cannot by any dexterity of manipulation be converted into questions of science. In the end we are bound to lose by such tactics. In fact this enthusiasm for scientific method has already done a great deal of harm. It has bred a type of educator whose outstanding traits are cocksureness and superficiality, and it has deepened the distrust of our academic colleagues, who refuse to abandon the conviction that education is something more serious and significant than it is made out to be."

B. H. Bode, "Where Does One Go for Fundamental Assumptions in Education," in *Educational Administration and Supervision*, 14:364-69 (Sept. 1928).

840. "MR. DOOLEY" ON THE CURRICULUM

"It makes no difference what you teach a boy so long as he doesn't like it."

Quoted in *School and Society*, 1:625 (May 1, 1915).

841. CURRICULUM FROM THE EXTERNAL POINT OF VIEW

"'A curriculum' is here defined as that assemblage of plans, formulated purposes, specifications, rules, texts, and principles, documented or subjectively held, under which a teacher or a faculty of teachers work in administering a specified kind and amount of education to a known body of learners over a substantial term of months or years."

David Snedden, *Foundations of Curricula* (New York, Teachers College, 1927), p. 3.

842. MEIKLEJOHN ON THE STUDY OF SUBJECTS

"Our attempts to understand a civilization by studying 'subjects' have had the general success of attempts to make

trees by nailing together planks or gluing together sawdust. Surely it is time that we tried the experiment of becoming acquainted with a civilization as a living whole."

Alexander Meiklejohn, "The Experimental College," in *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin* (Mar. 1928), p. 12.

843. AN EARLIER VIEW OF CURRICULUM MAKING (1924)

"It is helpful to begin with the simplest assumption, to be accepted literally, that education is to prepare men and women for the activities of every kind which make up, or which ought to make up, well-rounded adult life; that it has no other purpose; that everything should be done with a view to this purpose; and that nothing should be included which does not serve this purpose.

"Education is primarily for adult life, not for child life. Its fundamental responsibility is to prepare for the fifty years of adulthood, not for the twenty years of childhood and youth.

"When we know what men and women ought to do along the many lines and levels of human experience, then we shall have before us the things for which they should be trained. The first task is to discover the activities which ought to make up the lives of men and women; and along with these, the abilities and personal qualities necessary for proper performance. These are the educational objectives. . . .

"The first step is to analyze the broad range of human experience into major fields. . . .

"The curriculum-maker . . . will be careful to see that his analysis omits no portion of the broad range of desirable human experience. Many matters will be taken care of through the normal processes of living and without any systematic educational labor. Other matters will be left to non-scholastic agencies. But in the original analyses of human experience, the whole field should be viewed in order that the portions which belong to the schools may be properly seen, within themselves, and in relation to the whole.

"The major fields of human action having been defined, the second step is to take them, one after the other, and analyze them into their more specific activities. In this analysis, one will first divide his field into a few rather large units; and then

break them up into smaller ones. This process of division will continue until he has found the quite specific activities that are to be performed. . . .

"The activities once discovered, one can then see the objectives of education. These latter are the *abilities* to perform in proper ways the activities."

Franklin Bobbitt, *How to Make a Curriculum* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1924), pp. 7-10.

844. BOBBITT ON CURRICULUM MAKING (1926)

"Education is for the social purpose of elevating the character of human conduct above what it would otherwise be.

"This conduct, which is to be elevated in character, is in part child conduct; in part it is the conduct of youth; and in part it is that of mature men and women. Life is to be so lived at all ages or levels that it is diversified and wholesome, abundant and fruitful. The task of education is to assist childhood, youth, and adulthood to hold to levels of performance of their activities which are high for the age in question.

"The all-inclusive objective of education is to *hold high at all times and ages the quality of human living*. This central objective is the same for infants, children, youths, and adults. . . .

"Life is lived in the moving present. It is to be guided in the present. It is to be held high in the present. The life that is being currently lived is the life that is to be shaped. Since it exists only in the present, it can be shaped only in the present. Education is directly concerned only with the moving present; with anything else, only by way of assisting in holding high the day-by-day life-activities of the growing individual.

"Teachers, parents, children, and youths, must look to the entire seventy-year life-series of high-grade activities properly to appreciate and understand what is good and wholesome for any one of the age-levels. . . .

"Looking to the entire life-continuum for guidance in upholding the activities of the present does not demand that the present be merely a preparation for the future. . . . The *momentum* gained from holding the present high is the preparation for the future. . . .

"The current activities of high-grade living twenty-four

hours each day, and seven days each week *are* the curriculum. . . .

"The mere rearrangement of familiar subject matter in the form of general science, general mathematics, and the like, assumes only a continuance of the archaic subject-storage conception of education. These compositing movements, therefore, as such, are really no part of the modernization of the curriculum. They are merely new ways of doing the old things."

Franklin Bobbitt, in 26th Yearbook, Nat'l Soc. for the Study of Educ. (1927), Part II, pp. 41-55. (Quoted by permission of the Society.)

845. HOW CARE FOR DEFICIENCIES

"Throughout the year my consciousness of the children's lack of understanding of their own environment guided the direction of emphasis as new interests developed. The method remained much the same as at the beginning. I used the illustrative material they brought, their exhibits, the questions they asked, as a basis for further information, further activities, further questions. The emphasis was put upon those questions whose answers would help the children to a better understanding of their own environment while encouraging a growing interest in things far away. . . .

"No outline can give a fair representation of the children at work: of their attitudes, their developing interests, their relationships to each other, their increasing ability to handle the tools by means of which they grew in knowledge and in creative power. *A year's work was a year's living as best I could manage it.* No outline can give a picture of a year's living."

Martha Peck Porter, *The Teacher in the New School* (Yonkers, World Book, 1930), pp. 218-19.

846. DEWEY ON THE ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER

"While in outward form, these remarks are given to show that the teacher, as the member of the group having the riper and fuller experience and the greater insight into the possibilities of continuous development found in any suggested project, has not only the right but the duty to suggest lines of activity, and to show that there need not be any fear of adult im-

position provided the teacher knows children as well as subjects, their import is not exhausted in bringing out this fact. Their basic purport is to show that progressive schools by virtue of being progressive, and not in spite of the fact, are under the necessity of finding projects which involve an orderly development and inter-connection of subject matter, since otherwise there can be no sufficiently complex and long-span undertaking. The opportunity and the need impose a responsibility. Progressive teachers may and can work out and present to other teachers for trial and criticism definite and organized bodies of knowledge, together with a listing of sources from which additional information of the same sort can be secured. If it is asked how the presentation of such bodies of knowledge would differ from the standardized texts of traditional schools, the answer is easy. In the first place, the material would be associated with and derived from occupational activities or prolonged courses of action undertaken by the pupils themselves. In the second place, the material presented would not be something to be literally followed by other teachers and students, but would be indications of the intellectual possibilities of this and that course of activity—statements on the basis of carefully directed and observed experience of the questions that have arisen in connection with them and of the kind of information found useful in answering them, and of where that knowledge can be had. No second experience would exactly duplicate the course of the first; but the presentation of material of this kind would liberate and direct the activities of any teacher dealing with the distinctive emergencies and needs that would arise in re-undertaking the same general type of project. Further material thus developed would be added, and a large and yet free body of related subject matter would gradually be built up."

John Dewey, "Progressive Education and the Science of Education," in *Progressive Education*, 5: 203 (July—Aug.—Sept. 1928).

847. THORNDIKE ON THE DISCIPLINARY VALUE OF SCHOOL SUBJECTS

"By any reasonable interpretation of the results, the intellectual values of studies should be determined largely by the

special information, habits, interests, attitudes, and ideals which they demonstrably produce. The expectation of any large differences in general improvement of the mind from one study rather than another seems doomed to disappointment. The chief reason why good thinkers seem superficially to have been made by having taken certain school studies, is that good thinkers have taken such studies, becoming better by the inherent tendency of the good to gain more than the poor from any study. When the good thinkers studied Greek and Latin, these studies seemed to make good thinking. Now that the good thinkers study Physics and Trigonometry, these seem to make good thinkers. If the abler pupils should all study Physical Education and Dramatic Art, these subjects would seem to make good thinkers."

Edward L. Thorndike, "Mental Discipline in High School Studies," in *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 15:98 (Feb. 1924).

848. STORMZAND ON THE "MORAL" EFFECT OF DRILL

"Plan some drill work early in the semester. Opportunities for drill work are so plentiful in every school subject that but little adjustment of a semester's program will be necessary to introduce some drill work early in each semester. This is advocated for the psychological or 'moral' effect it will have, especially on a new class. It will give the pupils an early impression that the teacher means business, and that she expects earnest work. . . .

"We cannot always move in the child's childish sphere of interests as a basis for the selection of subject matter. This is true in the field of memorization, but even more so in regard to much of the other material that must be mastered by the drill method, notably in some of the elements that have been suggested as skills or habits in writing, spelling, arithmetic, and language work. . . .

"The greater part of the day must be spent in just the types of work that have been described, and, at best, there is a great deal of inglorious and wearing monotony about the learning of the fundamentals, both for teacher and pupils."

M. J. Stormzand, *Progressive Methods of Teaching* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1924), pp. 246-50.

849. NOT KNOWLEDGE BUT INTERESTS AND ATTITUDES

"Children carry away very little book knowledge from the schools. Every teacher knows this. But the attitudes and habits carried from the school are of vital importance, not only for efficiency but for health. The way the school determines attitudes is not merely by the school environment, the habits and manners of the teachers, but also by the whole course of study, and especially by the tasks set and the directions given to the children. A whole new pedagogy of the first importance is here involved. We have been so busy hitherto in teaching, in giving information, in imparting knowledge, that we have failed to see the significance of these deeper and more fundamental things that result from learning, these results of education that are really permanent, namely, these interests and attitudes."

W. H. Burnham, *The Normal Mind* (New York, Appleton, 1924), p. 293.

850. LEARNING TO MEET FELT NEEDS

"The time for learning anything is the time when you need it." For there are great advantages which accrue when learning satisfies some real need, benefits some cherished purpose, and is made use of at once and so is kept alive and healthy for further use."

Edward L. Thorndike, *Adult Learning* (New York, Macmillan, 1928), p. 183.

851. PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY AND FACING REALITY

"It may be asked: In what way does a curriculum based on purpose help the individual to face reality? The answer is not difficult. In the first place, the child's attention is settled on purposes that really can be fulfilled. The teacher must see that it is so. He is next guided in contriving to fulfill these purposes and so constantly meets the realities of life in the obstacles that stand in the way of the realization of his purposes. If his guide is wise, he will learn to face and overcome them without undue discouragement. In a school situation, most of the individual purposes will be part of larger group purposes and provide op-

portunity for coöperation in socially useful activities. The character of the purposes chosen by the child will change as the child himself grows in ability to manage them. In other words, the purposes that the child chooses and his increasing power to meet the contingencies that arise in the pursuit of his ends are indicative of his growth and personality integration. In short, the writer believes that a curriculum based, as it may be, on purpose provides the greatest opportunity for learning to face life as it really is."

Caroline B. Zachry, *Personality Adjustments of School Children* (New York, Scribner, 1929), pp. 260-61.

852. DEWEY ON THE TEST OF A GOOD PROJECT

"The test of a good project is whether it is sufficiently full and complex to demand a variety of responses from different children and permit each to go at it and make his contribution in a way which is characteristic of himself. The further test or mark of a good activity, educationally speaking, is that it have a sufficiently long time-span so that a series of endeavors and explorations are involved in it, and included in such a way that each step opens up a new field, raises new questions, arouses a demand for further knowledge, and suggests what to do next on the basis of what has been accomplished and the knowledge thereby gained. Occupational activities which meet these two conditions will of necessity result in not only amassing of known subject matter but in its organization. They simply cannot be carried on without resulting in some orderly collection and systematization of related facts and principles. So far is the principle of working toward organization of knowledge not hostile to the principles of progressive education that the latter cannot perform its functions without reaching out into such organization."

John Dewey, "Progressive Education and the Science of Education," in *Progressive Education*, 5:202 (July—Aug.—Sept. 1928).

853. DEWEY ON INDIVIDUALITY AND LEARNING

"There is a present tendency in so-called advanced schools of educational thought (by no means confined to art classes like those of Cizek) to say, in effect, let us surround pupils

with certain materials, tools, appliances, etc., and then let pupils respond to these things according to their own desires. Above all let us not suggest any end or plan to the students; let us not suggest to them what they shall do, for that is an unwarranted trespass upon their sacred intellectual individuality since the essence of such individuality is to set up ends and aims.

"Now such a method is really stupid. For it attempts the impossible, which is always stupid; and it misconceives the conditions of independent thinking. There are a multitude of ways of reacting to surrounding conditions, and without some guidance from experience these reactions are almost sure to be casual, sporadic, and ultimately fatiguing, accompanied by nervous strain. Since the teacher has presumably a greater background of experience, there is the same presumption of the right of a teacher to make suggestions as to what to do, as there is on the part of the head carpenter to suggest to apprentices something of what they are to do. Moreover, the theory literally carried out would be obliged to banish all artificial materials, tools, and appliances. Being the product of the skill, thought, and matured experience of others, they would also, by the theory, 'interfere' with personal freedom.

"Moreover, when the child proposes or suggests what to do, some consequence to be attained, where is the suggestion supposed to spring from? There is no spontaneous germination in the mental life. If he does not get the suggestion from the teacher, he gets it from somebody or something in the home or the street or from what some more vigorous fellow pupil is doing. Hence the chances are great of its being a passing and superficial suggestion, without much depth and range—in other words, not specially conducive to the developing of freedom. If the teacher is really a teacher, and not just a master or 'authority,' he should know enough about his pupils, their needs, experiences, degrees of skill, and knowledge, etc., to be able (not to dictate aims and plans) to share in a discussion regarding what is to be done and be as free to make suggestions as anyone else. (The implication that the teacher is the one and only person who has no 'individuality' or 'freedom' to 'express' would be funny if it were not often so sad in its outworkings.) And his contribution, given the conditions stated, will pre-

sumably do more to getting something started which will really secure and increase the development of strictly individual capacities than will suggestions springing from uncontrolled hap-hazard sources. . . .

"Freedom or individuality, in short, is not an original possession or gift. It is something to be achieved, to be wrought out. Suggestions as to things which may advantageously be taken, as to skill, as to methods of operation, are indispensable conditions of its achievement. These by the nature of the case must come from a sympathetic and discriminating knowledge of what has been done in the past and how it has been done."

John Dewey, in *Art and Education* (New York, Barnes Foundation Press, 1929), pp. 180-83.

854. FREEDOM

"If attention is centered upon the conditions which have to be met in order to secure a situation favorable to effective thinking, freedom will take care of itself. The individual who has a question which being really a question to him instigates his curiosity, which feeds his eagerness for information that will help him cope with it, and who has at command an equipment which will permit these interests to take effect, is intellectually free. Whatever initiative and imaginative vision he possesses will be called into play and control his impulses and habits. His own purposes will direct his actions. Otherwise, his seeming attention, his docility, his memorizings, and reproductions, will partake of intellectual servility. Such a condition of intellectual subjection is needed for fitting the masses into a society where the many are not expected to have aims or ideas of their own, but to take orders from the few set in authority. It is not adapted to a society which intends to be democratic."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), pp. 355-56.

855. SAFEGUARDS PROVIDED BY TEACHER AND THE ACTIVITY ITSELF

"a. Each child became so completely absorbed in his share of the activity that not a moment of time was wasted. The absence of disturbing problems proved this.

"b. A balancing of different types of enterprises was achieved by having the chosen activity cover such a large scope of ideas that almost every type of interest and work could be involved.

"c. A checkup was made at different intervals to make certain that the children's needs in subject matter were being cared for. For instance, our spelling words and sentences grew out of the activity. In looking over the list of words required for the second grade I discovered few which had not been used. Then my questioning included the new words and phrases and the children thus gained the necessary practice in their use.

"d. Sometimes I discovered a child who was not progressing in certain subjects. There was Daniel whose number work was weak. I gave him a position as ticket salesman. In this work he experienced money changing in figures up to one dollar. Often twenty youngsters bought tickets from him and he soon developed number strength."

Ruth M. Hockett (ed.), *Teachers' Guide to Child Development* (Sacramento, California State Board of Education, 1930), p. 340.

856. A MILITARY CONCEPTION OF WHAT IS NEEDED

"The demand everywhere is for men alert to receive directions, prompt in carrying them out, obedient to the last detail, and with the persistence that means final success. And how can these rare qualities be hammered into the boy or man more thoroughly than by some form of military discipline?"

Lucien Howe, *Universal Military Education and Service* (New York, Putnam, 1917), p. 107.

857. MILITARY DRILL

"Military drill is chiefly valuable from a psychological point of view,—*viz.*, the constant suggestion of authority and recognition of authority."

Major General W. M. Black, in *Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges*, Bulletin 1920, No. 8, U. S. Bureau of Education, p. 23.

858. THE MILITARY EFFECT OF TEXTBOOK ASSIGNMENTS

"Another habit inculcated by this system, [in vogue at the U. S. Military Academy] is respect for authority. This results

from the whole military educational idea, of course, but it is further stressed by the method of continued textbook assignments and the emphasis in the section room instruction upon the mastery of these assignments. The textbook is openly or tacitly assumed to be the last word on the subject under consideration. Time seldom allows classroom discussion of opposing theories or of further developments; time presses; the material in today's lesson must be covered; and then the next."

Col. Lucius H. Holt, "A Professional College with a Particular and Restricted Purpose," in *School Life*, 11:15f. (Sept. 1925).

859. MILITARY DISCIPLINE AS INSTINCTIVE OBEDIENCE

"In its deeper and more important sense, discipline may be defined as the habit of instantaneous and instinctive obedience under any and all circumstances—it is the habit whereby the very muscles of the soldier instinctively obey the words of command, so that under whatever circumstances of danger or death the soldier may hear the word of command, even though his mind be too confused to work, his muscles will obey. It is toward this ultimate object that all rules of discipline tend. In war the value of this habit of instantaneous and instinctive obedience is invaluable, and during the time of peace everything possible should be done to ingrain into the very blood of the soldier this spirit, this habit of instantaneous, instinctive obedience to the word of command. . . .

"In the military establishment certain exercises, such as close order drills and ceremonies, are called disciplinary exercises. They are designed to teach precise and soldierly movements, and to inculcate that prompt and subconscious obedience which is essential to proper military control."

Col. James A. Moss and Major John Lang, *Manual of Military Training* (Menasha, Wis., Banta, 1927), Ch. II, pp. 1-3.

860. HOW THE ARMY USES PSYCHOLOGY

"The military problem, psychologically speaking, resolves itself into taking every advantage of the herd instinct to integrate the mass. . . . This military processing of civilians is a purely empirical thing, but it is an eminently sound one. . . .

The methods have been tested out on many hard fought fields. . . . What we have left today is the residue of several thousand years of army experimenting. . . .

"The military problem in dealing with the herd has three phases. First must be determined the essential elements of military conduct which are to be impressed on the herd, such as bravery, self-sacrifice, loyalty, obedience, and subordination.

"The second phase is . . . the method. . . . It is useless to try and convince men of the value of military standards by reasoning with them; for reasoning, no matter how brilliant or conclusive, always leaves a suspicion of doubt and uncertainty in the mind of the average man. It is necessary that he be firmly convinced, and the best way of doing this, in fact the only way, is to indoctrinate him. Constant repetition of the item to be inculcated, unsupported by any reasons, will have an immense effect on the suggestible herd-minded human. An opinion, an idea, or a code acquired in this manner can become so firmly fixed that one who questions its essential rightness will be regarded as foolish, wicked, or insane. . . .

"The third phase . . . is . . . building up a feeling of unity. . . . Uniforms serve as a great means. . . . Parades and reviews are great factors. . . . But probably the greatest tool in the hands of the officer for bringing the members of the group their basic unity is close order drill. . . . The individual spends the entire period of drill in conforming his movements to the movements of the group. . . . Another important result is that the individual learns to comply immediately with orders. He cannot take time to think about their correctness or justness before he complies, but must automatically obey or his unit will likely walk over him."

Capt. John H. Burns, in *Infantry Journal*, 33:593-96 (Dec. 1928).

861. WEST POINT DISCIPLINE

"No less marked is the change of mental attitude of the new cadet at the end of 'Beast Barracks' [his first three weeks]. All sense of his importance, if he ever had any, has oozed away . . . and he realizes what a very small fish he is in this new pond. He rapidly acquires a most receptive mood in which

he absorbs the most important lesson that a soldier must learn,—OBEDIENCE. The officers and cadets in charge of him demand unhesitating and instant compliance with their orders. To this end the new cadets are made to execute every order at a run, not to harass them as they sometimes think, but to form the habit of immediate obedience."

Robt. C. Richardson, *West Point* (New York, Putnam, 1917), pp. 124f.

CHAPTER XX

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS

862. THE EFFECT OF BUSINESS EFFICIENCY ON OUR SCHOOLS

"The American people take great pride in their efficiency. . . .

"Building upon this foundation the new industrial order has provided in amazing abundance the tools of a certain type of efficiency. We say a certain type of efficiency, because it is often an efficiency without purpose, an efficiency of motion. . . .

"That this idolatry of efficiency should impress itself upon the schools is entirely to be expected. In fact, in those parts of the country which have come under the particular sway of the machine culture, the entire educational system and the accompanying educational theory have been greatly influenced by the ideals of business enterprise. Particularly in the great city systems education is thought of in terms of the construction of buildings, the floating of bonds, the keeping of records, the differentiation of function, and the evolution of a form of pupil management which makes possible the rapid and easy movement of great masses of children through the schools. And the ambitious school administrator covets a reputation for efficiency and feels complimented if he is mistaken for a banker or the director of some large corporation. Provided the ends are worthy there can of course be no objection to efficiency; but an efficiency of management should never be the ideal of education."

George S. Counts, *The American Road to Culture* (New York, John Day, 1930), pp. 136-38.

863. HOW PAST THEORY ABIDES IN PRESENT ADMINISTRATION

"The studies of the symbolic and formal sort represented the aims and material of education for a sufficiently long time to call into existence a machinery of administration and of instruc-

tion thoroughly adapted to themselves. This machinery constituted the actual working scheme of administration and instruction. These conditions persist long after the studies to which they are well adapted have lost their theoretical supremacy. . . .

"It is easy to fall into the habit of regarding the mechanics of school organization and administration as something comparatively external and indifferent to educational purposes and ideals. . . . We forget that it is precisely such things as those that really control the whole system, even on its distinctively educational side. . . . The school environment and machinery almost compel the more mechanical features of school-work to lord it over the more vital aims."

John Dewey, *The Educational Situation* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1906), pp. 22-25.

864. "THE ESSENTIALS OF AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF SCHOOLS"

"In a sense, a system of schools may be regarded as an organism created to produce certain changes in people. The fingers and hands are the teachers; the nerves, the supervisory force; the brain, the central administration. . . .

"a. In order that the system may be effective, therefore, it is necessary that there be at the center some agency which, in careful and detailed fashion, shall determine the purpose of the process. . . .

"The content, arrangement, and order of the curriculum should be worked out, and the materials of instruction necessary to the process should be developed and provided. Then the methods should be determined by which the curriculum may be best presented to and mastered by the pupils. . . . These are some of the problems of the brain of the organism. . . . Without the solution of these problems, the fingers and hands do not know how to work most effectively, the nerves to give impulses, the brain to direct.

"b. The fingers and hands, the teachers, must be competent to carry out the plans of the central organization. . . .

"c. The nerves, the supervisors and administrators, are useful only in so far as they facilitate the work of the teacher or carry messages to and from the central organization. Their

task is to keep the work going, free the teacher from petty detail, see that the direction of the work is right, and keep the central organization in touch with the work that is going on. . . .

"f. . . . The principles apply as well to the work of a single school, a regional unit, or to a uniform system of schools, nation-wide in extent."

Christian Education in China (New York, Foreign Missions Conference, 1922), pp. 135-37.

865. ONE CONCEPTION OF ORDER

"I have known our principal to walk into a room, show the children a fly on the ceiling and tell them he wanted them to keep so quiet that he could hear the fly walk."

Reported by a student.

866. HOW TO TREAT PERSONS

"If our schools create conditions which enable teachers, as well as pupils, to develop and exercise their most effective powers, they will remain true to democratic ideals. The major considerations are (1) that no one serve merely as an instrument in the hands of another; (2) that each be afforded an opportunity to realize his personality through the organizing activity of his own capacity; and (3) that one perform his own specialized tasks with a full consciousness of their implications in the functions of others."

H. B. Albery and V. T. Thayer, *Supervision in the Secondary School* (Boston, Heath, 1931), p. 103.

867. AN 1866 ATTITUDE ON TEACHER AUTHORITY

"The authority of the teacher as sovereign in the school is in no way derived from, or dependent on the will of the pupil as subject; nor is the teacher in any way amenable to the pupil for his mode of exercising it. So far as the pupil-subject is concerned, the teacher is, in the better sense of the term, a true autocrat, and may both take his stand and carry himself as such. . . .

"The teacher's authority as absolute, must be imperative, rather than deliberative or demonstrative. His requirements

and decisions, in whatever form presented, whether that of request, demand, or mandate, must be unargued. What he resolves upon and pronounces law, should be simply and steadily insisted upon as right *per se*, and should be promptly and fully accepted by the pupil as right, on the one ground that the teacher, as such, is governor."

Frederick S. Jewell, *School Government* (New York, Barnes, 1866), pp. 50-54.

868. A 1922 VIEW OF THE TEACHER'S RELATIONSHIPS

"The teacher should recognize certain relationships and their obligations. To the supervisor the attitude of respectful subordination should be the rule. To fellow teachers the attitude should be that of sympathy and coöperation. Toward the pupils those attitudes most favorable to discipline should be adapted."

C. E. Holley, *The Teacher's Technique* (New York, Century, 1922), p. 323.

869. HOW A TEACHER PROPERLY SERVES

It is the duty of a teacher and of every man of inquiring mind "to stimulate the same sort of mind in those younger than himself, whether his students, his children, or his friends. It is the business of such a man, not to hand out rigid bodies of doctrine, whether Socialism, Home Market Club protectionism, or anything else, but to train those to whom he speaks to think for themselves. He is not the gentleman behind the quick-lunch counter. . . . He is more like the leader of a group of miners going into partially opened country. He has been there before; he knows more than they do about the technique of exploration and detecting the metal they seek, but he cannot give them definite directions which will enable them to go to this or that spot and strike it rich. He can only tell them what he knows of the lay of the land and the proper methods of search, leaving it to them to explore and map out for themselves regions which he has never visited or rivers whose course he has erroneously conceived."

Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *The Inquiring Mind* (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1928), pp. 20-21.

870. SUGGESTIONS FROM THE TEACHER

"There is no ground for holding that the teacher should not suggest anything to the child until he has *consciously* expressed a want in that direction. A sympathetic teacher is quite likely to know more clearly than the child himself what his own instincts are and mean. But the suggestion must *fit in* with the dominant mode of growth in the child; it must serve simply as stimulus to bring forth more adequately what the child is already blindly striving to do. Only by watching the child and seeing the attitude that he assumes towards suggestions can we tell whether they are operating as factors in furthering the child's growth, or whether they are external, arbitrary impositions interfering with normal growth.

"The same principle applies even more strongly to so-called dictation work. Nothing is more absurd than to suppose that there is no middle term between leaving a child to his own unguided fancies and likes or controlling his activities by a formal succession of dictated directions. As just intimated, it is the teacher's business to know what powers are striving for utterance at a given period in the child's development, and what sorts of activity will bring these to helpful expression, in order then to supply the requisite stimuli and needed materials. The suggestion, for instance, of a playhouse, the suggestion that comes from seeing objects that have already been made to furnish it, from seeing other children at work, is quite sufficient definitely to direct the activities of a normal child of five. Imitation and suggestion come in naturally and inevitably, but only as instruments to help him carry out his own wishes and ideas. They serve to make him realize, to bring to consciousness, what he already is striving for in a vague, confused, and therefore ineffective way. From the psychological standpoint it may safely be said that when a teacher has to rely upon a series of dictated directions, it is just because the child has no image of his own of what is to be done or why it is to be done. Instead, therefore, of gaining power of control by conforming to directions, he is really losing it—made dependent upon an external source."

John Dewey, in *Elementary School Record*, 1:150-51 (June 1900).

871. THE FACTORY SYSTEM OF EDUCATING

"According to the present use of the word *grade*, we mean a year of school work. It thus signifies a level of accomplishment and we find, even in the beginning of grading, the term *grade of attainments* thus used. . . ."

"The factory system, introduced in the early part of the nineteenth century and characterized by specialization of work, proved so successful that it was applied to education. Teachers began to specialize in certain parts of the curriculum; for example, the subject matter which should be taught in one year to a group of pupils with a narrow age-range; and a superintendent was appointed to supervise the teachers and integrate their work. These groups of pupils studying specified amounts of subject matter were identified as grades."

W. W. Coxe, "The Development of Public School Organization," in *Review of Educational Research*, 1:168 (June 1931).

872. NO MISFIT CHILDREN

"There are no misfit children. There are misfit schools, misfit texts and studies, misfit dogmas and traditions of pedants and pedantry. There are misfit homes, misfit occupations and diversions. In fact, there are all kinds and conditions of misfit clothing for children, but—in the nature of things there can be no misfit children."

Frederick Burk. Quoted by Adolf Meyer in *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1917), p. 139.

873. GRADING TO HELP THE CHILD

"In child-centered schools the system of grading is designed to enable each child to make the best use of his time and aptitudes. Many educators oppose conventional grading because of the evils of trying to get each child to reach a definite standard of achievement in each subject in a restricted period of time. The sacrifice of the individual to the group, the feverish haste of the slow child, the discouragement of the failure, the waste of time for the pupil who can progress faster than his fellows and who forms the habit of working below his capacities, the evil of pushing him ahead among older pupils, are all decried

by progressive educators. So also are loss to the pupils and to the community through keeping back a child who fails in a few subjects only, and making him repeat all subjects of the grade with a group of younger pupils.

"The modern schools solve these problems in a variety of ways. Many provide for steady, continuous progress according to the individual ability of each pupil. Varying mentalities are taken into consideration. The superior child, being freed from routine work suited to the average child can be given a more extensive training along lines of special interest, and can be aided in developing to the highest degree the characteristics that will make of him a future leader. Some schools have developed a technique of individual instruction, allowing each child to progress through self-directive materials from step to step at his own rate of speed. In some schools this method is applied to the acquisition of skills only, and projects occupy group activities for a part of each day."

Dorothy Bildersee, *Teaching the Primary Grades* (New York, Appleton, 1932), pp. 10-11.

874. DISREGARD OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

"Public education is not keeping pace with the proved outcomes of research in this field. Mass methods are still in use, although they have been shown to be not only unintelligent, because impossible of specific direction, but actually brutalizing in their effect upon both pupil and teacher. For when pupils are at work at a level too high for their intelligence, the effect is brutalizing; when they are at work at a level too low for their intelligence, the effect is again brutalizing; and when teachers in large numbers reach a state of violent outburst over iniquities of organization which prevent them from doing their best work; or fall into a passive routine attitude of hopeless fatuity, still the effect is brutalizing."

A. H. Sutherland, in 24th Yearbook, Nat'l Soc. for the Study of Educ. (1925), Part II, p. 1. (Quoted by permission of the Society.)

875. TO EACH PERSON MANY I.Q.'S

"To talk of an I.Q. is absurd. A person has as many I.Q.'s as he has functions. . . . In certain fields of work some of the

failing students could be more successful than some of the excellent ones."

W. H. Pyle, in *School and Society*, 31:820 (June 14, 1930).

876. KELIHER ON HOMOGENEOUS GROUPING AND PROVISION FOR INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

"One of the major purposes of homogeneous grouping is the provision for individual differences. The assumption was made that with three levels of ability in sections of the same grade level, each child could be placed in a group in which his individual needs would be more like those of the others in the group, thus reducing the problem of providing for individual differences.

"The writer fears that, so far as total individual differences are concerned, and indeed so far as academic differences are concerned, grouping, unless extremely carefully directed, would lead teachers to have less alertness to detect and provide for these differences. On the academic side, the desire for uniformity would easily lead to less attention to deviations and consequently to mediocrity. From the total personality aspect the fixation on the academic traits on which the grouping is based leads to over-attention to the partial academic phases of education. The assumption of a general ability level in each group may cause rare gifts to pass by unsought and unnoticed. There is danger of ascribing to the 'general intelligence level' certain traits and dispositions which should receive especial attention, thus allowing retarding characteristics to develop. The implication of cause-and-effect where trait deviations and ability levels are concerned may serve to obscure the real causes possibly underlying both and demanding attention.

"True provision for individual differences can come only through the right teaching and the optimum educational program. When education means the liberation of the individual, both teacher and learner, for the maximum of development through social living and community interaction, individual differences will assert themselves and be apparent for curbing or encouraging. Individual needs cannot be ascertained without individual expression. The mechanizing accompaniments

of homogeneous grouping are in opposition to this type of educational program."

Alice V. Keliher, *A Critical Study of Homogeneous Grouping* (New York, Teachers College, 1931), pp. 100-1.

877. HORN ON ABILITY GROUPING

"Children do not fall into natural ability-groups and cannot be classified so as to yield homogeneous groupings; groups which appear relatively homogeneous at the time of classification soon vary more within themselves than they do from each other; different types and amounts of instruction are required by different children within each group; ability-grouping does not solve the problem of adjusting schools to individual differences."

Ernest Horn, in 24th Yearbook, Nat'l Soc. for the Study of Educ. (1925), Part II, p. 166. (Quoted by permission of the Society.)

878. A PSYCHIATRIC VIEW OF MENTAL TESTING

"'Mental testing' (meaning the measurement of intelligence capacity and of certain special abilities of performance and information) is used by teachers much as a clinical thermometer is used by some housewives; the only sickness she becomes alarmed about is something that registers a fever. Children whom these tests indicate to be having trouble are thrust into the 'ungraded' rooms, or 'retarded' rooms, much as if all patients found to have a fever were herded by the doctors into a huge 'fever' room and treated for 'the fever.' The amusing irony of it is that in many places these collections of the educators' failures are called 'opportunity rooms'!"

Karl A. Menninger, *The Human Mind* (New York, Crofts, 1931), p. 404.

879. HOW MARK PUPILS

"Pupils should not be marked on the intellectual response made in the class period. They should be marked only on the basis of satisfactory or unsatisfactory outside application of the lessons taught during the class period."

T. J. Knapp, *Educational Insurance* (Boston, Stratford, 1930), p. 3.

880. THE REGENTS' SYSTEM AS SOME SEE IT

"We find no evidence from any source which calls in question the underlying principles of the Regents system. . . . The principle of uniform centrally administered examinations is sound and is indispensable to the wise administration of our educational system."

Ben D. Wood, *New York Experiments with New Type Modern Language Tests* (New York, Macmillan, 1927), pp. 315f.

881. DANGER OF COLLEGE ENTRANCE STANDARDS

"On the one hand, we have a realization of the necessity of fitting the school curriculum to the individual child; on the other there is pressure from above, particularly in the secondary schools, to meet the requirements for college entrance. The preparation for college board examinations is especially the goal of the private schools. And this pressure is often exerted to the point where it seriously injures the physical or mental health of the child. The fatigue and anxiety occasioned by the drive to meet college entrance standards can hardly be overestimated."

Ernest R. Groves and Phyllis Blanchard, *Introduction to Mental Hygiene* (New York, Holt, 1930), p. 204.

882. AS IT WORKS IN SOUTH AFRICA

"The examination nightmare is forever haunting the child and to reduce its terrors for the victim, teachers have stooped to the expedient of spoon-feeding him mentally; but this robs him of initiative, stifles in him the growth of original thought, enslaves him to the habit of following the dictates of others and frustrates the primary aim of education, namely to produce a citizen who can think for himself, can hold his own, and is prepared to serve his country with love and devotion."

Report of the Education Inquiry Commission, Orange Free State Province, 1926, p. 26.

883. MEASUREMENT WORKERS' NEED FOR PHILOSOPHY

"Workers in educational measurement are frequently accused of being decidedly narrow and materialistic in their con-

ception of education. There is always a certain danger that in the giving and scoring of tests and the amassing of statistical data some individuals will not be able to see beyond to the larger purposes of education and to the real meaning of the measurement movement. Perhaps no educational worker is in greater need of a meaningful philosophy of education than he who is dealing with the most tangible results of instruction in the schools."

Clifford Woody and Paul V. Sangren, *Administration of the Testing Program* (Yonkers, World Book, 1932), pp. 364-65.

884. EXCESSIVE EMPHASIS ON QUANTITATIVE STANDARDS

"In a period of rapid readjustment the tendency of human nature to grasp at the one easy device of quantitative evaluation has unfortunately dominated thought and action. We have a quantitative standard all over the United States. It is a fiction of the most ludicrous transparency, but it seems to be satisfying to some who know little about the real conditions, especially to those who solemnly sit in judgment on those graduates of high schools who wish to go to college."

Charles H. Judd, *Psychology of High-School Subjects* (Boston, Ginn, 1915), p. 481.

885. THE MEASUREMENT OF SCHOOL PRODUCTS

"During the past twenty-five or thirty years interest in the accurate measurement of school products has probably absorbed more energy and first-rate ability among students of education in America than any other single activity. Inspired by the technique which had been perfected in the natural sciences those engaged in this work have sought to standardize procedures and to improve instruments of testing so that the personal equation of the tester may be eliminated entirely. . . .

"Although the development of instruments for the measurement of school products has had a scientific as well as a practical motive, its major claim for popular support has been made in the name of efficiency. When the movement was in its first flush of youth its champions advanced the most extreme claims regarding its practical utility. Many school administrators and

students of education apparently believed that measurement held the key to the solution of all educational problems. Through the use of standardized tests they argued that systems, schools, teachers, and methods could be appraised. An era of rapid and uninterrupted educational advance consequently seemed immediately ahead. The result was an orgy of testing that swept through the entire country.

"While it is yet too early to appraise this movement in its entirety, certain conclusions may be drawn with confidence. As aids in the process of education and in the advancement of knowledge in the whole field of learning, instruments of measurement have proved their value and are certain to remain. On the other hand the feverish and uncritical fashioning of tests in terms of the existing curriculum and in the name of efficiency has undoubtedly served to fasten upon the schools an archaic program of instruction and a false theory of the nature of learning. There is also evidence to indicate that interest in standardized testing procedures has tended to stimulate the competitive impulses, to enforce social conformity, to mechanize the teaching process, and to center attention on the less important products of the school."

George S. Counts, *The American Road to Culture* (New York, John Day, 1930), pp. 146-48.

886. DEWEY ON MEASUREMENT IN EDUCATION

"Nor need the progressive educator be unduly scared by the idea that science is constituted by quantitative results, and, as it is often said, that whatever exists can be measured, for all subjects pass through a qualitative stage before they arrive at a quantitative one; and if this were the place it could be shown that even in the mathematical sciences quantity occupies a secondary place as compared with ideas of order which verge on the qualitative. At all events, *quality* of activity and of consequence is more important for the teacher than any quantitative element. If this fact prevents the development of a certain kind of science, it may be unfortunate. But the educator cannot sit down and wait till there are methods by which quality may be reduced to quantity; he must operate here and now. If he can organize his qualitative processes and

results into some connected intellectual form, he is really advancing scientific method much more than if, ignoring what is actually most important, he devotes his energies to such unimportant by-products as may now be measured.

"Moreover, even if it be true that everything which exists could be measured—if only we knew how—that which does *not* exist cannot be measured. And it is no paradox to say that the teacher is deeply concerned with what does not exist. For a progressive school is primarily concerned with growth, with a moving and changing process, with *transforming* existing capacities and experiences; what already exists by way of native endowment and past achievement is subordinate to what it may become. Possibilities are more important than what already exists, and knowledge of the latter counts only in its bearing upon possibilities. The place of measurement of achievements as a theory of education is very different in a static educational system from what it is in one which is dynamic, or in which the ongoing process of growing is the important thing."

John Dewey, "Progressive Education and the Science of Education," in *Progressive Education*, 5:199–200 (July—Aug.—Sept. 1928).

887. EXISTING HANDICAPS TO SUPERVISION

"Supervision is suffering under three great handicaps. The first handicap is found in the widespread use of a type of close supervision that leaves to the teacher a minimum of opportunity for the display of initiative, that puts the chief emphasis on specific methods and devices, and on the learning of skills and predetermined subject matter, and therefore fails to see the importance of pupil growth in capacity for independent thinking, in variety of interests, in attitudes, appreciations, and habits. Second, the practice of this close supervision has produced confusion in the minds of teachers and executives as to the need, function, and methods of supervision. Finally, the tendency to organize supervision by subjects has a number of bad effects, the chief of which is that it puts undue emphasis on the learning of subject matter to the exclusion of other values and creates a set of vested interests that tend to oppose

curricular changes that threaten to disturb the status of existing subjects of study."

Jesse H. Newlon, "Creative Supervision in High Schools," in *Teachers College Record*, 30:640 (Apr. 1929).

888. A DEMOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY OF SUPERVISION

"In the process of unfolding and developing the creative act the control must be held by the creator. . . . The greater the control by the creator, the greater the possibilities for unique acts. The less the opportunity for control by the creator, the less the opportunity for creative acts. All attempts, therefore, to free pupils or teachers from domination by external sources are steps toward their greater creativeness. . . .

"If we believe that creating is the essence of education and intelligent self-direction the supreme act of life, a program of creative supervision should be so planned and administered as to achieve as far as possible the intelligent self-direction of the teacher through (1) an environment in which she is free to respond creatively; (2) opportunity to do her own thinking, to form her own judgments, to discover her own finest interests and abilities; (3) sufficient guidance to develop her own technique and her own procedures based on a knowledge of how learning takes place; (4) continuous experiences which result in more and better self-direction, in the re-creation of her experiences, and in the integration of her personality."

Supervision and the Creative Teacher, 5th Yearbook Dept. of Supervisors and Directors of Instruction, N.E.A. (New York, Teachers College, 1932), pp. 11, 290.

889. NOT DOMINATION BUT COÖPERATION

"As applied to the supervisor-teacher relationship, the democratic ideal does not sanction the imposition of the supervisor's will upon his colleagues. Neither does it permit of a relationship in which each member of his staff goes his own way without dynamic connections with his fellows or the aims and purposes of the school as a whole. Democratic supervision implies that a supervisor will strive, by virtue of his position, to organize life within his school so that all factors in the situation—supervisor, teachers, pupils, and even janitors—will

carry on their functions coöperatively and in such wise that each can define and perform his duty with an increasing appreciation of its bearing upon the functions of others."

H. B. Albery and V. T. Thayer, *Supervision in the Secondary School* (Boston, Heath, 1931), p. 91.

890. THE PRINCIPAL AND THE TEACHER

"What distinguishes two individuals is a difference in performance rather than false notions of status. The essential difference between a principal of a school and a teacher, for example, consists in the former's responsibility for the smooth operation of the school as a whole. He is the servant of his colleagues in that his first concern is to provide conditions under which they can best exercise their distinctive functions. His task it is to coördinate and integrate all factors that affect the general conditions for carrying on the educational process. The teacher, on the other hand, is primarily interested with life in the class-room, his pupils, and the work in which they are engaged. Elements of general discipline, the work in other class-rooms, in grades above and below and parallel to his own, involve him in so far as they modify of necessity the plans that he wishes to carry out. Consequently the principal's activities and the teacher's concerns should supplement and reinforce one another. Each is dependent for the adequate performance of his duties upon the understanding and coöperation of the other. The same is true of relations with the office staff, janitors, and so on. And there is every assurance that the interests of each group will receive fairly adequate recognition when facilities are provided for pooling information regarding common needs and formulating individual purposes in the light of all relevant considerations. A principal thus performs the duties of general administrator best when he brings all these functionaries into relationship with one another and by the exercise of tact and consideration stimulates the origin and development of policies which express the consensus of the best judgment of the whole group."

V. T. Thayer, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 237-38.

891. CHILD GROWTH THE AIM OF SUPERVISION

"But in the last analysis it is on behalf of the child that we must make our final plea for democratic supervision. He is the be-all and the end-all of our efforts, and the effects upon him of the environment we create is the test of our honesty and sincerity. We have fairly well abandoned that educational philosophy which contends that by oppression and suppression of all impulses a child learns to use wisely the relative freedom of adult life. We believe now that only as one learns painfully to exercise control will he practice control. Only as he lives in an environment that respects personality will a respect for personality develop. Consequently, we should strive to make our school environment consistent with the ideals we profess. If we are preparing our pupils to exercise the democratic functions of citizenship, we should organize our schools so that in very truth they become replicas of democratic life."

H. B. Alerty and V. T. Thayer, *Supervision in the Secondary School* (Boston, Heath, 1931), p. 106.

892. DUTIES OF THE COLLEGE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

"The fact that the board constitutes a body corporate under the law, with power to sue and be sued, with right to hold property, and so forth, makes it legally possible for the board to exercise whatever control it wishes over the use of properties and funds in the name of the institution, in so far as such control is not in violation of statute. . . . The board must determine in broad terms, the educational policies of the institution. . . . In the field of finance, the board is primarily responsible for the securing and management of the funds. In matters relating to the technical phases of educational policy, it is obviously good judgment for the board to accept expert advice which it may reasonably expect from the chief administrative officer, or members of his staff, through him."

R. J. Leonard, E. S. Evenden, F. B. O'Rear, and others, *Survey of Higher Education for the United Lutheran Church in America* (New York, Teachers College, 1929), Vol. I, pp. 84-85.

893. HOW THE TRUSTEE SEES HIS WORK

"But what are the responsibilities and duties of trustees? Legally, they have responsibility for the whole show, but actually they are considerably repressed. According to the faculty, at least, a trustee should not discuss education because he is not supposed to know anything about education; and he must be very careful not to criticize faculty folks because that might interfere with academic freedom. There is general consensus, however, that he may take a firm grip upon himself, and upon his hat, and pass the hat. He may raise money, and if he does he may manage it and the property and the business activities of the university."

Harold H. Swift, in H. P. Fairchild (ed.), *The Obligation of Universities to the Social Order* (New York, New York University Press, 1933), p. 76.

894. HOW THE TRUSTEE SEES FINANCE

"I am not speaking entirely academically. . . . There are very real and practical implications. We heard last night, and we are hearing on every hand, and we shall hear much more, that education is suffering from lack of funds. Our endowments come largely from private sources. Wills are being rewritten, and capitalists are not articulate. They write and rewrite wills, and they do not talk about it very much. Naturally, discontent occurs and expresses itself during such times as these. We should look for it, and I think we should welcome it. But because times are troubled, unsound doctrines should not go unchallenged; and the radical makes the front page. The conservative, therefore, should shout twice as loudly to be heard at all."

Harold H. Swift, in H. P. Fairchild (ed.), *The Obligation of Universities to the Social Order* (New York, New York University Press, 1933), pp. 78-79.

895. CATTELL'S PROPOSALS FOR UNIVERSITY ORGANIZATION

"1. There should be a corporation consisting of the professors and other officers of the university, the alumni who maintain their interest in the institution, and members of the community who ally themselves with it. In the case of the state universities part of the corporation would be elected by the

people. This corporation should elect trustees having the ordinary functions of trustees—the care of the property and the representation of the common sense of the corporation and of the community in university policy. The trustees should elect a chancellor and a treasurer who would represent the university in its relations with the community.

"2. The professors or officers, or their representatives, should elect a president who has expert knowledge of education and of university administration. His salary should not be larger, his position more dignified, or his powers greater than those of the professor.

"3. The unit of organization within the university should be the school, division, or department, a group of men having common objects and interests, who can meet frequently and see each other daily. It should be large enough to meet for deliberation and to represent diverse points of view, but small enough for each to understand the whole and to feel responsible for it. The size of this group is prescribed by a psychological constant, its efficient maximum being about twenty men and its minimum about ten.

"4. Each school, division, or department should elect its dean or chairman and its executive committee, and have as complete autonomy as is consistent with the welfare of the university as a whole. It should elect its minor officers and nominate its professors. The nominations for professorships should be subject to the approval of a board of advisers constituted for each department, consisting, say, of two members of the department, two experts in the subject outside the university, and two professors from related departments. The final election should be by a university senate, subject to the veto of the trustees. The same salaries should be paid for the same office and the same amount of work. The election should be for life, except in the case of impeachment after trial. The division should have financial as well as educational autonomy. Its income should be held as a trust fund and it should be encouraged to increase this fund.

"5. The departments or divisions should elect representatives for such committees as are needed when they have common interests, and to a senate which should legislate for the univer-

sity as a whole and be a body coördinate with the trustees. It should have an executive committee which would meet with a similar committee of the trustees. There should also on special occasions be plenums of divisions having interests in common and plenums of all the professors or officers of the university. There should be as much flexibility and as complete anarchy throughout the university as is consistent with unity and order."

J. McKeen Cattell, *University Control* (New York, Science Press, 1913), pp. 18-21.

896. OVERSPECIALIZATION IN ADMINISTRATION

"The practice now current in teachers' colleges, especially on the graduate level, of specializing candidates for educational leadership so exclusively in a narrow technology of administration is the most crucial defect of our present civilization, because it blindfolds the leadership of social planning. There is nothing the present crisis quite so urgently suggests as a new policy in our graduate teachers' colleges."

Ross L. Finney, in *Theses on Freedom* (Washington, Nat'l Council of Educ. of the N.E.A., 1932), p. 12.

897. SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION A MEANS, NOT AN END

"School administration does not exist for itself; it is only a means, not an end. Schools are maintained only for the giving of education. School administration which facilitates education, and does so without financial waste, is justifiable and worth spending money upon; school administration which does not facilitate education is a parasite—a debauchery of public funds. School administration, therefore, exists only for the pupil, and its efficacy must be measured by the extent to which it contributes to teaching and learning; to teaching and learning it must always be a servant. It makes its largest contributions by providing efficient teachers and by furnishing them and their pupils with the proper tools and environment with which and in which to work."

Ward G. Reeder, *The Fundamentals of Public School Administration* (New York, Macmillan, 1930), p. 4.

898. TEACHER CONTROL OF EDUCATION

"Effective performance of the professional functions presupposes a general shifting of responsibility on the technical side from lay to professional groups. And if the connection indicated in this study holds between the character of the administration and the character of the school program it would seem to constitute a warning against the idea that questions of administration are after all of little concern to the educator, and to imply that on the contrary administration must either be made to serve fundamental educational purposes or be permitted to dominate the public and the teaching profession in the interests of standardization. If this conclusion is sound, educational efficiency demands exact reversal of the traditional relationship within the profession between the administrator and the worker directly responsible for the educative process. Education in the technical sense should be the senior branch, educational administration the junior branch, of the profession. The expert in administration should assist, not control, the educational expert."

Howard D. Langford, *Educational Service: Its Functions and Possibilities* (New York, Teachers College, 1931), p. 159.

899. THE EDUCATIONAL PATTERN OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

"The patterns which should determine the functioning of educational organizations are more appropriately found in valid conceptions of the nature and purpose of education than in the structure of business and industry. Always it is the special task of the administrator to center upon those conditions basic for the active participation of all functionaries; and the end he should have in view is that type of planning which enables individuals and groups to carry on their own activities with intelligent reference to others. When problems arise or new policies are called for, the administrator is charged with peculiar responsibility for seeing to it that all relevant aspects are considered. Leadership on these occasions does not consist in imposing his will upon others; it involves rather bringing about the coördinated and coöperative thinking and planning of all interests in the light of purposes that transcend petty am-

bitions and concerns and which direct the active energies of every one toward the realization of ends shared by all.

"Leadership under these conditions is no small undertaking. It involves first of all bringing the specialists together and keeping them together until their association has brought forth good fruit. As chairman the administrator must guide and direct discussion along lines relevant for all. He must be able to see and appreciate relations possible as well as actual between two experts who are perhaps blinded by excessive preoccupation with their own specialties. He must respond sympathetically to a wide variety of interests. These he must hold constantly before the eyes of all participants so that in attaining one value others are not sacrificed. What wisdom he possesses he will contribute to the common pool, but the final decision arrived at will not flow from his superior will or depend upon his position of authority. It will evolve rather out of the group deliberations and win approval because it is the most relevant and comprehensive program possible. And as a means toward the emergence of a common program of this nature it is his special concern and responsibility to maintain and create the conditions which will elicit from each participant the very best he has to offer for the unified program. Finally, when deliberations are ended, his is the genius which must see that agreements arrived at are executed with the same intelligent and understanding appreciation of the relations between part and whole and whole and part that characterized their evolution."

V. T. Thayer, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 235-36.

900. SUBORDINATION OF EDUCATION TO ADMINISTRATION

"To anyone who knows the facts, it is evident that, in spite of the friendly attitude of teachers and the helpless good wishes of deans, our educational institutions are officially interested in pupils and students only where they happen to impinge upon the formal operations of the mechanism. We cannot tolerate administrative vagueness, suspense, or untidiness in our education. We must 'know where we are' in good clean credits even though the pupils get nowhere in particular. In other

words, we are afraid frankly to place the student, always unique and highly variable, in the full focus of attention and to venture direct dealings with the elusive, but recognizable and supremely desirable thing that we know true education to be. We set enormous store by curricula and instruction, as though these were the essential matters, instead of bending every effort, first of all, toward finding out what unique combination of forces each individual before us actually presents, what he is, what he knows, what he wants to do, what he can do, what he probably should do; then helping him to do his own learning under conditions that keep him in constant contact with the realities of his progress."

William S. Learned, *Realism in American Education* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1932), pp. 24-25.

901. PLACING POWER WITHIN THE TEACHING BODY

"Immediately and practically a great change toward democracy, freedom, and intelligence, not to mention character and leadership for our schools, would be realized if the teaching body, and finally the students as well, were given the right to nominate or to veto the appointment of the superintendent and other executive officers of a school. An executive office thus made responsible to the school community would speedily develop a wholly different character. The incumbent would of necessity be required to have or to develop a strong personality, vision, leadership. He could no longer remain, as he now too often is, a politician, a mere follower, a bureaucrat relying upon clerks and typewriters, without spirit and without vision."

J. E. Kirkpatrick, *Academic Organization and Control* (Yellow Springs, Ohio, Antioch Press, 1931), pp. 156f.

902. CONTROLLING SCHOOL POLICIES

"The basic service which the board renders society is the formulation of general educational policy. . . . If this major contention regarding the function of the board is granted, it naturally follows that the composition of the board of ed-

ucation is a matter of great social significance. The question is at once raised: To what element or elements of the population should society entrust its destiny? The criterion of personal competence is not enough. To permit one class or element to legislate for another would seem to be dangerous. Such a practice would open the way to exploitation of the most grievous type. Moreover, the whole of wisdom resides in no single class or group.

"This question of the control of education takes one to the heart of the social problem. . . . The temptation on the part of any controlling element in society to employ such an instrument to promote its own special point of view is certain to be extraordinarily seductive. Is any class able to withstand it? A major task which confronts us, therefore, is that of devising some means of so controlling the school that it may not become the subservient tool of some powerful interest or group in the community.

"The very conception of the nature of education and of the fundamental purpose of the school is at stake. Is education to be regarded as a process of indoctrination or of enlightenment? Is the school to be conceived as a broadly educative agency, an agency which may be trusted to strive earnestly, and without prejudice, to give to the youth of the nation genuine insight into the present complex industrial civilization, or is it to become an instrument by means of which some dominant class or sect impresses upon the mind of the coming generation its own special bias or point of view? . . .

"In shaping educational policy, the peculiar limitations of any dominant social class should be noted. . . . A dominant class is a privileged class, a class that is favored by the existing social arrangement. It therefore tends to be conservative, to exaggerate the merits of the prevailing order, and to fear any agitation favoring fundamental changes in the social structure. . . .

"Our boards of education are composed of business men. What this is likely to mean for American education is obvious. There is grave danger that the curriculum, methods of instruction, administrative organization, and criteria of successful achievement in the school will be derived from the procedures,

needs, and ideals of commerce and industry. Evidence is already accumulating to indicate that this is taking place."

George S. Counts, *The Social Composition of Boards of Education* (Chicago, Dept. of Education, University of Chicago, 1927), pp. 90-94.

903. THE REPRESENTATIVE COMPOSITION OF THE SCHOOL BOARD

"When we accept the principle of representation of differing interests on boards of education, we must also seek ways and means for giving an educational character to this relationship. This suggests that an analysis of a community in terms of conventional political or social or economic groupings may not serve the purposes of public education. Here again we should realize that an analysis must always take its character from the end it is to serve. As applied to education, this means that the groups represented on boards of education should have some functional interest in the processes of education. The criterion for representation should be an actual stake in the enterprise. This suggests a functional organization of boards that would include at least the professional staff, parents, the community at large, and those outside agencies with which the educational system is in intimate contact. To these should perhaps be added a representative of the city financial administration. The principle we have in mind is a functional grouping that will insure a hearing for all legitimate interests in education and a basis for mutual understanding and a necessary give-and-take, as between these groupings, on behalf of larger common concerns. Where the activities of the school are administered with the educational emphasis stressed in our previous discussion, we may hope that representation of diverse interests on the board of education will serve the necessary purpose of interpreting society to the school."

V. T. Thayer, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 255-56.

CHAPTER XXI

MORAL EDUCATION

904. OUR EVIL TIMES (3800 B.C.)

"In the Museum at Constantinople is a tablet of 3800 B.C. as follows:

"‘We have fallen upon evil times and the world has waxed very old and wicked. Politics are very corrupt. Children are no longer respectful to their parents.’"

G. T. W. Patrick, *Introduction to Philosophy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1924), p. 207n.

905. BREAKING UP SCHOOLS IN MASSACHUSETTS IN 1837

Horace Mann reports that in 1837 from 150 to 200 of the approximately 2,800 winter rural schools in Massachusetts were "annually brought to a violent termination . . . by the triumph of a rebellious spirit on the part of the scholars." In other words, in that one year the bad boys in Massachusetts broke up some 150 to 200 schools by running off the teachers.

Horace Mann's reports to the Massachusetts Board of Education: First Annual Report, 1838, p. 302; Sixth Annual Report, 1843, p. 38; Eighth Annual Report, 1845, p. 67.

906. THE UNREALITY OF AUTHORITARIAN MORALS

"A thoroughly modernized young man today distrusts moral wisdom precisely because it is commanded.

"It is often said that this distrust is merely an aspect of the normal rebellion of youth. I do not believe it. This distrust is due to a much more fundamental cause. It is due not to a rebellion against authority but to an unbelief in it. This unbelief is the result of that dissolution of the ancient order out of which modern civilization is emerging, and unless we understand the radical character of this unbelief we shall never understand the moral confusion of this age. We shall fail to see

that morals taught with authority are pervaded with a sense of unreality because the sense of authority is no longer real. Men will not feel that wisdom is authentic if they are asked to believe that it derives from something which does not seem authentic."

Walter Lippmann, *A Preface to Morals* (New York, Macmillan, 1929), p. 228.

907. CRIMINALS AND EDUCATION

"Criminals today are not illiterate. The prison school at Sing Sing was awarded a higher rating by investigators from Columbia University than public schools of similar grades. If the public school is really to mold character, it must learn to socialize education."

Lewis E. Lawes, "A Warden Looks at Education," in *New York Times Magazine*, July 31, 1932.

908. THE GOOD MORAL CHARACTER

(a) "The genuinely moral person is one, then, in whom the habit of regarding all capacities and habits of self from the social standpoint is formed and active. Such an one forms his plans, regulates his desires, and hence performs his acts with reference to the effect they have upon the social groups of which he is a part. He is one whose dominant attitudes and interests are bound up with associated activities. Accordingly he will find his happiness or satisfaction in the promotion of these activities irrespective of the particular pains and pleasures that accrue."

(b) "To one in whom these interests live (and they live to some extent in every individual not completely pathological) their exercise brings happiness because it fulfills his life. To those in whom it is the supreme interest it brings supreme or final happiness. It is not preferred because it is the greater happiness, but in being preferred as expressing the only kind of self which the agent fundamentally wishes himself to be, it constitutes a kind of happiness with which others cannot be compared. It is unique, final, invaluable."

John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics* (New York, Holt, 1908), pp. 298, 301.

909. NOBLE ASCETIC COMPOSURE

"The eyelids of a samurai know not moisture."

Etsu Inagaki Sugimoto, *A Daughter of the Samurai* (Garden City, Doubleday Page, 1925), p. 160.

910. CHARACTER

"Character consists in a man steadily pursuing the things of which he feels himself capable."

Goethe.

911. CONVICTIONS

"The adoption of intelligence as the very heart of a philosophy of action does not exclude firmness of conviction nor daring. It rather affirms that convictions must be firm *enough* to evoke and justify action, while also they are to be held in a way which permits the individual to learn from his further experience. It implies that every sound conviction will be confirmed, in the degree of its soundness, by subsequent experience. It trusts to convictions which are firm because confirmed in experience rather than those which are intense mainly because of immaturity. At the same time it recognizes that maturity often leads to the limitations of rigid fixation, and that inexperience and ignorance when animated by sincerity are often capable of thoughts and adventures of which a mind closed in by habit and indurated by past experiences is incapable."

John Dewey and John L. Childs, in William H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier* (New York, Century, 1933), pp. 312-13.

912. PERSONALITY NOT A BUNDLE OF CHARACTER TRAITS

"*The personality is not a bundle of character traits like aggressiveness, modesty, ambition, coöperativeness, good humor, and intelligence, each arising from a separate source of influence, and taking its own independent course of development. The personality evolves, a single pattern of behavior, with each act depending upon every other while it is emerging.*"

Raymond H. Wheeler and Francis T. Perkins, *Principles of Mental Development* (New York, Crowell, 1932), p. 25.

913. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL CONDUCT

"A moral situation is one in which judgment and choice are required antecedently to overt action. The practical meaning of the situation—that is to say the action needed to satisfy it—is not self-evident. It has to be searched for. There are conflicting desires and alternative apparent goods. What is needed is to find the right course of action, the right good. Hence, inquiry is exacted: observation of the detailed makeup of the situation; analysis into its diverse factors; clarification of what is obscure; discounting of the more insistent and vivid traits; tracing the consequences of the various modes of action that suggest themselves; regarding the decision reached as hypothetical and tentative until the anticipated or supposed consequences which led to its adoption have been squared with actual consequences. This inquiry is intelligence. Our moral failures go back to some weakness of disposition, some absence of sympathy, some one-sided bias that makes us perform the judgment of the concrete case carelessly or perversely. Wide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in the face of the disagreeable, balance of interests enabling us to undertake the work of analysis and decision intelligently, are the distinctively moral traits—the virtues or moral excellencies."

John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, Holt, 1920), pp. 163-64.

914. JAMES ON MORAL DELIBERATION

"The hackneyed example of moral deliberation is the case of an habitual drunkard under temptation. He has made a resolve to reform, but he is now solicited again by the bottle. His moral triumph or failure literally consists in his finding the right *name* for the case. If he says that it is a case of not wasting good liquor already poured out, or a case of not being churlish and unsociable when in the midst of friends, or a case of learning something at last about a brand of whiskey which he never met before, or a case of celebrating a public holiday, or a case of stimulating himself to a more energetic resolve in favor of abstinence than any he has ever yet made, then he is lost. His choice of the wrong name seals his doom. But if, in spite of

all the plausible good names with which his thirsty fancy so copiously furnishes him, he unwaveringly clings to the truer bad name, and apperceives the case as that of 'being a drunkard, being a drunkard, being a drunkard,' his feet are planted on the road to salvation. He saves himself by thinking rightly.

"Thus are your pupils to be saved: first, by the stock of ideas with which you furnish them; second, by the amount of voluntary attention that they can exert in holding to the right ones, however unpalatable; and, third, by the several habits of acting definitely on these latter to which they have been successfully trained."

William James, *Talks to Teachers* (New York, Holt, 1900), pp. 187-88.

915. OUTLOOK FOR MEASUREMENT OF CHARACTER

"There is no good reason for expecting tests of persons to yield the constant results found in physical measures. Exactly the same situation can never recur and can never be presented to two different persons. We deal in human life with a series of events having common elements but always distinguished by unique features and having thus unique totalities. The attempt to measure one trait after another, eventually to be summed into a total character, is doomed for two reasons. One is the very simple fact that before we can get to the last traits in the series the individual will have changed in some of the aspects earlier measured. We cannot measure fast enough. Even our measuring does something to change the person we would measure. Moreover, if we could bid the sun and all events in time to stand still for our measuring, we still would have the impossible task of combining a series of rigid abstractions into an integrated whole, the parts of which interact, supplement, and compensate."

Character Education, Dept. of Superintendence 10th Yearbook (1932), p. 404.

916. DISSATISFACTION WITHIN

"When the fight begins within himself,
A man's worth something."

Robert Browning, *Men and Women: Bishop Blougram's Apology*.

917. HOW CONCEIVE MORALS

"In the largest sense of the word, morals is education. It is learning the meaning of what we are about and employing that meaning in action."

John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, Holt, 1922), p. 280.

918. ACTUAL EXPERIENCE THE ONLY EDUCATOR

"Experience of the real world is the basis of vital instruction about it. . . . Character grows by fulfilling one's function in some social group."

George A. Coe, *A Social Theory of Religious Education* (New York, Scribner, 1922), p. 193.

919. TEACHING MORALS

"The moral life is a dynamic somewhat. It cannot be created; it may be elicited and stimulated. Morals cannot be taught; like diseases they are caught. The race has thus far made little use of a positive pedagogy of morals. It has adopted the quick and easy methods of precept, command, threat, punishment, repression. Commands repel; images attract. Prohibitions arouse defiance; symbols awaken the sympathies. Punishments brutalize; spontaneous choice of values brings grace and strength."

Edwin D. Starbuck and others, *A Guide to Books for Character* (New York, Macmillan, 1930), Vol. II, p. 15.

920. WHAT THE SCHOOL CAN DO

"A child is the creature of his groups, both those which make up his real world and those with which he associates in his imagination. His character is molded by the situations in which he most genuinely functions; that is, when he acts successfully, freely, and for the sake of some important object. Therefore the school, if it is to contribute positively to the child's character, must afford him opportunities to function, and whatever of character may result from schooling will be intimately associated with the activities involved. This resultant char-

acter, furthermore, will take on ethical significance in proportion as the activities engaged in are the functions that make up the world's life, since the activities which are so learned as to incorporate the moral factors by which they are raised to the level of true social functions will then constitute the life of society."

Hugh Hartshorne, *Character in Human Relations* (New York, Scribner, 1932), p. 290.

921. INFLUENCE OF THE HOME

"A careful study was made in one community of the homes of the fifty most honest and fifty most dishonest children. This revealed certain important differences between home conditions of these two groups of children. The homes from which the worst offenders came might be best characterized as exhibiting bad parental example, parental discord, bad discipline, unsocial attitudes toward children, impoverished community, and changing economic or social situation. The homes from which the more honest children came revealed the opposite of these conditions."

Hugh Hartshorne, *Character in Human Relations* (New York, Scribner, 1932), pp. 222-23.

922. HABIT AS SERVANT OF THINKING

"In discussions of moral education we often seem to take for granted that the chief problem is to develop certain traits, in the sense of securing *more* truthfulness, *more* tolerance, *more* sympathy, etc. This is a quantitative point of view, which breaks down under criticism. Truth-telling may be ruthless and brutal; tolerance may encourage crime; and sympathy, on the part of juries, may make it impossible to secure convictions. The problem in moral education is not to secure a quantitative increase in traits, but a re-direction of them. The traits must be coördinated and directed towards a worthy end, which means that moral education requires a social ideal and the continuous exercise of intelligence in the interpretation and application of this ideal. Habit is merely the tool of intelligence.

"This interpretation of habit gives a new significance to the function of intelligence. The insistence that habits must be

kept flexible so as to meet the exigencies of changing circumstances means that education must aim to make behavior intelligent by providing resources for dealing with novel situations. As contrasted with the rigidity of mechanical habits, it means freedom, which, according to Dewey, means essentially the operation of thinking in the form of 'intellectual initiative, independence in observation, judicious invention, foresight of consequences, and ingenuity of adaptation to them.' In a word, the concern of education is not with the strengthening of mental faculties, nor with the acquisition and organization of information, nor yet with the formation of S-R bonds, but with the cultivation of thinking. For the power to think is the educational kingdom of heaven; if we seek it persistently, other things will be added unto us. Thinking means flexibility of habit; it means a dominating purpose which achieves its realization by a reconstruction or reorganization of previous experience."

B. H. Bode, *Conflicting Psychologies of Learning* (Boston, Heath, 1929), pp. 273-74.

923. LITERATURE AND CHARACTER BUILDING

Character "is a descriptive word indicating how one will act and the spirit or temper in which the deed is done. It consists of the sum of one's attitudes at any given moment which determine how one will act in and feel toward any specific situation. It has its integrating centers like kindness or thoughtfulness or thrift or loyalty. Even these nuclei of conduct and attitude are shifting quantities that are subject to cultivation and training. They cannot be influenced, however, without changing the entire personality. It is the nature of art to appeal directly and powerfully to fundamental attitudes like courage, love, or curiosity. One cannot read a novel without becoming identified with the action of the story. The entire personality shifts and drifts in the direction of its dominant interests. An entrancing bit of fiction, therefore, is re-creating character at every instant."

Edwin D. Starbuck and others, *A Guide to Books for Character* (New York, Macmillan, 1930), Vol. II, pp. 11-12.

924. SCHEDULED MORAL INSTRUCTION

“Surely then, when all is said and done, there is no more fundamental need than to use every possible chance—not one kind alone—to cultivate moral thoughtfulness. Think of the speed at which we live. Think of the thousand and one clamorous and misleading appeals made by modern city life to our young people. Sometimes we marvel that, with so much to distract them from the pursuit of the quieter and better modes of living, they turn out so well. The time we set aside for reflection upon these worthier things is not wasted. Little as the results would seem to justify themselves in some cases, the school would not be living up to its obligation if it did not make provision for steady, regular reflection upon the things of highest excellence.”

Henry Neumann, *Education for Moral Growth* (New York, Appleton, 1923), p. 233.

925. DEWEY ON DISCIPLINE

“A person who is trained to consider his actions, to undertake them deliberately, is in so far disciplined. Add to this ability a power to endure in an intelligently chosen course in face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty, and you have the essence of discipline.”

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), p. 151.

926. THE OLD-FASHIONED DISCIPLINE

“What ails the youth of today? Every one is ready with an answer. ‘They have grown perverse because we have ceased to administer the old-fashioned discipline,’ says one. . . .

“The faults of youth are due less to relaxation of the old discipline than to the inadequacy and illusoriness of it.”

George A. Coe, *What Ails Our Youth?* (New York, Scribner, 1924), pp. vii–ix.

927. THORNDIKE ON DISCIPLINE

“The discipline from enduring the disagreeable seems to be far outweighed by the discipline from working with an interested will along lines that fit one’s abilities.”

Edward L. Thorndike, “Disciplinary Value of Studies in the Opinion of Students,” in *Teachers College Record*, 25:143 (Mar. 1924).

928. STRENGTH OF WILL

"A very large part of the everyday meaning of will is precisely the deliberate or conscious disposition to persist and endure in a planned course of action in spite of difficulties and contrary solicitations. . . .

"Clearly there are two factors in will. One has to do with the foresight of results, the other with the depth of hold the foreseen outcome has upon the person. (i) Obstinacy is persistence but it is not strength of volition. Obstinacy may be mere animal inertia and insensitiveness. A man keeps on doing a thing just because he has got started, not because of any clearly thought-out purpose. In fact, the obstinate man generally declines (although he may not be quite aware of his refusal) to make clear to himself what his proposed end is; he has a feeling that if he allowed himself to get a clear and full idea of it, it might not be worth while. Stubbornness shows itself even more in reluctance to criticize ends which present themselves than it does in persistence and energy in use of means to achieve the end. The really executive man is a man who ponders his ends, who makes his ideas of the results of his actions as clear and full as possible. The people we called weak-willed or self-indulgent always deceive themselves as to the consequences of their acts. They pick out some feature which is agreeable and neglect all attendant circumstances. When they begin to act, the disagreeable results they ignored begin to show themselves. They are discouraged, or complain of being thwarted in their good purpose by a hard fate, and shift to some other line of action. That the primary difference between strong and feeble volition is intellectual, consisting in the degree of persistent firmness and fullness with which consequences are thought out, cannot be over-emphasized.

"(ii) There is, of course, such a thing as a speculative tracing out of results. Ends are then foreseen, but they do not lay deep hold of a person. They are something to look at and for curiosity to play with rather than something to achieve. There is no such thing as over-intellectuality, but there is such a thing as a one-sided intellectuality. A person 'takes it out' as we say in considering the consequences of proposed lines of

action. A certain flabbiness of fiber prevents the contemplated object from gripping him and engaging him in action."

John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, Macmillan, 1916), pp. 150-51.

929. BAD DISCIPLINE FROM FORMALISM

"It looks at first sight as if formalism and disorganization were as far apart as possible, but in fact they are closely connected, the latter being only the next step after the former in a logical sequence. . . . Formalism goes very naturally with sensuality, avarice, selfish ambition, and other traits of disorganization, because the merely formal institution does not enlist and discipline the soul of the individual, but takes hold of him by the outside, his personality being left to torpor or to irreverent and riotous activity. So in the later centuries of the Roman Empire, when its system was most rigid, the people became unpatriotic, disorderly, and sensual.

"In the same way a school whose discipline is merely formal, not engaging the interest and good-will of the scholar, is pretty certain to turn out unruly boys and girls, because whatever is most personal and vital in them becomes accustomed to assert itself in opposition to the system. And so in a church where external observance has been developed at the expense of personal judgment, the individual conforms to the rite and then feels free for all kinds of self-indulgence. In general the lower 'individualism' of our time, the ruthless self-assertion which is so conspicuous, for example, in business, is not something apart from our institutions but expresses the fact that they are largely formal and unhuman, not containing and enlarging the soul of the individual."

Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York, Scribner, 1915), p. 349.

930. THE EFFECT OF PUNISHMENT

"Men do not become penitent and learn to abhor themselves by having their backs cut open with the lash; rather they learn to abhor the lash."

George Eliot, in *Felix Holt* (New York, Crowell, no date), p. 356.

931. CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN BOSTON IN 1844

“ ‘But there is [said Horace Mann in *The Common School Journal*, Oct. 1, 1845] another motive,—that of Fear, excited by the use of Corporal Punishment,—which it seems now to be admitted on all hands, has been employed to a most pernicious extent, in some of the schools. We do not refer so much to extreme cases, where surgical operations have become necessary, in order to save life or limb,—as to that general condition of mind, either of intense and disabling alarm, or of reckless hardihood and defiance, which is generated through the school, when corporal chastisement, like a grim Minister of Terror, stands forever at the teacher’s right hand, and its aid is perpetually invoked to overcome all the evils of the schoolroom. The abuse of this instrumentality had become so flagrant, and, at last, so notorious, in these schools, that, at the close of the year 1844, the school committee passed [an order requiring a record of each instance of corporal punishment] in hope that the fear of publicity and its consequences would effect a reform, which an appeal to reason and conscience had been unable to achieve.’

“In 1844 . . . for a representative school the Boston Survey Committee found the foggings to average 65 per day for four hundred children.”

Otis W. Caldwell and S. A. Courtis, *Then and Now in Education: 1845-1923* (Yonkers, World Book, 1924), pp. 266, 20.

932. HOW VIEW PUNISHMENT

“Punishment is perhaps of all things brought from the past that one which most hinders us in dealing with behavior. Much of course is included in this one word ‘punishment.’ The worst aspect probably is that of dealing with wrongdoing as such. Most of us seem to feel ‘instinctively’ that wrongdoing should be punished. In times past practically all the conscientious of our ancestors so thought and so acted on all wrongdoing in reach. Law and its enforcement are based on it. Theology seemed to fasten the idea in the very essence of religion. Custom enthroned the practice in home and school.

“In spite of all this we are now coming to see generally that

the punishment of children is seldom if ever effective of only good results and doubtfully of the best results. It is true that pain accompaniments can at times be arranged to advantage with very young children. But it seems beyond question that no child should ever be punished merely because he has done wrong. Not that wrongdoing should be ignored (sometimes yes, sometimes no), but that whatever is done be done only after full consideration of all foreseeable consequences and then solely with reference to improving affairs for the future.

"To believe much in punishment is so likely to shut the mind to the causes of the present bad condition that genuine search for real treatment will rarely take place. Considered remedial treatment is all but blocked. All in all, especially where the integration of personality is considered, punishment as such is seen to be so dangerous that fewer and fewer thoughtful people are willing to use it in any careful treatment of a behavior case."

William H. Kilpatrick, "Behavior Problems," in *Childhood Education*, 5:119f. (Nov. 1928).

933. NO MUNDANE BASIS OF MORALITY

"Were there no future life morality would cease. Man's only destiny would be to procure for himself the enjoyments of this life, irrespective of the means applied. . . . Moreover . . . there would be no reason why man should be harassed by conscience. His only rational endeavor would be to avoid detection and escape the punishment established by law. . . .

"Were there no future life, no motive whatever would induce us to practice virtue. The only restraint imposed on vice and crime would be the fear of temporal loss or punishment."

L. Jouin, S. J., *Logic and Metaphysics* (New York, St. John's College, no date), pp. 204-5.

934. MORAL CHARACTER UNDERGIRDED BY A MORAL UNIVERSE

"The full life of education and the full life of religion are bound up with one another. Education remains defective and falls short of its full end if it fails to beget the loyalty to eternal principles, the good will, the creative responsibility, which

enter into the making of moral character; and moral character is most surely established only when it is undergirded and sustained by a faith that the constitution of the universe itself is moral, and that moral values are therefore eternal. That faith, that conviction, is religion."

Luther A. Weigle, *Religious and Secular Education* (New York, American Tract Society, no date), p. 3.

935. THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE

"They [scientists] have developed an elaborate method for detecting and discounting their prejudices. It consists of instruments of precision, an accurate vocabulary, controlled experiment, and the submission not only of their results but of their processes to the judgment of their peers. This method provides a body in which the spirit of disinterestedness can live, and it might be said that modern science, not in its crude consequences but in its inward principle, not, that is to say, as manifested in automobiles, electric refrigerators, and rayon silk, but in the behavior of men who invent and perfect these things, is the actual realization in a practicable mode of conduct which can be learned and practiced, of the insight of high religion. The scientific discipline is one way in which this insight, hitherto lyrical and personal and apart, is brought down to earth and into direct and decisive contact with the concerns of mankind.

"It is no exaggeration to say that pure science is high religion incarnate. No doubt the science we have is not the whole incarnation, but as far as it goes it translates into a usable procedure what in the teaching of the sages has been an esoteric insight. Scientific method can be learned. The learning of it matures the human character. Its value can be demonstrated in concrete results. Its importance in human life is indisputable. But the insight of high religion as such could be appreciated only by those who were already mature; it corresponded to nothing in the experience and the necessities of the ordinary man. It could be talked about but not taught; it could inspire only the few who were somehow already inspired. With the discovery of scientific method the insight has ceased to be an

intangible and somewhat formless idea and has become an organized effort which moves mankind more profoundly than anything else in human affairs."

Walter Lippmann, *A Preface to Morals* (New York, Macmillan, 1929), pp. 238-39.

936. A ROMAN CATHOLIC ATTITUDE

"[Horace] Mann and the other educational reformers of the time, were not opposed to the teaching of religion. They seemed to realize the fact that religion is even more necessary for the public welfare than the other subjects of the curriculum, but it was their judgment, and the judgment of those who came after them, that religion could be taught effectively in the home and in the church, and that it should be taught in these institutions rather than in the school. They seemed to have no realization that the banishment of religion from the curriculum would weaken and disintegrate its remaining elements.

"The Catholic Church, however, did not concur in these judgments, and, as we have seen, she set to work immediately and vigorously to build up a school system of her own in this country. In doing this, the effective teaching of religion and of morality was her primary motive. She did not believe that these could be taught effectively when separated from the teaching of secular subjects and hence she introduced into her schools those secular branches which were being introduced in the state schools, that her children might not suffer in any way in their temporal concerns through attendance at her schools.

"But it is not in accordance with her purpose that these branches be taught in her schools in the same manner in which they are taught in the public schools. God must be restored to His place in textbook and teacher's instruction, hence both textbooks and methods are demanded for use in her schools which could not be used consistently in the public schools. When she teaches science in her schools, it must be in the light of higher knowledge, not that there is to be a conflict in the findings of science and the teachings of revelation, but, on the contrary, that the findings of science may be seen in their true perspective. When she teaches history, the saints must be re-

tained in their true relationship to human events and human conduct. She does not and cannot teach morality as a system of abstract laws and regulations or as a maudlin sentimentality devoid of rational content and rational basis."

Thomas E. Shields, *Philosophy of Education* (Washington, Catholic Education Press, 1917), pp. 405-6.

937. INFLUENCE OF THE SUNDAY SCHOOL

"In the matter of honesty, coöperation, inhibition, and persistence, we find a general tendency for children enrolled in Sunday schools to exhibit more desirable conduct than the children who are not enrolled in Sunday schools. But, on the other hand, we find (and this is especially true of honesty) that there is practically no correlation between frequency of attendance at Sunday school and conduct. Apparently it is only necessary to be enrolled. It is clear that we have here an excellent illustration of selection. It is the better-trained children who are enrolled in the Sunday schools in the first place. Furthermore, it is not expected that the Sunday school, having the children for one out of one hundred waking hours, could do very much in the way of establishing habits of conduct.

"We would expect, however, that the Sunday school would influence the ideals, attitudes, and opinions of children. It is true that our data showed the attendants to be slightly better informed regarding ethical standards than non-attendants. Furthermore, length and regularity of attendance was also correlated with the ability to score on tests of moral knowledge and attitude. These associations between knowledge and training, however, are very slight and do not establish any general competence of the Sunday school to improve ethical insight.

"Two of our co-workers, who were investigating the sources of moral knowledge, found that the correlation between certain Sunday-school teachers' scores on the moral-knowledge test and the scores of their pupils was exceedingly low, indicating that the pupils' ideas of right and wrong do not correspond with those of their teachers. They found, on the other hand, substantial correlations between the scores of parents on these

tests and those of their children, indicating that the ideas of right and wrong held by the parents are probably a strong factor in determining the ideas of their children."

Hugh Hartshorne, *Character in Human Relations* (New York, Scribner, 1932), pp. 224-25.

INDEX OF SOURCES

References are to excerpt numbers

Adams, Geo. P., and Montague, Wm. P. (eds.), *Contemporary American Philosophy*. Macmillan. New York, 1930. 120, 165, 461.

Adams, James Truslow, *New England in the Republic, 1776-1850*. Little Brown. Boston, 1926. 474.

Adams, John. 368, 476, 667.

Alberty, H. B., and Thayer, V. T., *Supervision in the Secondary School*. Heath. Boston, 1931. 568, 866, 889, 891.

Alexander, H. B., in P. A. Schlippe (ed.), *Higher Education Faces the Future*. Liveright. New York, 1930. 648.

Allport, F. H., *Social Psychology*. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1924. 567.

American Historical Review. Washington. 462, 527, 533.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Philadelphia. 598.

Anonymous. 259, 336, 416, 442, 566, 720, 759, 796, 865.

Anselm, Saint, *Proslogium* (trans. by Deane). Open Court. Chicago, 1903. 100.

Antioch (College) Notes. Yellow Springs, O. 512.

Arnold, Matthew, *Civilization in the United States*. De Wolfe Fiske. Boston, 1888. 348.

Arnold, Matthew, *Culture and Anarchy*. Macmillan. New York, 1912. 335.

Atlantic Monthly. Boston. 42, 267, 555.

Atwood, Harry F., *Keep God in American History*. Laird & Lee. Chicago, 1919. 812.

Atwood, Harry F., *Safeguarding American Ideals*. Laird & Lee. Chicago, 1921. 525.

Aurelius, Marcus, *Meditations* (trans. by Haines). 134, 144, 310.

Ayers, C. E., in *New Republic*. 790.

Bagley, William C., *The Educative Process*. Macmillan. New York, 1905. 825.

Baillie, John, *The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul*. Doran. New York, 1926. 369.

Baldwin, J. Mark, *Individual and Society*. Badger. Boston, 1911. 285.

Baldwin, J. Mark, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*. Macmillan. New York, 1906. 270.

Bean, Donald P., in *Saturday Review of Literature*. 530.

Beard, Chas. A., in Wilson Gee (ed.), *Research in the Social Sciences*. Macmillan. New York, 1929. 67.

Beard, Chas. A. (ed.), *Whither Mankind*. Longmans Green. New York, 1928. 125, 444.

Belloc, Hilaire. 422.

Benson, C. E., Lough, James E., Skinner, Chas. E., and West, Paul V., *Psychology for Teachers*. Ginn. Boston, 1926. 731.

Bentham, Jeremy, *Works*. Wm. Tait. Edinburgh, 1843. 419.

Bergson, Henri, *Creative Evolution*

INDEX OF SOURCES

(trans. by Mitchell). Holt. New York, 1911. 126.

Bernard, L. L., *Instinct*. Holt. New York, 1924. 221.

Bernard, Saint. 456.

Bernays, Edward L., *Propaganda*. Liveright. New York, 1928. 552.

Bernhardi, F. von, *Germany and the Next War*. Longmans Green. New York, 1912. 434.

Bible. 288, 308, 332.

Biddle, Wm. W., *Propaganda and Education*. Teachers College. New York, 1932. 559.

Bildersee, Dorothy, *Teaching the Primary Grades*. Appleton. New York, 1932. 873.

Black, Major Gen. W. M., in *Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges*, Bulletin 1920, No. 8, U. S. Bureau of Educ. 857.

Boas, Franz, *Anthropology and Modern Life*. Norton. New York, 1932. 471, 532, 762.

Boas, Franz, *The Mind of Primitive Man*. Macmillan. New York, 1911. 541.

Boas, George, *Our New Ways of Thinking*. Harper. New York, 1930. 686, 687, 704.

Bobbitt, Franklin, *How to Make a Curriculum*. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1924. 843.

Bobbitt, Franklin, in 26th Yearbook, Nat. Soc. for the Study of Educ. 844.

Bode, B. H., *Conflicting Psychologies of Learning*. Heath. Boston, 1929. 140, 189, 234, 922.

Bode, B. H., in *Creative Intelligence*. Holt. New York, 1917. 214.

Bode, B. H., in *Educational Administration and Supervision*. 839.

Bode, B. H., *Fundamentals of Education*. Macmillan. New York, 1921. 215, 252.

Bode, B. H., *Modern Educational Theories*. Macmillan. New York, 1927. 71.

Bogardus, Emory S., *The Essentials of Americanization*. Univ. of Southern California Press. Los Angeles, 1923. 303.

Bourne, Randolph, *Untimely Papers*. Huebsch. New York, 1919. 271.

Bower, W. C., *Religion and the Good Life*. Abingdon Press. New York, 1933. 323, 735.

Bradley, F. H., *Ethical Studies*. King. London, 1876. 401.

Braman, Dwight, in *New York Times*. 586.

Brandeis, Justice (with Justice Holmes), in *U. S. Reports*. 576.

Bridgman, P. W., *The Logic of Modern Physics*. Macmillan. New York, 1927. 146, 693, 713, 725, 726.

Briffault, Robert, *Breakdown*. Coward-McCann. New York, 1932. 488, 669.

Briffault, Robert, *The Mothers*. Macmillan. New York, 1927. 287.

Briggs, Thomas H., *The Great Investment*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 1930. 518, 519, 617, 774.

Briggs, Thomas H., in *Junior-Senior High School Clearing House*. 505, 805.

Brigham, Carl C., in *Psychological Review*. 697.

Brigham, Carl C., *A Study of American Intelligence*. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 1923. 695, 696.

Brooks, Phillips. 719.

Brown, W. Jethro, *The Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation*. Dutton. New York, 1915. 460.

Browne, Sir Thomas, *Religio Medici*. Cassell. London, 1886. 423.

Browning, Robert. 916.

Bryce, James, *Modern Democracies*. Macmillan. New York, 1921. 301.

Buchner, Edward F., *Kant's Educational Theory*. Lippincott. Philadelphia, 1904. 410.

Bulletin University of Wisconsin. University of Wisconsin, Madison. 842.

Burgess, Ernest W., *The Function of Socialization in Social Evolution*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1916. 300.

Burk, Frederick, in *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education*. Macmillan. New York, 1917. 872.

Burke, Edmund, *Reflections on the French Revolution*. Maynard Merrill. New York, no date. 103.

Burnham, W. H., *The Normal Mind*. Appleton. New York, 1924. 752, 849.

Burns, Capt. John H., in *Infantry Journal*. 860.

Burns, Robert. 152.

Burtt, E. A., *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*. Harcourt Brace. New York, 1927. 118, 119.

Butler, Bishop Joseph, *Sermons. Clark*. Edinburgh, no date. 411.

Butler, G. Montague, in *School and Society*. 473.

Butler, Samuel. 253.

Butler, Samuel, *The Way of All Flesh*. Macmillan. New York, 1927. 170.

Caldwell, Otis W., and Courtis, S. A., *Then and Now in Education: 1845-1923*. World Book. Yonkers, 1924. 931.

Calverton, V. F., *For Revolution*. John Day. New York, 1932. 591.

Carlyle, Thomas, *Sartor Resartus*. 579.

Carver, T. N., *The Economy of Human Energy*. Macmillan. New York, 1924. 799.

Carver, T. N., *Principles of Political Economy*. Ginn. Boston, 1919. 421.

Catholic Assn. for International Peace, *International Ethics*. Paulist Press. New York, 1928. 435.

Catholic Education Association. Catholic Association Press, Washington. 628.

Cattell, J. McKeen, *University Control*. Science Press. New York, 1913. 895.

Cazamian, Louis, *Criticism in the Making*. Macmillan. New York, 1929. 723.

Century Magazine. New York. 572.

Chafee, Zechariah, Jr., *The Inquiring Mind*. Harcourt Brace. New York, 1928. 469, 560, 562, 869.

Character Education, Dept. of Superintendence 10th Yearbook. Washington, 1932. 915.

Chase, Doris H. (with Percival M. Symonds), in *Journal of Educational Psychology*. 827.

Chase, Stuart, *A New Deal*. Macmillan. New York, 1933. 655.

Cheyney, Edward P., in *American Historical Review*. 462, 527, 533.

Child, C. M., *Physiological Foundations of Behavior*. Holt. New York, 1924. 181.

Childhood Education. Association for Childhood Education, Washington. 188, 191, 932.

Childs, John L., *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism*. Century. New York, 1931. 407, 515, 794.

Childs, John L. (with John Dewey), in Wm. H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier*. Century. New York, 1933. 22, 23, 75, 90,

INDEX OF SOURCES

241, 570, 640, 644, 654, 674, 689, 750, 911.

Child Study. Child Study Association. New York. 683.

Christian Education in China. Foreign Missions Conference. New York, 1922. 864.

Clark, Harold F., Economic Theory and Correct Occupational Distribution. Teachers College. New York, 1931. 684.

Clarke, E. L., *The Art of Straight Thinking*. Appleton. New York, 1929. 472.

Clemens, S. L. See Twain, Mark.

Clutton-Brock, Arthur, *The Ultimate Belief*. Constable. London, 1916. 393.

Coe, George A., *The Motives of Men*. Scribner. New York, 1928. 51, 480.

Coe, George A., in *Religious Education*. 626.

Coe, George A., *A Social Theory of Religious Education*. Scribner. New York, 1922. 39, 918.

Coe, George A., *What Ails Our Youth?* Scribner. New York, 1924. 433, 581, 587, 624, 926.

Coe, George A., *What Is Christian Education?* Scribner. New York, 1930. 255.

Cohen, J. X., in *Opinion*. 448.

Cohen, Morris R., *Reason and Nature*. Harcourt Brace. New York, 1931. 4, 52, 88, 93, 113, 133, 138, 151, 207, 260, 297, 380, 668.

Columbia University Quarterly. Columbia University Press, New York. 493.

Colvin, S. S. *The Learning Process*. Macmillan. New York, 1921. 779.

Compayré, Gabriel, *Histoire critique des doctrines de l'éducation en France*. Hachette. Paris, 1882. 25.

Compte. 325.

Condorcet, Marquis de, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*. Bibliothèque Nationale. Paris, 1886. 543.

Conference on Examinations, Eastbourne, Eng. Teachers College. New York, 1931. 56, 201.

Conklin, Edwin G., *Heredity and Environment*. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 1929. 404, 405, 549.

Cooley, Charles H., *Social Organization*. Scribner. New York, 1915. 577, 929.

Cope, Henry, F., *Education for Democracy*. Macmillan. New York, 1920. 502.

Counts, George S., *The American Road to Culture*. John Day. New York, 1930. 73, 509, 862, 885.

Counts, George S., *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* John Day. New York, 1932. 281, 511, 678, 763, 792.

Counts, George S., in Albert P. Pinkevitch, *The New Education in the Soviet Republic* (trans. by Perlmutter). John Day. New York, 1929. 611.

Counts, George S., *The Social Composition of Boards of Education*. Department of Education, University of Chicago. Chicago, 1927. 902.

Counts, George S., *The Soviet Challenge to America*. John Day. New York, 1931. 676.

Cowper, William. 356.

Coxe, W. W., in *Review of Educational Research*. 871.

Creative Intelligence. Holt. New York, 1917. 214.

Darlington, Thomas, *Education in Russia*. H. M. Stationery Office. London, 1909. 30, 504.

Daughters of the American Revolution

tion Magazine. Nat'l Soc. of the D.A.R., Washington. 38.

Dawson, Wm. H., *What Is Wrong with Germany?* Longmans Green. New York, 1915. 451.

Dealey, J. Q., and Ward, L. F., *Textbook in Sociology.* Macmillan. New York, 1907. 278.

Decatur, Stephen. 427.

Dell, Floyd, *Love in the Machine Age.* Farrar and Rinehart. New York, 1930. 729.

Denton, Daniel, *A Brief Description of New York.* William Gowans. New York, 1845. 630.

Dept. of Superintendence 10th Yearbook, *Character Education.* Washington, 1932. 915.

Dept. of Supervisors and Directors of Instruction, N.E.A., 5th Yearbook, *Supervision and the Creative Teacher.* Teachers College. New York, 1932. 888.

Dewey, John, in *Art and Education.* Barnes Foundation Press. New York, 1929. 367, 853.

Dewey, John, *Characters and Events.* Holt. New York, 1929. 143, 377, 764, 787.

Dewey, John, *The Child and the Curriculum.* University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1902. 360.

Dewey, John, *Construction and Criticism.* Columbia University Press. New York, 1930. 18.

Dewey, John, in *Creative Intelligence.* Holt. New York, 1917. 83, 91.

Dewey, John, *Culture and Industry in Education.* Teachers College. New York, 1919. 364.

Dewey, John, in Paul Monroe (ed.), *Cyclopedia of Education.* Macmillan. New York, 1911. 484, 758, 760.

Dewey, John, *Democracy and Education.* Macmillan. New York, 1916. 20, 218, 223, 257, 282, 304, 482, 500, 777, 778, 806, 834, 837, 854, 925, 928.

Dewey, John (with John L. Childs), in Wm. H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier.* Century. New York, 1933. 22, 23, 75, 90, 241, 570, 640, 644, 654, 674, 689, 750, 911.

Dewey, John, *The Educational Situation.* University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1906. 863.

Dewey, John, in *Elementary School Record.* 870.

Dewey, John, in *Elementary School Teacher.* 516.

Dewey, John, *Essays in Experimental Logic.* University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1916. 95, 127, 158, 161.

Dewey, John, *Experience and Nature.* Norton. New York, 1929. 9, 14, 15, 121, 145, 153, 155, 159, 169, 211, 232, 366.

Dewey, John, *Experience and Nature.* Open Court. Chicago, 1925. 80, 82, 84.

Dewey, John, *How We Think.* Heath. Boston, 1910. 219.

Dewey, John, *Human Nature and Conduct.* Holt. New York, 1922. 226, 227, 240, 246, 272, 279, 353, 391, 396, 399, 418, 436, 513, 538, 592, 748, 775, 917.

Dewey, John, *Individualism Old and New.* Minton Balch. New York, 1930. 376, 652, 677, 736

Dewey, John, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy.* Holt. New York, 1910. 688.

Dewey, John, *Interest and Effort in Education.* Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1913. 352, 830, 831.

Dewey, John, *Interest as Related to Will,* 2nd Supplement to Herbart Society Yearbook, 1895. 716, 829, 831.

Dewey, John, in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific*

Methods. New York, 97.

Dewey, John, *My Pedagogic Creed*. Progressive Education Association. Washington, 1929. 791.

Dewey, John, in *New Republic*. 72.

Dewey, John, *Philosophy and Civilization*. Minton Balch. New York, 1931. 17, 47, 55, 142, 199, 228.

Dewey, John, in *Progressive Education*. 846, 852, 886.

Dewey, John, in *Psychological Review*. 698.

Dewey, John, *The Public and Its Problems*. Holt. New York, 1927. 236, 299, 426, 703, 770.

Dewey, John, *The Quest for Certainty*. Minton Balch. New York, 1929. 41, 89, 128, 131, 148, 154, 157, 233, 235, 691, 694.

Dewey, John, in Kirby Page (ed.), *Recent Gains in American Civilization*. Harcourt Brace. New York, 1928. 645.

Dewey, John, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. Holt. New York, 1920. 114, 141, 264, 284, 291, 343, 361, 425, 494, 685, 913.

Dewey, John, in Wilson Gee (ed.), *Research in the Social Sciences*. Macmillan. New York, 1929. 53.

Dewey, John, *School and Society*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1915. 773.

Dewey, John, *The Sources of a Science of Education*. Liveright. New York, 1929. 40, 65, 69, 70.

Dewey, John, in A. D. Sheffield, *Training for Group Experience. The Inquiry*. New York, 1929. 490.

Dewey, John. (Not located.) 470.

Dewey, John, and Dewey, Evelyn, *Schools of Tomorrow*. Dutton. New York, 1915. 501, 772.

Dewey, John, and Tufts, James H., *Ethics*. Holt. New York, 1908. 247, 395, 908.

Dewey, John, and Tufts, James H., *Ethics*. Holt. New York, 1932. 263, 409, 424, 717.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor, *The Brothers Karamazov* (trans. by Garnett). Macmillan. New York, 1929. 333.

Douglass, Paul H., *The Coming of a New Party*. McGraw-Hill. New York, 1932. 634.

Drake, Durant, *The New Morality*. Macmillan. New York, 1928. 384, 397, 398, 412.

Dunlap, Knight, in *Progressive Education*. 446.

Dunlap, Knight, in *Scientific Monthly*. 186, 192, 213.

Economic Significance of Technological Progress. Continental Committee on Technocracy. New York, 1933. 638, 639.

Eddington, A. S., *The Nature of the Physical World*. Macmillan. New York, 1928. 66, 123, 200.

Edman, Irwin, in *Essays in Honor of John Dewey*. Holt. New York, 1929. 87.

Educational Administration and Supervision. Warwick & York, Baltimore. 187, 251, 839.

Edwards, Lyford P., *The Natural History of Revolution*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1927. 590, 664, 666.

Elementary School Record. 870.

Elementary School Teacher. Dept. of Education, University of Chicago, Chicago. 516.

Eliot, George, *Felix Holt*. Crowell. New York, no date. 930.

Eliot, George, *Romola*. Doubleday Page. Garden City, 1901. 340.

Elliott, Harrison S., *The Process of Group Thinking*. Association Press. New York, 1928. 489.

Elliott, Howard, quoted in Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *The Inquiring*

Mind. Harcourt Brace. Boston, 1928. 560.

Ellis, Havelock, Little Essays of Love and Virtue. Doran. New York, 1922. 328.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo, Essays, 1st series. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1903. 786, 807.

Emerson, Ralph Waldo, Ode inscribed to W. H. Channing. 646.

Encyclopedia Americana (1932 edition). Americana Corporation, New York. 459.

Encyclopedia Britannica (11th edition). Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., New York. 632.

Epictetus, Discourses, etc. Bohn edition. 311.

Essays in Honor of John Dewey. Holt. New York, 1929. 87.

Eucken, Rudolph, The Meaning and Value of Life (trans. by Gibson). Black. London, 1910. 110.

Fairchild, H. P. (ed.), The Obligation of the Universities to the Social Order. New York University Press. New York, 1933. 893, 894.

Faulkner, Harold Underwood, in Harper's Magazine. 601.

Federal Council Bulletin. Federal Council of Churches, New York. 718.

Federal Relations to Education, Report of National Advisory Com. on Education. Washington, 1931. 619, 620.

Field, Justice, in U. S. Reports. 633.

Finney, Ross L., A Sociological Philosophy of Education. Macmillan. New York, 1928. 468, 813, 828.

Finney, Ross L., in Theses on Freedom. N.E.A., Nat. Council of Education, Washington, 1932. 37, 896.

Fish, Hamilton, Jr., in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 598.

Fiske, John, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1891. 535.

Fleming, Cecile W. (with Maxie N. Woodring), in Teachers College Record. 833.

Fletcher, John M., in Scientific Monthly. 545.

Foght, Harold W., The American Rural School. Macmillan. New York, 1912. 439.

Foght, Harold W., The Rural Teacher and His Work. Macmillan. New York, 1917. 438.

Follett, M. P., Creative Experience. Longmans Green. New York, 1924. 708, 709.

Follett, M. P., The New State. Longmans Green. New York, 1920. 283, 483, 491, 554, 569.

Forum, The. New York. 339, 558.

Fouillié, Alfred, Education from a National Standpoint. Appleton. New York, 1892. 420.

Frank, Glenn, in Century Magazine. 572.

Fraser's Magazine. 485.

Frederick William IV. 503.

Freeman, Frank N., in School and Society. 195.

Gee, Wilson (ed.), Research in the Social Sciences. Macmillan. New York, 1929. 53, 67.

Gibran, Kahlil, The Prophet. Knopf. New York, 1923. 441.

Giddings, Franklin H., Theory of Socialization. Macmillan. New York, 1897. 298.

Gide, André, Dostoevsky. Knopf. New York, 1926. 327.

Giles, Herbert A., Civilization of China. Holt. New York, 1911. 542.

Giuliano, Balbino, in *International Education Review*. 607.

Givler, Robert Chenault, *The Ethics of Hercules*. Knopf. New York, 1924. 392, 705.

Goethe. 910.

Graves, Robert, *Good-bye to All That*. Jonathan Cape. London, 1929. 453.

Gray, J. Stanley, in *Educational Administration and Supervision*. 187, 251.

Green, Thomas Hill, *Prolegomena to Ethics*. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1899. 204.

Grisar, Hartmann, Luther. Kegan Paul, Trench & Truebner. London, 1915. 415.

Groves, Ernest R., and Blanchard, Phyllis, *Introduction to Mental Hygiene*. Holt. New York, 1930. 730, 749, 751, 881.

Haldane, J. B. S., in *Harper's Magazine*. 529.

Haldane, J. B. S., *Organism and Environment*. Yale University Press. New Haven, 1917. 173.

Harada, Tasuku, *The Faith of Japan*. Macmillan. New York, 1914. 315, 382.

Harper, S. H., *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1929. 33.

Harper's Magazine. New York. 62, 475, 529, 601.

Hart, Joseph K., *Adult Education*. Crowell. New York, 1927. 793.

Hartshorne, Hugh, *Character in Human Relations*. Scribner. New York, 1932. 797, 920, 921, 937.

Haydon, A. E., quoted in M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals*. Holt. New York, 1924. 305.

Hayes, Carlton J. H., *History of Modern Europe*. Macmillan. New York. 1916. 26.

Herrick, C. Judson, *Fatalism or Freedom*. Norton. New York, 1926. 137, 156, 245, 341, 403.

Herrick, C. Judson, *An Introduction to Neurology*. Saunders. Philadelphia, 1918. 212.

Herrick, C. Judson, *Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior*. Holt. New York, 1924. 172, 178, 210, 225.

Historical Outlook, The. Philadelphia. 836.

Hobhouse, L. T., *Development and Purpose*. Macmillan. London, 1913. 534.

Hobhouse, L. T., *Liberalism*. Holt. New York, no date. 431.

Hobhouse, L. T., *Social Evolution and Political Theory*. Columbia University Press. New York, 1911. 265, 276.

Hockett, Ruth M. (ed.), *Teacher's Guide to Child Development*. California State Board of Education. Sacramento, 1930. 855.

Hocking, W. E., *Human Nature and Its Remaking*. Yale University Press. New Haven, 1918. 104, 413.

Hocking, W. E., in *Journal of Philosophy*. 109, 111.

Hocking, W. E., *The Self: Its Body and Freedom*. Yale University Press. New Haven, 1928. 372, 406.

Hocking, W. E., *Types of Philosophy*. Scribner. New York, 1929. 3.

Holley, C. E., *The Teacher's Technique*. Century. New York, 1922. 868.

Hollingworth, H. L., *Educational Psychology*. Appleton. New York, 1933. 130, 819.

Hollingworth, H. L., *Psychology*. Appleton. New York, 1928. 216, 243, 820.

Holmes, Justice (with Justice

Brandeis). U. S. Reports. 576.
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, *The Common Law*. Little Brown. Boston, 1881. 115.

Holt, Col. Lucius H., in *School Life*. 858.

Holt, Edwin B., *Animal Drive and the Learning Process*. Holt. New York, 1931. 180, 185, 230.

Horn, Ernest, in 24th Yearbook, Nat. Soc. for the Study of Educ. 877.

Horne, Charles F., *The Story of Our American People*. U. S. History Publishing Co. New York, 1926. 597.

Hoskins, R. G., *The Tides of Life*. Norton. New York, 1933. 732.

Howard, Milford W., *Fascism*. Revell. New York, 1928. 466.

Howe, Lucien, *Universal Education and Service*. Putnam. New York, 1917. 857.

Hullfish, H. Gordon, in Wm. H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier*. Century. New York, 1933. 682.

Hu, Shih, *Our Attitude toward Western Civilization*. Peking Leader Press. Peking, 1926. 324.

Huxley, Julian, *What Dare I Think?* Harper. New York, 1931. 379.

Huxley, T. H., *Science and Culture, and Other Essays*. Appleton. New York, 1888. 2.

Ilin, M., *New Russia's Primer* (trans. by Counts and Lodge). Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1931. 657, 658.

Infantry Journal. Washington. 860.

Inge, W. R., *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*. Putnam. New York, 1930. 99.

Inge, W. R., *More Lay Thoughts of a Dean*. Putnam. New York, 1932. 385.

International Conciliation Bulletin. Carnegie Endowment for Intern'l Peace, New York. 430.

International Education Review. Cologne. 607.

James, William, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. Longmans Green. New York, 1922. 78, 92, 98, 220.

James, William, *Letters of (Henry James, ed.)*. Atlantic Monthly Press. Boston, 1920. 160.

James, William, *The Meaning of Truth*. Longmans Green. New York, 1927. 81.

James, William, *On Vital Reserves*. Holt. New York, 1922. 239, 342, 738.

James, William, *Pragmatism*. Longmans Green. New York, 1907. 11, 450.

James, William, *Principles of Psychology*. Holt. New York, 1899. 248, 254, 400.

James, William, *Some Problems of Philosophy*. Longmans Green. New York, 1919. 132, 135, 139.

James, William, *Talks to Teachers*. Holt. New York, 1900. 351, 914.

James, William, *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Longmans Green. New York, 1902. 370.

James, William, *The Will to Believe, and Other Essays*. Longmans Green. New York, 1923. 307.

Jeans, Sir James, *The Universe around Us*. Macmillan. New York, 1931. 46.

Jefferson, Thomas. 27, 28, 29, 467, 573, 589.

Jefferson, Thomas, and Cabell, J. C., *Early History of the University of Virginia*. Randolph. Richmond, 1856. 27.

Jennings, H. S., *Behavior of the*

Lower Organisms. Columbia University Press. New York, 1923. 177, 217, 244.

Jennings, H. S., *The Biological Basis of Human Nature*. Norton. New York, 1930. 550.

Jennings, H. S., *Prometheus*. Dutton. New York, 1925. 194.

Jerome, Saint, Letters and Select Works. Scribner. New York, 1912. 316.

Jewell, Frederick S., *School Government*. Barnes. New York, 1866. 867.

Josephson, Matthew, in *New Republic*. 635.

Jouin, L., Logic and Metaphysics. St. John's College. New York, no date. 933.

Journal of Educational Psychology. Warwick & York, Baltimore. 57, 827, 847.

Journal of Educational Research. Dept. of Educ., Univ. of Wisconsin. 68, 76.

Journal of Philosophy. New York, 109, 111.

Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods. Journal of Philosophy, Inc., New York. 94, 97.

Judd, Charles H., in Conference on Examinations, Eastbourne, Eng. Teachers College. New York, 1931. 56.

Judd, Charles H., *Psychology of High School Subjects*. Ginn. Boston, 1915. 884.

Judd, Charles H., *The Psychology of Social Institutions*. Macmillan. New York, 1926. 766.

Junior-Senior High School Clearing House. New York. University, New York. 505, 805.

Kaiser William II. 31, 451.

Kallen, Horace M., *Individualism: An American Way of Life*. Live- right. New York, 1933. 295, 487, 497.

Kant, Immanuel. 275, 410.

Kant, Immanuel, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics* (trans. by Abbot). Longmans Green. London, 1895. 414.

Keith, Sir Arthur, quoted in *The World Tomorrow*. 447.

Keliher, Alice V., *A Critical Study of Homogeneous Grouping*. Teachers College. New York, 1931. 876.

Kendig, M. Mercer, in *Red Book*. McCall Company, New York. 629.

Keyser, Cassius, *Mathematical Philosophy: A Study of Fate and Freedom*. Dutton. New York, 1922. 692.

Khayyám, Omar, *Rubáiyát* (trans. by Fitzgerald). Quaritch. London, 1872. 309.

Kidd, Benjamin, *Social Evolution*. Macmillan. New York, 1894. 277.

Kilpatrick, Wm. H., in *Childhood Education*. Association for Childhood Education, Washington. 188, 191, 932.

Kilpatrick, Wm. H. (ed.), *The Educational Frontier*. Century. New York, 1933. 22, 23, 75, 90, 241, 570, 640, 644, 654, 674, 679, 680, 682, 689, 750, 784, 803, 890, 899, 903, 911.

Kilpatrick, Wm. H., in *The Educational Frontier*. Century. New York, 1933. 679, 803.

Kilpatrick, Wm. H., *Education and the Social Crisis*. Liveright. New York, 1932. 580, 782, 795.

Kilpatrick, Wm. H., in *Journal of Educational Research*. 68, 76.

Kilpatrick, Wm. H., *Our Educational Task*. University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill, 1930, 8, 700, 757.

Kilpatrick, Wm. H., in Religious Education. 440.

Kilpatrick, Wm. H., in School and Society. 24.

Kilpatrick, Wm. H., in Teachers College Record. 174, 176, 179, 734, 817, 823, 835.

Kilpatrick, Wm. H., unpublished ms. 378.

Kirkpatrick, J. E., Academic Organization and Control. Antioch Press. Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1931. 901.

Knapp, T. J., Educational Insurance. Stratford. Boston, 1930. 879.

Koffka, Kurt, The Growth of the Mind (trans. by Ogden). Harcourt Brace. New York, 1925. 183.

Köhler, Wolfgang, Gestalt Psychology. Liveright. New York, 1929. 714.

Langford, Howard D., Educational Service: Its Functions and Possibilities. Teachers College. New York, 1931. 898.

Lanier, Sidney, The English Novel. Scribner. New York, 1892. 699.

Laplace, Marquis de (Simon Pierre), A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities (trans. by Truscott and Emory). Wiley. New York, 1902. 129.

Lashley, K. S., Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1929. 184, 203, 250.

Laski, Harold J., Democracy in Crisis. University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill, 1933. 499.

Laski, Harold J., in Harper's Magazine. 475.

Lawes, Lewis E., in New York Times. 907.

Learned, William S., Realism in American Education. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 1932. 900.

Leibnitz, quoted in William James, Pragmatism. Longmans Green. New York, 1907. 450.

Leighton, J. A., in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods. 94.

Lenin, quoted in Albert P. Pinkevitch, The New Education in the Soviet Republic. John Day. New York, 1929. 614.

Leonard, R. J., Evenden, E. S., O'Rear, F. B., and others, Survey of Higher Education for the United Lutheran Church in America. Teachers College. New York, 1929. 892.

Lessing, Gotthold E., Werke. 355.

Lincoln, Abraham. 589.

Lindeman, Eduard C., The Meaning of Adult Education. New Republic. New York, 1926. 801.

Lindeman, Eduard C., Social Discovery. New Republic. New York, 1925. 50.

Lindsay, A. D., The Essentials of Democracy. Oxford University Press. London, 1929. 492.

Lippmann, Walter, American Inquisitors. Macmillan. New York, 1928. 337, 390, 478, 623, 711.

Lippmann, Walter, A New Social Order. John Day. New York, 1933. 659.

Lippmann, Walter, The Phantom Public. Harcourt Brace. New York, 1925. 266, 463, 464.

Lippmann, Walter, A Preface to Morals. Macmillan. New York, 1929. 222, 906, 935.

Lippmann, Walter, Public Opinion. Harcourt Brace. New York, 1922. 524, 551, 565, 721.

Llano, Antonio, in Philosophical Review. 389.

INDEX OF SOURCES

Lodge, Nucia P., in *Child Study*. Child Study Association, New York. 683.

Lowell, A. Lawrence, *Annual Report*, 1916-17. Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 584.

Lowell, A. Lawrence, *Public Opinion and Popular Government*. Longmans Green. New York, 1914. 465, 481.

Luther Martin, quoted in Hartmann Grisar, Luther. Kegan Paul, Trench & Truebner. London, 1915. 415.

Lynd, Robert S., and Lynd, Helen Merrell, Middletown. Harcourt Brace. New York, 1929. 522.

McCall, W. A., *How to Measure in Education*. Macmillan. New York, 1923. 61.

McCrea, N. G., in *Columbia University Quarterly*. 493.

Macdonald, Rev. J., in *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*. 290.

McDougall, William, *Is America Safe for Democracy?* Scribner. New York, 1921. 547.

McGiffert, A. C., *The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas*. Macmillan. New York, 1921. 116.

MacIver, R. M., *Community*. Macmillan. London, 1917. 280, 286.

MacIver, R. M., *Society: Its Structure and Changes*. Ray Long & R. R. Smith. New York, 1931. 64, 261, 520.

Macaulay, Lord, *History of England*. Longmans Green. New York, 1906. 317.

Mallock, W. H., *Lucretius on Life and Death*. Adam & Charles Black. London, 1901. 162.

Mann, Horace. 595, 905.

Marsden, E., *History of India for Junior Classes*. 454.

Martin, Everett Dean, in *The Forum*. 558.

Martin, Everett Dean, *The Meaning of a Liberal Education*. Norton. New York, 1926. 6, 710, 761, 800.

Martineau, James, *Types of Ethical Theory*. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1889. 387.

Mason, Daniel Gregory, *The Dilemma of American Music*. Macmillan. New York, 1928. 358.

Mathews, William, *Getting On in the World*. Griggs. Chicago, 1883. 346.

Meiklejohn, Alexander, in *Bulletin of University of Wisconsin*. 842.

Melville, Herman, *Moby Dick*. Macmillan. New York, 1929. 163.

Menninger, Karl A., *The Human Mind*. Crofts. New York, 1931. 878.

Merriam, Junius L., *Child Life and the Curriculum*. World Book. Yonkers, 1920. 776.

Merriam, Charles E., *The Making of Citizens*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1931. 540, 603, 768.

Methodist Episcopal Church Discipline, 1792. 318.

Meyer, Adolf, in *Suggestions of Modern Science concerning Education*. Macmillan. New York, 1917. 739.

Mill, John Stuart, *On Liberty*. Parker. London, 1859. 477, 479, 563, 575, 621.

Milton, John, *Areopagitica*. London, 1644. 574.

Minor, Mrs. Geo. Maynard (President-General), in *Daughters of the American Revolution Magazine*. 38.

Modern Review, The. Calcutta. 417.

Monroe, Paul (ed.), *Cyclopedia of*

Education. Macmillan. New York, 1911. 484, 758, 760.

Montague, Wm. P. (with Geo. P. Adams) (eds.), *Contemporary American Philosophy*. Macmillan. New York, 1930. 120, 165, 461.

Montague, Wm. P., *The Ways of Knowing*. Geo. Allen & Unwin. London, 1925. 102.

Morehouse, Frances M. I., in *The Historical Outlook*. 836.

Morgan, C. Lloyd, *Emergent Evolution*. Holt. New York, 1927. 707.

Morgan, C. Lloyd, *Psychology for Teachers*. Edward Arnold. London, 1894. 249.

Morgan, John J. B., *The Psychology of the Unadjusted School Child*. Macmillan. New York, 1927. 728, 740, 747, 753.

Morley, John, *Life of Richard Cobden*. Macmillan. New York, 1908. 455.

Morris, William, *Useful Work versus Useless Toil*. Socialist League Office. London, 1886. 647.

Moss, Col. James A., and Lang, Major John, *Manual of Military Training*. Banta. Menasha, Wis., 1927. 859.

Motherwell, Hiram, in *New Republic*. 561.

Mussolini, Benito, in *Le Journal de Paris*. 36.

Mussolini, Benito, *My Autobiography* (trans. by Child). Hutchinson. London, no date. 34.

Napoleon. 25, 26.

Nathan, George Jean, in *The Forum*. 339.

National Society for the Study of Education Yearbooks. 24th (1925), 874, 877; 26th (1926), 844.

Neilson, Wm. A. (ed.), *Lectures on the Harvard Classics*. P. F. Collier. New York, 1914. 5.

Neumann, Henry, *Education for Moral Growth*. Appleton. New York, 1923. 924.

Newlon, Jesse H., in *Teachers College Record*. 887.

Newman, Cardinal, in *William Ralph Inge, More Lay Thoughts of a Dean*. Putnam. New York, 1932. 99.

New Republic, The. New York, 72, 561, 564, 635, 641, 671, 672, 673, 790.

Newton, J. H., in *Atlantic Monthly*. 555.

Newton, Sir Isaac, *Opticks*. Innys. London, 1721. 706.

New York Times. 357, 526, 531, 586, 599, 651, 662, 907.

Niebuhr, Reinhold, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. Scribner. New York, 1932. 429, 457, 593.

Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Beyond Good and Evil* (trans. by Zimmern). Modern Library. New York, no date. 388, 486.

Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Lecture (Bâle, 1872) on the Future of Our Educational Institutions* (trans. by Kennedy). Macmillan. New York, 1911. 508.

Nitobe, Inazo, *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*. Putnam. New York, 1905. 312, 375.

Noble, Edmund, *Purposive Evolution*. Holt. New York, 1926. 724.

Nunn, Sir Percy, *Education: Its Data and First Principles*. Edward Arnold. London, 1930. 74, 209.

Nutt, H. W., *Principles of Teaching High School Pupils*. Century. New York, 1922. 826.

Ogburn, William F., *Social Change*. Huebsch. New York. 1922. 521.

INDEX OF SOURCES

Opinion. Privately published by Jas. W. Wise, New York. 448.

Otto, M. C., *Natural Laws and Human Hopes*. Holt. New York, 1926. 168, 381.

Otto, M. C., *Things and Ideals*. Holt. New York, 1924. 16, 253, 305.

Overstreet, H. A., in *The Thinker*. 10.

Page, Kirby (ed.), *Recent Gains in American Civilization*. Harcourt Brace. New York, 1928. 645, 665.

Paine, Thomas, *Common Sense*. 1776. 292.

Parson, Geoffrey, *The Stream of History*. Scribner. New York, 1928. 456.

Patrick, G. T. W., *Introduction to Philosophy*. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1924. 904.

Paulsen, Friedrich, *System of Ethics*. Scribner. New York, 1899. 345, 408.

Peirce, Charles S., *Chance, Love and Logic*. Harcourt Brace. New York, 1923. 96, 101, 107, 112.

Perry, Ralph Barton, in Geo. P. Adams and Wm. P. Montague (eds.), *Contemporary American Philosophy*. Macmillan. New York, 1930. 120, 461.

Perry, Ralph Barton, in Wm. A. Neilson (ed.), *Lectures on the Harvard Classics*. P. F. Collier. New York, 1914. 5.

Peters, Charles C., *Foundations of Educational Sociology*. Macmillan. New York, 1930. 59.

Peters, Charles C., *Objectives and Procedures in Civic Education*. Longmans Green. New York, 1930. 769.

Peterson, Houston, *The Melody of Chaos*. Longmans Green. New York, 1931. 727.

Phi Beta Kappa Key. Phi Beta Kappa Fraternity, New York. 507.

Philosophical Review. Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 389.

Pierce, Bessie L., *Citizen's Organizations and the Civic Training of Youth*. Scribner. New York, 1933. 596, 604, 605, 606.

Pinkевич, Albert P., *The New Education in the Soviet Republic* (trans. by Perlmutter). John Day. New York, 1929. 32, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616.

Pintner, Rudolph, *Intelligence Testing*. Holt. New York, 1931. 229.

Plato, *Apology*. Page v.

Plunkett, Rear Admiral C. P., in *New York Times*. 599.

Poincaré, H., *Science and Hypothesis*. Walter Scott. London, 1914. 44.

Ponsonby, Arthur, *Falsehood in War-Time*. Dutton. New York, 1928. 556, 557.

Pope, Alexander, *Essay on Man*. 631.

Pope Pius XI, in *Four Great Encyclicals*. Paulist Press. New York, 1931. 386, 449.

Porter, Martha Peck, *The Teacher in the New School*. World Book. Yonkers, 1930. 838, 845.

Power, Leonard, in *N.E.A. Bulletin of Elementary School Principals*. 809.

Powys, Llewelyn, *Impassioned Clay*. Longmans Green. New York, 1931. 339.

Progressive Education. Progressive Education Association, Washington. 446, 846, 852, 886.

Prosser, C. A., in *Survey of Schools and Industry in Hawaii*. Honolulu, 1931. 771.

Psychological Review. Princeton. 697, 698.

Pyle, W. H., in *School and Society*. 875.

Randall, John Herman, Jr., *Our Changing Civilization*. Stokes. New York, 1930. 108.

Randall, John Herman, Jr., *The Making of the Modern Mind*. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1926. 637.

Raup, R. B., in Wm. H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier*. Century. New York, 1933. 680, 784.

Recent Social Trends in the United States, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends. McGraw-Hill. New York, 1933. 19.

Reeder, Edwin H., *Simplified Teaching*. Laidlaw Brothers. New York, 1929. 202.

Reeder, Ward G., *The Fundamentals of Public School Administration*. Macmillan. New York, 1930. 897.

Reinach, Solomon, *Orpheus: A General History of Religions* (trans. by Simmonds). Putnam. New York, 1909. 373.

Reisner, Edward H., *Nationalism and Education since 1789*. Macmillan. New York, 1922. 31, 503.

Religious Education. Religious Education Association, Chicago. 440, 626.

Report of the Archbishop's Fifth Committee. London. 443, 798.

Report of the Education Inquiry Commission. Orange Free State Province, South Africa. 882.

Review of Educational Research. American Educational Research Assn., Washington. 871.

Revolutionary Radicalism, Report of Joint Legislative (Lusk) Committee of State of New York Investigating Seditious Activities. Albany, 1920. 600.

Richards, I. A., *Science and Poetry*.

Kegan Paul, Trench & Truebner. London, 1926. 322.

Richardson, Robt. C., *West Point*. Putnam. New York, 1917. 861.

Rignano, Eugenio, *The Nature of Life*. Harcourt Brace. New York, 1930. 171.

Robinson, James Harvey, *The Humanizing of Knowledge*. Doran. New York, 1923. 808.

Robinson, James Harvey, *Mind in the Making*. Harper. New York, 1921. 585.

Rocco, Alfredo, quoted in Milford W. Howard, *Fascism*. Revell. New York, 1928. 466.

Rocco, Alfredo, in *International Conciliation Bulletin*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York. 430.

Rogers, A. K., in Geo. P. Adams and Wm. P. Montague (eds.), *Contemporary American Philosophy*. Macmillan. New York, 1930. 165.

Rolland, Romain, *Danton*. 394.

Rolland, Romain, *Jean Christophe: Journey's End*. Holt. New York, 1913. 331.

Rolland, Romain, *Mahatma Gandhi* (trans. by Groth). Century. New York, 1924. 330.

Rosenkranz, J. K. F., *The Philosophy of Education* (trans. by Brackett). Appleton, New York, 1894. 824.

Ross, E. A., *Principles of Sociology*. Century. New York, 1921. 452, 514.

Ross, E. A., *Social Control*. Macmillan. New York, 1915. 25, 811.

Royce, Josiah, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1892. 7.

Rugg, Harold, *Culture and Education in America*. Harcourt Brace. New York, 1931. 86, 190.

Rugg, Harold, *The Great Tech-*

INDEX OF SOURCES

nology. John Day. New York, 1933. 681.

Rugg, Harold, and Shumaker, Ann, *The Child-Centered School*. World Book. Yonkers, 1928. 60.

Ruskin, John. 320.

Russell, Bertrand, *Education and the Good Life*. Boni & Liveright. New York, 1926. 498, 546, 582, 588, 756.

Russell, Bertrand, *A Free Man's Worship*. Mosher. Portland, 1923. 150.

Russell, Bertrand, *Free Thought and Official Propaganda*. Huebsch. New York, 1922. 602.

Russell, Bertrand, *Mysticism and Logic*. Norton. New York, 1929. 167, 334.

Russell, Bertrand, *Philosophy*. Norton. New York, 1927. 701.

Russell, Bertrand, *Political Ideals*. Century. New York, 1917. 289, 432, 495, 536, 810.

Russell, Bertrand, *The Scientific Outlook*. Norton. New York, 1931. 48, 54, 124.

Russell, Bertrand, *What I Believe*. Kegan Paul, Trench & Truebner. London, 1928. 321.

Russell, Bertrand, in Chas. A. Beard (ed.), *Whither Mankind*. Longmans Green. New York, 1928. 125.

Russell, Bertrand, *Why Men Fight*. Century. New York, 1917. 344, 347, 374, 788.

Russell, Bertrand, and Russell, Dora, *Prospects of Industrial Civilization*. Century. New York, 1923. 767, 789.

Rutherford, Mark, quoted in André Gide, *Dostoevsky*. Knopf. New York, 1926. 327.

Sanders, B. M., *Valedictory Address*. Mercer University, 1840. 822.

Santayana, George, *Reason in Com-* mon Sense. Scribner. New York, 1905. 77, 79, 85, 117, 149, 306.

Santayana, George, *Reason in Science*. Scribner. New York, 1905. 43, 164.

Saturday Review of Literature. New York. 530.

Schlipp, Paul Arthur (ed.), *Higher Education Faces the Future*. Liveright. New York, 1930. 648.

Schneider, Herbert W., and Clough, Shepard B., *Making Fascists*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1929. 35, 608, 610.

Schoen, Max, *Art and Beauty*. Macmillan. New York, 1932. 363.

School and Society. Science Press, New York. 24, 193, 195, 473, 609, 625, 650, 670, 840, 875.

School Life. Office of Education, U. S. Department of the Interior, Washington. 858.

Schurman, Jacob Gould, in *Transactions and Proceedings of the National Association of State Universities*. 1909. 583.

Scientific Monthly. Science Press, New York. 186, 192, 213, 545.

Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*. 537.

Sharp, Dallas Lore, *Education in a Democracy*. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1922. 627.

Sheffield, A. D., *Training for Group Experience*. The Inquiry. New York, 1929. 490.

Sheldon, W. H., *Strife of Systems and Productive Duality*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 1918. 105.

Shields, Thomas E., in *Catholic Education Association*. Catholic Education Press. Washington. 628.

Shields, Thomas E., *Philosophy of Education*. Catholic Education Press. Washington, 1917. 13, 510, 936.

Slichter, Sumner H., *Modern Economic Society*. Holt. New York, 1928. 643.

Small, Albion W., *General Sociology*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1905. 294, 296.

Smith, T. V., *The American Philosophy of Equality*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1927. 49.

Snedden, David, *Foundations of Curricula*. Teachers College. New York, 1927. 841.

Snedden, David, in *School and Society*. 625.

Soares, Theodore G., *Religious Education*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1928. 258.

Soule, George, *A Planned Society*. Macmillan. New York, 1932. 636, 653.

Spencer, F. C., *Education of the Pueblo Child*. Columbia University Press. New York, 1899. 765.

Spencer, Herbert, *Social Statics*. Appleton. New York, 1878. 523, 594.

Spinoza, Ethics (trans. by Fullerton). 402.

Starbuck, Edwin D., and others, *A Guide to Books for Character*. Macmillan. New York, 1930. 919, 923.

Stevenson, Robert Louis, *Virginibus Puerisque*. Scribner. New York, 1923. 780, 781.

Stormzand, M. J., *Progressive Methods of Teaching*. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1924. 848.

Strachey, John, *The Coming Struggle for Power*. Covici Friede. New York, 1933. 166, 649, 656, 663.

Stratton, G. M., *Social Psychology of International Conduct*. Appleton. New York, 1929. 539.

Strayer, Geo. D., and Haig, Robert M., *The Financing of Education in the State of New York*. Macmillan. New York, 1923. 618.

Streeter, B. H., *Reality*. Macmillan. New York, 1927. 63.

Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education. Macmillan. New York, 1917. 274, 739, 872.

Sugimoto, Etsu Inagaki, *A Daughter of the Samurai*. Doubleday Page. Garden City, 1925. 350, 354, 814, 909.

Sullivan, J. W. N., *Gallio, or the Tyranny of Science*. Dutton. New York, 1928. 147.

Sumner, Wm. Graham, *Folkways*. Ginn. Boston, 1906. 106, 273, 437, 553, 675, 783.

Survey, The. *New York*, 622.

Survey of Schools and Industry in Hawaii. Honolulu, 1931. 771.

Sutherland, A. H., in *24th Yearbook, Nat. Soc. for the Study of Educ.* 874.

Swift, Harold H., in H. P. Fairchild (ed.), *The Obligation of Universities to the Social Order*. New York University Press. New York, 1933. 893, 894.

Symonds, Percival M., *The Nature of Conduct*. Macmillan. New York, 1928. 224, 815.

Symonds, Percival M. (with Chase, Doris H.), in *Journal of Educational Psychology*. 827.

Tagore, Rabindranath, in *The Modern Review*. 417.

Tagore, Rabindranath, *Nationalism*. Macmillan. New York, 1917. 428.

Taine, H. A., *The Modern Régime* (trans. by Durand). Holt. New York, 1894. 25.

Tallentyre, S. G., *Voltaire in His Letters*. Murray. London, 1919. 571.

Taylor, Thomas Rawson. 319.

Teachers College Record. Teachers College, Columbia University, New York. 174, 176, 179, 734, 817, 823, 833, 835, 887, 927.

Tennyson. 383.

Terman, Lewis M., *The Intelligence of School Children*. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1919. 506.

Tertullian, quoted in W. R. Inge, *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*. Putnam. New York, 1930. 99.

Thayer, V. T., in Wm. H. Kilpatrick (ed.), *The Educational Frontier*. Century. New York, 1933. 890, 899, 903.

Theses on Freedom. National Council of Education, N.E.A., Washington, 1932. 37, 896.

The Thinker. 10.

Thomas, William I., in *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education*. Macmillan. New York, 1917. 274.

Thomas, William I., *The Unadjusted Girl*. Little Brown. Boston, 1927. 733.

Thorndike, Edward L., *Adult Learning*. Macmillan. New York, 1928. 802, 804, 850.

Thorndike, Edward L., in Conference on Examinations, Eastbourne, Eng. Teachers College. New York, 1931. 201.

Thorndike, Edward L., *Education*. Macmillan. New York, 1912. 262, 268, 293.

Thorndike, Edward L., *Educational Psychology*. Teachers College. New York, 1913. 359.

Thorndike, Edward L., *Human Learning*. Century. New York, 1931. 821.

Thorndike, Edward L., in *Journal of Educational Psychology*. 57, 847.

Thorndike, Edward L., in *Proceedings of Indiana University Conference on Educational Measurements*. 58.

Thorndike, Edward L., in Teachers College Record. 927.

Tildsley, J. L., in *Phi Beta Kappa Key*. 507.

Titchener, E. B., *An Outline of Psychology*. Macmillan. New York, 1896. 208.

Todd, A. J., *Theories of Social Progress*. Macmillan. New York, 1918. Page v.

Townsend, Rev. Joseph, quoted in Chas. A. Beard (ed.), *Whither Mankind*. Longmans Green. New York, 1928. 444.

Tozzer, Alfred M., *Social Origins and Social Continuities*. Macmillan. New York, 1925. 445.

Trotter, W., *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*. Macmillan. New York, 1917. 715.

Twain, Mark. 329.

Twain, Mark, *Sketches Old and New*. Harper's. New York, 1903. 578.

U.S. [Supreme Court] Reports. 576, 633.

Veblen, Thorstein, *The Engineers and the Price System*. Huebsch. New York, 1921. 642, 660.

Veblen, Thorstein, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*. Macmillan. New York, 1915. 349.

Voltaire. 690.

Wallas, Graham, *Our Social Heritage*. Yale University Press. New Haven, 1921. 269.

Ward, Harry, in *The World Tomorrow*. 302.

Washburne, Carleton W., *Remakers of Mankind*. John Day. New York, 1932. 612.

Watson, John B., *Behavior*. Holt. New York, 1914. 197.

Watson, John B., in Harper's Magazine. 62.

Watson, John B., Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. Lippincott. Philadelphia, 1919. 182, 198.

Wayland, Francis (Aaron L. Chapin, ed.), Elements of Political Economy. Sheldon. New York, 1883. 647.

Weigle, Luther A., Religious and Secular Education. American Tract Society. New York, no date. 934.

Weiss, A. P., A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior. R. G. Adams. Columbus, O., 1929. 196, 205, 206.

Wells, H. G., in Atlantic Monthly. 267.

Wheeler, Raymond H., and Perkins, Francis T., Principles of Mental Development. Crowell. New York, 1932. 175, 231, 238, 256, 722, 818, 832, 912.

Whitehead, Alfred N., Science and the Modern World. Macmillan. New York, 1925. Page v. 12, 45, 122, 136, 365, 371, 528, 712, 785.

Whitman, Walt. 326.

Wiggam, Albert Edward, The New Decalogue of Science. Bobbs Merrill. Indianapolis, 1923. 548.

Wisconsin, University of, Bulletin. 842.

Withers, Hartley, The Case for Capitalism. Dutton. New York, 1920. 496.

Wolfe, A. B., Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method. Macmillan. New York, 1923. 21.

Wood, Ben D., New York Experiments with New Type Modern Language Tests. Macmillan. New York, 1927. 880.

Wood, Charles W., The Great Change. Boni & Liveright. New York, 1918. 661.

Woodring, Maxie N. (with Cecile W. Fleming), in Teachers College Record. 833.

Woodworth, R. S., Dynamic Psychology. Columbia University Press. New York, 1918. 237.

Woodworth, R. S., Psychology. Holt. New York, 1929. 242, 702, 816.

Woodworth, R. S., in School and Society. 193.

Woody, Clifford and Sangren, Paul V., Administration of the Testing Program. World Book. Yonkers, 1932. 883.

Wordsworth, William, Essay Supplementary to Preface, 1815-45. 362.

World Tomorrow, The. New York. 302, 447, 458, 544.

Wyatt, H. G., The Art of Feeling. Houghton Mifflin. Boston, 1932. 737.

Xenophon. 313, 314.

Yerkes, Robert M., in Carl C. Brigham, A Study of American Intelligence. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 1923. 695.

Zachry, Caroline B., Personality Adjustments of School Children. Scribner. New York, 1929. 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 755, 851.

Zinsser, Hans, in Atlantic Monthly. 42.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

References are to excerpt numbers

Ability, differences in: conservatism of intellectuals, 471; education of the dull, 37; in organic world, 212; masses inferior, 37, 466; thinking highly restricted, 37; varying education for, 37, 468, 506, 873. *See also* Differences, individual; Differences, racial; Homogeneous grouping.

Absolutes: as defense of privilege, 430, 698; as defense of status quo, 698; gone from religion, 116, 376, 377; in Fascist Italy, 610; in government, 476; in honesty, 393; in religion, 369; in right and wrong, 109, 383, 393; necessary to democracy, 104; non-existent, 692, 718-720. *See also* Certainty; Dynamic logic; Finalities; Fixed entities; Law.

Abstractions: nature of, 45; necessary to science, 40; need criticism, 45.

Academic freedom: discussed, 583, 584, 893; Fascist denial of, 609; in lower schools, 587, 588; patriotic limitations upon, 38; trustees' relation to, 893, 894. *See also* Freedom of speech.

Acquisitive régime unnecessary, 659. Action. *See* Thought and action.

Adjustment, degrees of, 212.

Administration of higher education: Cattell's proposed plan for, 895; duties of trustees, 892-894; influence of economics, 894.

Administration of school systems: as leadership, 899; based on older conception, 835, 863; democracy

in, 516, 899; education subordinate to, 900; educational pattern of, 899; from the top downward, 516, 835, 864, 898; implied in philosophy, 24; influence of business on, 862, 871, 892, 894, 899, 902; means, not end, 897; narrow preparation for, 896; subordinate to education, 866, 888-890, 895, 897-901; treatment of teachers, 516, 864, 866, 887-890, 898, 901. *See also* Board of education; Centralization; Principal; School superintendent; Supervision.

Adult education: adult ability to learn, 802; education throughout life, 681, 781, 783, 784, 800, 801; need for new, 580, 681, 801; profession of, 803; propaganda, use of, 681; teacher in, 802, 803.

Advertising, private school: snobish, 629.

Æsthetic, defined, 363, 367. *See also* Art.

Affections, as true responses, 89.

Aim, dangers of wrong, 756; education for fixed-in-advance, 760; vice of externally imposed, 837. *See also* Ends; Objectives, educational.

Alcohol, thirst for, 738.

Allegiance, automatic inheritance of, discussed, 514.

Ameliorative legislation, to maintain privilege, 422.

America (United States): conservative like Soviet Russia, 664; current situation, 640-643; divided

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

against itself, 645; economic situation 1933, 689, 641, 642; frontier philosophy, 635; future plastic, 655; its outworn philosophy, 634; planless, 658. *See also American dream.*

American dream: Long Island (1670), 630; now a slavery, 649.

American Legion: history project, 596, 597. *See also Patriotic education.*

American Revolution, ended before 1776, 667.

Americanism, shock-proof, 629.

Americanization discussed, 303.

Anarchy, international, discussed, 432.

Antwerp, fall of, propagandist lying, 557.

A priori: justice *a priori*, 110; underlies all action, 111.

Aristocracy: education for, 811; inferior to masses, 474; its own justification, 486; Jefferson on natural, 467; Nietzsche on, 388, 486.

Arithmetic, in modern type school, 855.

Art: climax of experience, 366; defined, 364, 366, 367; in relation to experience, 87; in the good life, 362-367; instrumental and consummatory in, 367; money and the artist, 347, 654; reflection in art, 88; release from monotony, 365; under existing economies, 654; why now low, 654. *See also Ästhetic.*

Asceticism, 316, 317, 318.

Association: function of, 264; how judged, 295; unit of society, 265, 299. *See also Society.*

Assumptions: become obsolete, 200; irritation from questioning, 714, 715; need challenging, 710, 711, 713-716; non-rational, 715; vary with times, 712.

Atomism: advocated in education, 769, 809, 815; denied in education, 779, 912; in literature, 723; in moral education, 922; in physics, 122, 205; in psychology, 72, 75, 201, 202, 723, 724, 815, 816, 912, 922; in sociology, 64, 70; not adequate, 60, 64, 70, 75, 119, 135, 184, 203, 912, 922; seeing a picture, 724. *See also Reduction; Whole and part.*

Attention: discussed, 215; focus and margin of, 249.

Attitudes, as educational objective, 849.

Authoritarian education: described, 854; teaching respect for authority, 856-861.

Authoritarian morality: blindfolded, 397; discussed, 297, 729, 906.

Authority: denied by Washington, 390; dependence on, inevitable, 105; external, gone, 116, 906; implies the other world, 106; military respect for, 856-861; of teacher, 867; why we submit, 107.

Beauty defined, 363.

Behavior: always regulatory, 172; learned, 728; nature of, 176; novel, defines learning, 178; of stentor in learning, 177; purposive, 175, 176, 816, 818; teachers' attitudes to, 754; varied efforts in, 177, 178; whole determines detail, 816. *See also Conduct; Equilibration.*

Behaviorism: attitude toward consciousness, 197, 213; cannot explain creation, 189; criticized, 72, 189; fundamental postulates, 196; in its own eyes, 198; will supplant philosophy, 62. *See also Atomism; Neurones; Psychology; Reduction; Relex, conditioned.*

Beliefs: irrationally held, 2, 101; perilous if false, 3, 101.

Bias: in all observation, 50; in edu-

cational effort, 23, 75, 241, 678. *See also Impartiality.*

Biology, many studies in, 530.

Birth control, Pius XI on, 386.

Board of education: business domination of, 902; controls school policies, 902; functional representation on, 903; represent privileged class, 902. *See also Educational policies.*

Body, influence of, in mental hygiene, 731, 732.

Body-mind, how conceived, 209, 210, 211.

Bonds. *See Neurones.*

Boston, corporal punishment, 1844, 931.

Brigham, Carl C.: Yerkes on, 695; on Brigham, 697; on racial ability, 696.

Buddhism: effect of, 375; confession of faith, 382.

Business: drudgery of labor, 647, 648; failure of, 641, 642; in Hawaiian education, 771; individualism in, 929; influence on school administration, 862, 871, 892, 894, 899, 902; workers' control over, 495. *See also Capitalism; Economic system.*

Capitalism: denies equal start, 496. *See also Democracy in industry.*

Catholic (Roman) Church: on religion in education, 936; state morally bound, 435; teaching of citizenship, 628; double taxation, 628. *See also Pope Pius XI.*

Causation: affected by interest, 704; all inclusive, 129; discussed, 704; not the whole truth, 406. *See also Determinism.*

Censorship: advocated, 560; evils of, 563; motives of, 562; of stage, unavailing, 561. *See also Freedom of speech; Index Expurgatorius.*

Centralization (in school administration): advocated, 864; ill effects of, 516, 898. *See also Administration of school systems.*

Certainty: absurd, 690; not possible, 691, 692. *See also Absolutes.*

Change: defined and contrasted, 520; demands on education, 500; how judged, 297; modern rapid, 529-531, 637, 785; more than motion, 207; omnipresent, 141; only separation and association, 706; to be avoided, 768. *See also Emergent evolution; Novelty; Progress.*

Character: concept of moral, 908; defined, 908, 910, 912, 923, 925, 928; how built, 916-921, 923, 924; influence of literature, 923; measurement of, 915; military view of, 856; not a bundle of traits, 912; place of convictions, 911. *See also Moral education.*

Charity: to glorify God, 423; to maintain status quo, 424; the why of, 422, 423, 424.

Chesterton, Gilbert: quoted by James, 11; referred to, 16.

Children: growth of, as aim, 772, 776-781, 866, 886, 891; in 3800 B.C., 904; no misfit, 872; not lazy, but indolent, 825; our power of molding, 756, 920. *See also Parents; Pupils.*

Chinese: earlier preëminence, 542; mandarin on inventions, 526.

Choice: based on philosophy, 10, 23; based on theory, 39; defined, 246; difficulty in, 248; from knowledge of consequences, 245; in morality, 913, 914, 919; involves valuation, 261; not impartial, 23; place of, in education, 919; in the lower organisms, 244. *See also Deliberation.*

Churches: on war, 456, 458.

Citizenship: in coöperative society, 640; in Roman Catholic schools, 628; kind needed, 585; to super-patriot, 600.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Civilization: American, divided, 645; China's earlier preëminence, 542; Eastern *vs.* Western, 324, 535, 542; modern *vs.* classical, 534; must be interesting, 348; new corporate, 677; new possibilities of, 511, 536; recently individualistic, 659; relation to biology, 228, 547; relation to education, 757; relation to philosophy, 17; self-destructive, 547. *See also* Culture; Progress.

Cizek, Franz, referred to, 853.

Class distinctions: democratic opposition, 499, 500; fostered by laissez faire, 656; fostered by private schools, 517-519, 627, 629; opposed by public schools, 595.

Classical education, failure of, 806. Cokesbury College, no play in, 318. College entrance requirements: dangers from, 805, 881, 882; preparation for, 774, 805; regents system, 880. *See also* University.

Common sense: how conceived, 5; related to philosophy, 5.

Communication: basis of intelligent criticism, 296; basis of society, 267.

Community, inescapably educative, 793.

Complacency. *See* Equilibration.

Compromise: sacrifices the individual, 708; *vs.* integration, 708.

Concept (conception): hazy around the edges, 713; operational character of, 725, 726; questioning of, 713; relation to meaning, 219. *See also* Meaning; Thinking.

Conditioned reflex. *See* Reflex, conditioned.

Conditioning, in doctrines, 510, 515. *See also* Indoctrination.

Condorcet, man's infinite perfectibility, 543.

Conduct: cumulative, 222; follows habit rather than ideas, 224; in-

cludes valuation, 261; learned, 728, 746; should follow meanings, 223, 225. *See also* Behavior.

Conflict, social, over ends, 21.

Conformity: education for, 766, 767, 810. *See also* Indoctrination; Transmission, education as.

Conscience: authoritative, 410, 411; Butler on, 411; ghost of dead past, 389; implies future life, 934; Kant on, 410; no safe guide, 412; not an acquisition, 410; product of moralizing, 412. *See also* Morality; Ought.

Consciousness: cannot be explained away, 199, 213; "conscious" an adjective, 213; conscious action *vs.* reflex arc, 214; conscious behavior, 215; for behaviorism, 197; function, not entity, 220, 260; necessary to social phenomena, 64; *vs.* mind, 232.

Consequences: basis of intelligence, 297; basis of morals, 397-399; knowledge of, a causative factor, 245; scorn of, 383. *See also* Thinking; Thought and action.

Conservatism: cause of revolutions, 592, 664, 665; fears publicity, 286; greatest among intellectuals, 471; necessary in teachers, 600; refuge in fixed entities, 698; resistance to novelty, 19, 297. *See also* Authoritarian; Property; Status quo.

Control: real and basic, 156; degrees of, and the good life, 341. *See also* Experiment; Precariousness.

Control, external: basis of effort *vs.* interest, 716; externally imposed aims, 760, 837; humbugging the child, 828; in education, 436-441, 613, 765, 766, 769, 770, 827, 833, 837; in industry, 442, 443; prefers conditioned reflex, 815. *See also* Motivation.

Control, internal: basis of interest,

716; democracy as, 837; education as, 759, 760, 762, 764, 770, 824. *See also Democracy; Intelligence, freeing of.*

Control of education. *See Education, control of; State control of education.*

Controversial issues: advocated for schools, 585, 588, 624, 626; opposed, 38, 600, 622, 623, 625. *See also Academic freedom.*

Convictions: effect on firmness, 911; prior to experience, 108; related to experience, 911.

Coolidge, Calvin: fear of radicalism, 562.

Corporate civilization, new: discussed, 640; new individualism through, 677. *See also Interdependence.*

Course of study. *See Curriculum.*

Creation: alien to behaviorism, 188; creation-imitation scale, 188; fostered by philosophy, 18; found in all, 189; in all life, 341; no supernatural creator, 380; through learning, 179, 189, 191, 817, 818; through evolution, 137; *vs.* problem-solving, 190; Rugg's discussion, 190. *See also Novelty.*

Credo ut intelligam, 100.

Crime: common treatment of, 748; education and, 807; mental hygiene of, 749.

Critical-mindedness: advocated, 511, 624, 678; against propaganda, 559, 621; avoided, 650, 764; objective for schools, 587, 588, 626, 764; opposed, 586, 622, 623; prevents public deception, 553. *See also Intelligence, freeing of; Thinking.*

Criticism: always comparative, 703; avoided by schools, 764; essence of philosophy, 9, 14, 18, 45; of values, 8.

Cultural values dependent on economic, 640, 644, 654. *See also Art.*

Culture: as an escape, 806; continually remade, 680; Fascist remaking, 34; influence on individuals, 37, 279, 281, 287, 735; lags in, 521, 522, 524; loss in, 528; modern rapid change, 529, 530, 531; needs criticism, 19; racial differences, 539; stereotypes in, 551, 721. *See also Civilization; Customs; Institutions.*

Curriculum, content of, man's chequered progress, 582.

Curriculum making: by central authority, 516, 864; by science, 56, 59; by teachers, 516; children's interests inadequate to, 848; from external standpoint, 841, 843; from progressive outlook, 845, 846; Mr. Dooley on, 840; not by statistics, 60, 64, 70, 71, 72, 839; on authority, 835; with political motives, 767. *See also Subject matter; Subjects.*

Customs: binding effect of, 290; define morality, 272, 274, 287; form habits, 272, 287. *See also Culture; Institutions; Social inheritance; Tradition.*

Daughters of the American Revolution: history project, 596, 597; on patriotic teaching, 38. *See also Patriotic education.*

Dawdling, pitiable, 346.

Day dreaming, dangers of, 740. *See also Escape mechanisms.*

Deficiencies, educational, how cared for, 845, 855.

Deliberation: as dramatic rehearsal, 247; difficulty in, 248; ending in choice, 246; in morals, 913, 914, 928; in relation to action, 246. *See also Choice; Thinking.*

Democracy (as a form of government): defined, 459, 460; discussed, 459-482; indicted, 463, 464, 466; justified, 461, 462, 492; law of history, 462; mass ability

inadequate to, 37, 467; minorities, function of, 479, 480; needs ever more experts, 465; public opinion in, 551-554; tyranny of majority, 476, 477; *vs.* Fascism, 466. *See also* Aristocracy; Expert; Fascism; Masses.

Democracy (as a social theory): defined, 482, 484, 494, 500, 516, 554; discussed, 482-499; confused with plutocracy, 650; denied by capitalism, 496, 498; discussion as technique of, 489-492; distinctions of wealth and birth, 499; economic security, 497; education from, 491, 492, 494, 500; fostered by printing, 579; freedom in, 483, 497; leadership in, 568, 569; opposed by private schools, 518, 519, 627; opposes individuality, 485; protects privilege, 488; public opinion in, 551-554. *See also* Class distinction; Equality; Hereditary principle; Personality, respect for.

Democracy in industry: a process of sharing, 494, 495; workers must control, 495.

Democracy (in relation to education): discussed, 500-519 (Chap. XII), 762, 854; current, shallow, 813; education for, 37, 468, 762; implies education, 494, 500; in home, 502; in school, 501; in school administration, 516, 899, 901; in supervision, 516, 887-889, 891; inequality in education, 505, 506; Jefferson on education, 27-29; popular education opposed, 30, 503, 508. *See also* Docility; Imposition; Indoctrination; Private schools; Public education.

Departmentalization (of teaching): origin of, 871; future of, 809.

Desire: curbing fretful desires, 334; necessary to happiness, 344; objects of, 408; to be expressed, 308, 309, 338; to be quenched, 310.

See also Asceticism; Good life; Hedonism; Motive; Self-denial; Self-sacrifice; Stoicism.

Determinism: defined, 146; knowledge of consequences, 245; not fatalism, 405. *See also* Fate; Fore-ordination; Freedom (of choice); Law (scientific); Pre-determinism.

Development: continuous with learning, 180, 181.

Dictatorship: tyranny against exploitation, 669. *See also* Fascism, Italian; Soviet Russia.

Differences, individual: disregarded, 505-507, 874; homogeneous grouping for, 809, 876, 877; in modern type school, 873, 876; to be cultivated, 581; "ungraded" room, 878. *See also* Ability, differences in.

Differences, racial: cultural, rather than biologic, 539, 541, 542; dogmatism on, 540, 695-697; evils of discrimination, 448; in native ability, 539, 541; intelligence tests on, 446, 695-697; Nordic theory, 445, 696; prejudices helpful, 447. *See also* Heredity.

Discipline: Dewey's definition of, 925; effort from, 829; enduring the disagreeable, 927; evils of formalism, 929; importance of, 868; military, 452, 856-861; old-fashioned, 926; psychology of, 860, 925, 927, 928; strength of will, 928; Thorndike on, 927. *See also* Moral education; Punishment.

Discussion: avoided at West Point, 858; essential to government, 492; my opponent's case, 493; technique of democracy, 489, 490, 491, 492; when irritating, 714, 715. *See also* Freedom of speech.

Disorder: calls for order, 145; defined, 126.

Distinctions in society. *See* Class distinction; Equality.

Divided Self. *See* Self, divided.

Docility, defined and discussed, 513.

Dooley, Mr., on the curriculum, 840.

Doubt: a moral necessity, 6; traitorous, 537; useful, 4, 7, 690. *See also* Skepticism.

Drill: facilitates learning, 827; memoriter, for the dull, 37; military, 856-861; moral effect of, 848; psychology of, 827, 857, 859, 860. *See also* Repetition.

Drudgery: in labor, 647.

Dualisms: mind and body, 197, 226; thought and action, 694. *See also* Body-mind; Parallelism, psycho-physical; Reduction.

Dynamic logic: discussed, 685-726 (Chap. XVI); becoming, 706-709; evils of fixed entities, 698; function and structure, 700; logic defined, 685; mathematics imperfect, 693; modern thinking different, 686-688; no certainties, 690-692; operational conception, 47, 97, 725, 726; principles and their use, 717-720; relativity in, 695-704, 717-720. *See also* Absolutes; Atomism; Finalities; Law; Logic.

Eagerness gives significance to life, 351.

East: Eastern *vs.* Western civilization, 324, 535, 542. *See also* Chinese; Japanese.

Economic system: current situation, 639-643; effect on art, 654; evil influence on civilization, 651-654, 894; failure of, 641-643, 649; in relation to education, 640, 670, 674, 677, 678, 681, 682, 894; to be criticized, 679; why now stressed, 644. *See also* Planning, social.

Education: defined, 20, 758-760, 782, 917; a kind of engineering, 769; after factory model, 809, 871; as means merely, 436-441, 761, 766, 771, 796, 798, 837, 859, 860; from experience only, 918; full only in democracy, 494; mistake in classical, 806; test of institutions, 289, 295, 425. *See also* many other items throughout the index.

Education and life: discussed, 756-803 (Chap. XVIII); conflict within, 762; education as inherent in life, 674, 680, 683, 757, 776-778, 781-784, 791-795, 801, 803, 817, 818, 838, 850, 884, 920; education for conformity, 766, 767, 810; education throughout life, 681, 781, 783, 784; interaction between, 674; schools and industry, 771, 796-799; thinking and life, 784-788. *See also* Adult education; Life; Objectives, educational; Preparation, education as; Transmission, education as.

Education, control of: by board of education, 902, 903; by Frederick William IV, 503; by imperialist state, 614, 762; by Napoleon, 25; by Prussia (1889), 31; by Russia (1824), 30; by trustees, 892-894; federal, 619; teachers' part in, 516, 895, 898, 899. *See also* Administration of school system; Public education; State and education; State control of education.

Education for a caste system: Prussia (1889), 31; Prussia (1850), 503; Russia (1824), 30. *See also* Aristocracy; Class distinctions.

Education for social reconstruction: discussed, 511, 611, 613, 682; Counts on, 511; education and reconstruction simultaneous, 674, 682; in Russia, 611, 613, 615; place of education, page v; 511, 577, 580-582, 600, 611, 674, 678, 680-

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

683; remaking the culture, 34, 680. *See also* Adult education; Planning, social; Social planning and education.

Education, informal: advantages of, 807, 808; Emerson on, 807.

Education, national system of: denied by laissez faire, 594, 621; Fascist, 34, 35, 607-610; Federal support and control, 619, 620; Lenin on bourgeois, 614; Napoleon's, 25 (c); Prussian (1889), 31; Soviet Russia, 32, 33, 611-616. *See also* Public education; State and education; State control of education; State support of education.

Education, philosophy of: as object of study, 24, 76; defined, 24; function of, 22, 23; in relation to facts, 24; in Soviet Russia, 32, 33; Jefferson's, 27-29; must consider actual situation, 22; Napoleon's, 25, 26; needed by measurement workers, 883. *See also* Education, theory of; Philosophy; Philosophy and education.

Education, profession of: in adult education, 803; must share responsibility, 516, 867, 895, 898, 899, 901; new duty of, 680; not adequately recognized, 516; restrictions upon, 600, 622, 625. *See also* Education, control of; Teachers.

Education, science of: cannot yield objectives, 839; not to follow physical science, 65, 72, 75; so far inadequate, 70, 75; would supplant philosophy, 59, 62, 73, 75. *See also* Atomism; Measuring; Psychology; Science; Science and education; Statistics.

Education, support of: double for Catholics, 628; federal, 620; wide *vs.* narrow areas of, 618. *See also* State support of education.

Education, theory of: embodied in administrative machinery, 863; philosophy as theory of education, 20; theory inherent in education, 39. *See also* Education, philosophy of; Philosophy and education.

Educational objectives. *See* Objectives, educational.

Educational policies, determination of: administrator's part, 516, 864, 892, 895, 899, 900; board of education, 902, 903; educator's part, 864, 895, 898, 899, 901, 903; parents' part, 903; trustees' part, 892-895.

Educative process: discussed, 804-861 (Chap. XIX); informal learning, 807, 808; simultaneous learnings, 823; subordinated to administration, 900; to fit the social outlook, 810-815. *See also* Aims; Curriculum making; Effort; Freedom (in the educative process); Interest; Learning; Method; Military training; Motivation; Objectives; Psychology; Teachers.

Educative process, administration of: discussed, 862-903 (Chap. XX); administration subordinate to education, 866, 888-890, 895, 897-901; business efficiency model, 862, 871; effect of outmoded theory, 863; order for its own sake, 865; place of teacher in, 864, 866-870, 888-891, 895, 898-901; the factory model, 809, 871. *See also* Administration of higher education; Administration of school systems; Grades; Individual differences; Measuring; Promotion; Supervision.

Educators. *See* Teachers.

Effect, law of (in psychology), Hollingworth on, 820.

Efficiency in education: business models, 862, 885; factory model of, 809, 871.

Effort: biologically defined, 169, 176;

counts, 164, 535-537; helped by faith, 378, 537; matter omnipotent, 167; modern possibilities of, 166, 168; necessary to happiness, 343-347, 355; necessary to progress, 535; thwarted by doubt, 537. *See also* Control; Effort (*vs.* interest) in education; Precariousness.

Effort (*vs.* interest) in education: advocated, 840; problem of, solved, 716; theory inadequate, 829. *See also* Interest.

Elite. *See* Aristocracy.

Emergent evolution: discussed, 707; seen in the mind, 230. *See also* Evolution; Reduction.

Emotion: discussed, 237; effect of jaded, 358; increase of tension, 238; indirect control of, 239. *See also* Psychology; Glandular action.

Empiricism, radical: discussed, 81, 98.

Emptiness, mental, annoying, 359.

End, man as, not mere means: denied under aristocracy, 486, 771; denied by Nietzsche, 486; in education, 436-441, 767, 771, 796, 866, 872; in Fascism, 430, 466; in industry, 442, 443, 797; Kant's statement of, 414; woman as means, 415. *See also* Military training; Personality, development of; Personality, respect for.

Ends: actual in nature, 159; correlative with means, 689; function of, 159, 689; implied in behavior, 816. *See also* Aims; End, man as; Means.

Engineering, as model for education, 769.

Environment: defined, 174; effect on I.Q., 195; coördinate with heredity, 192, 193. *See also* Heredity; Organism.

Equality: of opportunity in education, 505, 506, 508, 720; of start, 496; through social sharing, 677. *See also* Aristocracy; Class distinction; Democracy.

Equilibration: defined, 169, 175; discussed, 211; continuous readjustment, 170, 172, 176; return to new state, 178, 179. *See also* Behavior; Life; Organism.

Escape from reality. *See* Escape mechanisms; Reality, failure to face.

Escape mechanisms: blaming heredity, 746; compensation, 741; culture as, 806; daydreaming, 740; one-sided intellectuality, 928; projection, 744; rationalization, 743; regression, 745. *See also* Reality, failure to face.

Ethics. *See* Morality; Right and wrong, theory of.

Evolution: a creative process, 137; defined, 520; dispute over teaching, 623; intelligently guided, 581. *See also* Emergent evolution.

Eugenics: possibilities in, 550; referred to, 546.

Examinations: dangers of, 881, 882, 884; regents system, 880. *See also* Measuring.

Excitement, desire for, 349, 733.

Existence, generic traits of, 118-168 (Chap. IV).

Experience: concept of, 77-117 (Chap. III); active-passive, 83; always reflects nature, 121; aesthetic, defined, 363; basis of philosophy, 1; both process and end, 78; cognition a derivative, 84, 95; conjunction and disjunction in, 81, 92; continuous with nature, 9; contrasting views of, 91-93; creates its own divisions, 79; denotative, 82; finality of, 77, 85, 117; furnishes its own goals and criteria, 80; implies meaning, 218; new basis of religion, 116; not self-sufficient, 94; not to be ignored, 114; practical defined,

363; reconstruction of, 760; the only educator, 918; *vs.* logic, 115; *vs.* rationalism, 112. *See also* Experimentalism.

Experiment, inherent in life, 155. *See also* Science; Control; Precariousness.

Experimentalism (as philosophic method): criticized by Rugg, 86; implies a metaphysics, 142; in social affairs, 570; on doctrinal conditioning, 515; supported by new physics, 125. *See also* Philosophy.

Expert: forgets humanity, 475; inadequate to social problems, 472, 475; limitations upon, 475; opposes novelty, 475. *See also* Education, science of; Science.

Exploitation: proper in aristocracy, 486; tyranny against, 669.

External control. *See* Control, external.

Extrinsic learning, origin of, 835.

Facing reality: helped by purposeful activity, 851. *See also* Reality, refusal to face.

Factory, influence on education, 809, 871. *See also* Business.

Facts: always relative, 52, 67, 701; as related to philosophy, 24, 68; in relation to laws, 127, 148; in relation to science, 52, 127; not sufficient, 68, 70, 73; relation to observer, 701; statistical in nature, 148; Yerkes on, 695. *See also* Hypotheses.

Failure, effects of, 739.

Faith: based only on experience, 117; function of, 378, 537; man's new faith in himself, 116; necessary to planning, 676; source of knowledge, 99, 100; victimizes, 6. *See also* Doubt.

Family: educative effect of, 502, 720; often an autocracy, 502, 720. *See also* Home.

Fascism, Italian: as defined by Mussolini, 34; blind faith in, 610; conception of society, 430, 466; doctrine of war, 430; education in, 34, 35, 607, 609, 610; oath of, 608; oath for university professors, 609; place of individual, 430, 466; salvation through brutality, 668; textbook, 610; *vs.* democracy, 430, 466.

Fate: not determinism, 405; trust in, 375.

Federal government (U. S.) and education: control, 619; support, 620.

Feelings, James on ignoring bad, 342.

Finalities, verbs and adverbs, not nouns, 242, 702. *See also* Absolutes.

Firmness, effect of convictions on, 911.

Five year plan in Soviet Russia, 658.

Fixed entities: danger of, 785; fixed mind, 698; fixed principles, 718; Greek gods, 699; refuge for stand-patters, 698. *See also* Absolutes; Dynamic logic.

Flux, all inclusive, 162.

Focus of attention, 249.

Folkways, not shocking, 273.

Fellowship. *See* Leadership.

Foreordination, all pre-ordained, 144. *See also* Fate; Predeterminism.

Foretelling: complete, impossible, 406, 655; in complete psychology, 57.

Formalism, evil effect of, on discipline, 929.

Frederick William IV: moved normal schools to country, 503; on education of masses, 503.

Freedom: defined, 361, 483, 922; discussed, 282; Fascist theory of, 466; given by culture, 281; impossible under laissez faire,

649; in democracy, 483, 495; in industry, 495; means, not end, 488; negated by want, 487; parents over children, 517; sought in state coercion, 431; through social sharing, 677. *See also* Freedom (in the educative process); Freedom (of choice); Imposition; Indoctrination.

Freedom (in the educative process): an achievement, 853; conflict over, 762, 853; democratic conception of, 501, 762, 854; found in opportunity to think, 854; mistaken notion of, 678, 853, 870. *See also* Discipline.

Freedom (of choice): basis of, 245, 404–406; Bradley on, 401; knowledge of consequences, 245, 922; possible through reflection, 406; real, 403; Spinoza on, 402. *See also* Choice; Fate; Foreordination; Predeterminism; Responsibility; Will.

Freedom of speech: desirable, 491, 493, 572, 575; evils of suppressing, 563, 572, 575; for my opponent, 493; how limited, 576; John Milton on, 574; Thomas Jefferson on, 573; Voltaire on, 571; why feared, 560, 562. *See also* Academic freedom; Censorship.

Frontier, American: social philosophy of, 635; American dream, 630.

Function *vs.* structure, 700.

Fundamentalism, referred to, 376.

Gandhi on sacrifice, 330.

Gestalt psychology: learning in, 818; personality as a whole, 912; whole and part, 231, 722.

Girls, education of, Napoleon on, 25 (*f.*).

Glandular action: in emotions, 237; in mental hygiene, 731, 732.

Golden Rule, not self-applying, 395.

"Good" children, good for elders, 436.

Good Life, the: discussed, 305–382 (Chap. VIII); an achievement, 323; art in, 87, 88, 347, 362–367, 654; based on control, 341; denial of this world, 317–319; eagerness a factor in, 351; Eastern *vs.* Western, 324, 535, 542; economic security, 337, 487, 497, 639, 733; heart-pride in work, 350; life the only wealth, 320; live in the moment, 327, 336, 338, 339; meanings in, 20, 47, 352, 353, 364; modern cynicism, 329; more passion needed, 328; must include effort, 343–347; nature of, 305; older views on, 308–316; place of the machine, 325, 337, 358, 511, 638, 641, 651, 652; religion in, 370, 371, 376, 377, 379; resignation, 334; sacrifice, 330–332; seeking pleasures, 308, 309, 338, 339; variety a factor, 353–357, 359, 365. *See also* Asceticism; Happiness; Hedonism; Religion; Self-denial; Stoicism.

Government: an evil, 292; class controlled, 429; must become coöperative, 659; police power theory, 292, 632; state coercion, 431; state sovereignty, 433; to the super-patriots, 598, 599, 602, 603; use of propaganda, 556; under existing conditions, 463–465, 653; worships the past, 603. *See also* State.

Grades (graded school): ills of old system, 873; in child-centered schools, 873; on factory model, 809, 871; origin of, 835, 871; "retarded rooms," 878. *See also* Promotion.

Group. *See* Association; Society.

Grouping of pupils, 873. *See also* Differences, individual; Grading; Promotion.

Growth: as educational aim, 772,

776-781, 866, 886, 891; brings happiness, 352; continuous with learning, 180, 181; in idealistic theory, 204; native tendencies toward, 359; purpose of institutions, 289, 295, 425.

Guidance, of pupils, 870.

Habit: belongs also to environment, 174; control over us, 223; formed by customs, 272; in moral education, 922; inadequate unit of psychology, 225, 922; only indirectly changeable, 227; prevails over ideas, 244; servants of meaning, 226, 922. *See also* Atomism; Learning; Skill.

Habituⁿation: before age of reasoning, 813.

Happiness: as object of desire, 408, 409, 419, 908; defined, 352; from social interests, 908; found only in successful effort, 343; God's will, 333; highest, like pain, 340; hurt by monotony, 358; money in relation to, 347; Socrates on, 314. *See also* Asceticism; Good Life; Hedonism; Self-denial.

Hawaiian education, business policy in, 771.

Healthy mindedness vs. unhealthy, 738. *See also* Mental hygiene.

Hedonism (ethical): advocated, 308, 309, 327, 336, 338, 339; opposed, 310-312, 314, 316-319, 330, 340. *See also* Absolutes; Morality.

Hedonism (psychologic): affirmed, 419; denied, 408, 409.

Heredity principle: in occupation, 498; in ownership, 496, 499.

Heredity: adult character not in germ cells, 194; blaming heredity, 746; chief factor, 548, 549; effect of environments on I.Q., 195; relative to environment, 192, 193; subordinate place of, 886. *See also* Ability, differences in; Differences, individual; Differences, racial; Eugenics; Intelligence Quotient; Nature, human.

Higher education. *See* Academic freedom; Administration of higher education; College entrance requirements; University.

"Higher" in terms of "lower." *See* Reduction.

Hindu maxim on point of view, 49.

History: in Catholic education, 936; school content, 582, 623; super-patriotic, 596, 597, 602, 603, 623, 812.

Home: democracy in, 502; moral influence of, 921, 937. *See also* Children; Family; Parents.

Homogeneous grouping. *See* Differences, individual.

Honesty: absolute nature of, 393; effect of home on, 921, 937; measure of, 921; not taught in Sunday school, 937. *See also* Moral education.

Humanity, the supreme society, 265.

Human nature. *See* Nature, human.

Huxley, T. H., quoted, 6.

Hypotheses: biased effects from, 701; function of, 52.

Ideal: continuous with the real, 160; possibilities, 161.

Idealism: condemned, 158; confusion of method, 120; on individual growth, 204.

Ideas: place in morals, 914; small place in life, 224. *See also* Meanings; Thinking.

Impartiality: desired, 23; how secured, 789; impossible, 23, 678, 763; undesirable in teacher, 789. *See also* Bias.

Imposition (in education): by the culture, 281; Counts on, 678 763; Judd on, 766; vice of, 837; when defensible, 813. *See also* Freedom; Indoctrination.

Impulses: in relation to thinking,

241; insistent (Thomas), 733; prior to thought, 240.

Index Expurgatorius, referred to, 562.

Individual (human): alone acts, 266; biological nature of, 169-195 (Chap. V); end of educational endeavor, 295, 853, 854, 866, 869, 870, 888, 889, 891, 900, 920, 923; psychological nature of, 196-262 (Chap. VI). *See also* Differences, individual; Individual (in relation to society); Personality, development of; Self.

Individual (in relation to society): discussed, 263-304 (Chap. VII); a point not a unit, 283; antagonistic to society, 277; group the basis, 577, 636; helpless before society, 271; importance of group purpose, 675; realized only in society, 636; subordinate to society, 263, 264, 271, 276, 430, 466, 675; unsociable, 275, 276. *See also* Fascism; Individualism; Individuality.

Individual differences. *See* Differences, individual.

Individualism: competitive, hurtful, 640, 649; cult of, 37; fostered by impersonal science, 75; frontier philosophy, 635; in America, 634, 652, 659, 677, 929; in business, 929; in progressive education, 678; moral element in, 677; need for new, 677; only recent, 659; product of ownership, 287. *See also* Laissez faire; Selfishness.

Individualists, product of warring homes, 502.

Individuality: defined, 18, 286; an achievement, 291; demands socialization, 284-286, 636, 677; how developed, 18, 284-287, 291, 295, 750; how unified, 750; method in relation to, 855; opposed by democracy, 485; requires dependable loyalties, 376, 377; requires institutions, 295; undeveloped in primitive life, 287. *See also* Integration of personality; Personality, development of.

Indoctrination: defined, 515; discussed, 679, 869; advocated, 510, 512, 678, 769, 813, 860; actually practiced, 509, 602, 603, 614, 626, 679, 767, 769; automatic inheritance of allegiance, 514; by Fascist Italy, 34-36; by Prussia (1889), 31; by Soviet Russia, 32, 33, 613, 615; by the culture, 281; by the state, 602, 614, 621, 762; Counts on, 281, 509, 511, 678, 763, 902; docility defined, 513; feared in America, 509, 678; imposition in education, 511, 678, 763, 813; in military training, 860; inevitable, 769; necessary to social stability, 510; of the masses, 37; owning children, 440, 441; opposed, 902; psychology of, 860. *See also* Imposition.

Indulgence: defined and discussed, 360, 418, 928; *vs.* strength of will, 928. *See also* Discipline; Moral education.

Industrialism: current, brings monotony, 358; educative effect, 797; effect on social life, 637; enhances life, 325, 337. *See also* Economic system; Machine; Technology.

Information, to be stored up, 836.

Inge, Dean, quoted, 518.

Initiative in pupils favored, 810. *See also* Personality, development of.

Inorganic *vs.* organic, 211. *See also* Life.

Insecurity: from race antagonisms, 448; in mental hygiene, 742. *See also* Security.

Insight, religious, into science, 935.

Instincts, content acquired, 221.

Institutions: affected by philosophy, 13; can do no wrong, 294; chief conflict regarding, 294, 296; edu-

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

cative effect of, 289, 295, 425, 929; international needed, 293; nature of, 288, 291; need for new, 19; subordinate to man, 288, 289, 291, 294, 295, 300; tests of, 289, 295, 425. *See also Customs; Culture; Social inheritance; Society.*

Instruction, as defined in Soviet, 613.

Instrumental, in art, 86, 367.

Integration: basis of growth, 708, 709; *vs. compromise*, 708.

Integration (of personality): conditions of, 735, 736, 750; divided self, 734; effect of candor, 747, 750; effect of culture on, 735; requires stable loyalties, 376, 377; through unity of thought and action, 750; to be achieved, 41; within and without, 735. *See also Insecurity; Self, divided.*

Intellectual, defined, 233.

Intelligence: defined, 229, 233; discussed, 702; an acquisition, 236; creative, 225; dependent on symbols, 235; dependent upon uniformities in nature, 130; functions publicly, 296, 750; in relation to impulse, 240, 241; not cultivated in schools, 764; should control habits, 223. *See also Abilities, varying; Creation; Meaning; Mind; Thinking.*

Intelligence, freeing of: democracy as, 516; failure of school in, 764; fostered by printing, 579; main business of society, 784; opposed by conservatism, 787, 788; science in social affairs, 570. *See also Control, internal.*

Intelligence quotient (I.Q.): environmental effects on, 195; many, not one, 875. *See also Abilities, varying.*

Intelligence tests: defined, 446; many I.Q.'s, 875; of races, 446, 695-697; psychiatric view of, 878. *See also Ability, varying; Homogeneous grouping; Intelligence quotient; Measuring.*

Inter-dependence, social: basis for thought and action, 670; discussed, 640. *See also Corporate civilization, new.*

Interest: as an objective, 849; basis of education, 801, 927; children's inadequate, 848; discipline from, 927; factor in the good life, 348-351; making things interesting, 831; not to be indulged, 360, 830; to be manipulated, 769; *vs. effort, solution of*, 716; when proper, 830. *See also Discipline; Moral education.*

Intuition, basis of morals, 387.

Irreconcilability, in sub-groups, 481.

Japanese: Buddhism, 375; heart-pride in work, 350; Samurai education, 814; stoic ideal, 312, 375, 909.

Jazz-age, discussed, 358.

Jefferson, Thomas: educational plan for Virginia, 28; on elementary education, 27; on freedom of speech, 573; on local control, 29; on revolution, 589.

Kaiser William II: order to schools (1889), 31.

Kant, Immanuel: on conscience, 410; on man as end, not means, 414.

Knowledge: derived from experience, 84; derived from faith, 99; derived from mysticism, 102; handed down, 835; prior to experience, 108, 109; validity of, 97. *See also Truth.*

Knowledge, organization of, in project teaching, 852.

Labor: divorced from interest, 648; irksome, 647.

Lag, cultural, discussed, 521, 522, 524. *See also Culture.*

Laissez faire: defined, 632; divinely arranged, 631; frontier philosophy, 635; now outworn, 634, 640, 641, 642; opposes state education, 594, 621; origin of, 694. *See also Economic system.*

Laplace, reign of law, 129.

Law (scientific): controls man, 150; does not govern, 141; evil effects of, 694; Laplace's conception of, 129; new conception of, 127, 128, 141, 147, 148, 694; of electron behavior, 147; older conception, 131; statistical in nature, 148. *See also Determinism; Fact; Predeterminism; Science.*

Laziness: natural, 824; not natural, 825.

Leadership: demands followership, 37, 468; democratic, 568; how effected, 567; in educational administration, 899; influence of, 567, 569; Jefferson on natural aristocracy, 467; relation to masses, 468, 469; trained in private schools, 629.

Learning: defined, 178, 179, 817-819; adult ability in, 802; an acquisition, 835; basis of responsibility, 407; behavior learned, 727, 746; continuous with growth (development), 180, 181; creative, 817, 818; effects of, 174; effect of novelty, 178, 179, 817; effect of repetition on, 821, 822; gives content to "instincts," 221; Hollingworth on, 819; how to study, 832; in *Gestalt* psychology, 818; many simultaneous, 823; not in specific neurones, 184, 203; specific in individual neurones, 201, 202; stentor's learning behavior, 177; to meet felt needs, 850; *vs.* heredity, 746.

Legislation, ameliorative, self-seeking in, 422.

Leisure, Veblen on leisure class, 733. Lenin on bourgeois education, 614.

Liberalism: allows injustice, 488; criticized, 466, 636; mistake of, 636.

Liberty. *See Freedom.*

Life: education as thoughtful living, 782; nature of, 169-171; organic *vs.* inorganic, 211; worth living, 306, 307. *See also Good life; Education and life.*

Lincoln, Abraham: on revolution, 589; *vs.* Washington, 390.

Literature: atomism in, 723; in character building, 923.

Logic: defined, 685; modern *vs.* ancient, 686-688; *vs.* experience, 115. *See also Dynamic logic.*

Love, must guide teaching, 756.

Loyalties: as educational objectives, 511; automatically inherited, 514; basis of philosophy, 10; in method of inquiry, 377; lacking in this age, 376; need for stable, 376; to eternal principles, 934. *See also Religion; Values.*

Lusk Committee, report of, 600.

Machine: asset for new civilization, 511, 638, 641, 652; better than poetry, 325, 337; brings monotony, 358; evil effects of, 358, 651. *See also Industrialism, current; Technology.*

Majority: relation to individual, 478; rule of, questioned, 711; tyranny of, 476, 477. *See also Minority; Democracy.*

Man: infinitely perfectible, 543; naturally lazy, 824; not inherently rational, 694; not mere muscle, 657; slave to his inventions, 643; the factor of heredity, 548. *See also End, man as; Individual.*

Manifesto of American educators, a national planning council, 670.

Mann, Horace: on corporal pun-

ishment, 931; on keeping religion out of school, 936.

Margin, of attention, 249.

Marks, school, assignment of, 879.

Martineau, James, intuitive morals, 387.

Marx, Karl, in Soviet Russia, 33.

Massachusetts, breaking up of schools, 905.

Masses: ability inadequate to democracy, 37, 468; comfort for, 656; education of, opposed, 30, 503, 508; must follow, 467-469; must think, 469, 470, 854; require special education, 37, 468; seldom think, 37; superior in moral judgment, 471, 474. *See also* Ability, varying; Aristocracy; Democracy.

Materialism: condemned, 158, 209, 210; defined, 158; in ethics, 705; in Soviet education, 33; in vocational education, 798; things in the saddle, 643, 646. *See also* Newtonian metaphysics; Predeterminism; Reduction; Science, Newtonian.

Mathematics: imperfect, 693; non-Euclidian geometry probable, 123; questions the axiomatic, 4.

Matter, omnipotent, 167.

Meaningless questions, discussed, 726.

Meanings: biological beginning of, 217; enrich life, 20, 353, 364; how related to affection, 89; implied in experience, 218; in educative process, 782, 917; means of "transfer," 252; relation to concepts, 219; wider than truth, 47. *See also* Consciousness; Mind; Thinking.

Means: correlative with ends, 689; education as mere, 761; when enjoyed, 367. *See also* Ends.

Measuring: accurate gauge of education, 809; all existences measurable, 58, 886; bad use of, 883-886; excessive use of, 884, 885; needs philosophy, 883, 885; not sufficient for education, 65, 883-886; not sufficient in social study, 64; of appreciation, 61; of characters, 915; place of tests, 58, 59, 878, 885; quality not measurable, 63, 886; some things non-measurable, 19, 886. *See also* Atomism; Intelligence tests; Marks, school; Science; Science and education; Technicians, educational.

Mechanic arts, Greek aversion to, 313.

Meditation, practice of, 315.

Memory (biologic), nature of development, 181.

Mental, defined, 233. *See also* Consciousness; Intelligence; Mind; Thinking.

Mental balance, relative, 727. *See also* Integration (of personality); Mental hygiene.

Mental hygiene: discussed, 727-755 (Chap. XVII); behavior learned, 728; bodily factors in, 731, 732; candor *vs.* self-deception, 747; conduct appropriate to, 753; crime, 748, 749; demands integrated parents, 751; demands on the school, 752; demands on the teacher, 755; demands purposeful school work, 752, 851; escape mechanisms, 740-745; failure, effect of, 739; failure to face reality, 737, 738, 740-746; integration and disintegration, 41, 708, 709, 734, 750, 829, 929; mood, 737, 738; teachers' attitudes, 754.

Metaphysics, pragmatic, 142. *See also* Newtonian metaphysics.

Method, to be determined by science, 59.

Method (in education): discussed, 848-855; a new outlook on, 849; effect of textbook, 454, 790, 835,

858; fixed by central authority, 516, 864; freedom, 762, 853; good learning conditions, 818, 832, 850; in relation to mental hygiene, 752, 851; order for its own sake, 865; respect for individuals, 513, 853, 854, 866, 869, 872; safeguards in, 855; test of a good project, 852. *See also* Discipline; Educative process; Learning; Military discipline; Moral education; Purposeful activity.

Military training: bayonet practice, 453; by Napoleon, 25 (*e*); civilian aims, 856; dispute over, 623; objectives, 451-453; psychology of, 857, 860; value of drill, 857, 859, 860; value of parades, 860; value of textbook, 858. *See also* Educative process; Method; Moral education; War.

Mind: an emergent, 230; collective mind, 266; consciousness *vs.*, 232; molding of, 756, 763, 769; not fixed, 698; natural units of, 201, 202; socially built, 263, 268, 756. *See also* Consciousness; Integration (of personality); Intelligence; Meaning; Thinking.

Minority: function of, 480; irreconcilable, 481; right to speak, 479.

Mis-education in schools, 602.

Molding, education as: advocated, 763, 769; referred to, 756.

Monotony: effects of, 358; from current industrialism, 358; necessary in school, 848.

Mood, in mental hygiene, 737, 738.

Moral education: discussed, 904-937 (Chap. XXI); character defined, 908-912, 923, 925, 928; authoritarian morals, 297, 397, 729, 906; bad boys in 1837, 905; crime and education, 748, 749, 907; from Sunday school, 937; habit and thinking in, 225, 708, 750, 922, 928; how character comes, 913-924; in 3800 B.C., 904; in Catholic schools, 628, 936; inadequacy of traits, 912, 922; influence of home, 921; place of religion in, 32, 370, 376, 377, 933-937; place of school in, 602, 752, 762, 764, 920, 923, 924; punishment, 919, 930-932; schedule for, 924. *See also* Discipline; Morality.

Morality: definitions of, 391, 908, 913, 917; based on fact not opinion, 398, 399; based on human nature, 399; based on survival of fittest, 389; danger from authoritarian, 397, 729, 906; defined by custom, 272, 274; demands new society, 640; master *vs.* slave, 388; of effort *vs.* interest, 829; of states, 433-435; of violence and war, 457, 458, 593, 669; psychology of, 913, 914, 916, 917. *See also* Moral education; Right and wrong, theory of.

Motion, not the only change, 207. *See also* Atomism; Reduction.

Motivation: as humbugging, 828; defined, 826; to facilitate drill, 827. *See also* Interest.

Motive, nature of, 409.

Mussolini, Benito: a supreme genius, 35, 610; obeyed without question, 608, 610; on education, 34; on Fascism, 34. *See also* Fascism, Italian.

Mysticism, as source of knowledge, 102.

Napoleon: catechism of, 26; on control of press, 25 (*d*); on education, 25.

Nationalism: antagonism of, good, 447; evil effects of, 428, 640; our country, right or wrong, 427. *See also* Anarchy, international.

Nature: always in process, 136; basis of morality, 386, 392, 399; continuous with experience, 9; nature of, 121; place of change

in, 706. *See also* Nature, human; Universe.

Nature, human: legal interpretation of, 749; not always individualistic, 659; possibility of change, 546; war inherent in, 544. *See also* Differences, individual; Individual (human).

Needs, defined, 169, 176. *See also* Preferences; Values.

Neurones: in relation to "transfer," 250; inadequate unit, 922; not specific in learning, 184, 187, 203, 250; the unit element of mind, 201, 202. *See also* Atomism; Reflex, conditioned.

Newman, Cardinal, on sin, 385.

Newspaper. *See* Press.

Newtonian metaphysics: change apparent only, 706; its effects, 119, 131, 694. *See also* Law; Science, Newtonian.

Newtonian physics. *See* Science, Newtonian.

Nietzsche, Friedrich: education of the few, 508; master *vs.* slave morality, 388; on an élite, 486; quoted, 6.

Nordic theory: not supported, 445, 697; supported, 696. *See also* Differences, racial; Heredity.

Nouns: dangers from, 242, 702; less final than verbs, 242, 702.

Novelty: emergence of, 135, 146; cannot be ignored, 138, 152; behavior of electrons, 147. *See also* Behavior; Determinism; Law (scientific); Precariousness; Thinking; Unpredictability.

Obedience: chief virtue of pupils, 504; instant obedience, 861; needed by civilians, 856; taught by drill, 856, 859-861; virtue of soldiers, 859-861. *See also* Discipline; Moral education.

Objectives, educational: discussed, 756-791; as life itself, 674, 680, 683, 757, 776-778, 781-783, 791-795, 801, 803, 817, 818, 823, 838, 844, 850, 920; curiosity as, 838; external to pupils, 436-441, 770; from contemporary life, 843; from mental hygiene, 730, 734-736, 739, 740, 747, 750, 752, 753, 755; in aristocratic society, 811; in elementary education, 773; in secondary education, 774; initiative as, 810; interests, not knowledge, 838, 849; new loyalties as, 511; not got by statistics, 70, 71, 839; untrammeled thinking, 588. *See also* Atomism; Citizenship; Critical-mindedness; Education and life; Life; Preparation, education as; Social reconstruction; Status quo; Subject matter; Transmission; Vocational education.

Objectivity. *See* Subjective and objective.

Obstinacy *vs.* strength of will, 928.

Occupation, hereditary choice of, 498; planned distribution of, 684, 799.

Operational character of meanings: discussed, 47, 97, 725; meaningless questions, 726. *See also* Knowledge; Truth.

Opinion: non-rational, 714, 715; state control of, 25, 33, 34. *See also* Freedom of speech; Public opinion.

Order: called for by disorder, 145; for its own sake, 865; to hear a fly walk, 865.

Oregon school law (1922), 517.

Organism: choice in lower, 244; follows purpose, 228; higher *vs.* lower, 212, 341; organic *vs.* inorganic, 211; responds as a whole, 182-184, 186, 187, 228, 251, 256. *See also* Life.

Organism and environment, unity of, discussed, 173, 174.

"Origin of Species," Darwin, logical significance of, 688.

Others, regard for. *See* Regard for others.

Otherworldliness, 319.

Ought, natural origin of, 413.

Parallelism, psychophysical: referred to, 196; stated, 208. *See also* Body-mind; Dualism.

Parents: bad effects of disintegrated, 751; dominance over children, 729; "good children," 436; responsibility of, 594; rights over children, 440, 441, 517; 3800 B.C. disrespect of, 904.

Parochial school. *See* Private schools.

Particulars: why scorned, 132. *See also* Facts; Law (scientific); Whole and part.

Passion: in relation to thinking, 241, 248; in the good life, 328. *See also* Emotion; Impulse; Preference.

Pater, Walter, quoted, 363.

Patriotic education: American super-patriotic, 38, 586, 596-601, 623, 762, 812; as doctrinal conditioning, 515, 602, 603; citizenship, 600; Fascist, 34-36; history teaching, 596, 597, 602, 603, 623, 812.

Patriotism: inadequate conception of, 640; inflated, 601, 812.

Person: defined, 255, 256. *See also* Individuality; Integration (of personality); Personality, development of; Self.

Personality, development of: as a whole, 912; by democracy, 494, 500; defined, 300; economically conditioned, 337, 487, 497; how effected, 708, 709; hurt by compromise, 708; in education, 853, 854, 866, 869, 870, 888, 889, 891; independent judging in, 624; infinitely possible, 543; limited in slavery, 416; not to be limited, 417; socially conditioned, 258, 259, 300, 425, 487, 494, 497; test of institutions, 289, 295, 425; thwarted by bad education, 513, 889. *See also* Freedom; Growth; Individuality; Personality, respect for; Regard for others; Self.

Personality, respect for: absent in industry, 442-444; eugenic sterilization, 449; in education, 513, 796, 853, 866, 869, 872; in race differences, 447, 448. *See also* Democracy; Regard for others; Personality, development of.

Philistines, M. Arnold on, 335.

Philosophy: defined, 1, 5, 9-11, 14-17; as criticism of abstractions, 45; as criticism of values, 8, 14, 15, 18; as view of the universe, 10; concerned with meaning, not truth, 47; effect on institutions, 13; function of, 12, 13, 45; general theory of education, 19; in relation to authority, 3; in relation to civilization, 17, 45; in relation to common sense, 5; in relation to facts, 24; in relation to life, page v, 10, 11; in relation to reason, 3; not alien to ordinary experience, 1; supplanted by behaviorism, etc., 62, 75; system of values, 10, 14, 15, 52; the totality of loyalties, 10; theory of criticism, 9, 11, 14, 15, 45. *See also* Education, philosophy of; Experimentalism; Philosophy and education; Science and philosophy.

Philosophy and education: discussed, 1-41 (Chap. I); education a practical philosophy, 74, 75; philosophy as theory of education, 20; science and philosophy in education, 42-76 (Chap. II). *See also* Education, philosophy of; Philosophy.

Philosophy of education. *See* Education, philosophy of.

Physics: deals with ultimate reality, 205, 206; new conceptions of, 72, 75; new, opposes final truth, 125; questions the self-evident, 4. *See also* Causation; Law; Newtonian metaphysics; Physics, Newtonian.

Planning, national council for: advocated by educators, 670; how composed, 670, 673. *See also* Planning, social.

Planning, social: absent in America, 658; a planning council, 670; based on economics, 640; faith necessary to, 676; for cultural development, 640; for good of all, 656; hitherto opposed, 570; how to begin, 671; in Soviet Russia, 657, 658; now needed, 639–646; objectives of, 672; occupational distribution in, 684; opposed by privileged, 656; possible, 655; to increase production, 660, 661. *See also* Education for social reconstruction; Social planning and education.

Plato: referred to, 7; quoted, page v.

Play, religious antagonism to, 318. *See also* Sports.

Pleasures. *See* Desires; Good Life; Happiness; Hedonism.

Plutocracy, taught as democracy, 650.

Poetry: significance of, 362; inferior to spinning wheel, 325.

Point of view, determines the view, 49.

Politics: corrupted by business, 653; in education always, 613.

Pope Pius XI: on birth control, 386; on eugenic sterilization, 449. *See also* Catholic (Roman) Church.

Poverty: eradicable, 536; social utility of, 444.

Pragmatism. *See* Experimentalism.

Precariousness: in affairs, 152, 153, 157; makes life experimental, 155; necessary to happiness, 345; risk inevitable, 157. *See also* Novelty; Unpredictability.

Predeterminism: condemned, 158; Laplace's, 129. *See also* Determinism; Fate; Foreordination.

Preference: basic in life, 154, 261; basis of value, 262; defined, 176; in choices, 246; stirred by foreseen results, 247. *See also* Desire; End.

Prejudice, avoided in science, 935. *See also* Race prejudice.

Preparation, education as: discussed, 765, 767, 769–771, 775–777, 843; college entrance, 774; favored, 843; opposed, 844; fixed-in-advance aims, 770. *See also* Objectives, educational; Transmission, education as.

Press: evil influence of, 564; in wartime, 556, 557; supplies news, not truth, 565; what news is, 566. *See also* Printing, invention of.

Pre-suppositions. *See* Assumptions.

Principal: in relation to teachers, 890; function of, 890. *See also* Administration of school systems; Supervision.

Principles: danger from, 394; education based on eternal, 934; nature and value of, 395, 396, 717; not fixed, 68, 718; limitations upon, 719, 720; transmit experience, 717. *See also* Concept; Law; Rules; Thinking.

Printing, invention of, fostered democracy, 579.

Private schools: anti-democratic, 518, 627; aristocratic, 627; experimental, 519; foster class distinctions, 518, 519, 627, 629; lessen interest in public education, 519; reactionary, 519; relieve public of expense, 517 (c); Roman Catholic view, 628, 936; snobbish advertising, 629; superior to public, 517 (d), 629. *See also* Democracy; Public education.

Privilege: controls public education, 902; hurts industry, 642; maintained by ameliorative legislation, 422; opposes planning, 656; opposes study of society, 570; protected by democracy, 488; provokes revolutions, 592, 664, 665; yields only to force, 591. *See also* Aristocracy; Class distinctions; Democracy.

Problem solving (in education), 813.

Process, defined, 520.

Production: balanced, 640; greater, possible, 660, 661.

Profession of education. *See* Education, profession of.

Progress: discussed, 520-593 (Chap. XIII); a blinding obsession, 524; as increase of meaning, 538; beyond man's efforts, 527; civilization self-destructive, 547; contingent, not necessary, 535; definition of terms, 520, 538; goal of, 534, 538; gradual, 582; helped by antagonisms, 447; historic loss, 528; in morality, 533; in stone age, 532; inevitable, 523; nothing new, 525, 526; possibilities of, 536; through scientific study, 570. *See also* Change; Education for social reconstruction; Eugenics; Freedom of speech; Human nature; Leadership; Public opinion.

Progressive education: Count's criticism of, 678; measurement in, 886; must become social, 678. *See also* Purposeful activity.

Project, test of a good, 852.

Projection, defined, 744. *See also* Escape mechanisms.

Promotion (in school): new basis of, 873; old basis of, 835, 873. *See also* Grading.

Propaganda: dangers in, 555; discussed, 679; education *vs.*, 558, 679; forbidden to schools, 600, in adult education, 681; makes public opinion, 552; of public utilities in schools, 604-606; patriotic lying, 556, 597; skepticism against, 559; "the fall of Antwerp," 557. *See also* Indoctrination.

Property, sacred character of, 633.

Prussia: Frederick William IV to the schoolmasters, 503; William II on the schools, 31.

Psychiatry, criticism of school, 730.

Psychology: American *vs.* German, 701; aping physics, 72; atomism in, 72, 75, 201, 202, 723, 724, 815; conditioned reflex *vs.* purpose in, 815; influence by *Zeitgeist*, 51, 701; never complete, 406; no longer bound to physics, 200; of habit inadequate, 225, 922; place of thinking, 922; when complete, 57, 198. *See also* Behaviorism; Consciousness; *Gestalt* psychology; Habit; Parallelism, psychophysical; Reflex, conditioned; Thinking.

Psychophysical parallelism. *See* Parallelism, psychophysical.

Public, defined, 426.

Public education: critical-mindedness in, 679; excludes religion, 936; helped by private schools, 517 (c); necessarily inferior, 517 (d); nothing else proper, 517 (a); should experiment, 519; struggle to control, 623. *See also* Administration of school system; Private schools; State and education; State control of education; State support of education.

Public opinion: acts through stereotypes, 551; censorship, 560-563; crushes individuality, 485; effect of criticism, 553; ever developing, 554; how made, 552. *See also* Propaganda.

Public utilities, school propaganda, 604-606.

Publicity, discussed, 296. *See also* Communication.

Punishment: corporal, in Boston 1844, 931; ill effect of, 919, 930–932; vindictive, 450, 932. *See also* Discipline; Moral education.

Pupils: end of educative endeavor, 897, 900; no misfit, 872; no voice in decisions, 867; teacher's attitude toward (Wickman), 868; treated as persons, 851, 853–855, 866. *See also* Children; School.

Puritanism: on bear-baiting, 317; on play, 318.

Purpose: discussed, 815. *See also* Purposeful activity; Purposive action.

Purposeful activity: aims in, 838, 844, 849, 855; care of deficiencies, 845, 855; curriculum making in, 844, 845, 846, 855; development of subject matter, 846; directs thinking, 854, 869; early education, 773; fears homogeneous grouping, 876; freedom in, 853, 854; grading in, 873; *Gestalt* learning, 818; management of, 855; many simultaneous learnings, 823; measurement in, 886; necessary to mental hygiene, 752, 851; organization of knowledge, 852; place of teacher, 853, 869, 870; respect for individuality in, 853, 866, 869; source of purpose in, 853, 870; supervision in, 891; teacher suggestions in, 853, 870; test of a good project, 852. *See also* Growth; Progressive education.

Purposive action: inherent in life, 228, 816; remakes its stimulus, 234. *See also* Behavior; Equilibration.

Questioning: as educational objective, 838; how managed, 8; meaningless questions, 726.

Race. *See* Differences, racial; Race prejudice.

Race achievement. *See* Social inheritance.

Race prejudice: effect of, 448; effect of press on, 564; good, 447; growing antagonisms, 302.

Radical empiricism. *See* Empiricism, radical.

Radicalism, seeks publicity, 286.

Rationalism *vs.* experience, 112–115.

Rationalization, defined, 743. *See also* Escape mechanisms.

Reality: continuity of ideal and real, 160; defined pragmatically, 139; solely in electrons and protons, 205, 206. *See also* Reification; Verbs.

Reality, failure to face: mood, 737; unhealthy-mindedness, 737, 778. *See also* Escape mechanisms.

Reason: no mere spectator, 694; relation to philosophy, 3; rule of, 113. *See also* Dynamic logic; Logic.

Recognition, desire for: discussed, 733; effect of candor, 747.

Reconstruction of experience, education as, 760.

Reconstruction, social. *See* Social reconstruction.

Reduction ("higher" in terms of "lower"): a fallacy, 140, 199, 207, 228, 722; motion not the only change, 207; of ethics to muscle fabric, 705; of human personality to physico-chemical data, 196, 205, 206; of mind to S-R, etc., 197, 225. *See also* Atomism; Emergent evolution; Whole and part.

Reflection, needed, 2. *See also* Deliberation; Thinking.

Reflex arc *vs.* conscious action, 214. *See also* Atomism; Psychology; Reflex, conditioned.

Reflex, conditioned: favors external control, 815; not adequate, 203;

vs. purpose in psychology, 815. *See also* Atomism; Psychology.

Regard for others: discussed, 414-458 (Chap. X); ends externally fixed, 436-444; making others happy, 418. *See also* End, man as; Hedonism (psychologic); Personality, development of; Personality, respect for; Selfishness.

Regression, defined, 745. *See also* Escape mechanisms.

Regulation. *See* Equilibration.

Reification: fallacy of, 260; verbs, not nouns, real, 242. *See also* Reality.

Relativity: numerous books on, 531; of good and evil, 149, 150. *See also* Disorder; Order.

Religion: defined, 368-374, 934; an essential organ of life, 370; Buddhist confession of faith, 382; calls for all-directing purpose, 151; certitude in, 379; education bound up with, 934; in Catholic education, 936; incarnate in science, 935; leaving us, 166; nationality as, 375; of John Adams, 368; opposed in Soviet education, 32; revolution in, 116; science and, 376, 377, 379, 935; stable objects of allegiance, 376, 377, 934; no supernatural creator, 380. *See also* Religious education.

Religious education: contribution to citizenship, 626; education bound up with religion, 934; in Catholic schools, 628, 936; shut out of public school, 936. *See also* Religion; Moral education; Sunday school.

Repetition: insufficient for learning, 821; most effective device, 827; sufficient for learning, 822. *See also* Drill.

Representative stimuli, reaction to, 217. *See also* Meanings.

Repression in education: ill effects of, 919; Mr. Dooley's curriculum, 840. Resignation, called for, 167.

Respect for personality. *See* Personality, respect for.

Response, desire for, 733.

Responsibility: implies learning, 407; not admitted, 389; real, 403-407. *See also* Freedom (of choice).

Revolution: advocated now, 591, 662, 663, 669; agency of progress, 589, 591, 593; American, prior to 1776, 667; defined, 521; ethical use of violence, 593, 669; how generated, 592, 664, 665; Jefferson and Lincoln on, 589; need not be violent, 666; no one cause of, 590; revolutionists as stand-patters, 665. *See also* Industrial revolution; Violence.

Right and wrong, theory of: discussed, 383-413 (Chap. IX); absolute, 109, 383, 393, 729, 933, 934; based on future life, 933; based on nature, 386; based on consequences, 398, 399; based on moral universe, 934; decided by God's will, 384, 387; intuitive knowledge of, 387; master *vs.* slave morality, 388; physiological basis of, 392; prior to experience, 109; relative, 149, 150, 398, 399; survival of fittest theory, 389. *See also* Morality.

Risk, inevitable, 157. *See also* Control; Experiment; Precariousness.

Rules: inadequate in morals, 390; not given by science, 40, 69. *See also* Golden Rule.

Rural school, to hold children in country, 438, 439.

Russia (before 1917): education in 1824, 30; humility supreme virtue (1819), 504. *See also* Soviet Russia.

Sacrifice: in Fascist state, 430; necessary to great effort, 676. *See also* Self-sacrifice.

Samurai: asceticism of, 909; method in education, 814. *See also* Japanese.

Satisfaction, defined, 169.

School: Dewey's criticism of, 764; factory model of, 809, 871; formerly hurtful, 804; freedom in, 501, 678, 762, 853, 854, 870; graded, origin of, 835; in relation to industry, 771, 796-799; in social reconstruction, 511, 611, 674, 682; indoctrination in, 509, 602, 603, 614, 626, 678, 679, 763, 767, 769; mental hygiene demands, 752, 755, 851; mis-education in, 602, 762, 764; moral education in, 920, 923, 924; not sufficient for life, 580, 682, 764, 790; possibilities of, page v, 764; propaganda in, 604-606, 679; to be one with life, 577, 757, 792, 794, 795; to the psychiatrist, 730; undemocratic, 516; unreality of, 790. *See also* Educative process; Pupils; Teachers.

School superintendent: function of, 864, 871; leader of teachers, 899; narrow preparation of, 896; teacher election of, 902; too powerful, 516. *See also* Administration of school system; Supervision.

Science: admits measurable only, 66; affected by *Zeitgeist*, 51; as method, 42, 640; common-sense *vs.*, 43; concerned with truth, 47; defined, 42, 43; description, not explanation, 46; in relation to facts, 52, 53; in relation to theory, 40; in social affairs, 570, 640; needs philosophy, 45, 55, 68; not concerned with values, 53, 54; not infallible, 44; not true *a priori*, 44, 46; rapidly changing, 4; religion of, 935; requires abstraction, 40; to enrich life, 47, 54; tyranny of, 48. *See also* Science and philosophy; Science and education.

Science and education: "natural science" not sufficient for education, 60, 65, 67, 69-73, 75, 839; science to guide education, 56, 59, 62. *See also* Atomism; Education, science of; Measuring; Statistics.

Science and philosophy: how related, 55, 68, 75; in education, 42-76 (Chap. II). *See also* Education, philosophy of; Philosophy.

Science, Newtonian: inadequate basis for social science, 72, 75; no longer adequate, 72, 75, 122, 135; no longer dominates psychology, 200; theory of change, 706. *See also* Atomism; Newtonian metaphysics.

Science, social, 570.

Scopes trial, referred to, 623.

Search, for truth, 355.

Secondary education: bad teaching in, 805; inequalities in, 505, 506; preparation for college, 774; wasted in many, 507.

Secondary qualities, 136.

Security: desire for, 733; economic necessary to freedom, 337, 487, 497; in 1933, 639.

Self: empirical self, 254; how built, 257-259, 268-270, 272, 709; ideal social, 400; in continuous formation, 257, 259, 708; nature of, 253; prior to its activities, 231; self-improvement, 406; simultaneous with *socius*, 259; socially built, 268-270, 272. *See also* Individual; Person.

Self-deception, evils of, 747. *See also* Reality, refusal to face.

Self-denial, 315-317, 332.

Self, divided: effect of formalism, 929; how brought about, 734, 829, 929. *See also* Integration (of personality).

Self-interest: basis of action, 647; predatory, opposed, 669. *See*

also Hedonism (psychologic); Selfishness.

Self-love, social in effect, 631. *See also* Selfishness.

Self-respect, through candor, 747.

Self-sacrifice: Gandhi on, 330; idiomatic, 331; Jesus on, 332. *See also* Sacrifice.

Selfishness: advocated, 339, 419; an acquisition, 287; danger of, 420; discussed, 421; inherent, 419; product, not cause of ownership, 287. *See also* Hedonism (psychologic); Self-interest; Self-love.

Sex: desire for response, 733; in education, 755, 788; teacher and child attitudes, 754; teacher's attitude, 755; thwarted urge, 737.

Sharing: freedom through, 677; necessary in social problems, 472; of interests, 304. *See also* Discussion; Democracy.

Simultaneous learnings, inevitable, 823.

Sin: Cardinal Newman on, 385; of birth control, 386.

Situation, defined, 174. *See also* Behavior; Equilibration; Life.

Skepticism: against propaganda, 559; function of, 789. *See also* Critical-mindedness; Doubt.

Skill, obeys meaning, 226.

Slavery, evil of, 416.

Social conflict. *See* Conflict, social.

Social inheritance: discussed, 268-270, 272; in relation to education, 758, 759, 791. *See also* Culture; Custom; Institutions; Tradition.

Social planning and education: discussed, 630-684 (Chap. XV); American educators on, 670; new professional outlook, 680; place of education, 580, 581, 600, 611, 674, 678, 680-683; planning and education simultaneous, 674. *See also* Adult education; Education for social reconstruction; Planning, social.

Social reconstruction: current situation, 511, 640; occupational distribution, 684, 799; scientific study in, 570; simultaneous with education, 674. *See also* Education for social reconstruction; Planning, social.

Social science. *See* Science, social.

Social setting in education: discussed, 674, 680-683, 757, 777, 782-784, 791-795, 801, 803; gives moral possibilities, 923. *See also* Education and life.

Social will, how created, 491.

Socialism: criticized, 466; in Soviet Russia, 657.

Socialization: defined, 286, 298; as imposition, 766; builds individuality, 285-287, 300, 636; in education, 766; international, 302; may be good or bad, 299; measure of, 304. *See also* Solidarity, social.

Socially useful work in Soviet Russia, 616.

Sociology, quantitative method disputed, 64, 70.

Society: antagonistic to its members, 277; classless, advocated, 656; depends on communication, 267; education, main business of, 784; group purpose, 675; influence over morality, 272, 274, 920; nature of, 264-266, 299; now corporate, 640; social and individual life, 263-304 (Chap. VII); social ties internal, 280. *See also* Culture; Civilization; Education and life; Fascism; Individual (in relation to society); Institutions.

Socius, simultaneous with self, 259.

Socrates, on happiness, 314.

Solidarity, social, discussed, 301.

Solution (of a problem): by shift

of assumption, 716; integration *vs.* compromise, 708.

Soviet Russia: emphasis on labor education, 32; five year plan, 658; function of schools, 32, 33, 611, 612, 615; indoctrination in, 32, 33; opposed to religion, 32; planning in, 657, 658; salvation through brutality, 668; socialistic competition in, 683; socially useful work, 616; state aim of education, 613.

Spelling, deficiencies cared for, 855.

Spencer, Herbert: exponent of laissez faire, 632; opposed state education, 594.

Sports, sign of unsatisfactory life, 349.

Stability, of character, 729.

Stage, censorship unavailing, 561.

Standards: danger of absolute, 729; found in shared experience, 80; heart-pride in, 350. *See also* Concept.

State (nation): beyond moral obligation, 434; Fascist, 430; function of coercion by, 431; morally bound, 435; not ethically final, 433. *See also* Anarchy, international; Government; Nationalism.

State and education: discussed, 594-629 (Chap. XIV); denial of state support, 594; federal support and control, 619, 620; in Fascist state, 34, 35, 607-610; in Soviet Russia, 32, 33, 611-616; Lenin on bourgeois education, 614; propaganda forbidden, 600; restriction on teachers, 600; why universal education, 595. *See also* Education, national system of; Public education; State control of education; State support of education.

State control of education: federal, 619; inevitable, 613; Lenin on bourgeois, 614; opposed by laissez faire, 594, 621, 632; over doc-

trines taught, 622, 625; political ends, 613, 767. *See also* State and education.

State support of education: at whatever cost, 617; burdensome to Catholics, 628; federal, 620; opposed by laissez faire, 594, 632; wide *vs.* narrow areas of, 618.

Static outlook: in compromise, 708; in educative process, 835. *See also* Finalities; Fixed entities.

Statistics in education: dangers from, 883; do not give rules, 40; do not yield values, 70. *See also* Atomism; Education, science of; Measuring.

Status quo: maintained by charity, etc., 422, 424; upheld by schools, 626, 679, 765-768. *See also* Conservatism.

Stentor, learning behavior of, 177.

Stereotypes, in thought and action, 551, 721.

Sterilization, eugenic, Pius XI on, 449.

Stoicism: advocated, 310, 311; a Japanese ideal, 312, 375, 814.

Structure: modified in learning, 178-179; *vs.* function, 700.

Study: defined, 833, 835; learning to, 832; requires a goal, 832. *See also* Educative process; Learning.

Subjective and objective, defined, 216.

Subject matter: care of deficiencies in, 845, 855; defined, 834; orderly development of, 846; organization of, 852; storing up of, approved, 836; to be determined by science, 59, 60; wrong objective, 838, 873. *See also* Curriculum making; Educative process; Objectives, educational.

Subjects (school): departmental teaching of, 809, 871; disciplinary value of, 847; inadequate for schools, 795, 842, 887; like sawdust glued together, 842; re-

arranged, inadequate, 844; supervision by, 877; unsuited for adults, 801. *See also Curriculum making; Educative process; Subject matter.*

Success: acquiring habit of, 747; evils of failure, 739; necessary to happiness, 343; not material, 581; worldly success in schools, 767.

Sunday school, influence of, 937.

Superintendent, school. *See School superintendent.*

Supervision (in education): by subjects, 887; democratic, 516, 888, 889; evils of close, 887; from the top down, 516, 864, 868, 887; handicaps, 887; teacher attitude, 868; to develop child, 891; to develop teachers, 888, 889. *See also Administration of schools.*

Support of education. *See Education, support of; State support of education.*

Survival of fittest, as basis of morality, 389.

Symbols, significance of, 235.

Teachers: as state servants, 622, 625; attitude to pupil's behavior, 754, 868; attitude toward supervisors, 868; authority of, 867, 898, 901, 903; conservatism demanded, 600; control over education, 898, 901; courage needed, 764; function of, 853, 866, 869, 870, 890, 895, 898, 901; mental hygiene demands on, 755; partisan selection of, 25, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38; responsibility of, 516, 864, 866, 887-890, 895, 898, 899, 901; restrictions upon, 516, 600, 622, 625; subordinate to authority, 516, 864; suggestions from, 853, 870; to elect superintendent, 901; treated as persons, 866. *See also Administration of school system; School; Supervision.*

Teaching: how serves, 869, 891; of morals, 919, 920, 923, 924; teacher initiative, 853, 870. *See also Curriculum making; Educative process.*

Technicians, educational: criticized, 60, 65, 70-74; sufficient, 56, 59. *See also Measuring.*

Technique. *See Habit; Skill.*

Technology: in 1933, 639; influence of, 511, 637; reduces human labor, 638. *See also Industrialism; Industrial revolution.*

Tests. *See Measuring.*

Textbooks: authoritative depositories, 835, 858; Fascist, 35, 610; partisan, 35, 454; pupil's interest in, 790; selection of, 516; teaching hate through, 454; training value of, 858.

Theory, inherent in education, 39. *See also Theory and practice.*

Theory and practice, how related, 39-41.

Thinking: defined, 233; disturbing to society, 786-788; essence of will, 248, 928; essential element in education, 922; implied in experience, 218; in relation to impulse, 240, 241; in the stone age, 523; integration *vs.* compromise, 708; modern growth of, 530, 531, 534; needed only by the few, 473; no over-intellectuality, 928; response to the doubtful, 233; tested by situations, 794, 795; *vs.* habit, 225, 922. *See also Consciousness; Deliberation; Meaning; Mind; Thought and action.*

Thought and action: dualism in, 694; effect of stereotypes on, 551, 721; place of meanings, 223, 225; unity of, brings integration, 750. *See also Consequences; Deliberation; Intelligence; Meanings; Thinking.*

Time, sweeps all along, 134.

Tradition: directs life, 103; upheld by "scientific" education, 70, 71, 75. *See also* Culture; Customs; Social inheritance.

Training, relentless regularity, 437.

Traits: inadequate for morality, 922; measurement of, 915; not prior to character, 912, 922.

Transfer of training: as application of meanings, 252; from organism-as-a-whole, 251; not limited by specific neurones, 250; not through "identical elements," 251. *See also* Thinking.

Transmission, education as: discussed, 758, 835; by habituation, 765, 813; defined, 758; with Pueblos, 765. *See also* Conformity; Indoctrination.

Trends, recent social, discussed, 19.

Trustees, duties of, 892-894. *See also* Administration of higher education.

Truth: defined, 47; narrower than meaning, 47; social character of, 96. *See also* Knowledge.

Twain, Mark: education and soap, 578; view of life, 329.

Tyranny, against exploitation, 669.

Uniformities in nature, basis of intelligence, 130. *See also* Law (scientific).

Unity, world unity rejected, 124, 141. *See also* Organism and environment, unity of.

Universals, hypothetical nature of, 133. *See also* Facts; Particulars.

Universe: amenable to effort, 166; basis of morality, 934; closed, 131, 163; defines philosophy, 11; finite, dull, 357; ignores human wishes, 150, 157, 381; in ordinary religion, 151; man's place in, 150; purposive, 151; still in the making, 141-143, 164; supports human ideals, 165. *See also* Predeterminism; World, conception of.

University: Cattell's plan for, 895; duties of trustees, 892-894; Fascist oath for, 609; test of a free people, 583; utilities' propaganda in, 606. *See also* Academic freedom; Administration of higher education.

Unpredictability in nature: discussed, 146; in electron behavior, 147. *See also* Determinism; Novelty.

Unpredictability (of experience): asserted, 725; discussed, 406; of America now, 655. *See also* Foretelling; Precariousness.

Unquestioned, the, popularly self-evident, 4.

Values: basis of, 262; criterion of, 8, 14, 15, 19; in art, 364, 365; in deliberation, 247; involved in conduct, 261; involved in education, 23; need re-formulation, 19; not got by statistics, 70; philosophy as system of, 10, 14, 53. *See also* Loyalties.

Variety, enjoyment of, 354, 356, 357, 359, 365. *See also* Monotony.

Veblen, Thorstein, theory of the leisure class, 733.

Verbs: more real than nouns, 242; with adverbs, only finalities, 702.

Violence: advocated, 662, 663; how provoked, 592, 664, 665; in social reconstruction, 499, 662, 669; salvation through brutality, 668; when justified, 457, 593, 669. *See also* Revolution; War.

Vocational education: in a better society, 795, 797; pupils as ends, 798; pupils as means, 796.

Voltaire on freedom of speech, 571.

Wants. *See* Needs; Preferences; Values.

War: churches on, 458; eradicable,

536, 545; eternal law of mankind, 430; Fascist doctrine of, 430; glorification of, 456, 601; ineradicable, 544; may be ethical, 457, 593, 669; military virtues, 451-453; no instincts for, 545; supported by super-patriotism, 601-603; teaching hate, 453, 454; teaching in time of, 622; unreason of, 455. *See also* Violence.

Washington, George, defied constituted authorities, 390.

Weiss, A. P., referred to, 207.

Whitehead, A. N., referred to, 72.

Whole. *See* Organism; Whole person.

Whole and part: atomism in literature, 723; in behavior, 816; in personality, 912, 915, 923; more than sum of its parts, 187, 231, 722; not more than sum of its parts, 185; parts not prior to whole, 75, 98, 231, 722; parts prior to whole, 98; seeing a picture, 724; wholes evolve as wholes, 722. *See also* Atomism.

Whole person, Tagore on, 417. *See also* Personality, respect for. Wickman's study of teachers' attitudes, referred to, 754.

Will: defined, 242, 243; strength of, vs. obstinacy vs. flabbiness, 928.

World, conception of: controls all thinking, 118; fixed and closed, 131. *See also* Universe.

Yerkes, Robert M., on Brigham's findings, 695.

Youth *vs.* age, 780.

Zeitgeist, influences science, 51.

